MATRE AND BURNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000301490002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 30, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PUBLIC AFFFAIRS STAFF
The Fred Fiske Show
STATION WAMU-FM
DATE November 30, 1984 8:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Matte and Burns
[Technical difficulties]
LAWRENCE BURNS: ...the Liberal Party, which is the
President's, the current President's party, came out with a
statement saying that the country was occupied by American
troops, and this and that. He was expelled from the party.
We have, essentially, a military society in Honduras,
which hasn't reached, of course, the levels of violence, certain-
ly, as El Salvador or, in the past, Nicaragua. But it's not a
model society.
JOCHEM MATRE: Just a brief comment on that. You might
recall America always took exceptions to the very strong role
that the military played in Honduras. And to everybody's
surprise, Alvarez, the eminence grise in Honduras, was toppled by
the military. And the new generation of young officers seems to
be -- I'm not saying anti-American, but rather critical of
America's role within Honduras. There are objections to the
social fabric being torn apart by an overwhelming American
presence. We talk 1200 American soldiers there, by bases being
built, by ships calling regularly. This has changed, apparently.
And you have today, I think, a military that very much looks
after the national interests of Honduras, which is not what you
indicate -- namely, the role of a satrapy for the United States
of America.
FISKE: We can maybe get back to this discussion later
on. Let's turn our attention to the area in which most Americans
are most immediately interested, and that's the conflict between
Nicaragua and the United States. Nicaragua continues to insist
and to trumpet abroad and in its own country that they are in
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danger of an imminent invasion by the United States. The
President of the United States and people in his Administration
have repeatedly denied this, saying there's no intention to use
American troops in any such undertaking. Secretary of Defense
Weinberger the other day, in setting out the conditions under
which American troops would be used, clearly indicated that
Nicaragua certainly didn't fit any of those requirements.
What do you make of all of this? Do you think Nicarag-
ua, in fact, fears an invasion by the United States? or is she
using this in order to, for her own purposes, to rally her own
people behind her, to take their minds off some of the difficult-
ies, the disappointments that they've experienced with the
Sandinista regime, to gain world sympathy? What do you make of
it all?
MATRE: Well, let's interpret it from two viewpoints.
Number one, Ortega, when announcing the state of national
emergency, did that, I think, in particular, with the internal
situation on his mind. Nicaragua is in very bad shape economic-
ally. The population is very restive. You have roughly 15,000
Contras fighting the government in Managua. Ortega has to, come
up with some kind of an explanation for the predicament the
country finds itself in.
You have a war situation in Nicaragua. The export of
main products is back to zero. By the way, one can compare that
to El Salvador, which is in dire straits also, only from another
angle. You have to, in order to explain the necessity of
hardship to the population, find a guilty party. In this
particular case, of course, it is Uncle Sam up North.
I do not believe for one second that Ortega, whose
intelligence, I think, is outstanding, because it's provided
primarily by Soviet and East German forces, that these inform-
ations tell him that this country is not ready, in any way, to
land forces on Nicaraguan soil.
I also do believe that the Pentagon would not be able to
really pull through an invasion, because -- and let me emphasize
what Weinberger said just about two days ago -- it would be not
just risky, it would be irresponsible to commit American ground
forces in Central America without the consent of the population.
And when looking, even after November 6th, at the lack of
consent, you realize is in no position to commit forces against
Nicaragua.
BURNS: Well, I think the story is complicated. In
listening to the explanation about the hardships, it's as if the
hardships parachuted from the ethos. Actually, the hardships
that Nicaragua is suffering, it was a very calculated product of
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U.S. policy. A couple of years ago Nicaragua had the best growth
rate of any economy in Central America.
BURNS: It was up till '82. They had a growth rate of
three percent, whe Guatemala and El Salvador were having negative
growth rates and Costa Rica was having a negative growth rate,
and Honduras had no growth rate.
Then the United States put into effect a series, a very
sedulous policy, very, very concisely carried out, voting against
aid to Nicaragua in the Inter-American Development Bank, using
diplomatic means to persuade Western Europe to deny credits to
Nicaragua. The most recent example of that was the San Jose
meeting of the European Foreign Ministers, where Secretary Shultz
specifically told them we don't want economic aid to be given to
Nicaragua.
The United States cuts the sugar quota. The United
States closes down consulates, Nicaraguan consulates throughout
the country. There are a well-scripted plan of the United States
to destroy the Nicaraguan economy in order to breed unpopularity
amongst the population.
There is no question that the Sandinista government is
much less popular today than it was yesterday. And the reason
for that is that the generlity of population of any country don't
want to suffer. And if the government doesn't produce for that
population, restiveness and uneasiness occur.
FISKE: Well, what do we conclude from that, that the
talk about an imminent invasion is to deal with that, to take
people's thinking off their own difficulties?
BURNS: Well, I've been following this very closely, and
our contacts are as good as any, within the Administration. And
my own notion of this was that the decision about what to do with
Nicaragua has been very much up in the air within the Administ-
ration. It is by no means a very clear thing that there will be
no military action.
Now, we heard the phrase "ground forces" just used. But
that's never been in the script. It's always been aerial attacks
and naval attacks meant to destroy the Nicaraguan military
capacity, brodly defined to include economic targets, like oil
refineries and bridges and things of that sort.
MATRE: But primarily through the Contras, Larry. This
is very important.
BURNS: I don't think primarily through the Contras.
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MATRE: And when you talk proxy forces, let's...
BURNS: Yes, primarily through the Contras, primarily
through the Contras. But the Contras haven't been doing well, at
least in the past. And this produced a situation where U.S.
diplomacy risks the achievement of a Contadora peace process and
an election that would be witnessed by foreign observers which
would provide the government with the needed legitimacy to
survive, and a peace process that would enable them to cut back
on their very onerous military forces.
It is no great pleasure for a country like Nicaragua to
have to maintain a large military establishment. This not only
costs money, but in a country that is short of manpower, this
means that folks that could be spent engaged in economic activi-
ty, like harvesting the coffee crop, have to patrol the streets.
FISKE: Is that a broad definition of invasion that
you're giving us?
MATRE: Well, I think we should clarify here. Nicaragua
now is the only country in Central America that possesses main
battle tanks. We talk tanks in excess of 40 tons, 120 T-54/55
tanks. Those were bought a long time ago. The Contras only
really hit the surface about two years ago. I think Nicaragua
was on the road to armament, a very strong armament, a long time
before that.
It meets, by the way, with the definition of a very
strong socialist-oriented government, which we have in Managua.
I believe the militarization of Nicaragua, a nation of
2.5 million people having an army numbering roughly 80,000, is in
excess.
BURNS: An army numbering 80,000, or military forces?
MATRE: Military force.
BURNS: Okay.
MATRE: Military force, yes.
BURNS: Okay. You know, in adding up those military
forces, what are you including? Are you including the militia?
MATRE: Of course I do.
BURNS: Okay. You're including the ready reserve.
MATRE: Yes.
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BURNS: How large is the Guatemalan Army, then?
MATRE: In Guatemala, of course, you have unarmed civil
guards, if you talk about those, numbering about 400,000. But
they have no weapons.
BURNS: Well, the civil guards do have weapons.
MATRE: No.
BURNS: Well, they do.
MATRE: Sticks.
BURNS: they have weapons. And, in fact, there've been
a nubmer of very unfortunate incidents where people have been
killed.
MATRE: But, see, Guatemala has no common border with
Nicaragua. Let's just stick to Nicaragua and the problem with
Honduras and Salvador. I think we have a very good topic to talk
about for a long time. Guatemala poses no threat to Nicaragua.
BURNS: No, no, no. I was just -- I was bringing up
Guatemala because, you see, the Administration does this all the
time. They use shifting statistical bases. Sometimes, like with
Nicaragua, they include the militia. You're being relatively
accurate and moderate. The Administration will say "easily
150,000." That is, they always want that super-giant tube of
Crest.
FISKE: What are we to conclude from what you have said,
Professor Matre, that the arming several years ago indicates that
the Nicaraguans were in fact prepared to subvert their neighbors?
MATRE: Well, I would have to conclude that. The
primary explanation, of course, would have to be that any such
revolution will feel itself endangered by neighbors, whoever that
might be in this particular case. Now, you arm yourself to the
teeth to be prepared for all cases.
I just reject the explanation that it was caused,
somehow, by belligerent neighbors. Honduras never posed a
threat. Costa Rica certainly not at all. And Salvador is just
too far away from Nicaragua. I think it's really an attempt by
the Sandinist government to be ready for all circumstances. And
they are today.
If I were in charge of an American airborne division, I
would not really wish to send them into Nicaragua. I think the
chances are not very much in my favor. This is not saying that
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they would lose. I think the Americans could hack it, but the
losses would be tremendous. I wouldn't recommend any such
action.
BURNS: Well, it's very farfetched to say that Nicaragua
poses a military threat to any of its neighbors, as equally
farfetched as to say that its neighbors pose no threat to
Nicaragua.
Now, I don't see Honduran-based revolutionaries, exiles
attacking Honduras from Nicaragua. I'm sure the United States
would know what to do if that situation was in effect. But the
truth is, there have been no military actions against any of
Nicaragua's neighbors by Nicaragua, for the very simple reason
that if Nicaragua was the most [unintelligible] society in the
world, with a bunch of cutthroats running it, which it's not,
Nicaragua is well aware of the fact that Costa Rica and Honduras
and El Salvador don't stand by themselves, that on one aircraft
carrier off the coast of Nicaragua, off both coasts, is more
firepower than the entire country of Nicaragua put together. And
it's also aware of the fact...
MATRE: No disagreement when you talk about the American
firepower.
BURNS: Exactly. And the United States has preponderant
strength in Puerto Rico, in Texas and Florida that could be
within an hour over Nicaragua. And if you add up the figures
--and I admit those tanks. I don't know if there are 120, but
I've seen some of those tanks. They're pretty big. but you talk
to the Pentagon boys and they will clearly say those tanks are
absolutely defensive. They have no offensive capability. They
never could make it across the...
MATRE: The tank is an offensive weapon, always. It's a
gun that can travel.
