KUWAIT: STANDING UP TO TERRORISM AND THE RADICALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00434R000300240060-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: June 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DCI/NIC REGIONAL CONFERENCE
/ Kuwait: Standing Up to Terrorism and the Radicals
A major irony of the current hostage situation in Beirut is that
Kuwait may now be perceived in the region as less susceptible to pressure
by terrorism than either the US or Israel, and a decision by the Kuwaiti
government to execute its convicted Shia terrorists may seal the fate of
some of the US hostages held in Lebanon--particularly William Buckley.
Earlier this week Nabih Barri and Algerian officials involved in the
negotiations rejected a suggestion that release of the Shia terrorist
prisoners in Kuwait be added to the list of conditions for releasing the
TWA hostages, in part because it would have further complicated an
already messy situation, but probably also because the Kuwaiti regime has
.earned a reputation in the past two years for taking--and maintaining--a
tough stand against giving into Shia terrorist pressure.
The new respect for Kuwait probably results in large part from
changed perceptions. The Kuwaiti regime was once widely perceived as
spineless--US officials used to disparagingly describe Kuwait as
following a policy of "preemptive capitulation" to pressure--so almost
any sign of backbone came as a surprise to regional observers. Further,
the Kuwaiti policy has evolved quietly, without fanfare. In contrast,
the Un i~~S~a_~es_si_nce ~he_L~an_ian~-as_tage~i_tuati on has been perceived
in the Middle East as unable to implement it~w_i_c~ely~roclaimed intention
to counter terrorism In addition, perceptions of Israel's previously
rigid stand against compromise with terrorists may have been fatally
weakened by the recent exchange of over 1100 convicted Palestinians for 3
Israeli POWs.
The turning point for the Kuwaiti government was the series of
bombings by Iranian-backed Shias on 12 December 1983 of the US and French
embassies there as well as vital Kuwaiti government installations.
Seventeen members of the 9ro-Iranian Dawa Party were sentenced to long
prison terms--including three to death--for participation in the bombings.
-- Contrary to expectations, the Kuwaitis did not quietly expel the
prisoners after their convictions; nor, however, did they
execute the three sentenced to death. Radical Shia efforts in
Lebanon and in the Gulf have increasingly focused on trying to
win the freedom of these prisoners.
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The Kuwaiti position further hardened in December 1984 when a Kuwaiti
airliner was hijacked to Tehran by Shia terrorists who demanded the
release of the Dawa prisoners. Two US officials were murdered and
Kuwaiti passengers were brutalized by the terrorists, but the Kuwaitis
refused to buckle to the pressure. The Kuwaitis strongly suspect Iranian
complicity in the incident--and the suspicion is reinforced by Tehran's
continuing refusal to return the hijacked jet.
-- Kuwaiti-Iranian relations have further deteriorated recently as
Kuwait has stepped up deportations of Iranians caught illegall
in the country.
In a parallel fashion, .Ku n creasing backbone i
standin up to Syria--which the Kuwaitis suspect of comp ici y in both
the December 1983 bombings and~P nP['Pmhar leRa airlines hl.j_acking to
Tehran. Relations between the two countries are deteriorating.
-- Reflecting the large Palestinian presence in the country, the
semi-independent Kuwaiti National Assembly has voted to cut off
economic aid to Damascus to protest Syrian encouragement of the
recent Shia attacks on Palestinian camps in Beirut. The
Assembly also cut off aid in T983 to~protest President Assad's
efforts to destroy the PLO (then in Tripoli, Lebanon) and his
decision to massacre the inhabitants of Hama to stamp out Muslim
Brotherhood agitation.
-- Kuwait has also been expelling Syrian troublemakers in an effort
to improve internal security.
-- Syria has withdrawn its Ambassador from Kuwait, and last week it
sanctioned an anti-Kuwaiti demonstration to take place in front
of Kuwait's Embassy in Damascus.
Last month's suicide attempt to kill the Amir by blowing up his
motorcade may finally end the regime's hesitation to execute the three
condemned prisoners. Kuwaiti officials are all too aware that Hizballah
extremists have linked the fate of the seven US hostages captured in
Beirut before the TWA hijacking to the fate of the Dawa prisoners.
