CAN ANYBODY KEEP A SECRET?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301750014-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 15, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM The Big Story
DATE June 15, 1985 1:30 P.M. CITY Atlanta, Ga.
SUBJECT Can Anybody Keep a Secret?
DON MILLER: World attention focused this week on
international espionage. In Berlin the East and West staged what
one U.S. official called the biggest spy swap in history. In
London's Old Bailey a trial began for seven British military men
accused of giving away Western communications intelligence. In
Los Angeles a fired FBI agent testified to his sexual liaison
with an accused Soviet spy. And in Washington and countless FBI
offices and Navy bases around the world, the investigation
continues into a spy ring allegedly headed by John A. Walker, Jr.
As one revelation follows another, officials of the
nation's military and intelligence communities are joining
members of Congress in asking the question, "Can anybody keep a
secret?" The Big Story this week.
The nation's newscasts and newspapers this week were
full of reports about spies and spying. On Tuesday the headline
story came from Berlin.
JIM MIKLASZEWSKI: What already looked like a good deal
for the U.S. may be even better. The United States gave up four
East Bloc spies. The other side released 25, in the largest spy
swap since World War II.
Although details of those 25 remain secret, U.S.
officials now indicate some may have played a significant role in
U.S. intelligence behind the Iron Curtain.
But when the swap was first announced, former National
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski suspected the East Bloc got
the better part of the deal.
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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: The Soviets really work very hard
to get their good agents out. And while I've not yet seen the
full details of who was exchanged for what, I noticed that we
traded four of their people for 25 of ours. My concern is that
we probably traded four significant spies -- one of them is a
serious spy, for a fact, an important spy -- probably for a bunch
of part-time agents of secondary importance. And in my judgment,
we should not make such exchanges.
We do have some fairly important people behind Soviet
bars, and we should be holding out for them.
TOM BRADEN: You mean in order to get them back.
Because the spies that we just released, the four that we sent
across the bridge, are unlikely to come back as spies.
BRZEZINSKI: No. But that's not the point. We are
trading people who are important spies, who are professional
spies, who have importance within their intelligence networks,
for people who probably are of secondary importance as spies to
BRADEN: We're trading Abel for Gary Powers.
BRZEZINSKI: That's right. And, you know, that's
terribly important to the morale of an intelligence service. If
you are in the Soviet intelligence service and you get caught,
you know damn well that the Soviet Union is going to stand on its
head to get you out. And that's very important to morale,
motivation, and so forth.
If you're an American agent and you run high risks and
you do something good for America and you're caught, the chances
are you're going to be there for 25 years, if you're not
executed.
BRADEN: Would you really say that? I trust your
experience, but is that what an American spy thinks will happen?
BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't know what he thinks, but I
know that's what happens. In other words, we have not exerted
ourselves enough, in my judgment, to spring our people out and to
work particularly for those people who have run major risks for
us and sacrificed a great deal for us.
MIKLASZEWSKI: But according to one State Department
official close to the negotiations, Brzezinski, quote, doesn't
know what he's talking about. The official said the group of 25
included some very good quality people; and that once Brzezinski
was briefed, he won't say that anymore.
Brzezinski was briefed, and in a later statement
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released by his office said, "I am now reasonably assured the
arrangements were more equitable than originally feared."
U.S. intelligence officials refused to release any
details concerning the identities or activities of the 25
released by the East. According to one CIA official, "We
couldn't admit any of them were CIA agents. It could be a threat
to their lives."
Senator Patrick Leahy of the Senate Intelligence
Committee admits the U.S. gave up some important agents, but
endorsed the deal.
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Oh, I think that they're getting
a significant four people. I don't think there's any question
about that. But again, I'm satisfied that we made a fair swap.
MIKLASZEWSKI: Of the four spies released by the U.S.,
Marian Zaharski (?) appears to have inflicted the most damage to
U.S. security. Zaharski was convicted in the theft of secrets
from Hughes Aircraft in California and sentenced to life
imprisonment in 1981.
Intelligence expert William Corson thinks Zaharksi may
have even been able to shed some light on the current Walker spy
case.
WILLIAM CORSON: Mr. Zaharski was with the Polamco (?)
Company. He also was the individual who ran an engineer by the
name of William Holden Bell who worked for the Hughes Aircraft
Corporation. And in that role, for some $160,000, Mr. Bell
provided material of very, very strategic importance to the
Soviet Union, through the hands of Mr. Zaharski.
Now, much of that information dovetails with information
that would have been provided to the Soviet Union by Johnny
Walker Red Label. So we may have lost a potential witness in any
future Walker trial, because now Mr. Zaharski has returned to the
East.
MIKLASZEWSKI: The remaining three include Alfred Zehe,
an East German convicted and sentenced to eight years last April.