BURNS: Well, the tank is not always an offensive
weapon. It's also a defensive weapon. It's frequently used for
defensive purposes, as it was used in Lebanon by the U.S. Marines
as a defensive weapon. And I was secundered, when I was in
England in the early '60s, to the British Army of the Rhine, and
I saw British tanks being used for purely defensive purposes. But
the Pentagon has never said that these tanks are offensive.
But why do you stick to tanks? Why don't you talk about
airplanes. And why don't you talk about logistical capacity? Why
don't you talk about telemetrical equipment? In every respect,
the El Salvadoran Army is superbly equipped army. And the
Honduran Army, today, is easily the match, except it's slightly
smaller, but only slightly smaller, than the Nicaraguan standing
army.
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You see, the problem is not folks like you, who tend to
be responsible in your analyses. But it's folks like President
Reagan or Weinberger, or that lot, who will get on the television
and they will say that Nicaragua has military forces larger than
all the other countries combined. That is just untrue.
FISKE: Well, is it?
MATRE: I tend to agree when you bring up the question
of air forces. I think at the present time Nicaragua does not
have the offensive capabilities needed to attack a neighbor under
the American umbrella. This is quite true.
FISKE: What about the shipment of Soviet arms that we
have been so concerned about in recent weeks? For a long time,
of course, it was denied that Nicaragua was receiving Soviet
arms. The talk was that they were receiving arms from their
neighbors or their friends, or old American arms from Vietnam,
and so on. It's clear now that they are receiving arms from the
Soviet Union in substantial numbers. We were slightly embarras-
sed by the flap concerning MiGs a few weeks ago. Now the concern
is renewed that MiGs may be on the way.
MATRE: Well, if MiGs were to be on the way, they could
cause, of course, a real problem for the neighbors. But one
would misunderstand the Nicaragua [unintelligible] altogether if
talking is concentrating too much about MiGs. I do believe if I
were in any position of power in Managua, requesting aid from the
Soviet Union, I would, in particular, ask for attack helicopters
with a great deal of firepower to deal with the Contras inside my
own country.
FISKE: Well, it turns out that those shipping cartons
or crates that we were concerned about, that we thought might
contain MiGs, did in fact contain helicopters.
MATRE: 24s, yes. The famous Hind helicopter, which is
causing havoc amongst the guerrillas in Afghanistan, a formidable
weapon. The Contras have even stated publicly that they could be
wiped out within about half a year if those weapons were increas-
ed in number.
I think -- you call it a flap. Indeed, it was regret-
table that the MiG-21 issue created, I think, really, in this
country, ever achieved this particular prominence. Because the
MiG-21, it doesn't really matter whether it's a very advanced
aircraft. It is not. It could only really pose a threat to
neighbors. This is not on the list of priorities of the Sandin-
istas, a real big issue. They certainly have no aggressive
design right now, I have to say carefully, on any other neighbor.
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The exclusion being -- Larry, we should talk about that -- El
Salvador.
I realize that accusations are being brought against the
CIA, and in a way rightly so, for not having come up with one
shipment. Indeed, as people say, of one Kalashnikov has been
intercepted. It's almost regrettable, if not ridiculous, that
our intelligence forces have not been able to come up with one
shipment. If the Nicaraguans are so strong in supplying the
rebels in Salvador with weapons, how come we haven't been able,
with all the means at our disposal, telemetric, reconnaissance
included, with that particular kind of interception.
But let's talk briefly about one particular advantage
the Salvadoran guerrillas do have in a very, very uncleared
border question with Honduras. The rebels in provinces of
Chelatenango (?), Morazon (?), Canbanans (?) and St. Miguel can
withdraw into those pockets, regroup, rearm themselves, and be on
the attack again. One of the major failures, I believe, of
American policy in the area is to have those two allies, in
quotation marks, sit together and clear that border question
first. I think the Nicaraguan issue of supplying, allegedly
suplying, weapons to El Salvador would disappear overnight.
Because, clearly, the Nicaraguans find it very difficult to get
shipments through, given particular military power of today, to
Salvador. The American intelligence in the area, is good enough
to intercept whatever is happening.
BURNS: I'm sorry. I don't get -- are we saying that
the Salvadoran guerrillas are being refurbished with weapons once
the Salvadoran guerrillas withdraw into those balsonis (?), those
enclaves? That's what we're saying?
MATRE: Yes, yes. They have pockets of resupplying them
BURNS: See, the problem about that is precisely what
you indicated. In the history of warfare, which I've studied a
bit, both here and in England, there is no such thing as a
significant military resupply situation where one airdrop, one
mule, one dugout canoe doesn't fall into the hands of the
adversary. Particularly, at its nearest point, El Salvador is,
what, 60 miles from Nicaragua across...
MATRE: Across the bay.
BURNS: No, I'm talking about across Honduran territory.
The bay is so well patroled by Salvadoran craft and Honduran
craft and U.S. spy ships, that I just don't understand -- in
fact, a lieutenant commander who was training the Salvadoran navy
forces in the Gulf of Fonseca was quoted in the San Diego Tribune
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a year or two ago saying that nothing's going in over the water.
In fact, the radar facility on Tiger Island was dismantled, which
was meant to be used to monitor these cross-water shipments,
because there was no business. It had no business.
I don't believe that anything's going in. I think that
nothing's been going in since 1981. And Ortega told me this.
And, of course, I never believe anyone. But -- and it was told
to me in a way which suggested that before, as an act of solidar-
ity, we assisted our friends in El Salvador. But when our own
survival was at stake, that this ended.
But for the United States -- actually, you remember at
that time, when this military aid was taking place, there was
merely a de facto government in El Salvador elected by no one.
And the guerrillas -- and particularly after the Mexican-French
initiative had as much diplomatic credibility as the government,
which was essentially a group of officers, and President Carter
and then President Reagan -- I don't think any weapons are going
through. And I think that the State Department has been under
great pressure to produce evidence, and they haven't been able to
produce it.
That is, if there is no evidence, why do we say that the
arms are going through? Even if they go into the balsonis.
MATRE: I wish I had a straightforward answer. Of
course, one misunderstanding rampant in this country here is that
the guerrillas are armed to the teeth and receive regular
supplies. It is -- let's just emphasize that, and I have
sympathy for the warring parties -- it's called a low-intensity
war. The guerrillas really have very basic weapons. We talk
about assault rifles. We talk about mortars. We do not talk
about ground-to-air missiles, for instance.
About two months ago a rumor was started in Mexico that
the guerrillas in Morazon were receiving, for to first time,
Soviet SA missiles. And they very quickly denied this because
they realized it would have meant, in all likelihood, upping the
ante again, forcing the Salvadorans to demand for particular
counter ground forces.
The guerrillas have been extremely careful in their
demand for particular weapons because they can hold out, I think,
for quite some time with what they have. No large shipments are
required.
If only, from my viewpoint, the Pentagon came through,
and the CIA, and said, "We are talking about large supplies," as
if they were needed. We talk about a guerrilla war where you do
have rifles, basic ammunition, and can last with that being
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supplied about once every six months for a long, long time to
come. But I think the debate is, unfortunately, carried on a
very irrational level.
FISKE: Let's talk about the Contras for a moment. The
United States Congress decided some time ago not to provide funds
for them. We have continued to fund the Contras from other
sources, presumably CIA. There are indications now that the
Congress is going to take a firm stand. Senator Durenberger, who
will head the Senate Intelligence Committee, said only yesterday
that he favors discontinuation of all funds to the Contras.
What do you suspect will happen? Will we in fact stop
funding the Contras? And if we do, what will the effects be?
BURNS: There is right now in the Administration a
passionate amount of inter-bureaucratic dispute going on over
Central American policy. It involves the CIA, the civilian
leadership of the Pentagon, and certain elements of the National
Security Council arrayed against the career Foreign Service
officer establishment in the State Department. The State
Department folks look upon the repercussions of U.S. policy
elsewhere in the world. They also are concerned about -- that
the purpose of diplomacy is diplomacy, and not war.
The Defense Department -- that is, Weinbergerand his
immediate political advisers, people like Fred Ikle and Nestor
Sanchez, are thinking in terms of a military solution, as are
elements of the National Security Council, and certainly the CIA.
The ideologues...
MATRE: Do you include Weinberger? He just said he
would not.
BURNS: Well, the statements that Weinberger has made,
including his rather exotic exhumation of the Monroe Doctrine as
a guiding point of U.S. policy, in reviewing the statements that
he's made in the past three weeks, his statements have been of a
far more incendiary nature than have been the statements coming
out from Secretary of State Shultz, clearly. Clearly, they are.
And, you know, one has to readily acknowledge that
Weinberger knows little about the region, except that this is a
prong, as he sees it, of Soviet expansionism. I think that a
more sober analysis would see something else.
What I'm trying to suggest here is that the elimination
of Marxism, as defined by the Reagan Administration, is such an
article of credal faith on the part of those around Reagan, and
Reagan himself, that they are just not going to close shop on
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efforts to get rid of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. And
this is why they went to such great lengths to discredit the
election. And this is why they are proving to be obstructionists
with Contadora.
FISKE: Well, what do you suspect can happen? How can
they keep this effort going if, in fact, the Congress again
states its opposition to funding?
MATRE: One should be pragmatic. I do not expect a
renewal of aid for the Contras from this Congress, no matter what
the political balance is in Washington right now. It cannot be
done. The hostility in the country is such, in particular in the
media, it's just too great.
Then the Contras -- this is the next question -- can
they make it on their own? I think yes.
MATRE: I think the economic situation in Nicaragua will
worsen. You will have increasing numbers of Nicaraguans joining
the other side. I'm of course speculating. But looking at
Afghanistan, where the situation is so much more frantic for the
guerrillas, it doesn't look good for the Soviets, because they
are considered in Afghanistan an occupational force. And the
Cubans in Nicaragua are considered an occupational force.
For that reason, I do believe that the Contras will have
to make do with a lot less. I also do believe they have been
oversupplied in the past. I think aid from this country was
generous. The Contras should not have helicopters. They have no
base for them, they cannot maintain them, and a helicopter is a
very expensive item. I think,with regular arms, with an increas-
ing number of combatants on the ground, they will cause trouble
for the government in Managua for a long time to come. And the
Administration in Washington would be wise to acknowledge soon
that a particular experience in Central America advises against
military action -- that is, Guatemala.
