HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RE MURDER OF HENRY LIU, TAIWANESE-AMERICAN CITIZEN, 15 OCTOBER 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000500620022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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RE C"(
OLL 85-0662
7 February 1985
SUBJECT: Hearings Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on Asian & Pacific Affairs, re Murder
of Henry Liu, Taiwanese-American Citizen, 15 October
1984
1. The Subcommittee convened at 1:30 p.m., on
7 February 1985, in Room 2172 Rayburn, to hold hearings on
the murder of Henry Liu, an American citizen of Chinese
descent, in Daly City, California, on 15 October 1984. The
following Members of the Subcommittee were present:
Stephen J. Solarz, Chairman (D., NY)
Mervyn Dymally (D., NY)
Robert G. Torrecelli (D., NJ)
Tom Lantos (D., CA)*
James Leach, Ranking Minority Member (R., IA)
Douglas K. Bereuter (R., NE)
Gerald B. H. Solomon (R., NY)
Toby Roth (R., WI)
The Hon. Norman Y. Mineta, Member of Congress**
The Hon. William Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Mrs. Helena Liu, widow of Henry Liu
Professor Michael Glennon, University of Cincinnati
Law School, formerly Legal Counsel for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
*Mr. Lantos is not a Member of the Subcommittee, but was
invited because Mrs. Liu resides in his Congressional
district.
**Mr. Mineta was invited to testify because he is the most
senior House Member of Asian ancestry.
In Mr. Solarz' opening statement he stated that the
purpose for the hearings was to determine whether:
a) the relevant agencies of the Executive Branch have
acted properly in trying to secure justice for Henry Liu, by
mounting a vigorous investigation and taking appropriate
diplomatic steps;
b) the murder of Henry Liu was an isolated incident or
only the most visible manifestation of a consistent pattern
of acts of intimidation or harassment; and
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c) the existing legal framework for restricting
illegitimate foreign agent activity is strong enough, or is
new legislation required to better protect the rights of
people within the territorial boundaries of the United States.
A copy of Mr. Solarz' opening statement is attached.
Mr. Leach read portion of his opening statement, stating
that the Congress expects the Taiwanese Government to
cooperate fully with the State Department and FBI officials
and failure to provide cooperation may force the Congress and
the Executive Branch to consider sanctions against Taiwan,
e.g., a cut-back in the number of CCNAA (Taiwan's
Coordination Council for North American Affairs) in the
United States, a withdrawal of all Taiwanese Government
personnel who may be part of the intelligence services
implicated in ordering the murder (of Henry Liu).
Mr. Solomon took note of all the criticisms being leveled
against Taiwan, whose government is friendly to the United
States, that he was not in sympathy with the undue criticism
of our allies: Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines or many
of our other friends; that no one criticizes the KGB here in
Washington or at the United Nations and elsewhere throughout
the country. "I would like to try to change the tone here."
He went on to say that it was being implied (at the Hearings)
that the Taiwanese Government was not cooperating, but that
he found they were going out of their way to cooperate.
Mr. Mineta, the first witness, began by commenting on
the murder of a Mr. Chen in Michigan and now the murder of
Mr. Henry Liu and implied a pattern of discrimination against
Americans of Asian ancestry in that their basic rights were
being violated and no apparent concern or action by the
Reagan Administration. He said that if a Polish-American
journalist were murdered in the United States by Polish
agents, the national outcry would be enormous, and the issue
would be raised at the highest levels. He cited a letter he
had written to Attorney General Smith about the murder of the
Taiwanese-American in Michigan stating that he believed this
Administration was not concerned with the most basic of human
rights of citizens. Mr. Mineta was not pleased with the
form-letter response from the Attorney General which simply
acknowledged receipt of his letter.
In concluding his remarks, Mr. Mineta emphasized his deep
concern with what was the apparent freedom of agents of
foreign governments to seek out and terrorize foreign
nationals (in the U.S.)--agents come here, do their dirty
work, and run back to their country where they claim
protection of the foreign nation's laws for behavior that
dishonors that nation.
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He will ask the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence to begin an intense investigation of this whole
matter.
Mr. Solarz responded that State Department has requested
the Taiwanese Government to return the individuals; and the
FBI conducted a vigorous investigation of the murder. What
precisely would he like to have the Administration do that
has not already been done with respect to this murder?
Mr. Mineta said he wanted the three individuals interviewed
(from Military Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense).
Mr. Solarz said he was not prepared to reach the conclusion
that this (murder) is a "consistent pattern of treatment of
Asian-Americans." Mr. Leach commented that it might be
premature to call for ending of arms sales.
Mr. Lantos asked that in light of Mr. Mineta's service on
the Intelligence Committee could he shed some light on the
rationale for the assassination of Mr. Liu: could his
writings have had an impact? Mr. Mineta said he did not
think he was in a position to indicate what the rationale
might have been and, frankly, even though the Intelligence
Committee had material and he looked at it over a period of
time while serving on the (HPSCI) he was not sure he was able
to indicate if it existed. Mr. Roth thanked Mr. Mineta for
his testimony, but added that he failed to see any connection
between the murder of Mr. Chen and Mr. Liu.
Mr. Mineta closed by saying that he himself, when he was
ten and one-half years of age, was put in a detention camp in
1942 and felt very strongly about this issue (of discrimina-
tion against Asian-Americans).
The next witness, The Honorable William Brown, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, provided non-confidential information on the State
Department's involvement with the Taiwan Government (based
on requests from the FBI). Mr. Brown said he might not
respond to a number of things since what he might say would
be repeated in the press. He did not wish to say anything
that might prejudice an ongoing investigation and any
possible prosecutions that may occur within the United
States. He further said, with the indulgence of the
Subcommittee, that he proposed not to allude to, confirm or
deny, names of any of the suspects in the American
investigation of the case, and that any such questions be
directed to law enforcement officials investigating the case.
This was followed by a number of questions posed to Mr. Brown
on cooperation from the Taiwan Government, and extradition
treaties (none between USG and Taiwan).
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Mrs. Henry Liu, the widow of the murdered man, was
accompanied by her attorney and also a Professor Lee Chiu
Wong(?), provided information on her late husband and his
writings about President Chiang; she believed her husband was
killed by the Government of Taiwan. Mrs. Liu was asked
whether her husband had visited Mainland China (Answer: four
times--1975, 1980, 1981 and 1984, and met with officials of
the PRC. Another question from Mr. Lantos: Did he publish a
book in the PRC? Answer: Yes. It Was brought out that Henry
Liu had not visited Taiwan in 16 years and was not afraid in
the U.S. that anything might happen to him. Mr. Torricelli,
who had arrived late in the meeting, asked whether Mr. Liu
had been compensated for his writings by any foreign
government. Answer: No, supported himself by family business.
At approximately 4:15 p.m., and following the conclusion
of Mrs. Liu's testimony, Mr. Solarz announced that the
Subcommittee would now take up his Substitute for the
Amendment to H. Res. 49 offered by Mr. Solomon. (It appeared
Mr. Solarz had overlooked the fact that Mr. Glennon, the
fourth witness, had not yet testified. The Subcommittee
spent about twenty minutes on re-working the Substitute
Amendment.
