EVIDENCE OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN HIJACKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240061-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: June 24, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: DDI Working Group on TWA Hijacking
SUBJECT: Evidence of State Involvement in Hijacking
We do not believe that Iran, Syria, or Libya was involved in
planning or conducting the hijacking of TWA flight 847.
Available evidence indicates the hijacking began on 14 June as an
independent operation by disgruntled Shias from southern Lebanon,
and later was taken over by elements of the two principal
Lebanese Shia organizations--Amal and Hizballah.
Syria, on the other hand, has little to gain from a
prolonged hostage crisis, and is unlikely to encourage one.
Syrian President Assad almost certainly prefers a peaceful,
relatively quick resoultion to the crisis and is likely to urge
Amal leader Nabih Barri and Iranian officials to agree to a
compromise agreement with the United States. Assad's influence,
however, is limited, and he is not likely to take actions that
would risk antagonizing his allies.
Although Libya undoubtedly would like to play a role in a
situation that places the United States in an embarrassing
position, Libyan leader Qadhafi has few if any assets to bring to
bear in the crisis. Moreover, Libya continues to be held in
suspicion by Lebanese Shias and has failed in its efforts to
forge a cooperative relationship with them.
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As in the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran
December
Iran clearly
supports the hijackers' objectives and would like to exploit the
incident for its purposes. Unlike the Kuwaiti airliner
hijacking, however, the TWA crisis provides Iran with a
considerable opportunity to meddle with little apparent risk.
Because the incident is unfolding in Beirut, and not Tehran, Iran
cannot be held responsible for its outcome, and Iran can deny
that it is meddling in the situation.
Iran has publicly denied allegations of complicity in the
hijacking. Soon after the incident began, an Iranian spokesman
claimed that Iran was being blamed for the attack in order to
aggravate tensions in the region and to "pave the way" for the
United States to carry out a military intervention. Until last
weekend, in fact, Iranian officials refrained from making any
public comments in support of the hijacking. During a visit to
Libya and Syria, however, Consultative Assembly Speaker
Rafsanjani--Iran's second most powerful political figure--made
several statements generally supportive of the hijackers' goals:
On 22 June Rafsanjani defended the hijacking as a
valid means of obtaining the release of Lebanese
Shias from Israeli prisons.
On 24 June, Rafsanjani said that Iran in general
does not "approve of any acts that terrorize
innocent people, but we must also regard the Elysee
Palace and the Pentagon as centers of terrorism."
Rafsanjani asserted that Iran has no connections to
the hijackers and that Iranian officials would not
have approved of the hijacking had they known of it
in advance.
On 25 June, Rafsanjani publicly endorsed the
hijackers' demands, saying that he believes the
best way to end the crisis would be to release the
Shias in Israel in exchange for the US hostages.
While Rafsanjani has gone on the offensive publicly to defend
Iran's image in the hostage situation, we have seen no evidence
that Tehran has decided to undertake serious efforts to bring the
crisis to a conclusion. We believe that Tehran will continue to
encourage its radical Shia allies to prolong the crisis.
Evidence suggests Iran would not have encouraged its clients
to undertake the hijacking of a US airliner and that it has
sought to avoid any implication of complicity in recent
hijackings. Tehran also has been concerned about the
increasingly independent terrorist operations that its Lebanese
allies have carried out in recent months:
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Various sources indicate Tehran has opposed
hijackings since the Kuwaiti airliner incident last
December.
Rafsanjani met on 24 June with a number of Hizballah and
radical Amal officials while he was in Damascus.
We suspect Rafsanjani used the occasion to
encourage the radical Shias to prolong the crisis and to refuse
to compromise on their demands.
We believe that Tehran is decided to take advantage of an
opportunity that was presented to it. Iranian officials probably
calculated that the potential benefits to be gained from the
current crisis far outweigh the risks. A prolonged crisis would
serve a number of Iranian objectives, both in Lebanon and
elsewhere:
By encouraging Hizballah to hold out for the most
extreme demands, Iran can portray the radical Shias
as the staunchest defender of Shia interests, and
thus further undermine Barri's position in
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Lebanon's Shia community.