FISKE: Where will their support come from?
MATRE: What do you need as a guerrilla? You need
friendly territory, you need hand weapons, you need ammunitions.
That can be supplied, and it can be gathered from Sandinist
forces.
Look at El Salvador. I was trying to get at this
particular point. It is obviously quite true that the rebel
factions within El Salvador do have the occasional opportunity to
replenish their ammunitions depots, their weapons depots from the
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attack on the garrison. There is really, militarily speaking,
very little difference -- I would like to emphasize militarily
speaking. Chances are the Contras will survive for a long time
to come, causing great difficulty for the government.
BURNS: So, what we have here is one needn't posit a
source of outside supply, as we did before, in terms of Nicarag-
uan aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas, in order to maintain the
Salvadoran guerrillas. But the Nicaraguan guerrillas, they can
operate without an outside source of supply.
MATRE: I am not saying that. They have private
supplies coming from Miami. Let's face it. At the same time,
being supported also by both Honduras and Costa Rica, in a
logistical sense.
BURNS: Let me now suggest a different scenario, that
rather than too little, the sums of money that were spent on the
Contras -- rather than too much, have been far too little. There
is no way that a force numbering anywheres from 12 to 15 thous-
and, even if you take the outside large figure, could operate
with the kind of utilization of equipment that they had and their
far-flung operations on that kind of money. It takes a lot of
money to run a military force of that kind, a lot of money.
MATRE: Would you apply that to Salvador as well?
BURNS: Yes.
MATRE: To the Salvadoran...
BURNS: It's a different kind of thing. First of all,
the Salvadoran guerrillas don't have a air capacity. They don't
have a sea capacity. They don't have the kind of equipment, the
sophisticated equipment that the Nicaraguan guerrillas have.
BURNS: Well, Nicaraguan guerrillas use much heavier
field guns than do the Salvadoran guerrillas. Their weaponry is
much more -- it's brand-new U.S. military stock. There have been
pictures shown on TV of the Contras proudly opening up U.S.
military equipment that had been manufactured within the preced-
ing eight months.
Anyone who's seen the Nicaraguan -- I went up to the
Nicaraguan front lines. They were using, a year or so ago, six
different basic field rifles. And you can imagine the supply and
replenishment problems that that presented for them.
The Contras have been getting a lot of money, but it's
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always traced back to the same source. It's CIA money. And it's
money that not only comes through a direct appropriation that we
know of, the $24 million, but also the CIA has chronically
endowed institutes, foundations, some of them fake, some of them
pre-existing, which are used as surrogate backdoor financing
operations for the Contras.
That's why these people aren't screaming right now
because they have no money. The money, ostensibly, has dried up
several months ago. But they're not really complaining too
loudly, because they're operating at the same financial level,
more or less, that they've always operated in.
MATRE: You're assuming that. You do not know it. And
I don't know it, either.
BURNS: Oh, I know it.
MATRE: But are you then saying that if those flows were
finally dammed up, the insurrection in Nicaragua would cease?
BURNS: Yes. Yes. For this reason: First of all, you
say that you -- you compare Nicaragua to Afghanistan, in a way,
and you say that just like the Soviets -- that is, clearly,
Afghanistan is an occupied country by the Soviet Union. Clearly,
the Afghanistan government is a figment of somebody's imaginat-
ion.
MATRE: It's a puppet government.
BURNS: Right. Now, certainly you're not prepared to
say the same thing about Nicaragua.
There are Cubans in Nicaragua. What? There are
probably a thousand. Castro says 200 military advisers. The
State Department and the Defense Department say two to three
thousand Soviets and Cubans. I would say it would be fair to say
there's a thousand in -- there are advisers to government
agencies.
But Afghanistan borders the Soviet Union. Nicaraguan
doesn't border the Soviet Union. Nicaragua owes nothing to
Russia for its successful revolution. There are other countries
whose debt it's in. Of course, Costa Rica, Panama and Mexico.
The Sandinista Army is not a nine-to-five army. It's an
army that's grown out of a military revolutionary process. it
maintains a high level of loyalty. There are very few instances
where Nicaraguan military have run, run away from the Contras.
The Contras don't have a history, they don't have the
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autonomy that the Salvadoran guerrillas have. In no way are they
comparable. And they certainly are -- the Salvadoran guerrillas
are a lot less bestial than the...
FISKE: Let's get your reaction to what Larry's just
said. And then I want to invite listeners to join our discus-
sion.
MATRE: It will be important, though, to stress that
Nicaragua, on its own, could not be the formidable political
power in the area -- and I stress the fact political expansionist
power -- that it would be without Cuban, East German, Bulgarian,
even PLO presence in Nicaragua. The country is backed indeed by
the socialist super-international army, call it, to distinguish
it from Kreisky, Willy Brandt and Olof Palme. You do have a
Marxist-Leninist philosophy strongly backing Nicaragua. The
declarations of loyalty whenever Daniel Ortega goes to the Soviet
Union. You read Pravda or Neues Deutschland or Trud, you realize
it is a brother country, with support thrown in from all these
countries. Nicaragua is not alone. And it does have a common
border with Cuba, even if it's a watery border.
Nicaragua is not alone, as compared to, let's say, in
the area, Salvador is today, which enjoys, of course, tremendous
support from America.
It is indeed not a civil war that you see in Nicaragua
alone. It is an international ideological war.
FISKE: Let's invite our listeners to join the discus-
sion. The other important point that we'll cover a little while
later on, particularly the World Court and the role that it may
play in all of this. But we have time to get to that.
...We're discussing the problems of Central America,
with particular emphasis on Nicaragua. At our microphones, Dr.
Jochem Matre, Professor of International Relations at Boston
University, a writer on Central America and on military matters
for the Wall Street Journal, among other publications; and
Lawrence Burns, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
Good evening.
MAN: Let me pick up a few points that I think Dr. Matre
may have missed which Larry sort of tossed by and nobody picked
up on which I think are fascinating in terms of a better under-
standing of what's going on down there.
Larry gave the excuse for Nicaraguan -- the justifica-
tion for Nicaraguan aid to the guerrillas in El Salvador in '79,
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'80, '81 period as being, well, the government was a collection
of military people. It really wasn't a government in the sense
that we know of. And anyway, the French and the Mexicans
recognized the guerrillas.
Well, that isn't quite true. Whatever government was in
El Salvador and San Salvador was recognized as the government of
the country by everybody concerned, including the French and the
Mexicans, who chose to recognize the guerrillas as a political
movement, not a government. And I think there's quite a bit of
distinction there.
Secondly, I think it's instructive that it was only
after the aid -- the Carter Administration was clearly out of
office that the Nicaraguans changed their mind. I mean under the
previous Administration, we were giving all kind of we were
giving quite a bit of aid to the Nicaraguan government, and they
felt free to practice their friendly assistance to revolution-
aries in El Salvador, and maybe elsewhere, unhindered by any
constraint. It's quite clear that the Reagan policy made them
think again about doing that, no matter what the situation in El
Salvador was. That's the first point.
The second point...
FISKE: Well, hang on a minute. You've made a long
first point, so let's deal with that. And then we probably will
have to move along.
MAN: Well, I want to make another point that I think is
FISKE: Gentlemen, would you like to react?
BURNS: I don't know how much strong feelings I have
about this. But I think that the Salvadoran government in the
period that we're now discussing was as legitimate a government
as the Afghanistan government the Soviets installed, in that it
was a government that was self-created and -- I'm sure there are
lots of countries that have embassies in Afghanistan and recog-
nize the Afghanistan government. That may make it a government
in terms of international law, but it doesn't make it a govern-
ment in terms of higher law. And there was clearly a super-
imposition by outside authorities.
And what I was trying to suggest is that the Salvadoran
guerrillas have been fighting for decades, and they have been
fighting against a series of unjust, brutal military regimes; and
that it was only natural that a victorious government in Nicarag-
ua would give -- that came to power via a revolutionary action,
would want to give them some kind of aid.
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MATRE: One remark. When Somoza fell, in the summer of
1979, shortly thereafter in Salvador a group of military officers
decided to stage a coup along left-wing lines, very much intimid-
ated by what had happened to Somoza. When the dictatorial
government in Salvador was removed by a five-head military junta,
actually, the rebels could have considered their cause solved
because they were invited to participate. But you'll recall the
real violence in San Salvador broke out following the coup in
Salvador. In other words, the guerrillas did not consider that
particular reform government progressive enough.
And I think the entire violence you have today, to this
very day in El Salvador is the direct consequence of a radical
guerrilla movement that wanted the whole hog.
MAN: One other point I want to make. Look at, sure, I
go along with the fact that the MiG-21s are maybe defensive. But
I think that has a lot to do with the U.S. just not putting up
with Soviet-influenced air operations of any kind over that
region. And I think, clearly, the example will be Lebanon and
has been Lebanon when the Israelis went in there on the ground.
The thing about the tanks is that, yeah, they can be
used as offensive weapons. You know, they could go down into
Costa Rica and all that. And they also can be used, as the
Soviets used them many times, as defensive weapons. But even
more importantly, as was the case in Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
they are rather effective weapaons in internal suppression. And
that many tanks suggests something other than just defending the
fatherland against outside invaders. I think they have quite a
bit of understanding how a tank can be used as a weapon of
internal suppression.
FISKE: Okay. If. that's the point, thank you.
BURNS: I would just like to comment on something Jochem
said. The real violence in El Salvador began after 1980, in the
early months of 1980 and in the late months of '79. Now, the
overthrow of the military government in El Salvador occurred in
October of '79. The first junta, presided over by Guillermo
Ungo, resigned at the end of December of 1979 because the
military -- it could not exercise control over the military, and
a wave of killings by the security forces were breaking out. This
wave of killing never ended. Ultimately, it added up to, today,
upwards of 50,000 people. There's nothing comparable that's
happened in Nicaragua.
And the reason why the violence occurred was very clear.