Kuwait may postpone executing the prisoners if the TWA incident
appears likely to be resolved soon. The attempt to kill the
Amir has built powerful public pressures to proceed with the
executions, however, and I believe the regime will do so in the
near term--regardless of the consequences in Beirut. Some
reporting from Kuwait suggests the Amir may order the execution
of the prisoners at any time.
SECRET
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SECRET NOFORN
Hizballah elements in Beirut are already reputed to hold at least
five of the TWA hostages. The longer the TWA incident drags on, the more
likely it is that radical Shias will gain control of the fate of more of
the TWA hostages. If this occurs, the fate of these TWA hostages--along
wi~F~ie seven US citizens seized before the hijacking--will be linked in
part to developments in Kuwait.
-- Execution of the Dawa prisoners, particularly in the next week
or two, would greatly inflame the Hizballahis in Beirut, and
probably would rPC~,lt ;n rptal;~torv killing of some of the US
hostages they are holding.
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SECRET/NOFORN/
NL0/USSR
Moscow's View of the Hostage Crisis
Moscow surely appreciates the global perception of "America held
hostage" and impression that the United States is no more able to deter
these actions or bring power to bear to favorably resolve them than in
1979. Such images lower estimation for the United States and tend to
redound to Soviet advantage in the superpower competition insofar as it is
believed that the US is unwilling to forcefully use military power to
protect its interests and the assertion is made that the Soviet Union
doesn't suffer such outrages because it would forcefully retaliate.
While the Soviets currently use their propaganda techniques to
accuse the US of practicing terrorism--including US military
movements related to the crisis--they want to be able later to more
quietly inform the international community that the US is unable to
protect its own interests and those of its allies even less.
_ (Gorbachev
reportedly has told Syrian President Assad and informed Nabbi Barri
that the USSR would not get involved in the hostage crisis and
encouraged them to adopt a less provocative stance. He is said to
th
i
t
f
ili
ree
tary act
on
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o
have warned them of possible US m
hostages.- Whether this report is true or not, the Soviets probably
do fear a dramatic US use of force aimed at ending the standoff, or
more likely, following its resolution.
The best outcome for the Kremlin would be a diplomatic ending to a
protracted crisis that is both humiliating to the United Sta es_and not
followed by a conse uent US use of force w icfi-6o a ers future such
inci ed nts and heightens respect for t e US as a great power. While the
Soviets would appreciate least a dramatic rescue followed bjr some major
destruction of the terrorist network and capabilities, they probably accord
this a low probability.
The Kremlin's analysis of the impact and opportunities afforded by a US
use of force probably includes as potential scenarios US attacks against
terrorist positions in Lebanon, less likely attacks against Lebanon and
Libya or Iran, and least likely actions that included a strike against Syria
or a multi-theater operation aimed at both Iran and Libya. The Soviets know
well their resulting propaganda opportunities with the immediate targets of
such an action and will mount a worldwide propaganda barrage against US
"militarism and terrorism" in the event of any US use of force. They
probably are doubtful about their ability to gain directly or indirectly
valuable political advantage in Lebanon, fearful that Qadafi's hold on power
is fragile and that he could be overthrown by a US political-military
operation, and highly uncertain about the aftermath of a military attack
against Iranian targets.
SECRET/NOFORN
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' SECRET/NOFORN
Moscow probably has the least concern about Syria, both because of
doubt that it would be the target of a US attack and expectation
that such an attack would be circumscribed so as to not provoke a
major US-Soviet crisis. (Moscow is nevertheless angry at Syrian
actions in Lebanon, particularly its support of the Amal militia's
behavior in the internecine warfare there).
By contrast, the Soviets have no record of military commitment to
Qadafi and would be taking an enormous risk of massive escalation
on his behalf by militarily opposing a US military operation
against him. Such Soviet action would be highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, as in the past, Soviet naval dispositions and
operations in the Mediterranean probably would be made to appear
threatening so as to dissuade and limit the effectiveness of such a
US course.