Mr. Leach then suggested the Subcommittee adjourn due to
the lateness of the hour. Mr. Solarz agreed, but it was at
this point it was brought to his attention that Mr. Glennon
was still waiting to appear as a witness. (At this point,
however, Messrs. Lantos, Leach, Torricelli, Roth and Solomon
left the hearing room. Messrs. Lantos and Solomon returned
at the conclusion of Mr. Glennon's statement.)
Mr. Glennon thanked the Committee for inviting him to
appear and read his prepared statement (a copy of which is
attached), in which he alleged that foreign intelligence
agencies--including those of Taiwan--have conducted extensive
harassment, intimidation, and surveillance of U.S. residents;
that the U.S. intelligence community has known for some time
that these acts have been taking place. Pro forma protests
made, but liaison relationships continue. That if the
Subcommittee "is serious about getting to the bottom of this,
then it must look carefully and purposefully at the whole
gamut of relevant liaison relationships." He proposed, inter
alia, that the Administration "impose a prohibition against
direct and indirect participation in and encouragement of
activities that our own agencies are forbidden to conduct"
and "would 'task' the CIA, FBI and NSA to gather intelligence
actively about those foreign agencies reasonably believed to
be engaged in acts of harassment, intimidation, or
surveillance within the United States."
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At the conclusion of Mr. Glennon's remarks, Mr. Solarz
commented that he, Mr. Glennon, had provided some
"interesting thoughts on the subject and that the
Subcommittee would carefully consider them." He then asked
Mr. Glennon, considering his experience in following the
course of foreign intelligence activities and based on the
knowledge available to him, did he think the situation has
changed. Mr. Glennon said although he left the SFRC staff
five years ago it is his impression of the situation that the
present situation has not changed a lot. When asked what
countries he thought the Subcommittee should look at, Mr.
Glennon responded, "Again, I am not revealing classified
information, I think the countries would be Taiwan,
Yugoslavia and, to an extent, the Philippines. I might say
the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service,
retains a clipping service on this subject that could be very
useful. You should ask them to compile the clippings--to
determine what countries should be targeted."
Mr. Solarz then asked what the Subcommittee should do "if
the Administration genuinely believes it does not have
evidence to justify this conclusion. There is a difference,
he said, between allegations and proof--particularly if (the
Administration) believes the foreign government is initiating
standards--in order to justify implementation of penalties.
They do not have conclusive evidence that there is a
consistent pattern of harassment...." Mr. Glennon suggested
that Executive Branch representatives should be called before
the Subcommittee to show there is no conclusive evidence.
Mr. Solarz said the FBI--in their view--there is no foreign
intelligence activity that can be characterized as systematic
harassment or intimidation. If they did, would there be any
justification for the legislation you suggest? To which
Mr. Glennon responded that he thought the Congress can itself
come to that conclusion "if you take the conclusion reached
by the Administration--this Subcommittee itself can look to
see whether it supports the conclusion."
Mr. Solarz suggested that as a practical matter, it would
be almost impossible to persuade the Congress they (the
foreign intelligence agencies) are engaging in such a pattern
if the intelligence agencies say they have no evidence to
that effect. "We have to rely on their judgment."
Mr. Glennon commented,"in that case the approach is a
dead-end stone."
Mr. Solarz asked "Do the intelligence agencies allocate
resources to determine if foreign intelligence services are
involved? Mr. Glennon said that he could not go into the
subject in open session.
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STAT
At this point, Mr. Solomon submitted for the record an
article printed in the Wall Street Journal on December 26,
1984, which was relevant to the matter at hand.
Mr. Solarz concluded by saying to Mr. Glennon that he
made some serious suggestions which the Subcommittee would
take a close look at and take up with leaders in the
Government.
Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison
STAT
STAT
Distribution:
*.-Original - OLL Record w/atts
1 - OLL Chrono w/o atts
1 - PCS PGL /ivrlr$
LD/OLL gg (27 February 1985)
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Wall Street Journal - 26 December 1984
Protecting the Refuge
Zhang Zheng-gao, a 46-year-old
Chinese engineer, jumped from an up-
per floor of Peking's mission in New
York last April, winning asylum at the
cost of a broken ankle. With help from
local Chinese businessmen, he settled
in an apartment in Brooklyn and
bought a 19-inch color TV set and a
cassette player. But in mid-July, Mr.
group. Two were arrested in Taiwan
and are said to have confessed, but
Daly City police complain Taiwan
hasn't been giving the information
needed for indictments. Friends of
Mr. Uu accuse higher-ups in Taiwan
of arranging the killing to silence his
embarrassing writings about the re-
girne.
Ythese-cases-issnbject-to-
Within several days, he was re-
ported back in Peking, where the gov-
ernment stated he had returned volun-
tarily. The State Department accepts
this claim, noting that he seems to be
back at his old job, but other investi-
gators believe Mr. Zhang was kid-
napped as a warning to Chinese ath-
letes then arriving at the Los Angeles
Olympics.
The case of Zhang Zheng-gao, for
all its ambiguity, makes us think seri-
ously about several other mysteries.
Two weeks ago another Chinese engi-
neer named Zhang Xin (no apparent
relation) tried to seek asylum while
his government mission changed
planes at Kennedy Airport. After a
day in New York.-he somehow wound
up at the Chinese consulate in mid-
town and was found on its roof hanged
the next morning. The New York
Medical Examiner has Issued a pre-
liminary finding of suicide.
A similar mystery involves Pe-
king's capitalist rival, the Republic of
China on Taiwan. A Chinese-American
writer named Henry Uu, 52, was mur-
dered at his Daly City home south of
San Frapcisco on Oct. 15. Police have
named three Chinese suspects, said to
be members of the Bamboo Gang, a
large ,Taiwan-based underworld
the kind of proof that would stand up
in court, which is part of the problem
with incidents of this genre. Yet there'
can be little doubt that foreign govern-
ments sometimes do dirty tricks on
U.S. soil. Similarly suspicious inci-
dents have implicated the Philippines,
the Soviet Union and Cuba, among
others. And it is not always clear that
U.S. authorities are doing everything
they can to discourage such activity.
There is a predisposition to give such
episodes low priority, particularly if
diplomatic repercussions might result
from a tough stand.
Yet such escapades are an affront
to both public order and the U.S. repu-
tation as a haven of freedom; they
ought to be taken seriously, especially
by an administration that professes
devotion to law and order. We espe-
cially need to learn whether agents
capable of the suspected deed still are
operating in the U.S. The place to
start is with a strong effort to unravel
the disappearance of Zhang Zheng-
gao, the suicide of Zhang Xin and the
murder of Mr. Uu. Without prejudg-
ing any of the cases, serious investiga-
tions would give would-be foreign in-
timidators the message that the U.S.
really is a refuge for the ideals of
freedom.
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OPENING STATEMENT
CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AFFAIRS HEARING ON
THE MURDER OF HENRY LIU
HENRY Liu WAS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN OF CHINESE ANCESTRY. HE WAS AN
JOURNALIST WHO WROTE ON THE POLITICS OF TAIWAN, WHERE HE LIVED FOR
ALMOST TWENTY YEARS AFTER 1949. IN HIS WORK, HE MARRIED THE PRINCIPLES
OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING TO A CHARACTERISTICALLY CHINESE
FOCUS ON THE MORALITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
ONE MIGHT QUARREL WITH WHAT HENRY LIU HAD TO SAY, BUT NO-ONE CAN
DISPUTE THE FACT THAT HIS RIGHT TO WRITE AS HE WISHED WAS PROTECTED BY
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. APPARENTLY HIS FREEDOM OF SPEECH WAS NOT
PROTECTED ENOUGH, FOR HENRY Liu WAS FOUND SHOT TO DEATH ON THE MORNING
OF OCTOBER 15TH, IN HIS GARAGE IN DALY CITY, CALIFORNIA.
