CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000100010046-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: June 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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S 7588 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
policy, and introduce others to the
American way of life. It permits them
to serve the cause of freedom by pre-
senting the truth. But it does so
within our fiscal limits.
For USIA, we added to the freeze
level a small amount for an enhanced
book program and a portion of the
money necessary for Voice of America
modernization. These are essentially
capital expenditures, necessary if our
country's voice is to be heard at all. In
addition, following Senator PELL's 1982
amendment, we increased the ex-
change program-but, with his gener-
ous support, by only half of what
would have been required. The overall
result for USIA is a figure of $835 mil-
lion, 14-percent below the administra-
tion request of $973 million, and 9-per-
cent below the House figure. For 1987
we again froze at 1986 levels, with only
one exception-a $10 million increase
to meet the Pell requirement. the $845
million in our bill is 27-percent below
the administration's request.
For Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty we authorized $137 million, $5
million below the administration re-
quest. Again, we froze salaries and ex-
penses, adding to this the funding re-
quired this year and next for modern-
ization. of transmitters. Without mod-
ernization the radios cannot be heard
clearly, and if they cannot be heard
clearly other expenses on them are un-
justified.
Mr. President, S. 1003 also contains
several other sections that are worth
mentioning. It authorizes continued
funding for the Asia Foundation and
for the National Endowment for De-
mocracy. It makes improvements in
international narcotics control, in our
refugee program, and in the training
of our diplomats. It creates a frame-
work for an undergraduate scholar-
ship program. It is, I' believe, a bill
which authorizes a sound structure for
the conduct of foreign affairs, in a fis-
cally prudent manner. It has the bi-
partisan support of our committee,
and we urge its adoption by the full
Senate.
Mr. President, the foreign relations
authorization bill is an occasion to
consider not only the management but
also the direction of our foreign af-
fairs. Before we begin.the detailed dis-
cussion of other amendments to the
bill we will turn to the various amend-
ments on Nicaragua outlined, along
with time limits, in the unanimous-
consent agreement.
Mr. President, as Members know a
unanimous-consent agreement has
been entered into in order that full
debate might occur on Nicaragua, and
many Senators will - want to address
our foreign policy considerations with
regard to that country.
Following those amendments, I un-
derstand that it is the intent of the
leadership to proceed to discuss all
other relevant amendments to the
measure before us and to complete
action today. I believe that all of us
welcome that challenge and that op-
portunity.
There are provisions for specific
time allotted to the sponsors of
amendments under the unanimous-
consent agreement. I know that each
sponsor of an amendment will want a
full hearing, and each is entitled to a
full hearing. This is important busi-
ness, and the arguments should be
made part of the RECORD.
For my part, I will attempt to limit
debate on our side substantially, so
that the time now allotted to the Nica-
raguan debate might be curtailed. This
will not be meant to demean anyone's
amendment, but simply to push us
toward completion of the entire au-
thorization bill today.
Mr. President, I suggest that Mem-
bers might wish to listen in their of-
fices, if they are not on the. floor, to
the initial debate on the amendment
that is to be offered by the distin-
guished Senator from Connecticut. He
has been a careful student of the
issues involved, as have Mr. KENNEDY,
Mr. HART, and Mr. BIDEN.
In the event that any Senator
should not wish to offer an amend-
ment already provided for, I would
like to have some notice-and .I am
certain that Senator PELL would join
in this-of what we might expect, in
order that we can schedule the affairs
of the day and expedite business for
all Members.
Mr. President, I ask my. distin-
guished colleague, Senator PELL, if he
has any opening thoughts, preliminary
to the amendment to be- offered by
Senator DODD.
Mr. PELL. I thank the chairman.
Mr. President, today the Senate will
begin its consideration of S. 1003, a bill
authorizing appropriations for the De-
partment of State, the U.S. Informa-
tion Agency and the Board for Inter-
national Broadcasting for fiscal years
1986 and 1987.
The total amounts authorized by
this. legislation are $3.76 billion for
fiscal year 1986 and $3.77 billion for
fiscal year 1987. These figures are over
$251 million below the administra-
tion's fiscal year 1986 request and $311
million below the fiscal year 1987 re-
quest. Despite these substantial reduc-
tions, it is the belief of the committee
that this bill will provide the U.S. for-
eign policy and information agencies
with the resources necessary to carry
out their diverse and important man-
dates.