Penyu Kostadinov (?), a Bulgarian diplomat whose case was still
pending. And East German Alice Mikkelsen (?), described as an
intelligence courier, sentenced to ten years in prison.
CORSON: These actions are taken to facilitate some
activity on the part of the Soviet Union. We usually end up with
people of much less quality and caliber, in terms of
intellgience..
The reference you made to the Power case. Power was --
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Powers, rather, Gary Francis Powers, was merely a pilot of a U-2
airplane; whereas Colonel Abel, who became a Colonel-General in
the KGB, was one of the top Soviet spies who have operated in
this country in the last 50 years.
MIKLASZEWSKI: In the meantime, U.S. intelligence
sources express some personal frustration over the entire spy
swap affair. Said one official, "This is one case where we're
entitled to blow our horns. And we can't even talk about it."
MILLER: There was another spy story with a foreign
dateline this week. In London a trial began in a case involving
theft of NATO communications intelligence data.
KEVIN DUNN: The seven defendants, five airmen and two
soldiers, served on Cyprus with the Ninth Signals Regiment. At
this base, the Crown alleged, they operated a spy ring from the
heart of one of Britain's most secret listening posts.
From Cyprus, British intelligence monitors vital Soviet
ship movements in the Black Sea and eavesdrops on the Middle
East, one of the world's most volatile regions. Never more so
than in 1982, when Lebanon was thrown into turmoil by the Israeli
invasion and a wider conflict with Syria seemed imminent.
For the prosecution, Mr. Wright Cusey (?) said the
servicemen had access to Britain's most precious military secrets
and for two years they sold them for money, drugs and sex.
The ringleader was Senior Aircraftsman Geoffrey Jones,
who sat in the corner of the dock. In February 1982 he was lured
to a flat by a foreign agent, got drunk and high on cannabis, and
was seduced by two Arabs. He was photographed and blackmailed.
He too, it's alleged, was responsible for recruiting the others.
He did this by organizing homosexual parties at which the
defendants dressed up in women's tights and participated in
orgies, laying themselves, in turn, open to blackmail.
The group was finally arrested after Jones broke routine
regulations because of his infatuation with a Filipino singer.
She was a member of a girl group who also provided sex for some
of the defendants.
The prosecution said it wasn't clear who would receive
the secrets which the servicemen had betrayed. But one of the
agents they dealt with identified himself as a major in the
Soviet KGB.
Because of the secrets involved, the case is continuing
behind closed doors and it's expected to last at least until the
autumn.
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MILLER: But the major spy story of interest continues
to be the so-called Walker family case. We'll look at the week's
developments in that case in just a moment.
REPORTER: When accused spy Arthur Walker returned to
court, he heard FBI charges that he was aware that his brother
John was spying for the Soviets. And FBI agent Beverly Andrus
testified that he had told her that he had passed classified
documents to his brother.
Defense attorney Brian Donnally (?) said Walker was not
passing the documents to the Soviets, only to his brother. But
Federal Magistrate Gilbert Swink ruled there was enough evidence
to send the case to a grand jury.
Then there was the matter of bail for Arthur Walker.
Defense attorney Samuel Meekins portrayed him as a model
citizen. But the government said Walker possessed information
that could be of value to the Soviets. Magistrate Swink
apparently agreed and denied bail. Meekins was disappointed
SAMUEL MEEKINS: Under the circumstances of this case
and the charge that was preferred and in place at this time, my
client deserved bond.
REPORTER: And Arthur Walker's plea?
MEEKINS: Not guilty.
REPORTER: So Arthur Walker, like the other members of
his brother's alleged spy ring, is back in jail.
Meanwhile, investigators continue their search to
determine if there are others involved in the alleged spy ring.
JACK WAGNER: We are making progress, not only by the
FBI, but with the assistance of the Naval Investigative Service,
along with other agencies in the Federal Government. I do not
know, nor will I predict, where our efforts will lead us.
REPORTER: Investigators are known to be studying the
results of undeveloped film, video tapes, and computer disks
seized from the home and office of John Walker.
CARL ROCHELLE: Damage in the Walker case has been very
serious, but not catastrophic -- a top-level Navy assessment.
The most serious area of compromise, Navy
communications.
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Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations:
ADMIRAL JAMES WATKINS: Because of John Walker's
communications background and, in fact, that also of at least one
or two of his cohorts, there's obvious high potential gain for
the Soviet Union.
ROCHELLE: Gain in four key areas: intelligence on U.S.
Navy air operations, including aircraft capability; anti-ship
warfare, perhaps targeting information; anti-submarine warfare,
its tactics and effectiveness at finding Soviet subs; and the
vulnerability of the American strategic submarine force. All of
it information which could help fill Soviet intelligence gaps.
On the critical question of vulnerability, the Navy
insists our underwater nuclear deterrent is still safe.