THE SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE CRIME ITSELF WAS
PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT BY MEMBERS OF A TAIWAN CRIMINAL ASSOCIATION?
KNOWN AS THE BAMBOO GANG. Two THE GANG MEMBERS HAVE CHARGED WITH
MURDER BY THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. EVEN MORE STARLTLING WAS THE
JANUARY 15 ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE TAIWAN GOVERNMENT THAT THREE OFFICIALS
IN ITS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU WERE INVOLVED IN THE KILLING AND
APPARENTLY RESPONSIBILE FOR RECRUITING THE ASSASSINS FOR THIS
REPREHENSIBLE ASSIGNMENT. HOW EXACTLY THEY WERE INVOLVED IS NOT
PUBLICLY CLEAR, BUT IT WAS SUFFICIENTLY GRAVE TO LEAD TO TAIPEI'S
ANNOUNCEMENT AND TO THE ARREST OF THE THREE OFFICIALS-
I CANNOT EXAGGERATE THE SENSE OF OUTRAGE WHICH THE REPORTED
INVOLVEMENT OF OFFICIALS OF THE TAIWAN GOVERNMENT IN THE MURDER OF AN
AMERICAN CITIZEN ON AMERICAN SOIL PROVOKES IN ME. THE GENIUS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IS THAT IT OFFERS BROAD OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PEOPLE POLITICALLY TO THINK, SPEAK, AND ACT AS THEY WISH. IT SHOULD
NOT OFFER ANY OPPORTUNITY WHATSOEVER TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO PUNISH
CRITICS OF THEIR REGIMES WHO RESIDE IN THE UNITED STATES-
I KNOW THAT THERE MAY BE SOME DISAGREEMENT AMONG MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND IN THE CONGRESS OVER WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PUT
PRESSURE REPRESSIVE REGIMES ABROAD TO RESPECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
PEOPLE IN THEIR OWN TERRITORY. BUT I AM SURE WE ALL AGREE THAT THE
TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME A
HUNTING GROUND FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WISHING TO STIFLE DISSENT.
PART OF MY OUTRAGE STEMS FROM THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS IS NOT THE
FIRST TIME THAT TAIWAN HAS ABUSED THE FREEDOMS OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE
UNITED STATES. IN THE PAST, THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS CREDIBLE CHARGES
OF SURVEILLANCE, INTIMIDATION, AND HARASSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES BY
AGENTS OF TAIWAN'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO
TAIWANESE STUDENTS IN OUR COUNTRY.
THREE AND A HALF YEARS AGO, PROFESSOR CHEN WEN-CHENG, A TAIWANESE
PERMANENT RESIDENT ON THE FACULTY OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, WAS
DETAINED, INTERROGATED, AND KILLED WHILE IN TAIWAN. MEMBERS OF THE
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WILL REMEMBER THAT HEARINGS OF THIS
SUBCOMMITTEE REVEALED THAT PROFESSOR CHEN WAS TARGETED FOR THIS
TREATMENT BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN SPIED UPON AT PUBLIC MEETINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES. AS A RESULT OF THE CHEN CASE, CONGRESSMAN LEACH AND I
SECURED PASSAGE OF AN AMENDMENT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT WHICH
FORBIDS THE SALE OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES WHICH THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES
HAVE ENGAGED IN A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR
HARASSMENT AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES-
THIS MOST RECENT EPISODE RAISES A NUMBER OF SERIOUS QUESTIONS FOR
THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE-
FIRST OF ALL, HAVE THE RELEVANT AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ACTED PROPERLY IN TRYING TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR HENRY Liu, BY MOUNTING A
VIGOROUS INVESTIGATION AND TAKING APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC STEPS?
SECOND, IS THE MURDER OF HENRY LIU AN ISOLATED INCIDENT OR IS ONLY
THE MOST VISIBLE MANIFESTATION OF A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF
INTIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT?
THIRD, IS THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESTRICTING
ILLEGITIMATE FOREIGN AGENT ACTIVITY STRONG ENOUGH? OR IS NEW
LEGISLATION REQUIRED TO BETTER PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITHIN THE
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF THE UNITED STATES?
THIS HEARING IS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THIS
SUBCOMMITTEE WILL SEEK FULL ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS- CONTRIBUTING
TO OUR UNDERSTANDING TODAY ARE FOUR DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES:
THE HONORABLE NORMAN Y. MINETA, A MEMBER OF COGNRESS FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA- WITHIN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESSMAN
MINETA IS THE MOST SENIOR MEMBER OF ASIAN ANCESTRY, SO IT IS HIGHLY
APPROPRIATE THAT HE TESTIFY TODAY-
--THE HONORABLE WILLIAM BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS-
--MRS. HELENA Liu. FOR MYSELF, AND I AM SURE FOR OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, I WOULD LIKE TO PAY A SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO
MRS. LIU*FOR HER WILLINGNESS TO APPEAR TODAY AND SPEAK ON A SUBJECT
WHICH I AM SURE STILL CAUSES DEEP EMOTIONAL ANGUISH.
"PROFESSOR MICHAEL GLENNON, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW
SCHOOL. FROM 1977 TO 1980 PROFESSOR GLENNON WAS LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. AMONG THE SUBJECTS ON WHICH HE
SPECIALIZED WAS FOREIGN AGENTTIYY_I I~THE UN I TED_STA_TES.
AFTER THE WITNESSES HAVE PRESENTED THEIR TESTIMONY AND MEMBERS
HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO POSE QUESTIONS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL
PROCEDE TO CONSIDER AND MARKUP HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 49, WHICH
EXPRESSES THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD
COOPERATE FULLY IN THE CASE OF HENRY LIU BY DELIVERING TO THE UNITED
STATES FOR TRIAL THOSE CITIZENS OF TAIWAN CHARGED BY AUTHORITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE MURDER.
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TESTIMONY OF
MICHAEL J. GLENNON
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 7, 1985
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Let me begin by thanking the Subcommittee for inviting me to
be here today, and by commending the Subcommittee for its inter-
est in the acute and recurring problem of harassment, intimid-
ation, and surveillance of residents of the United States by
agents of the intelligence services of foreign countries.
I participated in a study of that subject in the late 1970's
while I was legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. Obviously I am unable to engage in any specific discussion
of its contents here today. There is, however, a vast amount of
information on the public record concerning this subject. The
following testimony responds to specific questions put to me by
the Subcommittee. It is largely a synopsis-of an article I wrote
that appeared last year in the~Harvard International Law Journal.
(The article is entitled "Liaison and the Law: Foreign Intellig-
ence Agencies' Activities in the United States," and appears at
25 HarvInt_L_J_ 1 [Winter, 1984].) That article sets forth my
thoughts in greater detail and also includes extensive citations
to the public record. With the Chairman's permission, I would
ask that that article appear at the conclusion of my remarks.
A. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
Mr. Chairman, foreign intelligence agencies -- including
those of Taiwan -- have conducted extensive harassment, intimida-
tion, and surveillance of United States residents here on Amer-
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON PAGE 3
ican soil. Typically, these activities are supervised by case
officers operating under diplomatic cover, although some may pose
as students, businessmen, or tourists. The case officers direct
agents, who are "tasked" to carry out specific intelligence
missions. The most frequent is surveillance, including the infil-
tration of groups thought to be inimical to the foreign regime,
attendance at demonstrations, and similar activities directed at
identifying critics of the regime. Another frequent mission is
the disruption of anti-regime activities, such as speeches, dem-
onstrations, and organizational planning.
Once the critics are identified, several things may occur.
They may be threatened or assaulted. Relatives in their homeland
may be harmed. Upon returning home, the critic may be imprisoned,
possibly tortured. On rare occasions, he or she may be murdered
here in this country.
B. THE EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Certain of these activities have violated three federal
statutes that require the registration of foreign agents. Prin-
cipal among them is the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22
U.S.C. 611-621, which requires a person who, within the United
States . . . solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contrib-
utions, loans, money or other things of value for or in the
interest of Ca] foreign principal . . . to register with the
Attorney General." In addition, the so-called Notification Act,
18 U.S.C. 951, requires that non-diplomats who act within the
United States as agents of a foreign government register with the
Secretary of State. A third provision, 50 U.S.C. 851, requires
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.that certain persons who have received instructions in espionage
or counterespionage register with the Attorney General. While
diplomats are excepted from the requirements of each statute by
their terms, persons acting on their behalf are not.
Furthermore, some of these activities appear to have vio-
lated one of the civil rights acts, 18 U.S.C. 242, which imposes
criminal penalties for willfully depriving any inhabitant of the
United States of his or her constitutional rights. (Resident
aliens stand on essentially the same footing as citizens under
the Bill of Rights.)
The United States intelligence community has known for_ some
time that these acts have been taking place. It has made occa-
sional protests, but these appear to have been gro forma. Not-
withstanding specific knowledge of these acts, it has in some
cases continued to conduct liaison relationships with the agency
in question. These relationships have embraced, among other
things, training programs, information-sharing, and organiza-
tional support.. In some instances that support has continued.
Let us be clear: the United States intelligence community has
continued to advise and tra_ n .some__of the same foreign services
that have used_ their _ newl y-acquired skills to
States law. And United States intelligence agencies have in some
instances made no real effort to ensure that the skills they have
imparted are not used in the United States against residents of
our country.
Mr. Chairman, I do not suggest any impropriety in liaison
relationships between the United States intelligence community
and foreign agencies that respect the constitutional rights of
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United States residents. These relationships provide executive
decision-makers with extraordinarily useful information, informa-
tion not otherwise available. Our national security is material-
ly advanced as a result.
I do suggest, however, that indifference can become acquies-
cence; acquiescence, consent; and consent, criminal liability as
well as moral responsibility. If the United States intelligence
community has not crossed that final line, it has come perilously
close. And if this Subcommittee -- or any congressional commit-
tee -- is serious about getting to the bottom things, it must
look carefully and purposefully at the whole gamut. of relevant
liaison relationships.
C. WEAKNESSES IN THE EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
So much for the existing statutory framework. The weak-
nesses in that framework are evident. The registration statutes
are overbroad. The Executive lacks the will to enforce them, for
reasons I will discuss in a moment. And two proof problems exist:
either the foreign agent must register himself, which is unlike-
ly,
or the United States intelligence community must furnish the
information needed to prosecute, which could compromise sensitive
intelligence sources.
Similar proof problems arise in connection with the civil
rights statutes. Moreover, at least with regard to the case
officers (as opposed to the agents), diplomatic immunity provides
a shield.
I think the "Solarz Amendment" of 1981 was a step in the
right direction, but it now appears that the Amendment has had
i
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON PAbt b
little effect; experience with it suggests why. First, the cut-
off is optional. Arms sales are terminated only in the event the
President makes the determination in question, but the Amendment
does not require that he make that determination. Second, some
nations engaged in these activities do not buy arms from the
United States, or they can obtain the arms elsewhere. Restrict-
ing the penalty to.a cut-off only in arms sales renders the
statutory penalty meaningless in those situations. Third, the
Amendment refers only to a "consistent pattern of harassment or
intimidation," but it makes no reference to surveillance. Most
offending foreign countries normally apply sanctions in their own
territory -- they wait for the dissident to return home before
"countering" him. Here the Amendment is irrelevant.
D. INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS
TO EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT
A variety of political and institutional factors further
impede the effective enforcement of these statutes. These become
clear as the role of each executive branch actor is reviewed.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is of course the agency
primarily responsible for federal law enforcement. The Bureau
has in the past made affirmative efforts to gather information
only about those foreign intelligence agencies whose activities
in the United States directly implicate U.S. national security.
For the most part these have been the agencies of communist
countries. In operational terms, this has meant that the FBI has
known a great deal about the intelligence activities of countries
operating against the United States government -- agencies en-
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON rRbt i
gaged in classic espionage. But it also has meant that the
Bureau has known virtually nothing about most agencies operating
against private persons -- agencies that conduct harassment,
intimidation, or surveillance of dissidents engaged in constitu-
tionally protected activities.
Now, one can agree or disagree with the Bureau's allocation
of counterintelligence resources. My own opinion is that some
measure of differentiation is appropriate. But it seems clear
that the amount of resources devoted to the investigation of
"friendly" foreign intelligence services by the FBI has been dis-
proportionately small in relation to the substantial systemic
harm caused by their activities. This, I think, is the first
institutional impediment: passivity on the part of the FBI.
Assume, in any event, that the Bureau does obtain evidence
of a specific federal offense by a foreign intelligence agency.
Two principal, remedies are available. If the violator is a case
officer clothed in diplomatic immunity, he can be expelled. If
the violator is an agent without diplomatic immunity, he can be
prosecuted. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, further in-
stitutional impediments limit the availability of either remedy.
First, the Central Intelligence Agency has a strong incen-
tive to oppose either-Action. In many instances intelligence
agencies know the identities of each other's personnel, and any
steps taken against foreign intelligence operatives in the United
States can result in retaliatory action against CIA officers
stationed abroad. Moreover, prosecution can risk the disclosure
of sensitive intelligence sources and methods, since the question
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON PAGE 8
always arises as to how the government knows the defendant is a
foreign agent.
Second, relevant State Department officials too often are
loathe to see any steps taken which will disrupt an otherwise
smooth-running bilateral relationship. Conflict-avoidance mech-
anisms seem highly evolved in the diplomatic personality; by
training and inclination, career foreign service officers -- to
their credit -- are experts in maximizing harmony and minimizing
discord. Yet that proclivity can impede a swift and firm re-
sponse to actions inconsistent with diplomatic norms. Perhaps
more important, it can also operate to cut short at the outset
counterintelligence efforts by the FBI. And without relevant
information, the propriety of either remedy obviously becomes
moot.
