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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301530004-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 7, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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V r_ fE 09 R_ T1 ' ABC N I GHTL I N E
-?~'{"t-`i= j' 7 January 1985
When we come back,'Ne'll get some different views on'the issues we've raised as
we talk live with Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the CIA, and with
Time magazine-diplomatic correspondent Strobe Talbott, who's-written a highly
acclaimed book about the Reagan administration and arms.control.
KOPPEL: Joining us live now from our affiliate KVUE'in Austin, Texas,
Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the CIA and an expert on so-called
'Star Wars' antimissile technology. And in our Washington bureau, Strobe
Talbott, whom I knew'from a different incarnation as diplomatic correspondent
for Time magazine. He is now their Washington bureau chief. More to the
point, I . . .
he is author of 'Deadly Gambits,', the definitive book on arms control
negotiations. Adm. Inman, let me`begin with you. Let me try-analyzing, which
I
used to do years ago,.what?our Soviet friend said from Canada a moment ago. I
interpret that as being if things go badly, then that's the way the United
States wanted it?to be in the first place. If we wanted it to go well, it is
within our power to do that. ADM. BOBBY INMAN (former deputy CIA director):
You're exactly on target. One other correction I would make. In sort of
letting the U.S. always be the one who moves out to new areas for new weapons,
Soviets are the ones with the operational antisatellite system. The U.S. does
not have an operational one.
KOPPEL: Why do you think the Soviet Union initiated or agreed to come to those.
talks? INMAN: The Soviets painted themselves into.a corner with-the
propaganda
campaign they had going in Western Europe to block. the deployment of the cruise
missile and the Pershing. When the shoot-down of. the Korean airliner caused
that whole effort to collapse, they didn't have an easy retreat. But they'.re
practical people. They believe there is a genuine prospect that the strategic
defense initiative would work, and I believe that concern, that fear is the
primary factor in the initiative that they've now started for a new round of
talks.
KOPPEL: Strobe Talbott., let me ask you. Does it really matter whether it will,
work or not work as long as the Soviets believe that it might? STROBE TALBOTT
(arms control expert): Well, I think, that's... Your, your question suggests a.
good point. The very danger that it might work, that is, an American strategic.
defense initiative might work, obviously casts a whole pall of uncertaintly
over
their own military planning. And also, Ted, they have to worry agreat deal
whenever the United States moves into a whole new area of military . technology:
Perhaps 'Star Wars' might be disappointing to those who hope that it'll give us
an inpenetrable defense of our populations. But who knows what other military
benefits it might give to the United States that the Soviets would. then have to
contend with? They are very frightened of American technology, and 'Star Wars'
is a kind of apotheosis of that, and therefore terribly worrisome to them:
KOPPEL: All right. If you were responding to Alexander Podakin, and, indeed,.
there's no reason why he can't jump in right now, and he has said to us it is
really in American hands.to,.make this thing go well beyond the-kind of limited.
goals that, that I sketched out earlier, you would say what? Was the question
so vague, Strobe? It was to you. TALBOTT: Sorry._. I wasn't sure it was to
me,
Ted. Cu~7-;~,~e;l
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Z.
KOPPEL: It is. TALBOTT: Yeah, I think that there is certainly an opportunity
-there for, for these talks to lead to very significant reductions in offensive
weaponry, which is one of the possibilities.
KOPPEL: What would the United States have to do, foreswear 'Star Wars'?
TALBOTT: Well, perhaps... It's not about to do that, so that's, that question.
really doesn't arise in the context of the talks that are going on now. The
Reagan administration has made absolutely clear that.'Star Wars,' in the words
of Robert MacFarlane, the president's national security adviser, is not a
bargaining chip. However, down the road, as it becomes a little clearer what
the United States really has in mind when it's-talking about the strategic
defense inititiative, if it becomes apparent, for example, that what we have in
mind is some kind of more limited plan to defend our. strategic offensive
weapons,. then it might be possible to have some kind of trade off back and
forth
between offense and defense. Now, it's not at all certain, of course, that the
Soviets will sign on to?that. Nor is it certain that that's what-the
administration will eventually come to.
KOPPEL: Mr. Podakin, let me just be-absolutely clear that-I understand your
position and.how it reflects the Soviet position. In order for these talks to
be successful,.in order for them 'to move on to a really useful next stage, is
it
possible for the Soviet Union to anything constructive right away, or must the
first step,.from your point of view, come from the Soviet, ah, come from.the
United States? PODAKIN: Well, I wouldn't be able to tell you right away who
is-
svp csed to make the -first step. The first step has been done, as far as we
ar
cc1cerned.
KOPPEL: And that is what? PODAKIN: That is the beginning of talks. This is
the -first, major step, and if the next step is done in the direction of
limiting
the arms stockpiles, of curbing, the arms race, of preventing it from going into
new areas, that would be the positive development we are looking for, and that
is exactly the whole idea behind the talks. Other than that, we didn't have
other goals of going for the talks. The talks. were called exactly to minimize
the threat of the war, to stop the new technology, destructive, nuclear
wi:atever, sophisticated technology going into space and so on. And if the two
sides would be able'to find some common grounds in-this particular framework,
there is a good chance that we might see a better world weeks from now or
months
from now.
KOPPEL: Adm. Inman, if that is indeed the framework, how do you, how do you
rate the chances then? If it requires that at some point or another the 'United-
States indicate a'willingness.to step back from, from research into, into
strategic defense initiative,.is.it realistic? INMAN: Standardly, we've not
agreed to cut off research in arms control agreements. We've not gone forward
with deployments or hopefully reduced forces. (sic) My understanding, sitting.
down here in my quiet- Southwestern'- part of the U.S., 'is that what Here
expecting to see out of Geneva is the framework for talks that are gonna run
for
Luuai.~;~
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3,
one, two, maybe three years before we see an actual agreement. It seems to me
that the question really is are we going to have several different negotiations
going on at the same time, or will we;try to do it all in one major package?
The U.S. has six to eight years of research before we really are in the
position
to make any kind of judgments on deployment of the strategic. defense intiative.'.
KOPPEL: If that is so, Adm. Inman, then clearly we would not be in a
position... I mean, if you're saying the research is gonna go on anyway, then,
then how can you negotiate something away the research--I'm gonna say this
badly--for which the research hash'--t yet even been done? INMAN: You would...
What you will actually negotiate away is'the decision to deploy, and with the
ABM treaty... We did not actually cut off research in the ABM area. We made a
decision not to proceed to deploy, and frankly I think the Soviets would settle
for that. They'd be happy if we didn't do the research. They worry about its
outcome. But what they're out for here is to get a treaty that would preclude
the deployment of the strategic defense initiative.
KOPPEL: Gentlemen, it is almost impossible to try to'discuss in the space of
20
minutes or so what will take months, maybe year's, to negotiate, but I'm very
grateful to the three of you for joining us this evening... Thank you. I'll be
back in a moment.
KOPPEL: Tomorrow on World News Tonight, Peter Jennings will again anchor from
Geneva with full coverage of the second day of the U.S.-Soviet talks on the
issue of arms control negotiations. That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted
Koppel in Washington. For all of us here at.ABC News, good night.
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