POLYGRAPH STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00869R000600070011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 2, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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3r%KCI
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
PERSONNEL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
PerSSub-002-84
y~8 (9
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM
Chairman, PerSSub
SUBJECT: Polygraph Study
Forwarded herewith is PerSSub-001-84, same Subject, in
response to your tasking contained in SECOM-D-172, dated
11 August 1982. It represents the final report on the matter.
Contributions to the study were received from CIA, FBI,
NSA, the Departments of Air Force,Army, Navy and State. The
remaining member organi do not employ the polygraph in
their security programs.
The PerSSub made every effort to provide this report to
you in a timely fashion, realizing that it will be of use to
Intelligence Community representatives testifying before
congressional committees in the near future. The anecdotes
were prepared for presentation in an unclassified forum, and
in such a manner that neither the subjects nor the contribu-
tors could be identified. I anticipate that th I will
agree to their release in their present form.
The contributing organizations and their polygraph
divisions were all most cooperative throughout this effort.
Special recognition is in order for the CIA and NSA members
and will be forthcoming.F___-]
Chairman, PerSSub
Attachment:
PerSSub memorandum 001-84 w/att.
SECRET
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.,?:vi~IflVtl~l I IAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Socurlty Committe*
Serial: PerSSub-001-84
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM
SUBJECT:
Polygraph Study
2 ~3 l~Pf~
In accordance with your tasking contained in SECOM-D-
172, d 11 August 1982, the PerSSub undertook a survey
designed to establish the utility of the polygraph as a security
device within the Intelligence Community. This report represents
the results of that effort.
The survey makes no pretense of objectivity. It was
designe to demonstrate that the polygraph is useful in eliciting
admissions which would not otherwise be forthcoming by other
investigative means. The survey did not address the scientific
validity of the process, its scientific reliability or the effect
the quality of the examiner's training may have on results. Its
utility in bringing out previously unattained information was the
only concern.
The survey was limited in scope to the period dating
from ary 1980 to September 1983, with a few cases drawn from
earlier years. By essentially limiting coverage to this short
timeframe, the survey therefore represents but a sampling of a
larger body of evidence which supports the utility of the
polygraph.
All agencies of the Intelligence Community utilizing
the polygraph contributed. The identities of the contributing
entities have been masked through a unique numbering system, the
key to which is retained by Chairman, PerSSub. Any inquiries
arising regarding a particular case will be referred by Chairman,
PerSSub to the proper contributor who will respond in keeping
with the policies of the agency involved.
The 51 selected cases are reported in anecdotal style,
contain only the salient facts and are intended to be presentable
in an unclassified forum. The issues run the gamut from
Espionage to Security Violations. Because this is an
Intelligence Community survey, however, numerous criminal cases
from those Intelligence Community agencies having a law-
enforcement function as well were specifically excluded. In each
case, the use of almost-identical wording is intentional to help
preserve the anonymity of the contributor.
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Serial: PerSSub-001-84
The sole conclusion drawn from this effort is that
the sts an ample body of evidence to prove that the
polygraph brings out critical information otherwise denied. The
exemplars are but a fraction of material available to support the
utility of the polygraph. Our contention is not that the
polygraph is perfect but that it is so successful as to justify
its retention in our inventory of investigative tools. Its use,
or threat of its use, was sufficient to deter Christopher John
Boyce from seeking a position at a super-sensitive installation,
and David Henry Barnett from attempting reinstatement with CIA.
In Great Britain, the Russian spy, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, also
conceded that the polygraph would have deterred him from joining
GCHQ or would have exposed him while there. Again, how many
others have been deterred by threat of polygraph is a matter for
frightening speculation.
LThe PerSSub does not endorse the polygraph as a panacea
for security ills. The polygraph is not considered in
isolation, and is always used in conjunction with other
investigative tools. Recognizing its limitations and applying it
judiciously, the polygraph is essential in obtaining otherwise
unattainable information.