E. METHODS OF STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
What is to be done? At the risk of sounding simplistic, I
must tell you that it seems clear to me that this problem can be
resolved swiftly and permanently, without further legislation, if
the requisite will were mustered at the highest levels of the
executive branch. That will would direct the following:
First, United States intelligence and law enforcement agen-
cies would be prohibited from encouraging foreign intelligence
agencies to engage in illegal activities in the United States.
For reasons that are not clear, the executive order promulgated
by President Reagan (E.O. 12,333; 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 119817)
dropped this prohibition; it provides simply that "Cn]o agency of
the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON rriur_ -y
person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order." In
contrast, the previous executive order governing domestic intel-
ligence operations (E.O. 12,036; 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1976]) pro-
vided that "(n]o agency of the Intelligence Community shall
request or otherwise encourages directly or indirectly. any per-
son, organization, or government agency to undertake activities
forbidden by this Order or by aeelicable law." (Emphasis added.]
Obviously the previous order was much tighter. If the Administra-
tion is serious about bringing these unlawful activities to a
halt, it must impose a prohibition against direct and indirect
participation in and encouragement of activities that our own
agencies are forbidden to conduct.
Second, if the Executive found the requisite will to resolve
the problem, it would task" the IA FBI, and NSA to gather
intelligence actively about those foreign agencies reasonably
believed to be engaged in acts of harassment, intimidation, or
surveillance within the United States.
Third, foreign intelligence agencies would be placed on
notice that the harassment, intimidation or surveillance of
United States residents will henceforth be regarded as a breach
of diplomatic norms, and that every foreign diplomat who thus
acts beyond the scope of his diplomatic immunity will promptly be
expelled. In response to concerns about retaliatory expulsions
of CIA personnel, I would simply say that I am aware of no
evidence that the Agency engages in the kinds of activities
abroad that have raised legitimate concerns about foreign intel-
ligence agencies' activities in the United States. The applica-
tion of reciprocal diplomatic norms by foreign governments would
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON vmuc av
not, therefore, undercut United States intelligence activities
carried out in foreign countries.
Finally, the State Department, in formulating policy towards
foreign countries, would be instructed (a) to learn from the
United States intelligence community precisely what foreign in-
telligence services are doing in this country; and (b) to take
into account the extent to which those services engage in acts of
harassment, intimidation, or surveillance directed at United
States residents. Many of these foreign governments are human
rights violators. It may be that we cannot affect the way they
treat people in their own countries. But surely the United
States government can affect the way they treat people here in
our own country.
F. METHODS OF STRENGTHENING THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Mr. Chairman, I am not optimistic that the necessary admin-
istrative steps will be taken. I must say that I am frankly
bewildered at the Administration's inaction. The issue is, in the
end, a law-and-order issue; there would seem few more squarely
conservative objectives than that of protecting the exercise of
constitutional rights from violation by foreign thugs. Nonethe-
less, it seems unlikely that the Executive will take the initi-
ative, and in the absence of an effective administrative
response, any solution will have to come from the Congress. I
should like at this point to outline briefly the principal legis-
lative remedies that I believe might be appropriate.
First, the Solarz Amendment might be strengthened by requir-
ing the President to transmit a written determination to Congress
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. bLtNNUIV
with respect to any country that engages in the pattern of activ-
ities now described in the Amendment. This would effectively
mandate a cut-off of arms sales to that country. The amendment
might be further strengthened by including in the cut-off other
forms of assistance, such as military and economic aid.
Second, the burden might be shifted to the Executive by
providing that the cut-off will take effect unless the President
determines that such a pattern of activities has not occurred.
It would of course be necessary, under this procedure, to specify
the country in question; given the substantial, unrebutted evid-
ence that the activities of Taiwan intelligence services now fall
within the statutory formula, it would seem appropriate that
Taiwan be so specified.
Third, a statutory requirement that the President expel
foreign diplomats who violate diplomatic norms would, I think,
raise constitutional problems. The conduct of diplomatic rela-
tions is generally thought to be a plenary power of the Pres-
ident. In addition, because immunity is conferred by treaty (and
possibly by customary international law as well), any statutory
attempt at retrenchment could seriously complicate the conduct of
United States diplomacy.
On the other hand, as members of this Subcommittee are well
aware, Taiwan is not recognized by the United States, and the
United States does not carry on diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Personnel affiliated with Taiwan's Coordination Council for North
American Affairs (CCNAA) do enjoy "privileges and immunities" of
a sort, but this is different from the immunity accorded diplo-
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNUN rr,uc av
not, therefore, undercut United States intelligence activities
carried out in foreign countries.
Finally, the State Department, in formulating policy towards
foreign countries,
would be instructed (a)
learn from the
United States intelligence community precisly what foreign in-
telligence services are doing in this cou try; and (b) to take
into account the extent to which those s rvices engage in acts of
harassment, intimidation, or survei lance directed at United
States residents. Many of these f reign governments are human
rights violators. It may be that a cannot affect the way they
treat people in their own coun ries. But surely the United
States government can affect t e way they treat people here in
our own country.
F. METHODS OF STRENGTFIENING THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Mr. Chairman, I am not optimistic that the necessary admin-
istrative steps will be taken. I must say that I am frankly
bewildered at the Administration's inaction. The issue is, in the
end, a law-and-order issue; there would seem few more squarely
conservative objectives;1than that of protecting the exercise of
constitutional rights from violation by foreign thugs. Nonethe-
less, it seems unlikely that the Executive will take the initi-
ative, and in the absence of an effective administrative
response, any solution will have to come from the Congress. I
should like at this point to outline briefly the principal legis-
lative remedies that I believe might be appropriate.
First, the Solarz Amendment might be strengthened by requir-
ing the President to transmit a written determination to Congress
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. GLENNUN .- -
with respect to any country that engages in the pattern of activ-
ities now described in the Amendment. This would effectively
mandate a cut-off of arms sales to that country. The, amendment
might be further strengthened by including in the cut-off other
forms of assistance, such as military and economic aid.
Second, the burden might be shifted to the Executive by
providing that the cut-off will take effect less the President
determines that such a pattern of activiti s has not occurred.
It would of course be necessary, under this procedure, to specify
the country in question; given the sub-4antial, unrebutted evid-
ence that the activities of Taiwan intelligence services now fall
within the statutory formula, it Mould seem appropriate that
Taiwan be so specified.
Third, a statutory requirement that the President expel
foreign diplomats who violate diplomatic norms would, I think,
raise constitutional problems. The conduct of diplomatic rela-
tions is generally thought to be a plenary power of the Pres-
ident. In addition, because immunity is conferred by treaty (and
possibly by customary international law as well), any statutory
attempt at retrenchment could seriously complicate the conduct of
United States diplomacy.
On the other hand, as members of this Subcommittee are well
aware, Taiwan is not recognized by the United States, and the
United States does not carry on diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Personnel affiliated with Taiwan's Coordination Council for North
American Affairs (CCNAA) do enjoy "privileges and immunities" of
a sort, but this is different from the immunity accorded diplo-
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TEST . PION Y ur n i L.ni i v. .+.
