EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING OF 17 JULY 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 30, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director O Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
NIC #03729-85/1
30 July 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting of
17 July 1985
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 17 July to
consider. the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on
21 August 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters.
Recommendations for discussions/warning topics should be forwarded to
this office by COB 7 August 1985.
SECRET
3. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early to
avoid parking problems created by construction work. Please enter the
compound through Gate 1, the Route 123 entrance. Plea a telephone
attendance intentions to and have your
clearances verified to us by your security office by COB 19 August 1985.
17 July 1985 Warning Report
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #03729-85
30 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: 17 July 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
Vietnam and the Soviets: The Status of the Relationship
1. Changes are taking place in the patron client relationship
that exists between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Some of these not
so subtle changes have the Vietnamese worried because they are almost
totally reliant on the Soviets for material and political support.
Le Duan's recent visit to Moscow did little to reassure the Vietnamese
of continued Soviet support; indeed, it probably increased their
alarm. Although the trip did result in some increased Soviet aid,
there was little else to offset recent improvements in Sino-Soviet
relations. Almost like rubbing salt in a wound, the Soviets had
Le Duan sign a joint communique that included a statement favoring
rapprochment amongst all three communist countries.
2. Vietnam cannot help but be concerned as it watches the warming
of the Sino-Soviet relationship weaken its position vis-a-vis China
and Cambodia. Its already important goal of settling the Cambodian
problem must now receive greater attention. However, Hanoi is
unlikely to alter its position on the Cambodian problem, particularly
the demand that Pol Pot, et al, be "liquidated." Nor would we
anticipate that the Soviets are willing to risk loss of facilities at
Cam Ranh by withdrawing support from the VN Cambodian venture. But,
if Hanoi comes to believe that the Soviets are headed for a
significant rapproachment with China, the impetus will be to settle
the Cambodian issue, open the door for economic assistance from ASEAN
and perhaps achieve normalization with the United States.
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Although there are few signs of movement toward the negotiated
settlement at this time, things could begin to move very quickly and
with little advanced warning. The Vietnamese could make some marginal
concessions to achieve a negotiated settlement in order to have a
friendly government in Kampuchea, remove their forces from Cambodia,
and reduce the heavy financial burden of carrying on the war.. They
will not, however, give up their key objection to participation of the
Khmer Rouge in a future Cambodian government. Because US-Vietnamese
normalization doubtless will be one of Hanoi's objectives in a
negotiated settlement, we must be alert for signs that the log jam is
breaking and that movement is about to take place.
South Korean Opposition Parties: Prospects for Instability
1. Since returning to Korea five months ago, opposition leader,
Kim Dae Jung has moved deliberately to reestablish his position on the
political stage. He accepted, for example, co-chairmanship of the
Council for Promotion of Democracy. He has, however, refrained from
openly defying the legal restraints that prohibit him from formal
affiliation with a political party. He does play a key role in
directing the maneuvers of the leading opposition, New Korea
Democratic Party (NKDP), from offstage. The NKDP used the spring
session of the National Assembly to focus attention on constitutional
reform and other sensitive issues. The Chun Doo Hwan government's
apparent unwillingness to make concessions in these areas undermined
efforts by party moderates to promote interparty dialogue with the
opposition. We doubt there will be any progress in the parliamentary
discussion area when the Assembly reopens in September.
2. Maneuvering between the factions of the opposition,
particularly the two Kims--Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam--produced a
rather feckless effort to unilaterally hold a special assembly session
in mid-June. Political infighting between the two factions will
continue to limit their effectiveness. The opposition, however, is
capable of-causing turmoil, particularly during the upcoming fall
session. If accompanied by student disturbances, this could put
President Chun under pressure to tighten political controls further.
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3. The prospects.for instability in the future remain high. The
economy is having difficulty, labor is increasingly restive, and the
students continue their advocacy of greater political liberalization.
In the longer term the question of a peaceful transition in 1988
raises a very explosive issue that the opposition will capitalize on
by pressing for a transition plan. Much will hinge on Chun's ability
to come up with a proposal for transition acceptable both to the
military and the opposition. Such a plan must guarantee his safety
while ensuring that radical elements do not gain an unacceptable level
of power. If Chun fails in this, we believe the military would move
to replace him with someone from their own camp who would restore
stability throughout the country.
As the September parliament session nears, the possibility for
instability will increase. Chun's ability to manage this will be more
restricted than it has been in the past. While we believe he is
capable of weathering the storm we cannot rule out the possibility
that violent student activities and a resultant military crack down
could produce a leadership crisis.
The ASEAN Ministerial Wrap Up.
1. Two issues dominated the ASEAN ministerial and post
ministerial meetings: first, trade and economic issues; and second,
Cambodia. In the trade and economic area protectionism and improved
market access were the main concerns. All participants agree on the
need for a new MTN round. Despite the recent ASEAN-Japan economic
talks, Tokyo was the recipient of harsh words because of continued
protectionism, mainly non-tariff barriers, and exploitative foreign
investment policies. New Zealand received heavy criticism for new GSP
actions which would have excluded some countries, notably Singapore.
Australia was also criticized for market access restrictions.
2. By contrast the US came off somewhat better. The ASEAN
ministers voiced concern about GSA tin disposals and about the pending
"Jenkins Bill" on textile imports, but were reassured by Secretary
Shultz' explanations that tin disposals would be managed without
market disruption and that the Administration is firmly opposed to the
Jenkins Bill. The ASEAN countries also expressed general concern
about the implementation of some of the more restrictive provisions of
the 1984 trade act, and in this connection proposed a "rolling
dialogue" with the US on economic issues.
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3. The concept of Pacific community was not advanced as Malaysia
objected to a formula for human resources development in which ASEAN
would be dealing with the five industrialized Pacific nations en bloc;
Kuala Lumpur is wary of domination of ASEAN by such a combination.
ASEAN has taken under advisement the Japanese suggestion that Korea be
included in Pacific cooperation circles.
Cambodia
There were no surprises in-the treatment of Cambodia during the
ministerials. The "proximity talks" proposal of Malaysia, as modified
by Thailand, was announced as a separate statement which in effect
reiterated the United Nations International Conference on Kampuchea
principles. The ASEAN ministers welcomed the congressional
initiatives that would enable (or oblige) the US to be more actively
engaged in support for the non-communist resistance, while they
downplayed the idea of direct US military assistance. They were at
pains to make known their position that the US should not normalize
diplomatic relations with Vietnam until Cambodia is settled -- even
the Indonesians went along with this line. They expressed renewed
concern about the Indochinese refugee problem, particularly along the
Thai-Cambodian border.
2. Some interesting developments have occurred since the
meeting. The Vietnamese have publicly derided the proximity talks
notion, but their ambassador in Kuala Lumpur requested clarification
of its details, saying that it had not been definitively turned down.
The Khmer Rouge early this week said they would abide by an election
that would exclude them from power in a new neutralist and capitalist
Cambodia; the next day they mentioned Pol Pot's name for the first
time in five years, saying that this "patriot" would not be exiled,
which is the Vietnamese apparently irreducible minimum position. The
Sino-Soviet mini-thaw adds intriguing elements to the equation.
A breakthrough on Cambodia does not appear imminent at this time,
but the issue could be resolved quickly if either side to the dispute
was prepared to make significant concessions.
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