The following 51 anecdotal summaries clearly support
the p se that the polygraph is a valuable and useful tool in
the security programs of the Intelligence Community.
Chairman
Personnel Security Subcommittee
Attachment:
As stated above (summaries)
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SECURITY VIOLATIONS
Eight members of the U.S. military, all holding TOP SECRET
clearances and Sensitive Compartmented Information access, were on duty
in a secure communications facility on the day that two safes within
the facility were left open at close of business. Normal investigative
procedures failed to fix responsibility. Polygraph examinations were
administered on the eight suspects and two individuals were identified
as deceptive in their denials. Both subsequently admitted
responsibility. The remaining six persons were exonerated as a result
of their polygraph testing.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, listed on his
security forms foreign travel to a communist-bloc country in
conjunction with a previous employment. During a polygraph examination
he admitted that while on such travel and in the company of foreign
nationals, he was drugged, and an attempt was made to have him engage
in a homosexual act. Later, he was directly requested to work for the
intelligence service of that country and refused. Subject never
reported this entrapment attempt or offer to any U.S. official. He
continued to show deception on the polygraph examination.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen, became employed within the Intelligence
Community in 1980 following security processing which was favorable
except for minor illegal drug use. She was afforded a strong drug use
briefing at that time. Subject received a routine reinvestigation
polygraph in 1983 and admitted to using marijuana since beginning her
employment; however, polygraph testing failed to support the
truthfulness of her admissions. She also admitted to identifying
classified sites to a foreign national whom she dated and discussing
her impending foreign assignment with him.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a Maber of the U.S. military who enjoyed access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information, was suspected of having contact
with the embassy of a hostile country. Although many indicators of
espionage were evident, a lengthy investigation complete with a complex
surveillance failed to produce hard evidence of espionage. During a
personal interview, Subject denied all allegations. Subject submitted
to a polygraph and deception was noted concerning contact with a
hostile intelligence service and passage of classified information.
Subject subsequently admitted to contacting the hostile service,
collecting a large quantity of highly classified information and
passing it to that hostile service in exchange for money. The
polygraph was also used to ascertain what information had been
compromised.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance
provided the requested biographical data during his security
processing, all of which was favorable. Subject also indicated that he
had not used any illegal drugs or narcotics. During the initial
polygraph examination, Subject admitted only to limited drug use but
showed deception in the area of serious crimes. He later admitted to
theft of merchandise and pilferage from employers and to shoplifting
the month prior to the polygraph examination. After further testing,
Subject also admitted to expanded drug use.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for an Intelligence Community
position requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, had a background
investigation conducted in connection with an earlier assignment.
Personal biographic data was favorable. During the applicant screening
polygraph examination Subject admitted that while serving with U.S.
forces overseas he lived for over a year with a woman known to him as
an agent of a foreign intelligence service. She paid all of his off-
post living expenses, was well-educated, traveled often, and had
unlimited financial resources. Prior to sharing an apartment with her,
Subject observed a transmitter/receiver which was apparently for
clandestine use in her apartment. He did not report this to
appropriate military intelligence authorities (a court martial offense)
since she paid for the apartment which they shared.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military, was one of five
individuals employed in a Communications Center from which highly
classified communiques of sensitive DOD, State and White House matters
were being illegally provided to a foreign intelligence service. All
suspects held TOP SECRET clearance and Sensitive Compartmented
Information access. Normal investigative procedures failed to identify
which of the suspects was guilty. When polygraph testing of the
Subject indicated deception, he admitted to working for a foreign
intelligence service and to supplying a great quantity of information
to that service. Polygraph testing of the remaining suspects did not
reveal any deception.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen with extensive employment with a member of
the Intelligence Community, was polygraphed in conjunction with his
periodic reinvestigation. During the polygraph examination, subject
admitted to unauthorized disclosures of classified information to news
media personalities over a period of ten years.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for employment with a member of
the Intelligence Community, received a background investigation with
favorable results. During a subsequent polygraph, Subject admitted
that he had purchased and sold illegal drugs and had been involved in
other criminal activities including theft, insurance fraud, arson, and
receipt of stolen goods.