.mats of recognized countries. The scope of CCNAA immunity is
narrower, and more important for present purposes, it is confer-
red by the President pursuant to statutory authorization. The
Taiwan Relations Act (in section 10; 22 U.S.C. 3309(c)) author-
izes the President to extend privileges and immunities to the
CCNAA on a reciprocal basis. That statutory provision can be
modified: there is no requirement in international law that this
immunity be extended, and there is no constitutional inhibition
against its limitation by Congress. It would be entirely appro-
priate for Congress to repeal this provision of the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act; it would also be entirely appropriate for Congress to
amend the provision so as to confer immunity conditionally. This
Subcommittee may wish to consider, for example, engrafting the
approach of the Solarz Amendment onto the Taiwan Relations Act:
the Act might be amended to authorize the President to extend
appropriate privileges and immunities to the CCNAA only after he
has transmitted to the Congress his determination that the auth-
orities on Taiwan are not engaged in a pattern of harassment,
intimidation, or surveillance of persons in the United States.
This approach would seem to have the benefit of relating the
remedy more directly to the wrong.
Fourth, and finally, the Subcommittee may wish to consider a
broader remedy, analogous to the "country reports" required by
the human rights legislation (sections 116(d)(1) and 502b(b) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961). The executive branch might
be required to report annually to Congress concerning every
country engaged in a pattern of harassment, intimidation, or
surveillance in the United States. Such reports would provide
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hard information on matters now beset with rumor and speculation.
Private entities that deal with these countries, such as colleges
and universities, would then have a reliable factual foundation
on which to base individual or collective pressure to halt their
misconduct.
G. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, at one level, the most painful level, the
problem we have been discussing today is the problem of relative-
ly few individuals: Henry Liu, Wen-chen Chen, their widows, their
children, their families, and other emigres who dare to speak out
against oppression and who have nowhere to turn but to you -- the
United States Government -- when the forces of oppression seek to
silence them.
On another level, however, the problem affects all Amer-
icans. For'every resident of the United States is constitution-
ally accorded the rights of free speech, free association, and
free assembly. If these rights are abridged by a foreign secret
police force, it is not simply the individual "target" who is
their victim -- it is our entire body politic.
For information is the lifeblood of our democracy. Our
system assumes a marketplace of ideas. My liberty depends upon
your rights -- to free speech, free association, free assembly --
as much as it depends upon my own. Our democracy works only if
each person can learn all he needs to know to develop informed
opinions and to cast intelligent votes. We need to hear what
these emigres have to say. They have important messages on the
terror of authoritarianism. We need to be reminded what tyranny
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. ULtNNUN ?^"'~
is all about.
So when a foreign secret police force strikes out at these
brave men on American soil, it strikes at the very heart of our
political system.
The murder of Henry Liu represents an attack, Mr. Chairman
-- some might say a terrorist attack -- on our country and on the
most precious ideals for which it stands. I hope that the Con-
gress responds accordingly.
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THE COMMITTEE TO OBTAIN JUSTICE FOR HENRY LIU
Statement of Mrs. Helen Liu to the Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Thursday, February 7, 1985
I am grateful and honored to be asked to come here today
to testify before the United States Congress regarding my
husband, Henry Liu, and to relate to you, and to the
American People some of the history of my husband's life,
what he believed in, and what he wrote about. 'Yy husband
and I lived here, in Washington, A.C. together for over
ten years, from 1967 to 1978, and Henry and I nade many
Friends here during those years. Yet though we made many
friends and acquaintances in government life, we never
thought that someday I would be testifying as a witness
here in the Conggress, and we certainly never could have
anticipated what tragic circumstances would bring me here.
First, I want to state that I am also here as a represen-
tative of The Committee to Obtain .T,_istice for Henry Liu which
was orc-anized spontaneously by many of Henry's friends and
fellow journalists right after his death on October 15th,
1984. The Chairman of our Committee, Prof. Ling-Chi Wang,
and our attorney, Jerome M. Garchik, are with me here
today also on behalf of our Committee. Our Committee has
members now all across the United States, and it includes
many prominent journalists, intellectuals and cont.uni.ty
leaders, some of whom did not know my husband personally,
but only knew and respected his work. Our Committee is not
a political comittee, but rather is a humanitarian and
civil rights group. The members and supporters hold
all different political viewpoints on issues of American
and Chinese questions, but they all share the same sense of
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7,1985
Page two
outrage and loss at the death of my husband, as well as the
same feelings of fear that his murder caused among Chinese
people of good will everywhere.
I believe that my husband was murdered on the orders of
high government officials of the Republic of China(Taiwan),
and that he was killed by them for a threefold purpose:
1) To punish him for writina about the r_ulin" Chiang family;
2) To prevent him from writing books and articles in the future
about the Chiang family, and their political and family history;
and 3) To scare other journalists and writers who might also
be interested as Henry was in writing about this family and
its history. My belief that this is why he was killed is
based on the following evidence, including the repeated
efforts of Taiwanese officials to bribe Henry not to
publish his book on President Chiang Ching-kuo, the sworn
confession of one of my husband's killers,Wu Tun, and on
the continuing efforts of the Taiwan Government to harm
my husband's reputation as a writer, now that he is dead,
and to cover-up all of the true facts about who in the
Taiwan Government ordered his murder and why.
Who Was Henry Liu
Everyone who met my husband knew him to be an especially
talented and resourceful journalist. He was born on December
7,1932 in Jingjiang, Jiangsu, and arew up amidst the turmoil
and chaos of war and revolution. When he was6Q years old,
his father fell victim to a Communist shooting. He was drafted
into the Nationalist(Kuomintang) Army when he was 16, and was
evacuated to Taiwan in 1949. During the 1950's he continued
his education, and attended a Defense Ministry School for
political cadres, run by Chiang Ching-kuo, son of President
Chiang Kai-shek. There, he niet Chiang Kai-shek's other son,
General Chiang Wei-kuo, and General Wang Sheng.
My husband, however, didn't like a military career, and
wanted to be a journalist. First, he worked for a Government
radio program. Later, he became a reporter for the Taiwan
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Statement of Helen Liu
Page three
February 7,1985
Daily News, which was published by Mr. Hsia Hsiao-hua who became
a mentor to Henry and helped his career along. I met Henry in
1962 when he had that job. Henry attended university courses
at night at National Chengchi University where I also was a
student. After the Taiwan Daily News sent him to cover a story
in Hongkong, Henry wrote a book about the island that was
published in Taipei. The newspaper later sent him to report on
Manila, and on the Vietnam War.Henry wrote his second book on
the Vietnam War and Souteast Asia, which was also published
in Taiwan.
Henry and I were married in 1967, and we moved to Washington,
D.C. when Henry was appointed correspondent for his newspaper.
In addition to writing for the paper, Henry took courses at
American University Graduate School, for a Masters Degree,
and he worked as a part-time interpreter/escort for the
State Department. Henry stopped writing for the Taiwan Daily
News in 1978, and we both became U.S. Citizens in 1973.
Beginning at about that time, Henry wrote and published
at least 25 articles, essays and books on the rulin; Chian?
family, its social and political history, and about several
political leaders closely associated with them over the
years. I have attached a bibliography of Henry's work during
this time. His articles were about Chiang Kai-shek, Mrs.
Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, Governor K.C.Wu (the
former mayor of Shanghai)& General Wang Sheng. When he died,
Henry was working on a biography of former Yunnan Province
Governor Long Yun, and had plans to write a full biography
of the political career of Governor Wu. In fact, Henry had
just signed a contract with the Wu family giving him exclusive
access to their extensive archives, shortly before he was
killed on October 15th, and some people feel that it was
official fear of this book that prompted Taiwan to order
Henry murdered.
