SOVIET MOTIVATIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000400810001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Motivations
for the Use of Chemical Weapons
in Afghanistan
and Southeast Asia
An Intelligence Assessment
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OdtEL~GENC Direct 01
Intellige'ire
Soviet Motivations
for the Use of Chemical Weapons
in Afghanistan
and Southeast Asia
An Intelligence Assessment
This assessment was prepared b
Theater Forces Division, and
Current Support Division, Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, China-Third World
Branch, SOYA
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
SOV 83-10005X
January 1983
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and Southeast Asia)
in Afghanistan
Soviet Motivations
for the Use of Chemical Weapons
conditions
Key Judgments The use by the USSR and its allies of lethal and nonlethal chemical
Information available warfare (CW) in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia has a foundation in
as of 3 January 1983 Soviet military doctrine. The USSR for a number of years has envisioned
was used in this report.
the possible use of such weapons in general or local wars. In addition to its
direct military utility in eliminating the resistance of stubborn, highly
resilient irregular forces in mountainous or forested areas, the Soviets-
and more particularly their Southeast Asian allies-appear to view CW as
an instrument of terror designed to eliminate popular support for insur-
gents. The Soviets apparently have also sought to operationally test and
evaluate a variety of old and new chemical agents under various field
In providing chemical weapons to their allies and employing them in
Afghanistan, the Soviets must have considered the possibility that they
would be accused of violating international law, even though the legal
aspects of such CW use are ambiguous. But Moscow probably believed
that there would not be significant risk of international discovery or outcry.
So far, the Soviet leadership apparently has judged the international
reaction to the use of chemical weapons to be tolerable and not a reason to
change policy. The recent UN report attesting to the existence of
circumstantial evidence of CW use may give Moscow more concern,
however, because it is the first indication that the US case is beginning to
obtain broader acceptance.
iii Secret
SOV 83-10005X
January 1983
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Soviet Motivations
for the Use of Chemical Weapons
in Afghanistan
and Southeast Asia
Chemical Warfare in Soviet Military Doctrine
The use by the USSR and its allies of lethal and
nonlethal chemical warfare (CW) in areas such as
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia has a foundation in
Soviet military doctrine.' The Soviets have written
extensively about chemical warfare in a NATO-
Warsaw Pact context and devote a substantial
amount of training to operating in contaminated-
nuclear, biological, or chemical-environments. We
have long estimated, however, that the presence of
nuclear or chemical weapons in the enemy arsenal
could give the Soviets pause in initiating chemical
attacks. No such deterrent exists with the irregular
forces in Southeast Asia or Afghanistan.
In countries where chemical weapons have been em-
ployed by the Soviets or their allies-Afghanistan,
Laos, Kampuchea, and, years ago, Yemen-they
were used to eliminate the resistance of stubborn,
highly resilient irregular forces located in inaccessible
mountainous or jungle terrain.
In addition to its direct military utility, the Soviets-
and more particularly their allies-appear to view
CW as a terror weapon, relying upon its psychological
as well as its physiological impact. Soviet allies have
employed CW in an apparent effort to eliminate
popular support for insurgents-as well as to eradi-
cate them. In Southeast Asia, for instance, chemical
agents frequently are used to contaminate entire
villages, including their food and water supply. In
addition, the medical symptoms produced by the use
of mycotoxins-"yellow rain"-are particularly hor-
rifying and guaranteed to instill fear in villagers who
have provided for employment of
chemical munitions in a number of tactical situa-
tions-such as in mountainous and heavily forested
areas.
LSoviet doctrine also envisions the use of
c emica agents in localized conflicts, such as border
wars. this doctrine envis-
ages the use, initially, of harassing (irritant) agents,
incapacitants such as psychochemicals, and herbi-
cides. During the decisive stage of a local war-and
apparently even earlier under certain circumstances-
lethal agents also could be employed, even if the
enemy had not used them first. In addition to support-
ing offensive military operations, CW in such a
conflict could be used to frustrate or spoil enemy
efforts to initiate an offensive.
' As used in this paper, the term "chemical warfare" includes the
use of mycotoxinsi
observe them.
Tactical Advantages
The use of a variety of CW agents in a local war also
affords a number of tactical advantages. Irritants and
incapacitants have been used to render an enemy, well
hidden in caves or dense forests, more accessible to
conventional weapons or to capture. For instance,
Soviet helicopter
units in Afghanistan have used chemical agents to
dislodge insurgents from caves and then have attacked
them with conventional weapons.
lethal chemical agents have been used
to kill resistance fighters in hiding places which, due
to natural terrain and vegetation, are impervious to
conventional ordnance.