It is because the nominal civilian head, first Ungo, then Duarte,
had no effective control over the military establishment.
FISKE: Good evening.
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MAN: I lived in Costa Rica for about five years when I
was in high school, and then I went back and I was there for two
years at the university. And I'd like to give you my insight.
In the first place, you're all mishmashing Salvador,
Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica like they're one big boiling
pot. And they're not. These are separate countries and they've
each got their own little border disputes. Salvador and Nicarag-
ua -- sorry. Honduras and Salvador have their own soccer war
that goes way back. And so they're not that together on this,
together against Nicaragua, by any means. In fact, they're very
suspicious of each other.
But I had the impression you were more into Nicaragua.
So my comment on Nicaragua is that the leadership -- about the
same time that the CIA handbook, you know, telling them to
neutralize, you know, Communists in Nicaragua, at the same time
that that came out, the leadership in Nicaragua -- I don't know
if it was Chamorro -- I'm sorry, the leadership of the anti-
Sandinists. I think it was one of these guys in Florida. He
came out and said, "I'm sick of the CIA help. I'm sick of this
U.S. aid." Because, basically, they guaranteed that we would be
in power in about a year. Well, it's been about two years now
that the U.S. has been supporting the anti-Sandinists. And the
anti-Sandinists finally recognized that the U.S. never really
planned to put them anywhere, except to pretty much use them as a
boder guard for the supposed weapons flow that was going into
Salvador, which was never proven, in the first place.
But they realized that -- I think they're starting to
realize that this is turning into one of these -- you know, it's
a type of thing that I think Kissinger -- this Representative
from Washington state was in on it too. They said, "Well, either
you're going to hemorrhage Central America to death, or you're
going to have -- or you're going to go one way or the other.
There's going to be a decision or they're going to hemorrhage
down there."
And right now we've got a hemorrhage, an East-West type
struggle there. And, you know, things are going to kind go on
for indefinitely. And that's my comment.
FISKE: All right. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, reaction?
MATRE: Well, just one remark. I think when you talk
about Washington's aim in Central America, regarding Nicaragua,
we're not really sure. One can go as far as to say that there is
no Washington policy regarding Nicaragua.
FISKE: We're ad-libbing, aren't we?
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MATRE: On the one hand, yes indeed. On the one hand,
we maintain diplomatic relations with a country that is consider-
ed an enemy. On the other hand, we are supporting the Contra
forces, explaining that they are there 15,000, on the upper hand,
strong in order to intercept weapons between -- or, rather, to
have the Managua government cease shipping weapons to El Salvad-
or; while the Contras, clearly, have only one aim: to topple the
government.
Now, the American government has never publicly said
that this is their aim.
FISKE: Didn't Chamorro, the man he referred to, say the
other day that in fact he was told by the CIA that this was the
aim?
MATRE: Yes, indeed. And I think the disappointment
within the Contras must be understood from that viewpoint. They
clearly do not wish to be cannon fodder for the Americans. They
want freedom in Managua, and not just intercept weapons across
the Bay of Fonseca.
There's a deep dichotomy, I think, that America is
paying for dearly because the population in this country, which
thinks, rightly so, it is entitled to the truth, does not believe
it's getting the truth.
BURNS: Well, I would just like to veer the conversation
a little bit. When I go to sleep at night I sometimes have
fantasies of this and that. And one of my fantasies would be to
reverse the situation and raise the question that when the United
States augmented its helicopter force in El Salvador, Salvadoran
helicopter force, from 18 to 40, and now soon to 52...
MATRE: Forty-two. I'm sorry. The upper limit is 42.
BURNS: They right now have 40.
MATRE: No, no, 33. Sorry. The last nine are in the
pipeline. Sorry.
BURNS: Well, they may be in the pipeline, but -- that
is, the...
MATRE: The declared limit, according to the military
assistance, is 42 helicopters, all together. It's perhaps a
small point, but...
BURNS: Well, I very clearly remember a New York Times
article just the other day which said that they have an inventory
of 40 and they'll soon be getting 12 more.
But were the Nicaraguans consulted whether this would be
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a threat, an offensive threat against Nicaragua? Or did we
assume, as the State Department has always suggested, that
Salvador has the sovereign right, the central government has the
sovereign right to defend itself against external enemies?
Now, what right does -- let's put it another way. When
the United States pours military weaponry, including nuclear
weapons, into such border countries as Pakistan and Turkey and
Norway, does it raise the question whether the Soviets might be
piqued, that the Soviets may get the wrong impression?
MATRE: Larry, Larry. Both Norway and Pakistan are
nuclear-free. The NATO member Norway refuses to receive...
BURNS: Well, right. But there are NATO bases and there
are offensive weapons in both countries. In Turkey there are
nuclear weapons.
It would seem to me that it's the height of arrogance on
the part of this country -- I mean I noticed with interest that
Mr. Weinberger brought out the Monroe Doctrine as a justification
for U.S. concern about the arms buildup in Nicaragua, but didn't
quote the other section of the Monroe Doctrine which said that
the United States will not meddle in European affairs, a very
clear provision of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine.
But the United States backyard is apparently on the
Soviet border, as well as it is in Central America. And the
United States writ is supreme.
It seems to me that it's the sovereign right of any
country to arm itself if it feels threatened, to bring in weapons
without clearing permission from other countries. Clearly, the
United States assumes that its NATO allies have the right to do
this. And yet we do not ask ourselves the question: How does
Nicaragua feel in terms of the buildup taking place across the
border? A buildup which is far more formidable, in most res-
pects, than has taken place in Nicaragua.
FISKE: Do you want to react to that?
MATRE: Just briefly, in particular on the helicopters.
Let us not compare, please, the 24 Hind helicopter, which is a
formidable attack helicopter, with those very dated Hueys that we
are sending as transport choppers, in particular, into El
Salvador.
The number you mentioned -- let,'s assume it were 50. I
wish it were, but it's really only 42. Half of those are unarmed
helicopters, Vietnam vintage. They pose no threat to anybody.
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But your point, I think, is very well taken regarding
arms deliveries into Nicaragua. I wish we would face that
squarely. It is a sovereign nation. As long as we maintain
diplomatic relations with this country, it is a very tricky issue
to what extent one is ethically justified to actually conduct
covert war against the country. It's really a question of
international law.
Now, my mind may be made up on this, but many other
people's minds are not made up. And right now we are facing, of
course, World Court action, one way or the other, dealing with
this issue. And there Will, in all likelihood, be a clarificat-
ion. It is a very serious issue because, as you say, the Monroe
Doctrine had two sides to the coin, and we tend to interpret one
side only.
One afterthought on the sovereign nation to arm itself
as it sees fit. In 1962 Cuba, under protest to the Soviet Union,
did allow particular offensive weapons to be removed. And this,
I think, is considered the application of the Monroe Doctrine in
the case of Cuba. And perhaps in Washington, a large number of
people in the State Department and elsewhere still believes this
can be done successfully as regards Nicaragua.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I was wondering if maybe we could get a clarifi-
cation on the last exchange. Did I understand-Larry Burns to:say
that Pakistan has NATO bases and that the United States has
poured nuclear weapons into Pakistan? Did he actually say that?
BURNS: No, I didn't really say that. What I was saying
was that the United States is a military supplier of Pakistan,
has provided large military credits to Pakistan.
MAN: No nuclear weapons.
BURNS: Has supplied Pakistan with first-rate aircraft.
MAN: But no nuclear weapons.
BURNS: No nuclear weapons, right.
MAN: And they're not a NATO country, are they?
BURNS: No, they're not a NATO country.
MAN: Very good. Okay.
Now, Fred, the last time you had Larry went on, he went
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21
to great lengths to discuss what he called limited press freedom
in Nicaragua, and he cited La Prensa as an example. Now, the
editor for La Prensa was in Japan two weeks ago. And I picked up
from the wires, UPI, AP and Reuters, his story about what was
going on in Nicaragua. He says there's been no press freedom in
Nicaragua, whatsoever -- his word. You know, no press freedom,
whatsoever -- for over two years. He said the Sandinistas have
used agents from labor unions to shut down the presses. They've
organized mobs to intimidate the nonunion workers and the
editors, that they've denied La Prensa's purchasing agents
foreign exchange so they could buy needed equipment, that they've
denied them paper so they could print, that they've shut them
down at least once for an extended period of time.
Now -- oh, he said the only thing they haven't done yet,
and he emphasized yet, was start murdering people. He said
that's the only thing that's left, and he expected that to start
happening.
FISKE: We have about a minute before news time, sir.
MAN: Now, my question is this: Larry several times has
pointed out that he has a direct line to Daniel Ortega, and on
several occasions he's spoken of freedom of the press in Nicarag-
ua. My question is this: Given what the editor of La Prensa
says when he got out of Nicaragua, who am I to believe, the
editor of La Prensa or Larry Burns and Daniel Ortega?
BURNS: Well, maybe the three of us are lying. Certain-
ly Pedro Joaquin Chamorro is lying.
I don't have a direct line to Ortega. I've spoken to
CIA officials far more than I've spoken to Daniel Ortega. I've
spoken to Daniel Ortega once.
MAN: You were my source for that, Mr. Burns. I don't
know any CIA agents.
BURNS: I think that La Prensa is a scandalous news-
paper. I also think -- and we have every year that we've issued
our press freedom survey, we have taken note that there has
been...
FISKE: Let me interrupt. This is an interesting
exchange.... Let's continue it following the news.
FISKE: We're talking about Central America with Larry
Burns, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs; and
Professor Jochem Matre of Boston University and a writer on
Central America and military matters.
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.We have a gentlemen on the line....
MAN: Where we left was Larry Burns explaining that he
believed Chamorro to be a liar. Now, as I mentioned earlier,
Chamorro, in Japan, when he got out of Nicaragua, said that there
was no press freedom in Nicaragua for two years. Now, my
question was, why shouldn't I believe Chamorro? And Larry
responded, because Chamorro is a liar. Now, what I'd like to
know, in what respect is he a liar? Is_he lying about there
having been no freedom of press in Nicaragua for two years? And
how do you know that?