The bulk of the funding authorized
by this legislation-over .$2.7 billion in
fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987-
is contained'in title I. This money will
be used to fund the operations of the
State Department,'pay the U.S. share
of the assessed contributions to the
United Nations and 43 other interna-
tional organizations, finance the U.S.
participation in 16 international
boundary and fishery commissions,
and pay for the U.S. Migration and
Refugee Assistance Program.
June 6, 1 985
S. 1003 also contains in titles II, III,
and IV the funding for the U.S. Infor-
mation Agency, the Board for Interna-
tional Broadcasting, and the National
Endowment for Democracy. The com-
mittee mark for USIA in fiscal year
1986 is $835.6 million, an increase of
$39.7 million over the fiscal year 1985
appropriation level but a decrease of
$138 million below the administra-
tion's fiscal year 1986 request. The
committee approved most of the ad-
ministration's request to modernize
the badly outdated Voice of America
facilities.
Earmarked in the bill for fiscal year
1986 is the USIA's Fulbright, Hum-
phrey and International Visitor Pro-
grams. This earmark represents an in-
crease of. $15. million over the fiscal
year 1985 levels but falls short of the
congressional mandate embodied in
the 1983 Pell amendment, that these
programs be doubled over the fiscal
year 1982 levels by fiscal year 1986.
However, the fiscal year 1987 request
will meet the requirement of my
amendment.
The Board for International Broad-
casting authorization of $137 million
for fiscal year 1986 will fund the ongo-
ing operations of Radio' Free Europe
and Radio Liberty as well as provide
needed resources for modernization of
the radios' facilities. This bill also in-
cludes an amendment I authored, to
include the Secretary of State as a
nonvoting ex-officio member of the
B.I.B. This will ensure that U.S. for-
eign policy interests are a factor in the
oversight of the radios as is envisioned
by the Board for International Broad-
casting Act.
Mr. President, in conclusion, I wish
to join the, chairman in pointing out
that the committee has made a good
faith bipartisan effort to reduce the.
budgets of these various agencies
while providing them with the funding
necessary to carry out their essential
functions. Any further cuts could en-
danger programs considered essential
to carry out U.S. foreign policy goals
and to promote U.S. interests abroad. I
hope my colleagues 'will keep this in
mind in considering this legislation
and support the bill as reported by the
committee. .
Mr. President, it is my understand-
ing that we will now turn to the vari-
ous amendments on Nicaragua.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask
unamous consent that Chip Andreae
of my staff, and Mark Blitz, Bill Perry,
Dave Keaney, Rick Messick, Barry
Sklar, Bill Triplett, Peter Galbraith of
the committee have the privilege of
the floor throughout the duration of
consideration of S. 1003.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 271
.Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send to
the desk an amendment and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
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June 6,.1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
There. being no; objection, the edito-
rial was ordered to be printed in .the
RECORD, as=follows
THE HENRY Liu MURDER
Here we go again. Following the murder in
California of Henry Liu,. a Chinese-Ameri-
can writer hostile to the government in
Taipei, the wheels- of Chinese justice began
to turn-began to turn, it must be conceded,
somewhat more speedily than is generally
the case in this country.
Mr. Liu was shot dead in his home last
Oct. 15. By April of this year two- Chinese
thugs, members of the infamous Chulien
gang,. had been convicted in Taiwan and, sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. Two weeks
later, Vice Admiral Wang Hsi-ling,. 58-year-
old.head of Taiwan. government's Military
Intelligence Bureau was convicted of insti-
gating the crime. He likewise was sentenced
to life imprisonment. Two of his- deputies,
accessories to the crime; were, sentenced to
21/2 years in prison.
But that is not the. end of the story. The
U.S. House of Representatives is now asking
that these criminals be extradited to this
country, and. a similarly dumb resolution is
expected to pass the Senate. All. this. despite
the fact that (a) due process already has
been exhausted and (b) the United States
has no extradition treaty with the Republic
of China.
