INTELLIGENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100620001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 20, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence in Central America
To enable you to evaluate the significance of our current intelligence
on what is happening in Central America, I would like to provide a little
historical background as well as a brief review of how our intelligence
picture has evolved.
The Sandinistas have attempted to portray the United States as hostile
to their revolution from the moment they ousted Somoza in July 1979. This
is false. We immediately recognized the new regime and took steps to help
it rebuild the country. During the first year of the Sandinista regime, we
provided or supported in the World Bank $400 million of aid and soft credits
to the Sandinista regime.
Despite this, from the very beginning the Sandinistas began to build a
totalitarian state with close ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Within a
week after the Sandinistas' takeover, Cuba had some 100 military and security
personnel in Nicaragua. Three months later, by October 1979, this figure had
increased to 200. Today, Nicaragua "hosts" 7,000-10,000 Cubans, including
2,500-3,500 military and security advisers, and many high-level Sandinistas
have counterpart Cuban advisers. Cubans have trained virtually all Nicaraguan
recruits in the General Directorate of Sandinista State Security, the new
State police organization responsible for maintaining Sandinista control over
the populace.
From the beginning, the Sandinistas began to spread revolution to
El Salvador and to assist leftist insurgencies elsewhere in the region.
Castro brought the five Salvadoran guerrilla factions together in Managua to
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work out a unity pact just as Castro had brought the three main Sandinista
factions together in 1978. The Sandinista leaders flatly promised that they
would spread the example of Nicaragua beyond El Salvador to Honduras, Guatemala
and the entire region. One of the principal guerrilla leaders said, "The
revolutionary process in Central America is a single process. The triumphs
of one are the triumphs of another. Guatemala will have its hour. Honduras
its. Casta Rica, too, will have its hour of glory. The first note has been
heard in Nicaragua."
The Sandinistas began training guerrillas from El Salvador and other
Central American countries. This was the beginning of a steadily expanding
partnership between Cuba and the Sandinistas in exporting subversion in the
region--a partnership that has included the establishment in Nicaragua of
numerous guerrilla training camps, like the one shown here, the transportation
of tons of weapons and the establishment on Nicaraguan territory of guerrilla
command and control facilities along with a variety of propaganda and covert
activities. In April 1980, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders met in the Hungarian
Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of Cuba, the USSR, Bulgarian,
East Germany, Poland and Vietnam. In June and July 1980, the Salvadoran
communist leaders went to Moscow and then with Soviet endorsement visited
East Germany, Bulgaria, Vietnam and Ethiopia--all of which promised them
military and other support. The commitment of weapons was estimated at
about 800 tons. The Salvadoran insurgents use American weapons left behind
in Vietnam.
To complement their subversive activities in Central America, the Soviet
Bloc and Cuba began in early 1980 to launch a massive propaganda and disinformation
campaign. Initially, at least, the campaign focused on US policy toward El Salvador,
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although it also came to include US involvement with Guatemala and Honduras.
Captured Salvadoran insurgent documents reveal that the guerrillas coordinate
their international activities out of Mexico City, and that they were in
close contact with the Soviet and other Bloc embassies.
The Soviets and Cubans held a key meeting with Salvadoran insurgents in
June 1980 to establish a propaganda strategy. It included:
-- Emphasis that the insurgents are fighting military oppression.
-- A concerted effort to gain recognition and support from European
and Latin American political parties and international humanitarian
and church organizations.
-- Attempts to strengthen ties with US congressmen and sectors of
of the US labor movement.
Meetings in Havana and Mexico City laid out the channels and the propaganda
themes to be spread around the world. During 1981, some 80 mass meetings were
held ranging from 15 people in Adelaide, Australia, to 75 people in Vancouver,
to a few hundred in Edinburgh, a few thousand in Amsterdam, and 15,000 in
Frankfurt. This process could only be carried out through the apparatus that
the communists have put together in the world peace movement, student groups,
unions, etc. There is no way a small Central American country or even Cuba
could mount a worldwide propaganda campaign of this kind. Today the Salvadoran
guerrillas, with less than 10,000 men in the field and little popular support,
have official propaganda representatives in over 35 countries around the world.
