TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301760003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/01/08: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000301760003-0
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815
[phone]
PROGRAM
CBS Morning News
STATION
WDVM-TV
CBS Network
DATE
SUBJECT
June 24, 1985
Terrorism
7:00 A.M.
CRY
Washington, D.C.
PHYLLIS GEORGE: When terrorists move into action
against the United States, it's natural to ask about U.S.
intelligence gathering: What did Washington know and when did it
know it?
Two men who know the intelligence operation inside and
out are joining us this morning. In Philadelphia at WCAU-TV is
Admiral Stansfield Turner, who ran the CIA during the Carter
Administration. In our Washington Bureau is James Schlesinger.
He was CIA Director in 1973 before becoming Secretary of Defense.
And with him is our Washington correspondent, Terence Smith.
TERENCE SMITH: Gentlemen, let's talk about the
situation and capacities of our intelligence in the Middle East
right now. Obviously, it's been severely tested.
The question is, what is our capacity to confirm
information of the kind we're looking for right now, such as:
Who were the hijackers? Where are the hostages held? What is
the real connection between Nabih Berri and the hijackers? These
specific things which are so hard to get at, and yet are the
essence of what we're dealing with right now.
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Well, Terry, I don't think
that we could have predicted this hijacking. I don't think that
this kind of a group existed long enough and we would be capable
in the time permitted to penetrate it and get somebody inside it
to know they were going to go to Athens and do that.
I certainly hope that after four and a half years in
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office, with all the emphasis this Administration has placed on
Lebanon, that we've got some informants inside the Shiite
community who can be giving us a general idea of who these people
are, if not their specific plans.
SMITH: Let me ask Mr. Schlesinger whether or not at
this stage in this kind of continuing dilemma it's likely we can
come up with that sort of information.
JAMES SCHLESINGER: Well, you set a very high standard:
confirmation of who is holding these people, who has planned this
operation.
We do not have the capacity to confirm. We may, as the
Admiral indicates, have a general idea. We may have clues. But
confirmation is quite demanding. I doubt that we have that
capacity.
But more important than that, even if we knew precisely
who it was, it's not clear what we can do. The hostages have
been dispersed to various homes. There's no easy way to ferret
them out. And there is nobody, as Mr. Arens has just indicated,
on the other side with whom we can positively deal.
SMITH: Are there practical ways, Admiral Turner, for us
to even locate where the hostages are, that sort of physical
specific information?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think it would be very difficult to
be sure we had our hands on all 37 of them who are not at the
airport.
Yes, we should be able to identify where some of them
are because, again, as I say, I hope that we've been able to et
some informants inside the communities in Beirut.
But the chances of doing anything about that, as Jim
Schlesinger has just said, are very slim because, first of all,
they can move them on a daily basis. And the opportunity to go
in and rescue them is just not there. It's too difficult.
SMITH: We have all read press reports that the U.S.
intelligence infrastructure in Lebanon was gravely damaged in
April 1983 when the embassy there was blown up and many of the
key people were killed in that incident.
Is that true? And has it been rebuilt since then?
Either of you?
SCHLESINGER: Well, I don't think that one should
confirm or deny these things. But if it were true, we have had
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sufficient time since then to rebuild the intelligence
infrastructure. And we should have done so. As the Admiral
indicates, it's been a high-priority target.
SMITH: Admiral, there was also the suggestion that we
lost considerable intelligence information and capacity when the
Paletinians were forced to leave Beirut and Lebanon. Is that
correct?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, any situation like that, you can
have a changing environment. I don't know whether we lost it
during the Palestinian departure. But there's been lots of time
since then -- it's been almost three years -- to rebuild. And
certainly we had a broader base than that, I would hope.
SMITH: We also have had in recent days extraordinary
terrorism acts, apparent terrorism acts, such as the destruction
of this Air India airplane over Ireland and the incident in Tokyo
yesterday. Are these the sorts of things that U.S. intelligence
ought to be able to have an inkling of? Mr. Schlesinger?
SCHLESINGER: I don't think that one can demand too much
of intelligence. What we have to have is a security procedure at
airports that can deal with the planting of a bomb. But
intelligence may or may not get hold of this kind of thing. If
we are fortunate, indeed, those clues will come through
intelligence. But one cannot count on it.
SMITH: Admiral Taylor? Turner. Excuse me. Admiral
ADMIRAL TURNER: I would certainly agree with that. One
has to try. One has to not only set up one's own networks, but
pressure other countries to set up theirs and trade information
with us. But the odds of getting a mindless terrorist act like
yesterday's with Air India are very, very slim.
SMITH: Very slim and very difficult.
Gentlemen, thank you, both, for this insight into that
world.
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