BURNS: Well, of course he's lying about that. Actual-
ly, I suggested that all the folks involved in this were lying. I
didn't only mean Chamorro.
FISKE: It's a pretty broad brush, right?
BURNS: A broad brush, of course.
Nicaragua has a very, very poor press. La Prensa looks
good when only compared to the other two newspapers there. But
certainly in terms of international journalism, it stinks.
For example, when I was down there in '81, the United
Nations had just concluded a meeting on ethnicity, on indigenous
cultures. And they had, at that point, kind words to say about
what the Nicaraguans, at that point, were trying to do in terms
of their indigenous population. Not a word about that meeting --
after all, how many U.N. meetings are there in Managua? Not a
word about that meeting appeared in La Prensa.
Ortega gives a speech, a very important speech, the
other day about military threats against the country, and this
and that. Not a word about that in La Prensa.
Now, is that a real newspaper? It's a newspaper that is
engaged in -- it's an adversary. It's a newspaper that's engaged
in a titanic struggle with the government.
MAN: But Larry, you presented La Prensa to us, on the
many times you've been: on this program, as an example of freedom
of the press in Nicaragua. I'm not concerned about the quality
of their reporting.
FISKE: I believe he's right, Larry. You have done
MAN: I'd suggest that there are many newspapers in the
United States that both you and I would agree are rather poorly
put together and they don't cover enough things. The question
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is, does freedom of the press exist in Nicaragua? Chamorro says
no. You call him a liar.
BURNS: No. I think that historically, up until 1982,
there was no press freedom -- there was no press restrictions in
Nicaragua. From 1982 on, the restrictions were rather severe,
and, you know, mainly against La Prensa. After the electoral law
was announced this year, censorship was lifed. That is, prior
clearance of news articles, censorship -- let's call it censor-
ship -- was lifted, except on two grounds: security, meaning
military operations; and also certain economic questions.
Now, La Prensa didn't really have much trouble with the
government during the latest period.
Now, in terms of newsprint availability and that sort of
stuff, La Prensa publishes every day. It was -- the paper was
closed down, closed itself down for an extended period of time.
The government never closed it down.
MAN: So Chamorro's a liar, then.
BURNS: No, he never said that. I think that you
misinterpreted what he said.
MAN: No, sir. No,
BURNS: Believe me, you misinterpreted.
MAN: I'll send Fred a Xerox, and he can be the arbiter
FISKE: Do you have anything to add to this?
MATRE: Well, just on the principle of freedom of the
press. The First Amendment in this country includes my right to
put out a truly lousy newspaper.
MATRE: And when you do talk about freedom of the
FISKE: A lot of people take advantage of that, don't
they?
MATRE: Absolutely, in many, many countries, both East
and West, I think.
When you talk about the free press, you talk about the
availability of newsprint. And as you know, the economy, all
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imports are regulated by the government; availability of foreign
exchange, only through the government. The government that has
introduced those laws exercises tremendous power.
BURNS: Oh, sure it does.
MATRE: And it wouldn't be proper to say, I think, La
Prensa only closes itself down. There were days when so much was
censored out, out of the copy, that the paper decided it wasn't
really -- it was a betrayal of the public to bring out a news-
paper.
BURNS: The point was that the government closed down La
Prensa for an extended period. That was the point I was counter-
ing.
MATRE: Yes. But in particular, prior to the...
BURNS: I have not problem at all in saying...
MATRE: During the electoral campaign, for instance.
Of course, we do talk about ideological war within
Nicaragua. And, of course, Vallacarta (?), also called bully
carta (?), the Big Bull, by the population in Nicaragua, did not
cover, acutally, La Cruces' (?) rallies with particular joy.
BURNS: I think you're probably right.
MATRE: Because there's a war on. I mean having agreed
to that, we do realize freedom of the press in the hands of a
government that does not necessarily nurse freedom with vigor is
a misnomer.
FISKE: Let's devote a little time to this business of
the World Court. It's pretty generally conceded now that we made
a mistake in the way we handled that. We kind of withdrew,
denied the court's jurisdiction over the case. The court was
outraged and they're going ahead with the trial anyway. We find
ourselves in a very, very delicate, very difficult situation
here, don't we? What's likely to result?
BURNS: Well, I read a Washington Post editorial the
other day -- you know, a typical Washington Post Central American
editorial: bad. In this editorial, it chided the United States'
conduct vis-a-vis the World Court. And then it came forth with a
rather inaccurate analysis of the disuse of the court, leaving
out all sorts of cases that were germane, that were relevant to
the kind of ruling that the court's being called upon to make in
Nicaragua. And then it ends up with a sentence suggesting that
the Reagan Administration has a strong case to make and should
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really look forward to making it before the court.
Well, of course, what's ludicrous about that line in the
editorial is that the Reagan Administration has an extremely weak
case to make. It cannot say that its reason for press censorship
in Nicaragua [sic], which is getting the U.S. involved and
staging massive- maneuvers against Nicaragua, and so forth.
Because, obviously, press censorship in right-wing dictatorships
in Latin America have never troubled the Reagan Administration.
It cannot really say that the Nicaraguans will not talk
to the Contras, they will not dialogue with them, because the
United States is against this kind of power-sharing in El
Salvador.
If you go through all of the kinds of things, ostens-
ibly, that would provide the Reagan Administration with an
argument, you see that they have no argument. The problem really
is that this argument cannot stand up to scrutiny. That is, in
the Washington Post...
FISKE: So you think that the court decision will favor
the Sandinista position.
BURNS: Of course. Of course it's going to favor it.
FISKE: All right. Now, what position will that put us
MATRE: Well, I don't know if that will be the decision.
I don't wish to speculate on that.
However, I think if there's any consistency in Washing-
ton's argument regarding the World Court, the White House and the
State Department will have to remain very stubborn in continuing
not to recognize the World Court's authority in this very field.
And I predict this is exactly what will happen, because...
BURNS: Yes. But you see, to make the statement, as the
United States did, that it will not recognize the court for a
two-year period, it is so banal, it is so pitiful, it is such a
wretched, embarrassing position for this-country to take, with
Reagan talking out against terrorism and calling for a rule of
law in the United States. Here he says that, like the stubborn
bully on the block, "No. I'm picking up my marbles and going off
from this game."
MATRE: But Reagan is doing that, the Administration,
regarding UNESCO. And there is a very definite opportunity to do
other things like it. For instance, our refusal to sign the Law
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of the Sea Treaty. I think the World Court will be up next on
the target list. After all, another body, another world body
that is not recognizing our principles of freedom and internat-
ional exchange. It really is a clash of ideas.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I have one question that I'd like both your guests
to try to answer, if they could. This whole MiG crisis. One
White House official was quoted in The Post last week, I think,
as saying -- or two weeks ago -- that it was an exercise in
perception management. And I get the impression that Reagan is
drawing a line in Central America and daring the Nicaraguans to
cross it. And I wonder, you know, what might be the next move.
And my question is, what your guests think is the
feasibility of a U.S. naval quarantine of Nicaragua, both
tactically, as a military maneuver, an effective military
maneuver, and politically, in terms of winning the support of the
American public.
FISKE: Why don't you take that first?
MATRE: A quarantine? I understand the word was first
used by Candidate Mondale. I think little of it, in military
terms. You cannot really quarantine Nicaragua today unless you
do it for two years. You can fly in whatever you wish to. You
cannot attack the very basis of the government on that level.
To go back to the MiGs, to give you one example. Let's
just assume that the Nicaraguans have two MiG squadrons numbering
18 each stationed on Cuba. There is absolutely no reason why
that should not be the case, why the Nicaraguans have been
playing it very cool, having those particular squadrons there,
flying them whenever they please or when the balloon should go
up.
I think the quarantine is a ploy, is a game that can be
played in terms of public relations. Militarily speaking, I see
no power in it.
FISKE: Would you like to address that one first, Larry?
MAN: If that's the case -- and you',ve already said, Dr.
Matre, that you doubt whether there's support among the American
public for a ground action in Nicaragua -- what do you think will
happen if Nicaragua -- or do you think that Reagan is going to
take action against Nicaragua if they get MiGs, as he's already
said that he won't allow that?
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MATRE: I do not believe that action will be taken.
MAN: Oh. Well, that's reassuring.
FISKE: Well, how is he going to not allow it if he
doesn't take action?
MATRE: Well, let me just quote Jimmy Carter in 1979
rearding the Soviet brigade, and he also said "over my dead
body." And, of course, no further word was lost.
Internationally, the situation is extremely complicated.
You can threaten verbally. But when push comes to shove, I think
you can just swallow your words and tolerate those MiG-21s, which
are really not big-threat aircraft, in my estimation.
BURNS: Well, you see, I have to admit that I think this
is a loony Administration...
MATRE: I didn't say that, though.
BURNS: No, no. But I'm saying it. No, you didn't say
that. You're a cautious, decorous man, but I'm not.
I think it's a loony Administration. And I think that
what has taken place in the past few weeks is very dangerous, is
very ominous indeed. What has taken place is this: that a
justification and a denaturization of the -- of a kind of almost
juridical basis for the United States to have the right to go in
and interdict those planes, those MiGs coming in has been set. In
fact, even Senator Dodd and Senator Sasser, two traditional
critics of Administration Central American policy, to my light,
have totally rolled over. They've said if the MiGs come in, we
have a right to take them out. Now, what right do we have to
take them out? becomes the question.
Now, my assumption is that if the Nicaraguans --even
more to the point, in his Meet the Press program, Weinberger sort
of edged away from the MiGs and just spoke about the military
buildup taking place in Nicaragua, talking about the guns and the
bullets that are coming in, as if at a certain threshold the
United States might feel, though he didn't say this, the United
States might feel impelled to do something militarily to Nicarag-
ua in order to deal with what they describe as an overwhelming
balance of power in the region.
Now, we do know that very upgraded option papers were
prepared, both last year and this year, for a military exercise
against Nicaragua that would involve aerial and naval actions on
the part of the United States, based on the pretext that a
Honduran provocation would elicit a Nicaraguan response which
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would set into action the same type of juridical framework that
occurred with Grenada -- that is, the OECS, which in Central
America would be CANDECA (?), the Central American Defense
Community, would go to the United States and say, "Look, Hondur-
as, our ally is being attacked. We ask you to come in and help
to defend us."
