CONTADORA TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100260008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R000100260008-8
CONTADORA TALKING POINTS
Contadora--because it is a peace initative and because it was sponsored by
respected Latin American democracies--has wide acceptance, but to the Central
American countries most threatened by foreign-supported subversion, the Contadora
initiative has produced a peace instrument of such imbalance that it augments,
not reduces the threat to them. Moreover, the current draft treaty virtually
guarantees the survival of Marxist Nicaragua and, thus, the consolidation of
Cuban/Soviet influence in the Isthmus. Because Contadora is a peace initiative
designed to end the bloodshed in Nicaragua and El Salvador, there is a
reluctance to criticize the draft treaty directly. Nonetheless, there is,a
wide variance between the public and private attitudes of the leaders of the
Contadora countries toward the treaty and, with the exception of Mexico, these
leaders believe that the treaty provisions are particularly inadequate with
regard to verification. This concern persuaded the countries of Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador (Nicaragua was invited but refused to
attend) to meet and discuss revisions to the treaty. The result of that
meeting was to propose to replace the Additional Protocol with a Protocol
of Guarantor States. The meeting also agreed to have only the four original
countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela) sign the Protocol. The
Guarantor nations would be limited (suggestions are Brazil, Argentina, Spain
and West Germany. France would be welcomed as a guarantor as well).
The following represent an update of our perceptions of the private views
of leaders of the Contadora countries toward the process. It is too soon to
know the reaction to the latest initative by the countries of Guatemala, Costa
Rica, El Salvador and Honduras to replace the Additional Protocol.
Mexico:
-- Mexican leaders appear more willing to strengthen the verification
procedures than their public statements would indicate.
-- The Mexican Government is, however, anxious to have a successful
conclusion to the Contadora process, even if an imbalanced treaty
favorable to Nicaragua emerges. Mexico continues to play the role
of a "protector" of Nicaragua.
Venezuela:
-- Privately, Venezuelan Government officials express their misgivings
about the Contadora process. One official believes the treaty as
written would be "unverifiable" and does not provide sufficient
guarantees against Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan penetration of the region.
Costa Rica:
-- Costa Rican officials have strong concerns about the Contadora
Treaty as originally revised. They believe their country will
have serious problems with Nicaragua, regardless of what happens to
the Sandinista regime. Through the Contadora process, Costa Rica
hopes to impose an "international big brother" on the Sandinistas.
SECRET/
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R000100260008-8