By December 1980, the Carter Administration decided to hold up US aid
disbursements to Nicaragua when the Sandinistas ignored repeated warnings
that their support to revolution in other countries would jeopardize our
continued assistance.
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During 1981, Castro moved to unify insurgent groups in Honduras, Guatemala
and Costa Rica in exchange for Cuban arms. Cuba and Nicaragua have also
sponsored terrorist actions in each of those countries.
-- In Honduras, Castro replaced all members of the Communist
Party who opposed immediate commitment to armed struggle. In 1982,
Honduran leftists were involved in numerous terrorist incidents, some
in cooperation with Salvadoran guerrillas. Last year events took a more
ominous turn, as Nicaragua sent across the border a group of 100 Cuban
trained Hondurans to establish an insurgent infrastructure. The Hondurans
captured almost all of them. Recently we have reporting that several hundred
Cuban and Nicaraguan agents are being infiltrated into Honduras.
-- In Guatemala, Cuba has trained several hundred insurgents and
provided them with money and a large amount of arms. Nicaragua has trained
Guatemalan insurgents and facilitated arms transfers and travel to Cuba for
more specialized training.
-- In Costa Rica, Havana and Managua have been cultivating ties
to the Community Party since the Sandinista takeover. They have sponsored
various acts of terrorism, including bombings, kidnappings, and attempted
assassinations in an effort to promote dissension and undermine the democratic
government there.
During 1981, Managua became an international center with Soviets, Cubans,
East Germans, Bulgarians, Palestinians, Vietnamese, Libyans and North Koreans
working to export revolution from Nicaragua. Our government recognized that
all of Central America had become the target of a regionwide subversive attack
spearheaded by the Soviet Bloc.
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In March of 1982, the Salvadoran guerrillas did their best to spoil the
election there by intimidating the voters. Over 80 percent of the people
came out to vote despite threats from the guerrillas.
The insurgents are now concerned about the results of another successful
election next week with a large turnout. They will try to discredit it, and
it is now clear that they will be taking military actions during the election
time and through the second round of balloting over the next six weeks.
The guerrillas will continue their military campaign against the government:
-- Attacking major strategic targets, such as bridges, dams and power
stations, in the west as well as in the east.
-- Attacking large military units and outposts, when they can set up
a favorable situation on the ground.
-- Carrying out terrorism in San Salvador itself.
Their aim likely is to strike at army morale, to erode public confidence
in the military and in the government, to capture international attention, and
in all this to overshadow the elections--to make them seem unimportant compared
to guerrilla initiatives--possibly not targeting the balloting per se or voters
going to the polls.
The guerrillas have good capabilities for doing this:
-- Their combat effectiveness is high. They are well trained, they
have good communications and intelligence, and they take advantage of their
experience to improve their tactics and strategy. They seem often to have
the initiative, controlling the terms and the pace of engagements with government
troops.
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-- Despite all this, they lack widespread popular support in El Salvador.
They have not yet held a major city nor can they tie down or defeat a major
military unit.
Over the last year, the guerrillas have succeeded in arming and training
and incorporating into their military units large numbers of militia, about
4,000, we used to view as support forces. This has resulted in a more unfavorable
ratio of government forces to guerrillas, roughly 4:1. The government needs to
have a larger force to defeat the guerrillas and restore order to the country.
For instance, the government will not put ballot boxes in 72 of 261 towns
because of its inability to provide adequate security. This makes it all the
more important to them that the army keep the initiative in the rest of the country.
The army is conducting sweeps in northern and eastern El Salvador designed
to disrupt guerrilla plans for the election. Guerrilla base camps are again
being attacked and the government has seized towns the guerrillas have been
holding.
We have a tactical stalemate in El Salvador which is likely to continue
as long as outside support continues to both sides at current levels. The
strength and durability of the guerrillas depends on their safehaven in
Nicaragua: the guerrilla command being there, the guerrillas being trained
there--and in Cuba--and the supply of arms and ammunition coming from Nicaragua
to the guerrillas in El Salvador.