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within
the Intelligence Community requiring a security clearance, had a
favorable background investigation conducted on him. During a
subsequent polygraph examination, Subject was found deceptive to
questions regarding contact with a foreign intelligence service and the
truthfulness of his application for employment. Subject subsequently
admitted that attempts had been made by a foreign intelligence service
to recruit him prior to leaving his country of origin and again while
en route to the United States. He also admitted to falsification of
his employment application by omitting additional membership in various
organizations.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was given a
polygraph examination. Subject described his various radical and
Marxist connections including residence with a British Communist Party
member while both were students at a British university. Subject
visited the Soviet Union twice on British student tours. During his
initial tour he became particularly friendly with a young woman who
described herself as a student and a part-time INTOURIST guide. She
was also his tour guide on the second trip. Subject later corresponded
with her and informed her that he had applied for employment with U.S.
intelligence agencies. Shortly thereafter, she came to the U.S.
supposedly to visit relatives. She contacted Subject and arranged to
meet him the day after his polygraph examination. After admitting to
this forthcoming meeting, Subject continued to show deception to
counterintelligence questions during the polygraph. While Subject
denied that he had ever been approached to engage in espionage,
deception was indicated to questions regarding additional knowledge of
individuals involved in espionage against the United States.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor, with access
to classified information, required security processing for access to
another classified project. During a polygraph examination, Subject
admitted that he furnished classified information and industrial
proprietary information to foreign nationals of hostile countries.
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CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community
and a former member of the U.S. military provided suspicious
intelligence information about planned terrorist activity at two U.S.
military installations, to include the theft of military weapons.
Subject was administered a polygraph examination and was found
deceptive. Upon further questioning, he admitted that he deliberately
fabricated the story of planned terrorist activity and then reported it
in order to gain recognition. Subject also admitted to unrelated
contact with hostile intelligence services to discuss military and
cultural matters as well as possible defection.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and
requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, had a favorable national agency check
conducted on him in conjunction with a previous employment where he
held a SECRET clearance. During his polygraph examination, Subject
showed deception to questions about involvement in intelligence for a
foreign government, espionage activity, intent to commit espionage
against the United States, the accuracy of personal biographic data
Subject provided and other related questions. Subject admitted that he
falsely reported an academic affiliation during two lengthy tours
abroad, amounting to a total of eight years. He admitted that during
those years he actually served as a scientific advisor to the chief of
a foreign military intelligence service. He reported directly to the
head of military intelligence of the foreign power. Although Subject
admitted that he might, in the future, pass classified information to
that foreign military intelligence service, he claimed that he had
never done so. He had never revealed his foreign intelligence
connection to his employer or to the cognizant government security
officer. Subject was still in contact with the foreign intelligence
service though legitimately so through his U.S. contractor employment.
Subject continued to show deception to questions about giving or
lli
se
ng classified information to the foreign intelligence service.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a member of the U.S. military service, was detailed to an
agency within the Intelligence Community. In conjunction with his
assignment, Subject was polygraphed. He admitted to a wide variety of
homosexual activities with foreign nationals, one of whom was
blackmailing him.
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DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and
requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, previously worked for the U.S.
Government and held a TOP SECRET clearance. A favorable background
investigation was completed in conjunction with his prior government
position. As part of his processing for a TOP SECRET clearance as a
contractor, Subject was administered a polygraph examination and showed
deception to questions pertaining to divulgence of classified
information. Subject then admitted to divulging classified information
to friends, co-workers, and family members. He held a classified slide
show for friends and family and also provided classified information to
a foreign national. Deception was indicated to questions concerning
Subject's intent to commit espionage and/or sabotage against the United
States and Subject threatened to divulge classified information if he
lost his clearance. During his final examination, Subject continued to
show deception regarding his intention to commit espionage against the
United States.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen and an applicant for a
sensitive position within the Intelligence Community, provided the
necessary biographical data and was favorably investigated. There was
no indication in his declarations or during the background
investigation of any contact with a foreign intelligence service.