In this instance, the United States -- this was the plan
Pegasus of last year. I don't know the name of the plan this
year. But the United States would bring in military action.
I believe that if the right configuration of elements
are there, the United States will yield to a desire on the part
of many in the Administration to have a military bash at Nicarag-
ua.
MAN: Do you think they could get away with it, from the
public opinion?
BURNS: I think that the public reaction in this country
would be very short-lived.
MATRE: Well, let's go back to the Weinberger statement,
which is now only about three days ago. I do exclude that
possibility right now. Weinberger said, "Without support in
Congress, we can not and should not do it."
CANDECA, by the way, is defunct. It doesn't work at all
any longer. So this particular group couldn't come to Washing-
ton.
BURNS: But it's been succeeded by another military
arrangement.
MATRE: Yes. But at the same time, tensions are running
high in the area. I do not believe the countries would get
together on that very level, under American authority in particu-
lar.
But let me be more cautionary, I think. President
Reagan, in his second term, very much looks as if he would like
to embark on a new course of detente worldwide. It very much
looks since the appointment of -- or, rather, the reappointment,
the staying in the job of Secretary Shultz, the letting go of
Ambassador Kirkpatrick in the United Nations. I do predict there
will be accommodation between Nicaragua and Washington.
FISKE: Well, it'll be interesting to see.
Good evening.
MAN: I'd like to chat just very briefly about the
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terminology, the semantics of what's going on down there, so
maybe people can get a clearer idea.
In your newscast just about 15 minutes ago, the newsman
said something about 6000 right-wing Contras to be infiltrated.
And that immediately puts a black hat on these guys. And, of
course, they've been labeled as Contras, which implies that
they're counterrevolutionaries, which means counter-reform,
against reform. And I would suggest we can better, more clearly
understand what's going on down there is we realize that they are
not counterrevolutionaries, they are revolutionary Contras.
The leadership of that movement is almost unanimously
anti-Somoza in their, background. They were the same people, they
gave the civil rights, the human rights legitimacy to the
revolution five years ago and supported the revolution, like
Robello and Pastora, and the list goes on and on, revolutionaries
who are still conducting the revolution -- let's call it a new
revolution -- against another dictatorship that has superimposed
itself where Somoza was.
And in fact, there was -- I don't know whether your
guests are aware of it, but on October 4, about eight weeks ago,
the State Department issued a study with biographical sketches on
about 20 of the top 20 leaders of the -- I'd call them the
revolutionary Contra group, the new revolution -- identifying, I
think, all but one of them as having a strong anti-Somoza
background.
These are not counterrevolutionaries. They are revolut-
ionaries. And that needs to be understood. They are trying to
overthrow a dictatorship and to give to their people the thing
they were fighting for in the first place: freedom of the press,
freedom of religion, freedom of privacy and property and emigrat-
ion, and so on.
And it's by inadvertence -- a lot of it is in good
faith, but just like your newscast said a while ago, said, "Hey,
these are right-wing Contras," which implies they're a bunch of
facists, they're a bunch of illiberals.
FISKE: Well, that's an interesting argument.
BURNS: Yes, but I don't think particularly accurate.
But it's an interesting argument.
The original Nicaraguan Contras were the more than 2000
former Somozista Guardsmen from the National Guard who had found
themselves encamped in Honduras after the fall of Somoza. Their
commander was Colonel Enrico Bermudez, one of the most hated
members of the National Guard. He still is the military
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Incidentally, the word Contra is a word that the Contras
use with pride. It's not a pejorative word.
MAN: That's right. And I think it should be used with
pride. I say it in the same'sense that Maggie Thatcher responded
to those who accused her of being a reactionary four or five
years ago. And she says, "Well, I must say I am a reactionary. I
have a great deal to react against." And the Contras have a heck
of a lot to be contra. And that's why I say they are revolution-
ary Contras. They are conducting a new revolution. But nobody
calls it that. And therefore it seems right-wing and non-
reformist.
And I've conducted a little bit of research and showed
that of the top 50 revolutionary Contra leaders, the political
directorates of the six or seven -- I forget how many --different
Contra groups, all but about three of them were anti-Somoza
people who participated in, who supported, and who led the
earlier revolution. And they are contra-Sandinista and they're
revolutionary counter-Communists, is what they are.
Let me make one more point.
FISKE: Let's get a reaction from Professor Matre to
MATRE: Well, the point is well taken, not just semanti-
cally. It is quite true that, of course, the generation, Larry,
you talked about, in 1980, the leftovers from the Somoza regime,
they have actually died out. Those were old corporals. By now,
if you go into the field with the Contras and say...
BURNS: They're only four years older.
MATRE: Fair enough -- you have today the rank and file,
they are 17-18 years of age, I think. We are dealing with a new
generation. And indeed, the term [Spanish expression], "the
stolen revolution," is well taken.
If you look at the [unintelligible] compossion, Robello,
if you talk Eden Pastora, they used to march to the front line
together with the Sandinistas.
MAN: Robello was a member of the original Sandinista
junta, for God's sake, and so on.
MAN: Another thing. You know, if you read back --
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Fred, you had Bob Laken on about a month or two ago. He was a
fellow who was a great longtime supporter of the Sandinista
revolution because it was a civil libertarian, broad-based
revolution. But now he has finally awakened to the point, and he
stated it very, very beautifully in that October issue of the New
Republic, in which he says these guys are worst than Somoza.
These are Gestapo leftists who are running a dictatorship that
just will not quit.
And the best parallel that we have to look at is what
happened and what we found out behind the scenes in the secret
documents in Grenada. And I'm sure that Larry Burns, before
Grenada happened and before we discovered it, would be making the
same defense of the Bishop regime in Grenada as he's making now
of the Sandinista regime.
BURNS: I read, by the way -- I don't know whether
you've read them or not. I've read every single one of those
secret documents. Even Roger Fontaine, who's not exactly a
raging [unintelligible] liberal, in his article in the Washington
Times, said -- to quote him directly, he said, "In a sense, there
are no bombshells in this collection of documents." Those
documents revealed nothing except a group of immature, silly,
overly-given-to-rhetoric schoolboys chatting it up.
MAN: See, I would suggest to you there is a bombshell
when you just find that on a little speck of an island like
Grenada there are East Germans, Bulgarians, Libyans, North
Koreans, for God sakes. A secret military treaty with North
Korea, and that's not a bombshell? In Grenada you had a Russian
four-star general as ambassador to that little speck of sand out
there, an expert in guerrilla and terrorist warfare who was
ambassador to Grenada. Now, that guy was not there for the
sunshine. He was there to lead revolutionary...
I'll give you a clue. The United States Embassy today
in St. George's in Grenada is considerably larger than the Soviet
Embassy was in Grenada during the time of the Maurice Bishop
government.
MAN: Do you think that our embassy is there to conduct
-- to keep a dictatorship in place?
BURNS: No. No, I don't. But I don't necessarily think
that the Soviet Embassy was there to keep a dictatorship in
place. In fact, the Soviet Embassy in Grenada, we did discover
from the secret documents, was there to tell Bishop to run the
government a little bit more efficiently than it was running
because that's what one of the great issues of.
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MAN: Finally we agree on something. He was there
trying to tell Bishop to run that government the way the Soviet
Union's government is run, more efficiently in terms of dictator-
ship...
BURNS: No. No, no, no. That's rubbish. More effici-
ently in terms of filling in potholes in the road and doing other
things that would prevent the population from becoming disaffect-
ed over an ill-administered revolution.
MAN: Let me make one more little point. Could I?
FISKE: Yes, go ahead.
MAN: I want to point out that I believe -- and Dr.
Matre may be able to verify this -- that at the time of the
success of the -- or during most of the revolution against
Somoza, I think the Sandinistas had only about 2000 guerrillas
out in the field. And I think now the revolutionary Contras.have
15,000. And I think it's time for people to realize that the
numbers are there and they're situated now that they may well
succeed. If the Sandinistas could do it with 2000, there are
seven or eight times that many now and they're growing at a rate
of about 50 percent a year. And I suggest to you before too long
this new revolution can succeed. And by believing it, it can
help make it happen, and finally get a civil libertarian,
multi-party, pluralist democracy down there.
MATRE: Yes, the number is almost correct. It's about
3500. Nevertheless, those Sandinistas marching in the mountains
against Somoza had the support of the whole of Central America
and the Socialist International. The Contras today are, as yet,
lacking that support. I hope they'll be receiving it soon.
BURNS: Why? Why do you hope they'll be receiving it?
MATRE: I do believe that they are fighting, indeed, for
liberty. I cannot see the flag of liberty flying over Managua
today. As I see the central government in Managua, Larry, it is
a government which is reaching out into the furthest corner of
the country to establish Marxist-Leninist communes.
Let's just talk a little bit, because we haven't as yet,
talk about the Indian question, when even Tomas Borge says today,
"We were very foolish," but uprooting a tribe numbering, roughly,
a hundred thousand, by killing animals, by burning down villages.
Was all that necessary? The idealists, by then, already said.
Today there is a particular enlightenment: "We shouldn't have
done it." Yet nothing is being changed. I think...
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BURNS: No, wait a minute. Wait a minute.
BURNS: I'm very much with you until that point. Because
when I was down in Nicaragua, they all confess that they handled
the Miskito issue very badly.
MATRE: But why is that?
BURNS: Why is that?
MATRE: Yes.
BURNS: Because what they wanted to do was -- before the
Sandinistas came in, the Miskitos had an autonomous culture out
there, totally separated, under Somoza, totally separated from
the rest of the country. Stefan Faggot (?) was in the pay of
Somoza. He was receiving -- he was an intelligence officer for
Somoza. And the infant mortality rate and the literacy rate, and
so forth, in that ethnic grouping was staggering.
So, the Boy Scout Sandinistas decided, "We're going to
open up the country. We're going to integrate those good folk
into our culture. We're going to to make them into good, happy
Sandinista Nicaraguans. They're going to become part of the
national culture." So they send teams out there to reeducate
them, to get them going.