The Soviets certainly would seek to exploit US military retaliation
against Iran but probably doubt that they can gain a political
position with the Khomeini regime secure and significant enough to
sway post-Khomeini Iran. Insofar as such an attack further
reinforced anti-Americanism in Iran, the Soviets would feel further
comforted about US inability to regain political influence there in
the future.
Moscow probably is more uncertain than hopeful that US military action
against Iran would result in a net advantage because it basically views the
Khomeini regime as a fanatical political throwback, as the US does. Tehran
has sought a more balanced Soviet position in the Iran-Iraq war, but so far
has been unwilling to give Moscow anything tangible to obtain it (see
attached for more on this).
In the event of major instability in Iran, that possibly might be
promoted by US use of force, the Soviets do not have a political position in
Iran today that they could count on to dominate events. They do have
assets--in their diplomatic presence, the Tudeh (weakened as it is), and in
Azerbaijan--that the US does not have; how valuable they would be in a
crisis probably is debated by Soviet analysts. As always, Soviet military
intervention to gain control of Iran would forebode enormous risks.
SECRET/NOFORN
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SECRET/NOFORN/~
Soviet Perspective on Iran
In the main, the Soviets so far are rejecting Iranian entreaties for
improved relations and Moscow's adoption of amore balanced position in the
Iran-Iraq war. Moscow is able to play tough because of Iran's hostility
toward the US and the Soviet position with Iraq. The Soviets seek to drive
a hard bargain that includes tangible gains and not just an increased
presence or symbols.
A scowling Gromyko reportedly entered a Moscow meeting between an
Iranian delegation and Soviet officials to attack Tehran for its
oppression of the Tudeh, assisting the Afghan insurgents, and
sending secret emissaries to Azerbaijan to incite the populace
against the USSR. He further alleged that the Iranians had
extended the range of the Scuds they had received from Libya. He
then terminated the meeting, giving the Iranians no chance to
present their position.
The May issue of the Party journal Kommunist includes an article
that attacks the clerics for subverting the Iranian revolution in
1979 with their "muslim fanaticism" and "political despotism." The
article concludes that "the conservative clergy has succeeded in
stopping the social revolution and tearing it away from the
elimination of American domination." It perceives the clergy's
plans as supportive of "bourgeois business and large landowners."
Pravda on 20 June replayed the main part of a Tudeh protest calling
or an end to repression by the Khomeini regime.
These types of events broadly overshadow the fact that the government
newspaper Izvestiya did not replay the Tudeh attack--thus possibly
indicating so- me discord between the Party Secretariat and the Foreign
Ministry--and a Ministry readout to a US embassy officer in April suggesting
optimism over future economic relations.
A good indicator of Moscow's perspective and tactics toward Tehran
will be whether Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko visits Tehran in
the next several months, as has been long rumored, and the fallout
from that visit.
The Soviets may believe that the Islamic regime will survive Khomeini
and is a fundamental threat to Moscow's control of the muslim portions of
its empire, and that open support for the regime could ultimately threaten a
danger more important than the possibility of influencing the post-Khomeini
era. Their goal, nevertheless, may be to do what is possible to weaken the
r_e4ime by assisting Iraq in its war effort--which they are doing--so as to
maximize i s amena iTi y an poss y -ring about its collapse. The Soviets
probably calculate that cLtk~ax~~Chomeini. From a current
-~zaczicai stianapo~nti, However, Moscow may believe that without the Tudeh it
stands little chance of swaying events in Iran.
SECRET/NOFORNJ
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SECRET/NOFORN
The Kremlin might be right in~such thinking; while we worry about the
Soviets cutting a deal that would better position them to influence the
post-Khomeini era, they have some immediate objectives and concerns in the
meanwhile, and they have much experience in the pursuit of influence and
dominion over Iran.
The likelihood that the Soviets are thinking in these terms is
greater insofar as Soviet policy toward Iran probably remains in
the hands of hard-nosed tacticians like Gromyko and ideologues like
Ponomarev of the International Department. The new chief of the
Middle East countries department for Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan
is a cautious, old school diplomat.
SECRET/NOFORN
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