During polygraph testing Subject admitted that a family member had in
fact been a member of such a service. Testing did not support his
statement that this was his only intelligence affiliation. During
subsequent interrogation and testing, Subject made increasingly more
damaging admissions which made it evident that he had worked for known
members of a foreign intelligence service in the recent past.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community
with access to classified information, was administered a polygraph
examination in conjunction with his reinvestigation. During the
polygraph, Subject admitted that he had shoplifted and changed price
tags on merchandise. He further admitted to accepting gratuities from
contractors and to providing classified information to uncleared
contractors to assist them in their bidding.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military who was known to have had
contact with a foreign intelligence service, was arrested while selling
classified material to undercover Federal Agents. During
interrogation, Subject denied additional contact with hostile
intelligence services and admitted no additional security infractions.
During a polygraph examination Subject was found deceptive in those
areas and subsequently admitted additional liaison with a hostile
intelligence service and possession of additional classified documents
at his residence.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a sensitive Intelligence
Community position, was the subject of a full background investigation
which raised questions regarding his associates and overseas travel.
When these issues were raised during a pre-polygraph interview, Subject
maintained that he had no contact with foreign intelligence
representatives. When polygraph testing on this issue showed
deception, Subject admitted associating with persons he believed to
represent a foreign intelligence service and having visited a foreign
embassy on occasions, the most recent being a week prior to his
polygraph. Although he declared he had nothing more to admit, further
testing failed to support this. He later made additional admissions in
regard to contact with foreign embassies during his overseas travel.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community, had previously held clearances with access to
classified information. During polygraph testing he admitted to the
unauthorized disclosure of highly classified information on many
occasions to associates and family members.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance, was
serving in the U.S. military and had access to cryptologic information.
During the applicant screening polygraph examination, Subject indicated
deception. In the post-test interview, he admitted to various petty-
crimes and miscellaneous wrongdoing. The polygraph examiner noted
continued specific reactions to relevant questions and when the Subject
was reexamined several weeks later, the same situation continued. His
access was withdrawn and an investigation opened. While that
investigation was still in progress, Subject was found dead in his
automobile. It was subsequently determined that he had been engaged in
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed with a security clearance within
the Intelligence Community, received a polygraph in conjunction with
his periodic reinvestigation. During the polygraph, Subject admitted
to falsification of operational reporting, fraudulent accounting
practices, improper handling of classified material and serious drug
abuse.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was subjected to a full
background investigation after applying for a sensitive Intelligence
Community position. Nothing unfavorable was discovered. There were no
indications in his personal declarations of association with a foreign
intelligence service. Initial polygraph testing indicated that Subject
failed to list a previous employment at a foreign embassy in his
country of origin, and that he was related by marriage to a member of a
foreign national police force. During subsequent testing, Subject was
also found to be deceptive in the area of currently working for a
foreign intelligence service and also to being instructed by a foreign
intelligence service to seek U.S. Government employment.
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DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and having a
security clearance, was suspected of discussing highly classified
information concerning a special project with unauthorized persons.
During a personal interview he denied any involvement in an
unauthorized disclosure. During a subsequent polygraph examination,
deception was indicated and he later admitted that he did discuss in
detail the highly classified project with unauthorized persons.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within
the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance,
was polygraphed following a favorable background investigation.
Subject was found deceptive to questions concerning contact with
foreign intelligence services. During subsequent interrogation he
admitted that he had been contacted by representatives of a foreign
intelligence service prior to leaving his native country. A system was
devised whereby he would receive instructions from the foreign
intelligence service after he arrived in the United States.