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7,1985
Page four
Taiwan Censors Henry Liu
Henry began writing articles about the Chiang family in the
early 1970's as part of his graduate study work, and he arranged
for publication of some of this work in several Hongkong
magazines. Around that time he received a}etter from General
Wang Sher the powerful head of Taiwanese evaeall
who told Henry to"take heed" of three things before he pub-
lished his biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. He was told to
consult with as many people as possible before publishing,
to think of what was good for Taiwan, and should "move
cautiously, and think twice," before publishing such a book.
As reported in a recently published letter Henry wrote to
41-
a friend in Hon;kong,-.:.~ -t'
Henry wrote General Wang back bluntly
telling him: "I'm living in America and I am independent,
No one could tell me what I should write about"' This
correspondence with General Wang Sheng was in 1973.
Two years later, General Chian Kai-shek died, and his
son Chiang Ching-kuo became Henry published three
articles on Chiang Ching-kuo in Hongkong, that year. These
were collected and published in book form in Hongkong. In
1980, the book was translated without Henry's permission
into Japanese and published there.
The 1975 book covered the life of Chiang Ching-kuo only
through about 1949, and Henry was determined to bring it
up to date. He would also publish chapters or installments
in various magazines as they were completed, and hoped to
base his PhD. thesis at American University in Political
Science on this work.
Of course, the Taiwan Government was aware of Henry's
plans, since he did not keep any of it secret. In 1977 when
we still lived in Washington, D.C., Henry was approached
by Admiral Wang Shih-ling, who was then the military atache
at the Taiwanese Government Offices in Washington. Admiral
- 4 -
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7,1985
Page five
has since been dismissed, and arrested in Taipei
because of his involvement with Henry's death. In 1977,
Admiral Wang told my husband that he could write about
whatever he wanted to write about, but "not about the
Chiang family." Henry rebuffed him, and told him that this
was in fact "the only thing" he wanted to write about. Henry
also wrote to his friend in Hongkong about this conversation,
s .
These warnings were not the only attempts to interfere
with Henry's work during the next few years. Henry told
of rumours that he would be paid $1 million if he would not
write his book on C.K.Chiang. Our friend, Van Lung said
recently that the Taiwanese had actually offered Henry
$40,000 to drop his plans to publish the book. A number
of money offers and approaches were made to Henry's
publisher, the American Tribune(Los Angeles) to get ther.,
to back off plans to print the book.
Henry and hi.s publisher bravely rejected all of these
censorship attempts, and continued with their plans.
However, I believe that Henry was concerned about the
reaction of the Chiang family to his book and made several
efforts to show that he did not carry any personal
antagonism towards them. For example, when Henry went to
China in 1981 for reasearch on his book, he took photos of
Hsi-k'ou where C.K.Chiang has lived as a boy, and Henry
sent these to General Chiang Wei-kuo. Not long after, Henry
received letter from a friend of the General asking foriS1 _
photos. So on his next trip to China,in
1982, Henry arranged with a Chinese film crew to take some
films of the Chiang family's house there. These he also sent
to the Chiang family, and received a letter of appreciation
in return.
As arrangements for the publication of Henry's book neared
-5 -
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7, 1985
Page six
completion, Henry was approached once again by the Taiwan
Government regarding the book. This time, the approach was
made by Henry's old friend and mentor, Hsia lisiao-hua, the
publisher of Taiwan Daily News. Mr. Hsia was himself a former
military intelligence officer who still had close ties to
that agency. He came to California in December, 1983, and
told Henry he was there on behalf of
Admiral Ching Tzu-li, the Associate Director of Military
Intelligence, under Admiral Wang Shih-ling. He made a
personal appeal to Henry, based on their years of friendship
and their mentor/protege relationship, asking Henry to drop
a chapter from his book dealing with the family history of
the Chiangs, and to tone down the book's criticism of Chiang
rule on Taiwan. No money was offered at this time. In the
face of this personal appeal, Henry was unable to refuse
Mr. Hsia's request, because to do so would have been
an insult and disrespectful under Chinese culture and
tradition. So, Henry reluctantly agreed to Mr. Hsia's requests
and modified the book in this way, because he felt that
if he did this he could finally go ahead and safely publish
the book, which really was his lifework.
Henry believed that this was the case because Mr. Hsia
telephoned Henr f om Taiwan in 46~~ 1984 and told him
that ik*hilitarMie happy about the changes and would
give Henry $20,000, to be paid in installments, to show their
gratitude. Of this money, Henry received $17,000 before he
died. Somehow, the F.B.I. found out about this and talked
to Henry about it only a week before he was killed. Another
strange fact is that just after Henry was killed, Mr. Esia's
friend in Military Intelligence, Adm. Ching Tzu-li was. transfered
out of that job, to a job Mr. Hsia formerly held as head of the
Taiwanese propaganda radio station, Cheng Sheng (Rightous Sound)
Broadcasting.
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7,1985
Page seven
Who Killed My Husband and Why?
In late November of last year, the F.B.I. identified four
members of the United Bamboo Group, a large Mafia type organi-
zation, as the hit squad that murdered my husband. Last month,
the Taiwan Government identified four high level officers of
their own military intelligence agency as being involved in
Henry's death. Since then, a number of Chinese language news-
papers here, in Hongkong and in Taiwan have published reports
identifying other high military and Kounintang officials as
being involved in ordering Henry's murder.
I believe that my husband was killed by the Taiwan Government
because he was not just another journalist or writer. Many
people have compared Henry's work to that of William Shirer,
Theodore White and Louis Fischer. Henry's work was. widely
published and read all throughout Asia, in China, Japan,
Hongkong, and in Taiwan, despite repeated Government efforts
to suppress it.
Just a few months before Henry was killed, the Taiwanese
Government impounded and suppressed the entire printing of a
Taiwanese monthly publication, China Tide Review, which re-
printed Henry's interview with Governor K.C.Wu. After Henry was
killed, the Government suspended this magazine for one year
because it reported on Henry's death, and because it included
exerpts from his book on Chiang Ching-kuo. The Government has
also closed a weekly named Marching Forward which reported on
the killing. Many Chinese Americans also believe that Taiwan
officially interfered in the U.S. publication of China Times
and closed that newspaper because it fairly reported on Henry's
death.(See ttft/n~v of Henry's last letter, to Jack Anderson,
which he wrote regarding Taiwan's interference with the
editorial policy of China Times just before he was killed.)
Henry and I came to the United States because Henry could
not live under the policy of fear, censorship , and suppression
that prevails in Taiwan. Once he became a citizen, Henry believed
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Statement of Henry Liu February 7, 1985
Page eight
he would be free to write what he wanted, as he wanted, and
he told Taiwan's officials this on several ocassions.
Henry had the courage to write about the official family
of Taiwan when others did not. People who know China know
the passion for secrecy that surrounds the Chiang family.