BURNS: No, not resettlement at that point. The
resettlement only occurred after the Contra activities occurred.
They didn't resettle before...
MATRE: Larry, Larry, you never had Contra activities in
this particular area. The Rio Coco (?) area is entirely Indian.
BURNS: The Rio Coco area was the prime area of the
original Contra activity. That is, the activity in November and
December of 1981 produced the resettlement movement of January
1982. And that was what the whole story was about, is because
the justification, good or bad, that the Sandinistas gave for
resttlement was that these...
MATRE: To have a fire-free [sic] zone.
BURNS: Exactly. Exactly. Exactly.
So, they made mistakes. They made errors. But look,
look at what's happening now. Brookla (?) Rivera, a Miskito
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leader, wants to negotiate with the Sandinistas and take his
people back from Costa Rica to Nicaragua. We discover, or at
least he states, first of all, when he goes to your blessed
Honduras, he's immediately detained by the Honduran army,
briefly. When protests come in over the detention, they're
freed. He talks to Faggot about sor of negotiating a return,
saying that "our problems with the Sandinistas are not the
problems that the FDN Contras have. We're different kinds of
people. What we want is a return to our traditional culture."
So the United States Embassy and the State Department
oppose this negotiation. They oppose the negotiation because...
MATRE: Do you have proof of that?
BURNS: Well, unless Rivera is lying. And since the
State Department constantly quoted Rivera in the past as telling
the truth, I assume he's still telling the truth. It is just
because he's telling a different story today than he told
yesterday, one less consonant with U.S. values. But let's forget
about all of that.
I'll tell you something, Jochem, I cannot believe if you
had a full sense of what these Contra thugs are doing in
-- they're not fighting a clean war at all. They have committed
upwards of 800 political assassinations of chosen targets. We
don't have to read that book, that CIA manual about neutralizing
people. They've been doing it for a long time. Their chosen
targets are public health teams, agricultural teams, and so
forth. This has been validated so often by independent people.
I witnessed a whole stream of torture victims in
Brussels recently. I saw people take off their shirts and show
me where they'd been burned and so forth. The validation of
atrocities by the Contra forces is beyond question.
And what's even more condemnable is a number -- about a
year or so ago, if I remember, Secretary of State Shultz said, in
testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he said
that the Salvadoran guerrillas are creating hell against the
economy. Well, that's the stated purpose of the Contras, as
financed by the United States, to destroy the Nicaraguan economy.
They go in, they blow up coffee mills. They're not after
military targets. They're not after winning the hearts of
people. They're out to destroy the...
MATRE: Larry, this applies to the Salvadoran guerrillas
as well.
BURNS: To a very large extent, it does.
MATRE: When we talk war, it's very important to see, of
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course that guerrillas have a particular technique in conducting
a war. You're quite right, you destroy the infrastructure. You
harm the government by destroying what maintains the economy of
the country: bridges, electricity plants, coffee fields, and the
like.
Here, the two parties, I think, have no accusations to
bring against one another.
BURNS: You cannot maintain -- it's just not a credible
position to say that these people are the harbingers of freedom
or that these people are freedom fighters. They're a mixed
group. I mean I happen to privately -- I always did -- admire
Pastora. I certainly admired his resistance to taking CIA
funding. But there's a tremendous amount -- the Contras are in
no way like the guerrillas in El Salvador. They're a much less
ideologically motivated group. Some are in it for the money.
Some are in it for the position and dash. Some are in it because
they really believe that the government has committed excesses.
But, you know, I find it very difficult to look upon it as a
great patriotic force.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I wanted to ask Mr. Burns if he -- I presume he
would answer yes, that he believes in freedom. And secondly, if
he believes that it is the practice of freedom to limit freedom
of movement. In the last couple of seeks, it is very well known,
it's been reported in the press, particularly in Central America,
from where I just returned, that numbers of Nicaraguas represent-
ing a cross-section of society, all professions, have been denied
their freedom to leave the country, even on short visits, even to
neighboring countries. And I wonder when we're going to see a
report from COHA, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, about the
freedom of movement, or the absence of freedom of movement in
Nicaragua.
BURNS: Did you read about that in some newspaper?
MAN: Several.
BURNS: In the United States?
MAN: In Central America.
BURNS: Because I frankly, quite honestly, haven't read
a single -- I don't know anything about that.
MATRE: Oh, yes. There was a big report even in the New
York Times, that particular, mentioned by name, Nicaraguans have
not received their visa, had pages ripped out of their passports.
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BURNS: You mean by the Nicaraguan government?
MATRE: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Absolutely. One of them is,
by the way, Chamorro, who prior to his business trip to Japan
could not leave because his passport couldn't be found. Oh, yes
indeed.
And I predict the Nicaraguans will be able to demonst-
rate to the world the amount of liberty in Nicaragua by letting
people go. The basic liberty that people have is the freedom to
leave.
BURNS: Well, Nicaragua never before limited...
MATRE: It is happening now. And I predict...
MAN: ...ask this question of Mr. Burns. I would just
love to see a report by COHA outlining and criticizing and --just
as they would do if the Salvadoran government or the Guatemalan
government or any other government imposed this sort of restrict-
ion. I'd like to see a report from COHA on this kind of restric-
tion on freedom.
BURNS: Okay. Well, now that I know about it, it
becomes a serious contender for a report. But you should know
that in the recent past, about a year and a half ago, or so, we
brought out a series of two reports against Grenada and Nicarag-
ua, both, collectively, warning them, warning both countries that
unless they maintained pluralism in the country, they would lose
the support of the Socialist International. And we did that.
MAN: Have you warned the government of El Salvador in
the same way? No.
BURNS: No. Because the government of El Salvador
doesn't have the support of the Socialist International.
MAN: But it seems that you're prepared to help the
Nicaraguans protect their image internationally, and so on, by
giving them good advice like that. Why don't you advise them not
to stop people from leaving their own country?
BURNS: As I just admitted, I didn't know that they have
prevented people,from leaving.
MAN: But you know everything else.
BURNS: I do know everything else. I just didn't know
MAN: How do you explain the fact that you don't know
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BURNS: Well, I'll tell you-how I explain the fact. I've
been working on Chile and Bolivia, and I've been working on it 15
hours a day the last couple of days. And I just haven't been
working on Nicaragua.
MAN: Fred, I would like to address my question to Mr.
Burns, please.
Mr. Burns, I wanted to ask you a personal question. What
is your views -- I'm just kind of improvising as I'm going along.
What is your views of economics? For example, what do you think
that the Latin American countries should be? Should they be
capitalistic or should they be socialistic?
BURNS: I think they should bloody well be whatever they
want to be. That is, as you may know -- I don't see why you
should know it, actually. But my favorite hero in Latin America
today is the President of Colombia, who is a member of the
Conservative Party of Colombia, a man named Belisario Betancur. I
think he's a gutsy guy, and so forth.
I'm really not that interested in economics, except in
pragmatic questions like foreign debt questions and so forth. But
I certainly don't care what any government is. As a matter of
fact, when I went down to Chile with the United Nations in 1973,
I went down as a proto-card-carrying member of the Christian
Democratic Party, and I was a very close friend of Eduardo Frei
and his Foreign Minister and most of the former President's
Cabinet.
Don't -- that is, I am not really big on ideological
gigs. I'm essentially a man who believes in open societies, and
I'm against tendencies and trends towards closed societies.
FISKE: Okay. I think we've established that.
Was there something else, sir?
MAN: Yes. I wanted to say that I've listened, Fred, to
Mr. Burns a number of times on the air here. He's been your
guest a number of times, very interesting guest. But it strikes
me as though Mr. Burns seems to take the totalitarian view of the
more socialistic countries. I mean there seems to be a pattern
to your views that...
BURNS: Well, give me an example of what you mean.
MAN: Well, for example, you support the Sandinistas.
You support the so-called revolution in Nicaragua which overthrew
Somoza in favor of the pro-Communist revolution.
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BURNS: Well, as a matter of fact, you're quite wrong.
At the time that the Sandinista revolution was taking place, I
actually wanted to see a more pluralistic government come in,
because I felt that it would better guaranty not only civic
guarantees, but also the survivability vis-a-vis the United
States of the new government.
Quite to the contrary, I charge that the Reagan Adminis-
tration is much more sympathetic to totalitarian regimes than I
am, and that what I'm calling for is a single standard of
appraisal: We condemn in Nicaragua the same thing that we
condemn in El Salvador, in Guatemala, and in the right-wing
regimes, that restrictions on freedoms is something that we
condemn.
We looked upon the elections as an improvement, as a
hopeful sign. We're sorry that the United States attempted to
discredit these elections almost from the very first moment that
they were announced.
What we're saying is let's call upon Nicaragua to
pluralize, and then give it the opportunity to do so, not to slam
it.
FISKE: Would you like to comment on that?
MATRE: I just wish to throw in a comment on the real
ogre, I think, in the area, which clearly is Cuba. If we appeal
to Central American and Caribbean states to establish liberty and
democracy, we should not exclude Cuba.
And I think when you say the Reagan Administration tends
to be more friendly towards totalitarian governments than anybody
else, that I think is contradicted by the eternal hostility
between Cuba and the United States.
BURNS: But I don't think -- the United States is not
against Cuba because it's a totalitarian. society. It's against
Cuba because it's a left totalitarian society. If it was a right
totalitarian society -- it's been 20 years since Cuba exported
anything.
MATRE: You mean to say Cuba is not very strongly behind
the Sandinistas in Managua, militarily, politically?
BURNS: They certainly are supportive. And as I'm sure
you know, the Cubans have been a very heavy pressure on Managua,
first, to hold elections; secondly, to normalize relations with
the United States. You know, this is something that the State
Department will tell you, that -- in fact, Castro has made a
series of speeches, publicly. He said...
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MATRE: You mean Castro demanding elections in Nicaragua
and not tolerating them at home? That's almost funny, isn't it?
BURNS: It is fun and it's hypocritical, but it also
happens to be his position.