Furthermore he signed an agreement that he would never reveal this
contact. Subject had numerous contacts with the hostile foreign
intelligence service in the months prior to entering the United States
and was indeed contacted in the pre-arranged manner after his arrival.
EXCESSIVE USE OF ALCOHOL
Subject, an applicant for employment with a member of the
Intelligence Community, received a favorable background investigation
and was subsequently cleared for limited access to classified
information. During a polygraph examination he admitted to stealing
from his previous employers over a ten year period. Testing further
disclosed that alcohol consumption affected his personal and
professional life style and that he was unable to work on five
occasions and blacked out weekly due to excessive drinking. He further
acknowledged discussing with friends and relatives classified
information pertaining to sensitive sites and missions.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information, was alleged by a superior officer to have
passed classified information to a member of a hostile intelligence
service: During a personal interview Subject admitted only to passing
one piece of classified data to a representative of that country. When
polygraph results indicated deception, Subject subsequently admitted
giving a substantial number of classified items to that representative
who was later proven to be a member of his country's intelligence
service.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a non U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a security clearance, had a favorable
background investigation conducted on him. During a pre-polygraph
interview Subject indicated that he had never been in contact with a
representative of a foreign intelligence service. He was subsequently
polygraphed and was found deceptive to questions regarding contact with
a foreign intelligence service. After further questioning, Subject
admitted that while he was employed as a contractor for an intelligence
service of a friendly country he had several contacts with members of a
hostile intelligence service. Subject never reported this information
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen employed as a courier for a
foreign intelligence service, was arrested as he was meeting a foreign
intelligence agent, who was actually a U.S.-controlled agent working
undercover. Subject was subsequently tried and convicted of espionage.
Throughout interrogation he maintained he could not identify any other
intelligence operatives engaging in espionage in and against the United
States. During polygraph testing, Subject admitted to knowing and, in
fact, identified several persons in the United States known or
suspected by him of being in the employ of the same intelligence
service Subject served.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET security clearance had a
favorable background investigation in conjunction with an earlier
assignment. All personal biographical data was favorable. During a
polygraph examination Subject indicated deception to questions about
knowing others engaging in espionage, intent on his part to engage in
espionage, and the truthfulness of the information on his security
forms. During the post-test interview he admitted that he had been
terminated from his employment with a U.S. intelligence service after a
year of training but before he was assigned to a position. He admitted
that he engaged in freelance journalist work in the U.S. and abroad
with an Asian. During their work, the Asian told him he was an
intelligence agent for his country. Although the Subject identified
the agent by name, his location in the U.S., and his intelligence
service, he would not give many details of their joint activities.
Subject continued to show deception to questions about intending to
commit espionage against the United States.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within
the Intelligence Community, was subjected to a full background
investigation during which nothing unfavorable was discovered. During
his polygraph examination, he declared that he had no contact with
officials of foreign intelligence services and he denied that he had
been directed by any such service to seek Intelligence Community
employment. Testing showed deception on these issues and Subject
subsequently admitted that prior to leaving his country of origin,
officials of that country's intelligence service contacted him in a
recruitment attempt. He maintained that he had refused to cooperate
with them.
LOSS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a member of the U.S. military with access to classified
information was one of three military personnel with direct access to
approximately one thousand classified aperture cards, which were
subsequently reported missing. An investigation was initiated and all
three individuals denied culpability. Each was then administered a
polygraph examination, with no deception indicated by the other two
individuals. During Subject's polygraph, however, deception was
indicated. When questioned further, he admitted that he had
deliberately destroyed the aperture cards due to inventory/filing
problems. Additional polygraph testing did not surface any indication
of compromise of the missing cards.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen who divided his employment career between
two agencies within the Intelligence Community, required security
processing for detail to yet another intelligence organization. During
polygraph testing, Subject admitted to unauthorized disclosures of
classified information to Soviet intelligence and involvement in a
homosexual act in the USSR.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the U.S. Intelligence
Community with access to classified information, was administered a
polygraph in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. He admitted
to operational security indiscretions and sexual misconduct with an
overseas asset. Additionally, he continued to show deception to
counterintelligence-type questions.