ADMIRAL WATKINS: There is no indication that the
Soviets have broke the code of how to detect our SSBNs. And
therefore we remain convinced that our SSBN force is still 100
percent survivable.
ROCHELLE: Still, the Walker case has forced the Navy
to make some changes in codes and procedures. Also promised, an
acceleration of designs for new equipment.
There is also a message to Navy units worldwide calling
for stringent new security measures. Included, an immediate 10
percent reduction in security clearances. The ultimate goal, 50
percent. And random security inspections of articles and papers
carried to and from Navy ships and installations.
Secretary Lehman also proposed what Congress would have
to approve, a major expansion of lie detector tests.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JOHN LEHMAN: We are not talking
about what are called so-called lifestyle polygraphs, but a
strictly limited set of questions that are limited to espionage.
ROCHELLE: The Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee questioned Lehman's polygraph wish.
SENATOR LEAHY: It's kind of a lazy way if one's going
to rely on the polygraph. And like all lazy methods, it's one
that doesn't always work.
ROCHELLE: The Navy insists it expects no more surprises
in the Walker case, no new exposes about what might have been
given away to the Soviet Union.
Shortly after Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins met
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with reporters, the Pentagon said it was establishing a
commission to review security Defense Department-wide to identify
weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
Attorney General Edwin Meese says he hasn't gotten any
polygraph recommendations from Lehman, but says he shares the
concern about security.
ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE: We're working with the
various departments, and will be over the next few weeks, to
review our entire protection system for classified information.
ROCHELLE: Republican Senator William Roth of Delaware,
a past critic of Pentagon security procedures, said the problem
of quantity must be emphasized.
SENATOR WILLIAM ROTH: I think last year something like
16 million items were classified. Now, the job of trying to
protect that is almost impossible.
ROCHELLE: Questions of clearances and documents aside,
there is the bottom-line issue of deterrence, using the fear of
punishment to prevent espionage.
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on Wednesday said he
was asked recently what should happen to the Walker case suspects
if they're found guilty. He said his immediate response was that
they should be shot.
Capital punishment is not now permitted for espionage
convictions in either military or civilian law.
BRZEZINSKI: The situation is extremely serious. And I
think it's up to you people in Congress to do something about it.
For one thing, the penalties are not stiff enough. I think we
should have a very massive application of maximum penalties for
cases like this.
MAN: Capital punishment?
BRZEZINSKI: Yes. When a single person can jeopardize
national security for profit and place in jeopardy the lives of
thousands of people, not to speak of American national security,
he eliminates himself from the society, and should be treated
accordingly.
MILLER: Coming up, a look at the possible motives for
espionage and the classic techniques used by KGB agents to
compromise a prospective spy.
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MILLER: According to government affidavits filed in
court in connection with the Walker cases, money appears to have
been a principal motive for espionage. But experts say agents of
the Soviet KGB use other weapons, as well, to recruit and hold a
spy.
ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE: Now, the incentive seems to be
primarily money. But it's always a combination of what Stan
Levchenko calls MICE, the acronym MICE, M-I-C-E. M for money, I
for ideology, C for compromise, and E for ego.
just...
LARRY KING: They're always involved? It's never
DE BORCHGRAVE: It's a combination. Because if I were
to go to the KGB tomorrow -- and they did make an attempt to
recruit me as a young journalist in Paris in the early '50s. But
if I go voluntarily and say, "We are wrong. I've concluded that
you, the Soviet Union, are right, and I want to put myself at
your service," that's not good enough for them. They have to
compromise you. So that two years from now if you change
your mind, you can't walk away from them.
As this fellow testified on Nightline the other night,
you know, who's serving time out in California -- what's his
name? Boyce, I believe. And he said there's no way out. You
think it's very glamorous when you get into the spy business, and
suddenly you find yourself in a dark room falling down a dark
hole, and there's no turning back.
We are in a totally open democratic society. And if you
were a KGB agent or a KGB proxy agent in this country, it would
really be, relatively speaking, a piece of cake.
I've frequently said on the air that if I were working
for the KGB, I'd probably be spending five days a week in Palm
Beach sunning myself and two days a week working, and still
getting congratulatory messages from Moscow.
MILLER: Details of an alleged KGB recruitment operation
began unfolding this week in a Los Angeles courtroom, where a
federal jury watched FBI surveillance tape of a meeting between a
former FBI agent and accused spy Svetlana Ogarodnikov.
[Clip of tape]
RAY SUAREZ: Miller said he had been warned by his
fellow agents, who said, "Proceed with caution." Svetlana
Ogarodnikova, accused of spying for her homeland, was said to be
unreliable, unstable. But Richard Miller, who's revealed in his
testimony that he had hit bottom in his long FBI career, went
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ahead with their meetings, which resulted in sex after the second
time they met.