Castro, in his speeches -- remember that speech he made
right after the fall of Grenada? He said, "I told Bishop that we
couldn't guaranty the security of Cuba -- of Grenada, in the same
way that we cannot guaranty the security of Nicaragua."
The Cubans today, Castro is one of the most rational
actors in Central America because he recognizes that the United
States is the predominant power, he recognizes that the United
States could do whatever it wants in Nicaragua, and neither the
Soviet Union nor Cuba are going to vouchsafe their own security
in what happens in Nicaragua. And so he's calling for a region-
wide detente and he's a strong supporter of Contadora and he
would -- obviously, Cuba doesn't need Nicaragua. What Cuba
needs, essentially, is the security and safety of Cuba, and also
the reintegration of Cuba back into the Inter-American system, so
its trade patterns can be more normal and it could take advantage
of being 90 miles off the United States. And that's its primary
desiderata, not what happens in Nicaragua.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: Is Mr. Burns maintaining that the election in
Nicaragua was fair? Did he not read about the mobs that attacked
Cruz and the other candidates that were reported, indeed, on Fred
Fiske's show by Robert Laken?
BURNS: Well, Robert Laken is not and has never been my
gospel philosophe on these questions.
MAN: [Unintelligible]
BURNS: But, of course, the truth is that the Cruz
campaign was harassed by Sandinista militants. I don't know, I
doubt it, whether this was officially organized, because this was
very embarrassing for the government for this to take place. But
Cruz's campaign was harassed. And [unintelligible] more so. He
wasn't beaten up. He wasn't pounded.
BURNS: He wasn't killed, as he would be in El Salvador.
But he was certainly bothered.
MAN: Well, the candidates haven't been killed in El
Salvador campaigning, have they?
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BURNS: Well, a lot of them have. Many of them are
right-wingers, too.
But, of course, the difference between the Salvador
election and the Nicaraguan election is in El Salvador the United
States did everything it could to see that an effective and
successful election would take place. In fact, it even laundered
over a million dollars of CIA funds through the Adenauer Foundat-
ion to a Venezuelan institute called Avipo (?) to be sure that
its favorite candidate would win the election. And I think Jesse
Helms has every reason to be angry over that particular piece of
conduct by the United States.
In Nicaragua -- and also the United States spent visibly
several million dollars to create a national register of voters
and to set up polls throughout the country.
In Nicaragua, the United States used every device
possible to prevent an election taking place, by persuading, and
in certain instances paying off, a political party to leave the
campaign, and persuading other parties -- this, you know, came
through leaked National Security documents.
MAN: Was Arturo Cruz paid off to leave? Is that your
charge? He was the major opposition candidate.
BURNS: No. I.don't really think that Arturo Cruz was
paid off. But I do think that...
FISKE: Let's let Dr. Matre get a word in.
MATRE: Normally, when talking free elections on this
famous Sunday, the 4th of November, when we talk fairness perhaps
we should refer to this very day. The preparation for the
election really was not what we understand in this country to be
fair at all, because parties were excluded, were under pressure.
The Turabas (?) were extremely active, the so-called divine
guards for the revolution.
All that may be embarrassing for Ortega. But clearly,
Biada Arce (?) was not very embarrassed about all this.
The target was to gain a huge majority for Sandinist
[unintelligible]. I think the majority was smaller than that. In
itself, quite some punishment, I think, for the ruling party.
Let's agree to that. Even Arce said, "If we don't get at least
80 percent, we should cry and be ashamed." They didn't get that.
I think the proof of democracy now -- and let's just
give them the benefit of the doubt. I'm quite willing to do that
-- will be, over the next year, to what extent the new assembly
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really represents the people of Nicaragua.
BURNS: I agree. I think what we should do is maintain
constant pressure on the Nicaraguan authorities to see to it that
this assembly has a real voice, that the folks who hold -- the
opposition, that holds 35 of the 90 seats, have an effective
role, and that the national dialogue continues between all
political parties.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: Dr. Jochem was saying at the beginning of the
program that he doesn't think Reagan would send U.S. troops to
Nicaragua, even after November the 6th, because he knows that
United States public opinion would be strongly against this. But,
you know, Reagan landed troops in Grenada without worrying about
public opinion, and Reagan landed hundreds of Marines in Lebanon
and sent a battleship to lob 16-inch shells and 21 superpower
bombers to slaughter the helpless villages of Lebanon, just as he
send a full-blown superpower invasion force with 10,000 troops
landing after he bombed a mental hospital hospital in Grenada.
The history of United States military action on foreign
countries in this century has always followed an incident created
and precipitated by the United States Government and the military
itself. But Reagan, he doesn't even need an incident. He just
goes ahead and commits these crimes against humanity.
MATRE: We shouldn't talk about Lebanon as an incident
at all, because there is no comparison.
But let's compare Grenada. It was, as you know, a
blitzkrieg action that was supposed to last for only about a
week, and still lasted for about two months. It was a military
success in a limited way because America did indeed overcome
difficulties in Grenada. You cannot compare the Nicaraguan
countryside and their Sandinist forces with the Grenadans. I
think it would not be easy going at all. We talk about a minimum
time of three months. What will happen after three months,
nobody knows.
This country, given its present mood -- and I talk in
particular about representatives in the Senate -- would not put
up with it. And the President, in his second term, will not
accept that particular challenge, I speculate.
WOMAN: I'm concerned because, as I see our country, our
primary problem is that we will accept Communism anywhere except
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in our hemisphere. We will use constructive engagement with
South Africa. We will deal with Communists in Poland. But we
will not accept them here. And I think it's significant that
Castro, as I understand it, told Maurice Bishop to maintain good
relations with the U.S. because you don't get anything from the
Soviet Union. We're a much wealthier country. And Bishop tried.
But because he wanted to be Communist, that wasn't acceptable.
So that no matter what the Sandinistas do, no matter how
they try to run a government, it would never be acceptable to us.
I'm also concerned about our perception of free elect-
ions and multi-party systems.
Fred, am I right? Weren't our first five Presidents
elected more or less without opposition of a second party? After
you have a revolution, don't you usually have one party? And the
United States went through about 20 years without really a
two-party structure.
FISKE: No, that's not my recollection.
MATRE: Now, of course, you talk 18th Century.
WOMAN: I know, I know. I'm just saying that I'm
talking revolution, that when you have one, you usually do spend
a good number of years with a one-party, somewhat autocratic kind
of system, until there is enough time for some pluralism. to enter
the system. And I'm just saying that the U.S. even started out
that way.
MATRE: Well, as I said, in the 18th Century. But right
now you said Communism or a Communist state will be unacceptable.
You yourself contradicted yourself when you talked about Castro.
He has been around now since 1959. He is perhaps not recognized
diplomatically, but, truly, he is in existence and...
WOMAN: Well, wait. No, no. Wait a moment. What I
said was acceptable from the perspective of the United States
just dealing with them as any other government. We cut off all
trade. I mean Castro never said he could run a government if he
couldn't sell sugar. He never said he could run a government
easily if he could not deal with the United States at all. And
while we're quite willing to deal with dictatorships in South
Africa and dictatorships in the Philippines, we are not willing
to deal with a dictatorship if it's a leftist dictatorship, or
even if it's not. I mean we didn't like Allende, and we managed
to overthrow him and have him murdered.
I'm saying that we have an absolute blind side when it
comes to any Communist government in this hemisphere. It's not a
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blind side that deals with the Communist government next to the
Soviet Union, but it's a blind side in this hemisphere.
MATRE: Well, aside from not trading with it, at least
we don't do anything else.
simply...
WOMAN: Well, we certainly tried to invade it. We
BURNS: We also tried to kill Castro. But aside from
trying to kill Castro...
FISKE: Nothing serious.
BURNS: Nothing serious.
FISKE: Good evening.
WOMAN: I just wanted to tell Mr. Burns I agree with him
100 percent. Our tendency is to support rightist dictatorships
all over the world, and especially in South America. And this is
no answer for us. We are the last great empire. But we are
falling, just like Britain fell, Germany, France. You`cannot
exploit people and continue in this world.
Our history has not been -- when I say ours, I mean the
human history has not been one of Communism taking over the
world. It's been capitalism exploiting people for centuries. Now
we're beginning to see people say, "No more exploitation." And I
go along with that. And I don't want to have my taxes supporting
people, people in Nicaragua being held down.
I have never, never, never accepted this negative aspect
concerning Castro, never. I agree with the caller who just spoke
about our trying to divest Allende of his power -- or not his
power, but of his logical right to rule his people. I think that
we did the wrong thing in Grenada. And I don't believe that we,
as American people, get the truth about where we really are. I
still believe that Reagan is very rightist. And I'm not a
fascist. I would much rather see socialism on enlightened
Communism than any fascism. And we...
FISKE: Ma'am, I think we understand what you're saying.
Professor Matre, would you like to react?
MATRE: Well, just to inject a friendly note, right-wing
dictatorships in the hemisphere clearly are dying out, when you
look at the march of democracy in Latin America. You have left
Stroessner in Paraguay and, of course, Pinochet in Chile.- Aside
from that, democracy is way on its march.
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I don't worry too much right now about right-wing
dictatorships. I worry a lot about coming very totalitarian
systems elsewhere, not particularly under the influence of Castro
in Nicaragua.
By the way, Larry, when you say he has said publicly,
"We cannot defend you," he meant that. Nevertheless, support,
given America's helplessness in dealing with Nicaragua, Castro's
support weighs heavily, and Soviet support.
BURNS: I don't think so. I think the Soviet and Cuban
presence in Nicaragua is symbolic. And the Soviets -- also, I
think I probably disagree with you that the Reagan-Soviet wish
for a nuclear detente, forward progress on arms negotiations,
that Reagan will not take an adventurous step in Central America
because this would prove too costly.
We know that the Soviets have a very short memory. If
you recall a number of years ago when the Prime -- President
Nimeri of the Sudan left the country and there was an attempt by
the Communists to stage a coup, the Sudanese Communists, the
attempt was put down and over a hundred thousand Sudanese
Communists were butchered. Well, the Soviets broke off relations
for eight or nine months, and then they were back, trading and
doing business with the Sudanese.
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