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ESPIONAGE
5u ect, a foreign national employed in a non-sensitive
osition
p
with a U.S. Intelligence Community agency, was assigned within a
friendly foreign country. His father was also employed in a non-
sensitive position with a U.S. Intelligence agency in his homeland, a
hostile foreign country. During normal debriefing interviews, Subject
admitted to several contacts with representatives of a hostile
intelligence service but denied cooperation with them. He appeared
forgetful and evasive on this issue. The polygraph showed deception
regarding the contact issue, and when confronted, Subject not only
admitted to greater contact but also to cooperation with a hostile
intelligence service. He attributed his cooperation to his family's
hostage situation. As a result of his admissions, Subject was
terminated from his position. He was immediately arrested, tried and
convicted of espionage by the friendly host country.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence Community
was arrested for petty theft. During a subsequent specific issues
polygraph examination administered by his Intelligence Community
employer, Subject admitted to extensive shoplifting. He further
admitted to skimming $7500 from operational funds.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen with 20 years experience within the
Intelligence Community, was administered a polygraph examination in
conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. He admitted to
unauthorized disclosures of classified information to non-U.S.
citizens, including a foreign liaison official.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen applying for a position within
the Intelligence Community requiring a security clearance, indicated
that he truthfully reported his organizational affiliations on his
application for employment. Subject advised that none of his relatives
was employed by or cooperating with any foreign intelligence services.
Subject was subsequently polygraphed and found deceptive to questions
regarding his membership in organizations as well as knowledge of
representatives of foreign intelligence services. When questioned
further about his relatives and their cooperation with foreign
intelligence services, Subject refused to cooperate and terminated the
interview.
DRUG USE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military service applied for a
civilian position within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP
SECRET clearance. A prior background investigation was conducted in
conjunction with his military service. Prior to his polygraph
examination, Subject indicated minor use of marijuana and hashish. He
reported identical information to a staff psychologist during his
employment processing. During the polygraph examination, he admitted
to heavy use of marijuana, in addition to repeated use of hashish,
"speed", and quaaludes while in the military service between 1978 and
1982. Generally he purchased these drugs for his personal use; on
several occasions he sold small amounts to finance his own drug use.
He admitted that he falsified his application forms and lied to the
staff psychologist to enhance his prospects for employment. He ceased
all illegal drug use several months prior to the date of his polygraph
examination.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. contractor and
requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was administered a polygraph
examination. When deception was indicated to questions concerning
espionage, Subject admitted that her former husband was engaging in
espionage against the U.S. for a foreign intelligence service. These
activities spanned several years while her former spouse held various
positions with the U.S. government and with defense contractors
requiring classified access. Subject provided very specific details on
his espionage activities. She denied any personal involvement in
espionage, with the exception of knowledge of her former spouse's
activities.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was an applicant for a
sensitive position within the Intelligence Community. A complete
background investigation failed to disclose any unfavorable
information. During a pre-polygraph interview, Subject admitted to
providing non-intelligence information to a foreign intelligence
service. The polygraph indicated deception in that area and during
subsequent interrogation Subject confessed to gathering intelligence
information for a foreign intelligence service.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a member of the U.S. military, applied for a position
within the Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance. A
favorable background investigation was previously conducted on Subject
in conjunction with his military service and all personal biographical
data provided by him was favorable. During the polygraph examination,
Subject was found deceptive to questions concerning espionage against
the United States. He then described several visits to a hostile
embassy to make arrangements to defect. Embassy officials obtained
extensive biographical information on Subject, retained copies of his
documents, and upon learning of his pending applications for employment
with U.S. intelligence agencies, encouraged him to remain in the U.S.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen employed within the Intelligence
Community, received a background investigation and polygraph in
connection with her initial assignment in 1974. She was cautioned in
1976 to heed regulations and not take classified information home and
again in 1977, when it was determined that she discussed SECRET and
Internal Use Only documents with her husband, a foreign born
naturalized U.S. citizen. Reinvestigation polygraph examinations
revealed additional significant unauthorized disclosures and the fact
that between 1976 and 1980, her spouse acted as an attorney for the
Soviet Embassy, where his principal contact was a KGB officer. Subject
continued to show deception to questions regarding unauthorized
disclosures.