Chiang Ching-kuo, who has been president of Taiwan for
years, has not even had an official biography published
about him, and Henry's book was the only reliable,documented,
and accurate book. Certainly it was a controversial and
critical book about Chiang Ching-kuo. For example, Henry
wrote that Chiang Ching-kuo was a secret instigator of the
May, 1957 burning of the U.S. Embassy in Taiwan, when a
U.S. Army court-martial released an Army Sargeant charged
with the murder of a Taiwanese national named Liu. This
little remembered "May 24th incident," and C.K.Chiang's
early Russian education, and pro-Soviet activities, do
not relect well upon Taiwan's President. Many people feel
that Henry's planned full biography of Governor Wu would
contain many more shocking and damaging revelations about
President Chiang and his family.
In his soon to be released book, The Soong Dynasty published
by Harper & Row, Sterling Seagrave has written about the attitude
of the Chiang family towards journalists and biographical writing
and his comments give some insight into why my husband was killed:
"It is characteristic of the Chinese, rich and poor
to be reserved and private-even secretive. The Soongs
were the most Westernized of all Chinese,but the
appearance of openness and accessibility was merely
an acquired manner, not a total transformation. Close
associates could not penetrate this mask. Their
public image was enhanced and propagated by a legion
of publicists. The Chiang regime was known to have spent
hundreds of millions of dollars each year in the
1940s,1950s,and 1960s to guarantee its image in
America and thus,the continuance of the regime. At the
same time,the regime suppressed negative publicity;
for example,a critical biography of Chiang Kai-shek
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7,1985
Page nine
written by one of his ex-wives was purchased by Taiwan
authorities for a sum said to be in excess of $1 million,
and`evidently was destroyed."
The Soong Dynasty (Harper & Row,1985) page 10.
Attached is the Daly City Police Affidavit charging Wu Tun
with my husband's murder, based on the police interrogation of
Wu Tun in Taipei on January 24,1985. In it Wu Tun confessed
that Chen Chi-li, the hit squad leader, asked him to help
"teach a lesson" to my husband, because Henry "had written
some bad things about Taiwan and its president."
On January 31,1985, a Taiwanese newspaper, "Fa-yang sleekly"
reported that in September, Chen Chi-li agreed with Taiwanese
officials to kill my husband after Admiral Wang Shih-ling mentioned
Henry's new book, and said that "A guy like Henry would have
been killed long ago if a Chief of Police like Dai Li were alive."
This report and others confirm the several contacts between Chen
Chi-li and several Taiwanese military intelligence officers,
some of whom are now under arrest in Taiwan, and confirm Chen
Chi-li would hide the true purpose of his trip to the U.S. by
holding a big reception in Houston,Texas ostensibly for the
purpose of honoring the U.S. publication of his gang's magazine,
Mai Wah Reports. This reception, held at a Chinese restauarnt
in Houston on September 25th, was attended by Liu En-Ti, the
Houston head of the Taiwan official office (C.C.N.A.), by
Chang Ning-chip, the Houston based head of the official Taiwanese
Press Bureau, and by Chan; Hsueh-hai, the Secretary of the Committee
of Overseas Chinese in Houston, also an official of the Taiwan
Government.
The involvement of Government officials in my husband's
murder is not subject to any question at this time. Nor is the
true motive. The only questions remaining are whether all of the
people involved will be identified, and whether all of these will
really be punished for Henry's murder.
Is there a Political Cover-up of This Case?
I and the Committee fear that both Taiwan and the Reagan
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7,1985
Page ten
Administration will cover up the true story about my husband's
murder for political reasons, and to protect the high officials
who were really involved.
We have the following evidence of such a cover-up:
1. The refusal of Taiwan to extradite or deport all the
persons arrested for involvement in my husband's murder;
2. The failure of the Reagan Administration to publicly
denounce my husband's terrorist murder, or to insist upon
the delivery over of the killers to U.S. Justice;
3. The continued suppression and concealment of Chen Chi-li's
taped confession, which the F.B.I. has had for weeks, giving
rise to concern about a joint U.S.-Taiwan doctoring of this
taped confession; the growing conflicting newspaper reports
of drastically differing versions of this tape recording,
with a recently leaked one from Taipei alleging that Chen
Chi-li had no official support in this murder.
4. A cowardly campaign orchestrated from the Taiwan
Government to discredit Henry Liu by leaking alleged spy
letters, and spy rumours which have been given widespread
publicity in the press;
5. Recent intimidating approaches by the F.B,I. and Taiwan
Government officials to members of our Committee who were
suspected of writing about the Chen Chi-li tape recording,
or of having any information regarding this tape. In fact,
one of our committee members was threatened by a C.C.N.A.
official over this matter;
6. The refusal of the Justice Department to seek federal
civil rights indictments against any of the killers or their
sponsors, and the instructions of the F.B.I. and the Justice
Department to local law enforcement to limit their indictments,
and investigation away from Taiwan officials.
7. The failure of the federal F.B:I. and local investigative
team to interrogate the several Taiwanese officials arrested
in connection with this murder during their January trip to
Taipei;
8. Interference by C. C.N.A.officials with local law enforcement
and offering of gifts by the C.C.N.A. to local police;
9, Disturbing statements from local and federal law enforcement
that this case will soon be closed, without any U.S. or state
prosecutions or trials of anybody;
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Statement of Helen Liu February 7, 1985
Page eleven
10. The failure of the Taiwan Government to appoint
an independent Warren type commission or special prosecutor
such as was recently created in the Aquino case and in
Israel, to conduct a blue ribbon, bona fide investigation
into Taiwan's official involvement in this crime. Instead,
Taiwan has only entrusted the investigation of the crime
to another military intelligence official, Gen.Wang Ching-hsi,
who himself has been identified in at least onenews report
of having approved the murder of Henry Liu in advance.
(Formosan Weekly, Los Angeles).
11. The State Department recently stated that
they would rather this whole incident and all of its details
be kept quiet for twenty years, because of the political
repercussions of the identification of government officials
in Henry Liu's murder;
12. The failure of U.S. authorities to arrange for the
arrest and surrender of Tung Kuei-shen, aka Little Tung
who is in hiding in the Philippine Islands, and who is
rumoured to wish to surrender to the U.S.Published
reports state that Tung fears he will be assassinated
by Taiwanese agents, and would only feel safe in U.S.
hands.
I and the Committee to Obtain Justice for Henry Liu are not
pleased with the conduct of the U.S. Government so far in this
case. We have found a profound historic precedent against which
we can measure the U.S. official response to Henry Liu's death,
and against which the U.S. response is found wanting. Almost
a hundred years ago, a mob of American miners killed twenty
eight Chinese miners in Rock Springs, Wyoming. Unlike the
conduct of our Government in this case, the Chinese Government
then made vigorous protests on behalf of its murdered subjects.
As a result, this Congress, in 1887,voted an indemnity to the
families of the murdered Chinese, totaling $147,000.
Since my husband's death, I have received no words of
condolence or regret from any representative of the Taiwan
Government,desvite the admitted involvement of Taiwan officials
in his murder. On the contrary, that Government has only acted
coldly and insolently, in a manner which is unacceptable under
both Chinese and American customs. It is disheartening to me,
as Henry Liu's widow, to my Committee members, and,I believe,
to the American public, that our Government has taken this
rude and insolent behavior from Taiwan, without any public
reproval. I and the Committee appeal to you, the Congress,
to express a sincere and stronger response to the killers and
their sponsors in official places in Taiwan; we appeal to you
to help us obtain Justice for my murdered husband, Henry Liu'
Thank you.
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