A prolonged crisis also is likely to preclude Amal
from undertaking, with Syrian support, an armed
crackdown against Hizballah. Iranian officials
recently expressed concern that Barri, with
Damascus' blessing, would move to eliminate
Hizballah once Amal completes its operations
against the Palestinians in the Beirut area.
A prolonged crisis also makes the United States
appear impotent in the Middle East. Tehran may
believe moderate Arab states will conclude that the
United States offers them little protection from
Iranian-inspired terrorism.
Finally, a prolonged crisis in which the United
States is unable to take effective action against
radical Shias in Lebanon will encourage Iranian-
inspired terrorists elsewhere to attack US
interests.
Syria
Although Syria provides support and guidance to the Amal
movement and probably sympathizes with the hijackers' demands for
the release of the Shia prisoners in Israel, Damascus almost
certainly was not involved in planning or staging the hijacking
of TWA 847. Neither the initial attack nor a prolonged hostage
crisis would benefit Syria. In fact, Syrian President Assad
almost certainly sees the situation as an unwelcome complication
of his efforts to stabilize the security situation in Lebanon and
control developments there. We believe that Assad favors a
peaceful resolution, but it is not clear how much, if any,
capital he is willing to expend to achieve that end.
Early in the incident Assad asked Barri to become actively
involved in negotiations, and Barri has said he will go to
Damascus soon to discuss the hostage situation with Syrian
officials.
If Barri goes to Syria, we believe Assad will
strongly urge that the hostages be released.
Assad does not control Barri, however, and cannot
force Amal to try to free the TWA passengers.
Moreover, Assad undoubtedly knows Barri does not
control the situation, and he is unlikely to do
anything to undermine further the position of a key
moderate Shia leader who is trying to prevent a
fundamentalist revolution in Lebanon.
Syria has even less incentive to use the influence it may
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have with the radical Shia elements involved in the hostage
situation.
Syria, for instance, could restrict Hizballah
activities in the Bekaa valley or disrupt Iranian
resupply routes through Syria.
Although Syrian objectives in Lebanon, however, are incompatible
with Hizballah's aim of establishing a fundamentalist, Iranian-
style regime there and Syrian troops have periodically clashed
with Shia extremists in the Bekaa valley, Damascus so far has not
chosen to endanger its overall relationship with Iran by cracking
down on Hizballah. In addition, a dramatic Syrian action against
Hizballah could unleash a fundamentalist backlash against
Damascus.
On 23 June, Assad met with an Iranian delegation headed by
afsan'ani.
We suspect Assad urged that Tehran use its
influence with t e radical Shias to end the crisis. Here again,
however, Assad's ability to secure cooperation is limited and he
probably is not willing to risk his relationship with Iran to
save the lives of American hostages
Libya
While Libyan leader
a a i wou relish the opportunity to be involved in a
situation that embarrassses the United States, he does not have
any assets to bring to bear in this situation.
Libya is distrusted by Lebanese Shias across the religious
spectrum because of its suspected involvement in the
disappearance of the Imam Musa Sadr--the religious leader of
Lebanon's Shias and founder of the Amal movement in the 1970s--
during a visit to Tripoli in 1978. Since then, elements of Amal
calling themselves the "Musa Sadr Brigade" have conducted
numerous attacks against Libyan interests both in Lebanon and
elsewhere. Relations have become further strained by the recent
Amal-Palestinian fighting in Lebanon. Tripoli has publically
defended the Palestinians in the conflict and tried to pressure
Damascus into restraining the Amal. It is very unlikely that
Amal elements involved in the hostage crisis would ask for any
guidance or support from Libya, or accept any that was offered.
Tripoli probably will use the recently proclaimed Libyan-
Iranian alliance to press for access to the Hizballah over the
next year, but Qadhafi will be unable to exert significant
influence on them independent of Tehran. For their part, the
radical Shias are unlikely to be susceptible to Libyan efforts to
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become involved in their activities. They are unlikely to accept
guidance or operational support from Qadhafi in their terrorist ,
activities.
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