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ESPIONAGE
Subject, a Q.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Coaaunity requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was a former
member of the U.S. military where he had access to classified
information. A favorable background investigation was previously
completed on Subject in conjunction with his prior military service.
Subject was administered an applicant screening polygraph examination
and showed deception to the question relating to intent to commit
espionage or sabotage against the United States; however, he made no
admissions. During a reexamination deception was also noted to
questions about clandestine contacts with representatives of a foreign
country. Subject then admitted that he would sell classified
information to a foreign power if it would guarantee him a comfortable
living. He continually denied ever having committed espionage, having
clandestine contacts, or actually having a specific intent or plan to
commit espionage. However, deception was still indicated to questions
regarding intent to commit espionage against the United States and to
having had clandestine contacts with agents of foreign powers.
DIVULGENCE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Subject, a U.S. citizen on active military duty and assigned to an
organization within the Intelligence Community, was administered a
polygraph in conjunction with a periodic reinvestigation. During a
series of polygraph examinations over a two week period, Subject
admitted that he had provided classified information to a foreign
security service without authorization. He had taken classified
information to his personal residence on several occasions, and had
taken uncleared friends to his place of employment to explain the
classified mission and functions of the installation. Polygraph
testing also revealed that Subject had been stealing office supplies
since 1972, some of which he had sold. He also admitted taking money
from office funds and from the desk of co-workers.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was
administered a polygraph examination. When deception was indicated to
counterintelligence questions, she admitted that while overseas she was
cultivated by the host country intelligence service. Subject was
offered a position in which she was to travel to another country under
a false identity, but as a U.S. citizen, and then obtain employment in
the target country (not the U.S.) to gather information. She was to be
provided training in intelligence activities. Subject said that after
two days of thoughtful deliberation, she declined the host country's
offer. She had not previously reported this to the U.S. authorities.
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CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Cos unity requiring a TOP SECRET clearance, was employed
as an engineer by another government agency. During his polygraph
examination, he admitted that his engineering degree, which was listed
as part of his personal biographical data, was phony and was purchased
by him through mail order in London for $100. Subject also admitted
that he shot and wounded his second wife and served two years in prison
for this offense. (He omitted his prison term from his personal
biographical data.) His present wife was missing under unusual
circumstances which he refused to explain. Subject continued to show
deception to questions regarding additional involvement in criminal
activity.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ISSUES
Subject, a U.S. citizen applying for a position within the
Intelligence Community, received a favorable background investigation.
Polygraph testing surfaced the issue of divided loyalty. Subject
claimed to be loyal both to the United States and another country and
stated that if approached by the other country he would relocate there
to offer his assistance, after resigning his U.S. position. Subject
admitted that he would provide information obtained through his U.S.
employment to the other country based on his own determination that
such information would not be detrimental to U.S. interests. Polygraph
testing further resulted in Subject's admission to recent use of
illegal drugs and two acts of shoplifting.
ESPIONAGE
Subject, a former Intelligence officer, was convicted of espionage
activities on behalf of the KGB in 1980. When instructed by his KGB
handlers to regain his former Intelligence Community employment, he
stated that he was constrained from doing so because of his fear of
taking a polygraph examination.
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