WEST EUROPEAN VIEWS ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 23, 2010
Sequence Number: 
56
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 13, 1984
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7.pdf210.67 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 r I ? The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 National Intelligence Council NIC No. 00332-84 13 January 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe SUBJECT : West European Views on Central America 1. The Department of State recently asked embassies in Western Europe to comment on host country views of Central America. We thought you would be interested in a summary of the replies. 2. Public Information Campaign. Despite the Department's efforts to increase t Fe flow of information and high level visitors to European capitals, attitudes generally remain critical of US policies in the region. The tone and temper of that opposition has softened in the past six months, however, partly in response to the greater publicity given to official US concern about human rights violations in El Salvador and to the anti-democratic leanings of the Sandinista regime. West European governments have been increasingly willing to acknowledge the complexities of Central American politics and have been more sympathetic to US goals if not methods in the region. Moreover, although publics remain largely indifferent and overwhelmingly uninformed about U.S. concerns in Central America, there appears to be a greater willingness by the press and even some critics on the moderate left to listen to and attempt to understand, US positions. The growing awareness of East bloc involvement in the region has contributed to the perceptible change in European views. Some leaders in the Socialist International have been especially chagrined by the revelations of radical Socialist activity uncovered in Grenada. CL BY SIGNER DECL Jan 1992 DERV OADR 25X1 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 3. El Salvador and Nicaragua. The hardest West European perception to overcome is the belief that policy is aimed at a military solution in to believe that we will ultimately intervene militarily in El Salvador, and that the US is interested not "in reforming Nicaragua but in destroying it." The recent Sandinista "peace offensive" is viewed in some capitals as a sign of flexibility that they fear the Reagan Administration will dismiss too readily. ,);v i 25X1 25X1 25X1 4. Grenada. US actions in Grenada have had a curious effect on European taming. On the one hand, it appears to have heightened fears that the US is content on solving problems in the region -- which are seen as primarily socio-economic ones -- through the use of force. On the other hand, some European observers believe that the U.S. operation in Grenada and the possibility of its repetition in Nicaragua, is in some measure responsible for the Sandinistas' new interest in negotiations and alleged commitment to democratic elections. officials now acknowledge that the US has vital interests in the region, an appreciation that was largely missing prior to Grenada. "Latin America experts here are not well informed, and though they do not always agree with us, a careful presentation of facts can influence their thinking. They readily acknowledge that the US government has better intelligence in the area than they. In order to maintain a credible dialogue and counter their views with relevant facts we need timely and in-depth analyses. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 ? ? Milton Kovner Distribution: 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - Ex.Di.r. 1 -ER 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC/HM 1 - VC/NIC/CW 1 - NIO/LA 1 - A/NIO/WE 1 NI0/WE chrono 1 - NIO/WE sub 1 - DDI Ron_ NIO/WE/MKOVNERI (13JAN84) i 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 20f0/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 National Intelligence Council NIC No. 00332-84 13 January 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council,:,-6 Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe SUBJECT : West European Views on Central America 1. The Department of State recently asked embassies in Western Europe to comment on host country views of Central America. We thought you would be interested in a summary of the replies. 2. Public Information Campaign. Despite the Department's efforts to increase t e ow of information and high level visitors to European capitals, attitudes generally remain critical of US policies in the region. The tone and temper of that opposition has softened in the past six months, however, partly in response to the greater publicity given to official US concern about human rights violations in El Salvador and to the anti-democratic leanings of the Sandinista regime. West European governments have been increasingly willing to acknowledge the complexities of Central American politics and have been more sympathetic to US goals if not methods in the region. Moreover, although publics remain largely indifferent and overwhelmingly uninformed about U.S. concerns in Central America, there appears to be a greater willingness by the press and even some critics on the moderate left to listen to and attempt to understand, US positions. The growing awareness of East bloc involvement in the region has contributed to the perceptible change in European views. Some leaders in the Socialist International have been especially chagrined by the revelations of radical Socialist activity uncovered in Grenada. CL BY SIGNER DECL Jan 1992 DERV OADR SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 3. El Salvador and Nicaragua. The hardest West European perception to overcome is the belief that US policy is aimed at a military solution in both countries. Some West European officials (continue to believe that we will ultimately intervene militarily in El Salvador, and that the US is interested not "in reforming Nicaragua but in destroying it." The recent Sandinista "peace offensive" is viewed in some capitals as a sign of flexibility that they fear the Reagan Administration will dismiss too readily. 4. Grenada. US actions in Grenada have had a curious effect on European thin ling. On the one hand, it appears to have heightened fears that the US is content on solving problems in the region -- which are seen as primarily socio-economic ones -- through the use of force. On the other hand, some European observers believe that the U.S. operation in Grenada and the possibility of its repetition in Nicaragua, is in some measure responsible for the Sandinistas' new interest in negotiations and alleged commitment to democratic elections. officials now acknowledge that the US has vital interests in the region, an appreciation that was largely missing prior to Grenada. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 ? crrnr-r Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/23: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200140056-7