Chemical attacks frequently have been conducted in
turn home by poisoning food and water supplies.
lieu of costly ground sweeps in extremely difficult
terrain. Such attacks also can deny the insurgents
entry into contaminated areas and prevent their re-
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Testing and Evaluation
Operational testing and evaluation under various field
conditions is another important military rationale for
the use of chemical weapons.
training at the Chemical De-
fense Academy in Moscow during the 1960s and early
1970s included discussions of US use of irritants
,
herbicides, and, allegedly, incapacitants, during the
Vietnam war. In our judgment, the Soviets may have
thought the United States gained valuable experience
during these operations. This, in part, may have
stimulated their own interest in conducting overseas
operational testing of chemical agents. The wide
variety of medical symptoms reported in Southeast
Asia and Afghanistan suggests that these countries
now have become test sites for a broad spectrum of
Soviet irritant, incapacitating, and lethal chemical
agents-both old and new-as well as delivery vehi-
Soviet
and Lao medical survey teams have entered contami-
nated areas after attacks and conducted field exami-
nations of living and dead victims. In at least one case,
the Soviets removed bodies
for further study. Some field examinations may have
been conducted to assess levels of toxic contamination
before the entry of ground troops
Military Effectiveness
The military results of the use of chemical weapons in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan have varied consider-
ably. In Laos, where aircraft spray poisonous sub-
stances on unprotected villagers-routinely including
women and children-such use apparently has been
quite effective. Thousands of H'mong have been
killed, injured, or forced to seek refuge in Thailand. In
Kampuchea, where the attacks in large part have
been conducted by artillery in support of ground troop
operations against better protected guerrilla fighters,
the effectiveness has been substantially less.
In Afghanistan, where Soviet forces have at their
disposal a broad range of modern weaponry, the use of
lethal and nonlethal chemical weapons seems to be
much more limited and selective than in Southeast
Asia. In addition, the effectiveness of such use has
been even lower than in Kampuchea. This may be
because the Mujahedin normally are well hidden and
have begun empl4ying crude methods of protecting
themselves from . haling gas vapors, and because
weather and eo a hic conditions are extremely
difficult an
.
Political Calcula ons
In providing their Vietnamese and Laotian allies with
a chemical weapo s capability and in undertaking
some lethal-chemical operations in Afghanistan them-
selves, the Soviets must have considered the possibility
that they would b accused of violating the relevant
international acco ds, even though the legal aspects of
CW use are ambi uous (see appendix). We doubt,
however, that the oviets believed there would be
significant risk of nternational discovery. They prob-
ably anticipated t at -documenting the use of chemical
weapons in the T rd World would be difficult-the
areas where they ave been used are remote and the
substances genera y dissipate rapidly. In addition,
Moscow and its al ies could try to thwart detection
efforts-as they h ve by making it difficult for UN
observers to gain cess to Afghanistan, Kampuchea,
and Laos. Further ore, the Soviets probably initially
doubted that anyo a would take an interest in such
obscure people as he H'mong or the remnants of the
stigmatized Pol P regime.
The continuing us of chemical weapons in Southeast
Asia and Afghanis an indicates that, so far, Moscow
has judged the inte national reaction to their use to be
more an irritant th in a reason to change policy. The
Soviets probably t ught that initial US charges of
employment of suc weapons could be brushed away
as part of US effor s to discredit the USSR. They
probably judged th it propaganda on such US actions
as the use of chemi al weapons in Vietnam and the
decision to underta e a binary CW program could be
used to counter the US charges. The failure of all but
a few close US alli s to publicly endorse the US
charges and the ini ial UN investigation's equivoca-
tion on the issue pr bably reinforced these judgments.
The recent UN re rt attesting to the existence of
circumstantial evid nce of CW use may give Moscow
more concern, how er, because it is the first good
indication that the S case is obtaining broader
acceptance.
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Appendix
Legal Issues Associated With the Use
of Chemical Agents and Mycotoxins
The 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use in war of
chemical (and bacteriological) weapons.' Although the
USSR ratified the treaty in 1928 and Vietnam did so
in 1980, Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea have not
signed it. By its own language, the Protocol only
applies between signatory parties. Many countries-
including the USSR and Vietnam-have made reser-
vations reiterating that they are not bound with
respect to countries that did not sign the Protocol.
Therefore, the Protocol itself would not apply to
Soviet or Vietnamese use of chemical weapons in
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, or Laos. Neither the pos-
session nor transfer of chemical weapons, nor assist-
ance to other countries in their acquisition, are viola-
tions of the Protocol in the absence of involvement in
the use of such weapons. The Protocol, however, has
become international custom among civilized nations.
That custom, at least, would be "violated" by the use
of lethal chemical weapons or assistance in such use.
The US position is that the use of mycotoxins in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan clearly violates the
1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This
agreement, to which the USSR, Vietnam, Laos, and
Afghanistan are parties, prohibits the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of
biological agents or toxins. It also bans weapons and
equipment to deliver such substances. Additionally,
the convention prohibits the transfer of such items "to
any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly," and
prohibits assistance to any state in manufacturing or
acquiring them.
I The United States holds that the treaty covers only the use of
lethal weapons, not such substances as irritants and incapacitants.
The Soviets deny using mycotoxins but assert that
these substances-whether produced synthetically or
by biological organisms-are not living and hence are
chemicals. They say they should be classified as
chemical warfare agents. The US position, however, is
that all toxins, whether natural or synthetic, are
prohibited by the agreement.
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