In Nicaragua, starting in 1981 a strong resistance force developed and
now is operating in much of the country outside the major cities in the east
and along most of the Pacific Coast.
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Over these last two years, the Nicaraguan opposition has turned in a
remarkable performance in building an increasingly effective resistance force.
More than 10,000 anti-Sandinista guerrillas are fighting in Nicaragua now, and
this month another 3,000 ralliers will be receiving arms. The growth in anti-
Sandinista numbers has been accomplished because resistance has been stimulated
by continuing Sandinista repression and by defections from the Sandinista ranks.
The resistance is demonstrating a growing capability to bring pressure
on the Sandinistas in all parts of the country. Over the past three months,
the FDN has made significant progress in moving deeper into Sandinista territory.
Some areas of the country have been swept of Sandinista presence. The FDN has
conducted heavy fighting and seized temporary control of towns and areas in
the north central region, where we have seen increased discontent, disorganization
and desertions among the Sandinista troops.
The FDN has developed particular strength in the center of the country
around Matagalpa. The fighting there has hampered the coffee harvest. The
Miskito Indians and ARDE forces can threaten and interrupt the only lines of
road transport between the Atlantic coast ports and Managua. The Sandinista
government has shut down construction on the highway from Matagalpa to Puerto
Cabezas because of fighting. It has curtailed traffic on Atlantic coastal
rivers because of the insurgent presence there.
The resistance has demonstrated an ability to strike into the populated
areas and to attack military garrison headquarters, supply depots, and a
Nicaraguan tank part inside Nicaragua. In recent weeks, there have been
successful attacks on a command center in Nicaragua for the Salvadoran
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guerrillas, on a Salvadoran arms transshipment post and radio transmission
center in Nicaragua, and insurgent teams have conducted air-sea raids on supply
depots in Nicaragua of the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Mines have been placed on the Pacific harbor of Corinto and the Atlantic
harbor of El Bluff, as well as the oil terminal at Puerto Sandino. This,
together with damage to oil pipeline and storage facilities, has impaired
the mobility of Nicaraguan forces and brought them close to running out of
crude oil and aviation gas and other refined products. The Nicaraguan airline
at the end of last week announced a 30 percent reduction in its international
flight schedules.
All this has caused considerable disruption of the Nicaraguan economy.
This resistance activity has contributed significantly to the government deficit
of $550 million, and that the Nicaraguan government has concluded that resistance
activity in the north has led owners of small and medium-sized farms to cooperate
with the resistance because the Sandinistas cannot protect them. Last week,
Daniel Ortega, leader of the Sandinista junta, said that damage done by the
resistance force amounted to 1/3 of their exports.
these paramilitary activities are having
a demoralizing psychological effect on the once competent Sandinista Directorate
as evidenced by several developments:
-- Nicaraguan recognition of the failure of a full-scale military
operation "Sandino Lives" in the northeast due to large-scale troop deseration
caused by lack of supplies.
-- The desertion of a,full battalion of 260 Sandinista troops to
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-- Apparent reduction in Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran
insurgents.
-- Allegations of enforced drug use among EPS troops in order to
improve combat performance.
-- Court martial of 150 Sandinista officers and NCOs ostensibly for
abuse of campesinos but in reality for failure to fight resistance forces
aggressively in the north central area. A Cuban mission is investigating this
failure.
-- High concern in Managua about increased support of the resistance
by the population.
The insurgency in Nicargua has diverted support to the Salvadorans in
a number of ways:
-- The demonstrated ability of the Nicaraguan resistance to threaten
land and sea supply routes and attack supply depots in Nicaragua has made it
more difficult to get arms to the Sandinistas.
-- The Sandinistas have been forced to divert attention and weapons
to fighting the resistance and Nicaraguan arms have been lost in combat and
in desertions of Nicarguan soldiers and militiamen to the resistance. There
is a steady increase in desertions from the Nicaraguan army and military.
We have been watching closely the evidence to support the claims of the
Sandinistas that they have moved the FMLN command out of Nicaragua and that
they have stopped supplying the guerrillas.
heads of the five guerrilla factions recently visited El Salvador and may
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indeed be planning to move to El Salvador. Right now, we believe they are
free to return to Nicaragua when they choose to.
