EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00307R000100040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC# 05530-84
26 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 19 September 1984 to
consider the attached subjects.
Acting National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia
Attachment:
East Asia Warning and Forecast Report
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CL BY Signer
DECL OADR
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19 September 1984 East Asia Warning and Forecast Report
1. The Acting NIO opened the meeting by introducing Mr. James Kelly,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Affairs. Mr. Kelly gave a
brief rundown of DoD policy concerns toward East Asia. He singled out the
Philippines, New Zealand, and Kampuchea as the three most active accounts,
Japan as the most important because of security implications, and Indonesia as
increasingly important but generally overlooked. He recommended that
Indonesia be given more attention. Following this policy overview, analysts'
presentations and discussion focused on countries and issues requested by
Mr. Kelly.
2. Indonesia's long term prospects:
Economic growth is Indonesia's Achilles' heel. Although Jakarta has
effectively "tightened its belt" to compensate for lowered petroleum
prices and the slump in commodity prices by cutting back on expensive
development projects, the long term outlook is not bright. The current
stable investment climate, projected growth rates and job creation are
unlikely to keep pace with Indonesian population growth (4 million
annually of which 2 million enter the labor force), and increasing energy
demands, which will reduce earnings from oil exports. Jakarta's recent
openings to the PRC, USSR, and Eastern Europe are attempts to get a head
start on solving the coming economic pinch.
Forecast
During the coming decade, economic conditions will worsen.
Authoritarian measures applied by the government will exacerbate the
situation. Suharto appears likely to run for another term and Murdani
could continue to be in charge of security.
3. Thailand: Internal dynamics, external problems.
The fall coup season appears likely to pass uneventfully. Prem and
Athit will probably reach an accommodation (at least for one year) on
Athit remaining on active duty with a shot at succeeding Prem.
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Bangkok's external concerns are focused on Vietnam's occupation of
Kampuchea, Kampuchean resistance, resultant border clashes and
refugees. China's more forthcoming attitude concerning support for the
non-communist resistance, coupled with ASEAN 's support for Thailand 's
"frontline" role, have created improved conditions in a basically bad
Forecast
The prospects are dim for any quick improvement in Indochina.
Despite Vietnamese statements of willingness to negotiate, other more
concrete signs of flexibility are lacking, such as the demand for Pol
Pot's removal--and China's unwavering support for the DK leader.
Internally, the succession dispute will resurface next year, with the
King probably favoring Prem through 1988. The Queen's continued
displeasure with Athit's antics will not help his drive to succeed Prem.
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4. North Korea - is time running out?
Clearly, North Korean economic growth has not kept up with the
South's. Systemic problems, plus disproportionate defense burden, have
contributed to the North's poor performance. While Northern leaders are
fully aware of the South's economic achievements, their propaganda
program continues to demean the South. The flood aid now being sent to
the South will doubtless be used to further the line that the North is
better off.
We expect the military balance between the North and the South to
remain unchanged.
Kim's efforts to transfer power to his son appear to be on track
with Kim Chong-il assuming more day-to-day responsibility for the
internal management of the country. We lack evidence of overt opposition
to Chong-il now and can only speculate on the question of how widespread
it may indeed be.
Forecast
Kim it-Sung will continue to press for reunification, on his terms,
while attempting to increase Soviet support for the North to improve the
balance with the South.
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6. In his concluding remarks, Mr. Kelly thanked the analysts for their
efforts and made an appeal for a closer relations between the desk officers in
ISA and the analysts, citing need for both sides to be more aware of the
problems of the other, and sharing the information which each has for the
benefit of all.
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