Miller said the Russian woman was distraught. A few
days before during a visit to the Soviet Consulate in San
Francisco, she had been ordered to return to Russia on a mission
for Soviet military intelligence. Miller said he consoled
Svetlana and sought sympaty from her, in turn.
Miller had been suspended from the FBI L.A. office,
threatened with firing if he didn't get his weight down. Miller
was also dogged by money problems. And during tough questioning
by Assistant U.S. Attorney Bruce Merritt, Miller was forced to
reveal he was far from a model G-man. He stole money from his
wife's grandmother, skimmed FBI cash off the top of payments to
informers, bounced checks, and violated FBI rules by selling
criminal records to a private eye.
Money has become the driving force behind the
prosecution's case. Miller's life was dissected with surgical
skill, revealing money problems which at times threatened his
house, and at others forced the $50,000-a-year agent to sell
Amway products from his FBI car.
While listening to an FBI surveillance conversation with
another woman with whom he was having an affair, the court heard
Miller say, "You're talking to a man who loves money, who makes a
good salary, but can't make it."
Before Miller would agree to testify in the Russian
couple's trial, he had to be given what's called use immunity.
That means whatever he says in these proceedings can't be used
against him when his own turn comes to face a jury.
MILLER: According to intelligence experts, the Soviet
Embassy in Washington is a major base for KGB operations in the
United States. About two months ago, a Soviet diplomat
identified as a KGB agent by U.S. intelligence experts had lunch
with CNN investigative reporter Joe Trento.
JOE TRENTO: What you're looking at is a video tape
taken with hidden cameras of a Soviet named Vladimir Bruznitsyn
(?). Bruznitsyn's cover job is as the deputy Soviet information
officer here in Washington. But intelligence experts tell us
Bruznitsyn is a Soviet KGB agent. They say that the meeting you
are seeing is th first step in his attempt to recruit me to work
for the Soviet cause.
To me, it seemed like an uneventful conversation.
Bruznitsyn talked about his days as a University of California
exchange student at Berkeley.
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VLADIMIR BRUZNITSYN: And when I came to the city and
saw the quiet, very quiet campus...
TRENTO: Nothing like you expected, huh?
BRUZNITSYN: Without any violence, without any riots.
CORSON: Well, we're all fellas, we're all friends.
We're all friends. They're just fellas. They're nice guys. And
he's wearing, obviously, a Joseph -- not a Joseph A. Banks, but
he's wearing a Henry Dash's blazer and slacks and a proper shirt.
He likes Miller Lite. Just a fella. Just like you and I.
But he's a trained Soviet intelligence officer.
TRENTO: Dr. William Corson should know. He's spent
most of his life fighting the Soviet KGB around the world as a
Marine officer assigned to the CIA. Now he and Robert Crowley, a
longtime CIA official whose face we cannot show, have written a
new book, The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power. The work is
based on their combined 70 years' experience of battling the
Committee for State Security.
They alerted me prior to my meeting with Bruznitsyn,
outlining the approach he would take. They said after opening
with small talk, the KGB officer would get my views on more
serious issues. They turned out to be right.
CORSON: This is a Soviet operation designed to find out
if they can establish an agent in place. It doesn't mean that
you will know that you're working for the KGB. Somebody's going
to help you.
TRENTO: Corson and Crowley believe that because I've
reported on scientific intelligence in the past, the KGB officers
believe I might be a source for information on the Star Wars
program.
We learned the KGB officer was trained in physics.
During lunch he asked me about Reagan's strategic defense
proposal, SDI, also known as Star Wars.
BRUZNITSYN: What do you think about this SDI?
TRENTO: According to Corson and Crowley, Bruznitsyn
will prepare a report and send it to KGB headquarters in Moscow,
known as the Moscow Center.
CORSON: You can make book that he and Stanislav
Androsov (?), the resident, got together and they looked at it
because they're making recommendations and they're seeking
additional advice from the Center. So at the next meeting, the
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next lunch, dinner, whatever you want to call it, there will be a
more precise agenda.
TRENTO: Of course, we don't know if there'll be another
meeting with Bruznitsyn, especially after this program runs.
MILLER: Intelligence experts warn Americans had better
take the KGB threat seriously.
CORSON: The lines and the organization were established
beginning in 1967, the new KGB, by Yuri Andropov. Yuri's boys
are in charge. Viktor Chebrikov is the head of the KGB, and
Vitaly Fedorchuk is the head of the MVD. And we better pay
attention because, as the Russians say, these are [Russian
expression], these are serious matters. And if we don't get
serious, Walker will just be one little blip on a radar of
continuing disasters.
MILLER: As the tales of espionage unfold in the
nation's courtrooms, newscasts and newspapers, the question
remains to be answered: Can anybody keep a secret?
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