Salvadoran insurgent units still
asking for additional shipments of weapons and ammunition to be sent from
Nicaragua.
supplies are coming in from Nicaragua by
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air and by sea.
Last fall the insurgents were told by Cuba and by Nicaragua to conserve
their resources because the flow of material from Nicaragua to El Salvador
might have to be curtailed. The-reason given in this case was not a change
in Sandinista policy but rather that the supplies had to be diverted to
Nicaraguan troops fighting insurgents inside Nicaragua.
The Salvadoran guerrillas indicate that they are suffering from a shortage
of funds and their flow of supplies has diminished; however, we believe they
have enough supplies on hand to sustain an offensive operation for some months.
In addition to the covert means by which Cuba and Nicaragua have been
attempting to destabilize the region, they have embarked on a massive buildup
of their conventional armed forces.
-- Over the past five years, the USSR has increased both the quality
and quantity of its military aid to Cuba. Cuba's Navy has received Soviet
submarines, frigates, guided-missile patrol boats, and amphibious landing ships.
-- Most the Cuban Air Force's older fighters have been replaced
with moder MIG-21s and MIG-23s.
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-- In addition, Cuba's ground forces have received hundreds of
new tanks and artillery pieces, and enough small arms and ammunition to
equip more than half a million members of its territorial militia.
Cuba's armed forces pose only a marginal threat to US territory, but
their ability to project military power into Central America and the Caribbean
Basin has been enhanced.
-- Cuba now has a capability to interdict shipping entering and
exiting the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and in time of war could hinder
the Unites States' ability to reinforce our allies in Europe.
The Sandinistas have been undertaking a similar buildup of their own.
-- Since taking over from Somoza, they have built or expanded over
40 major military facilities, including Army garrisons and airfields.
We believe that Soviet MIG-21s have been delivered to Cuba earmarked
for Nicaragua and that Nicaraguan pilots hae been trained to fly them.
-- We have warned the Soviets and Cubans not to deliver MIG-21
aircraft to Nicaragua, because they have sufficient range to threaten the
Panama Canal.
-- Nevertheless, the Sandinitas have received large numbers of
Soviet weapons, including tanks, artillery, and combat helicopters.
-- Their active duty armed forces are now the largest in the region,
and their stated goal is to match the combined armies of Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras.
The Cuban and Nicarguan military buildups, both done with extensive Soviet
Bloc support, are designed to protect their regimes from external threats while
they continue to export revolution.
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-- Should they succeed in E1 Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala would
undoubtedly be the next targets.
-- Success in Guatemala would bring a radical regime to Mexico's
southern border.
-- And Mexico, with its large oil fields and severe economic
difficulties, would be an inviting target for destabilization by radical leftists.
What do these threats mean for America's future--and for American business?
-- For one thing, should Central America fall under leftist control,
it could mean a tidal wave of refugees into the US.
-- Every country that has fallen under Communist control since
World War II has sent refugees streaming over the borders--first Eastern Europe,
then Cuba, and more recently Vietnam and Afghanistan--and the potential influx
from Central America is even higher than from any of these. Since 1980, some
200,000 Salvadorans fleeing the instability in their own country have entered
the US illegally. The tide from Mexico has been even greater. Some 300,000
Mexicans illegally entered this country in 1983 alone.
Today, the Cuban and Nicaraguan security force are together four times
the size of those of Mexico and equipped with vastly superior weapons. If
Central America were controlled and militarized to the extent that Cuba is,
we would see a mighty force of better than half a million armed men in Cuba
and south of the Mexican border. Today, with armed force larger and better
equipped than the rest of Central America put together, Nicargua could walk
through Costa Rica which has no army to Panama and Cuba can threaten our
vital sea lanes in the Caribbean.
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It is clearly in America's--and American business'--best interests to
help governments and business leaders in Mexico and Central America turn
back the revolutionary threat and develop the political, social and economic
institutions conducive to the well-being of the 100 million people in the
region.
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