EVIDENCE ON USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000400800037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DDI #1574-82
National Intelligence Council 24 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Hans Heymann, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer
at Large
SUBJECT . Evidence on Use of Chemical
Agents
The attached paper responds to your
request.
/W V
Hans Heymann, Jr.
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SECRET
DDI #1574-82
24 February 1982
MEMO FOR: DCI
FROM : NIO-at-Large
SUBJECT : SNIE on Chemical Warfare
Distribution:
0 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - SA/DCI
1 - C/NIC
1 - ER
2 - NI'O-at-L (Heymann)
NIO-at-Large/HHeymann/
SECRET
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 orrnrT
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Evidence of Use of Chemical Agents
in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
Four types of evidence were adduced to arrive at our conclusion that a
variety of lethal and non-lethal chemical agents were used in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan:
? Signs and symptoms (medical-toxicological)
? Environmental samples from known attack sites.
? Blood samples from and examinations of victims
? Collateral and special intelligence
1. Signs and Symptoms
Study by medical-toxicological experts of symptoms exhibited by
individuals exposed to toxic agents has provided a good indication of
the general class of chemical agent used, e.g., the range of clinical
manifestations from chemical agents as reported by a US Army
investigative team resulted in the determination that nerve agents,
irritants such as CS, and a highly toxic hemorrhaging chemical or
mixture of chemicals were used in Laos. Other medical-toxicological
personnel arrived at the same determination and further indicated
that toxins such as the trichothecenes were a probable cause of the
lethal hemorrhaging effect seen in Kampuchea as well as Laos.
Symptoms reported by the DK in Kampuchea and the Mujahedin in
Afghanistan were in many cases similar to those reported by the
H'Mong in Laos. In addition, symptoms reported from Afghanistan and
Kampuchea indicated that a highly potent, rapid-acting incapacitant
"knockout" chemical also was being used. Mujahedin victims and
witnesses to chemical attacks reported other unusual symptoms,
including a blackening of the skin, severe skin irritation with
multiple small blisters and severe itching, severe eye irritations,
and difficulty in breathing -- suggesting that phosgene oxime or a
similar substance was used.
With respect to "Yellow Rain" specifically, the attached table
shows a comparison of effects as reported by victims, observers and
medical personnel with medically known effects of tricothecene
poisoning.
2. Environmental Samples
Samples have been collected from Southeast Asia since mid-1979
and from Afghanistan since May 1980. To date about 50 individual
samples -- of greatly varying types of usefulness for analytical
purposes -- have been collected and analyzed for the presence of
traditional CW agents, none of which have been detected. On the
basis of recommendations by medical and toxicological experts and of
findings by the CSL, many of the samples have been analyzed for the
trichothecene group of mycotoxins. Four samples, two from Kampuchea
and two from Laos, were found to contain high levels of trichothecene
toxins. In the most important cases, control samples taken in the
immediately adjacent area of the attack were negative.
t
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Comparison of Reported "Yellow Rain" Effects
With Known Trichothecene Effects
Yellow Rain Reports*
Effects of Trichothecenes
1.
Nausea, vomiting--severe, immediate
1.
Nausea, vomiting--severe, immediate
2.
"Falling down, world turning"
2.
Dizziness
3.
"Burning of skin" . . . small blisters
3.
Generalized erythema with a burning
sensation of skin
4.
"Shaking all over, flopping like fish
out of water"
Ataxia (failure of muscular coordination),
occasional tremors and convulsions
5.
"Bleeding eyes"
Congestion of the sclera (white outer coat
of eyeball) and blood in tears
0
6.
"Pounding" chest, rapid heartbeat,
weakness
Hypotension (abnormally low blood pressure)
with secondary rise in heart rate
7.
Severe pain in center of chest
7.
Angina (substernal chest pain)
8.
Sleepiness, "not able to talk"
8.
Somnolence, central nervous system symptoms
9.
Bleeding gums
9.
Stomatitis (inflammation of oral mucous
membranes) and ptyalism (excessive
salivation)
10.
"Can't breathe"
10.
Shortness of breath
11.
"Skin and body hot with cold"
11.
Fever and chills
12.
Diarrhea with blood
12.
Diarrhea with blood
13.
Loss of appetite, inability to eat
13.
Anorexia
14.
Bleeding into skin and fingernails
14.
Thrombocytopenia (decrease in number
of platelets, white blood cells
involved in clotting of blood) and
purpura (skin discoloration caused
by hemorrhage into tissues)
15.
Drop in white blood cell count
15.
Leukopenia and anemia
16.
"Rotten esophagus, stomach, intestines;
16.
Rapid necrosis of linings of gastro-
soft spleen and liver"
Swelling of all organs
intestinal tract; lymphoid necrosis in
spleen and liver
Congestion of all organs
Effects are immediate at levels near to or above a rough estimate of 500 to 1,000 mg total body
burden for an adult. Athough inhalation data are pending, the levels are consistent with reported
lethal and sublethal doses. Trichothecenes in combination, when directly ingested or inhaled, or
in purified form, are more toxic in lower concentrations and the order of signs and symptoms and
timing varies.
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We should note that, because of the low persistency of CW
agents, sample collections should ideally be made within minutes or
hours of an attack. Under the circumstances of Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan this has simply not been possible. While numerous
Samples were collected, few of them held any realistic prospect of
yielding positive results. It is fortunate that trichothecenes are
sufficiently persistent to allow detection several months after the
attack. Regarding Afghanistan, where access is relatively better, a
new collection effort is underway to obtain samples in such an
accelerated manner.
3. Blood Samples and Direct Medical Examinations
A number of blood samples taken from victims of recent attacks
showed results strongly supporting poisoning by trichothecenes. This
evidence included the presence of trichothecene metabolite, as well
as other changes in blood count and enzyme studies that are entirely
consistent. Control samples from non-exposed members of the same
population were negative.
No single piece of evidence of any category taken alone proves our case
in any scientific sense. But so far, qN A exposed to all of the evidence
combined has questioned its compelling nature.
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. SECREI
1P
24 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Hans Heymann
National Intelligence Officer at Large
FROM : Special Assistant to the Director for
Interdepartmental Affairs
SUBJECT : SNIE on Chemical Warfare
1. The Director asked this morning for a short statement on the nature
of the evidence which has led us in our recent SNIE to conclude that the Soviets
have, either directly or through their proxies, used chemical agents in South
and Southeast Asia. What he means is specifics as to types of blood samples,
the tests run, etc. He is on top of the judgments of the SNIE, but he feels
a little bit weak on the nature of the evidence underlying those judgments.
2. The Director would like to have this as soon as possible, although
he is not asking for it for any particular meeting. Because it should be a
fairly simple and straightforward exercise, I ask that, if possible, you give
it to me by close of business today. My suggestion is that you somehow
summarize the discussion of the evidence in the SNIE and attach excerpts
from the SNIE if necessary as backup.
cc: C/NIC
ExO/NIC
SA/DCI
25X1
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