It makes no sense. The State Department
from the beginning has discounted the. pos-
sibility that higher-ups in the Taiwan gov-
eminent were involved in the Liu killing. It
also acknowledges that Taiwan authorities
cooperated fully in the murder investiga-
tion. Most significant of all, the criminals.
have been brought to trial publicly, prompt-
ly, and in accordance with the law, and have
been sentenced-three of thern to terms of
life behind bars. So why all the fuss?
In the People's Republic of China thou-
sands perhaps hundreds of thousands, are
imprisoned' without due process. One entire
province,. Qinghai, is a virtual slave labor
camp. The total number of deaths arising
out of the political orgies to which Commu-
nist governments' are so susceptible ap-
proaches 100 million- And not a peep out of
Congress. If you get the feeling, that all the
hoopla over the Liu. killing. is largely--ideo-
logical, move to the head of the. class..
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER- Morn-
ing business is closed.
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORI-
ZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS
1986 AND 1987
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate wilt now proceed to the consid-
eration of S. 1003, which will-be stated
by title.
The legislative clerk. read as follows:
A bill (S.. 1003) to authorize appropria-
tions for the Department of State. the
United, States Information Agency, the
Board for International Broadcasting, and
the National Endowment for Democracy,
and for other purposes,. for fiscal years 1986
and 1987.
The Senate proceeded to consider
the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order,. the Senator from
Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. is now recog-
nized.
Mr. DODD.: Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll..
The legislative: clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the quorum
call be rescinded..
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, It. is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may deliver
a short introductory statement prior
to, commencement of the debate on
the: Dodd amendment:
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? The Chair hears
none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we begin
today our consideration of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for fiscal.
years 1986 and 1987. The bill author-
izes appropriations for the State De-
partment, the U.S. Information
Agency; Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty, and the National Endown-
ment for Democracy.
We bring this bill to the floor in the
same spirit with which we brought the
foreign assistance bill before the
.Senate. It is, first, a spirit of biparti-
sanship: both the majority and the Irii-
nority made compromises in order to
bring to the floor a bill we jointly sup-
port. We may sometimes have differ-
ent judgments about what our nation-
al security requires. But national secu-
rity must not. become an object of par-
tisan.passion.
It is, second, a spirit of fiscal re-
straint. Government must continue to
eliminate. the unnecessary and the ex-
travagant. Agencies- and departments
must learn to do more with what they
already have.. They must become
leaner,. trimmer, and less bureaucrati-
cally cumbersome-they will be better
for it.
It is, finally, a spirit of defense of
national security. The agencies au-
thorized in this bill do not procure
weapons or train. forces.. But they for-
mulate policy and explain. it,. gather
information,. promote. democratic. insti-
tutions, and secure American interests.
It is naive to think that diplomacy- is
'sufficient and that force and the
threat of force are unnecessary. But
the quiet and thoughtful management
of our everyday affairs helps us to
keep a peaceful world. Essentially, the
bill before us authorizes appropria-
tions for the conduct of our basic dip-
lomatic relations.
Mr. President,. S.. 1003 was reported
by the committee in. the spirit. I have
discussed.. Section 1 authorizes appro-
priations for the State Department. It
does so in four categories:. $1,874 mil-
lion in 198& for the administration. of
Foreign Affairs; $534 million for inter-
national organizations; $26.2 million
for international commissions; and
$355 million for several other activi-
ties, the chief of which. is, migration
and refugee assistance.
S 7587
In arriving- at these figures the com-
mittee began from a. simple premise: to
start from 1985's original appropria-
tion with the intention of freezing at
this level unless there was strong justi-
fication for exceeding it.
The result of our deliberations is a
budget for State Department activities
that is $108 million below the total
1985 appropriations, including supple-
mentals. This total is also $120 million
below the level authorized by House
bill 2068-including permanent au-
thorities, even though the House, total
is described as a freeze by its manag-
ers.,
The total we are recommending is,
however, above 1985's original appro-
priations. The reason is simply that
much of the supplemental appropria-
tion voted after the tragedy in Leba-
non to help secure our Embassies and
the lives within them in fact involves
recurring costs. These costs are now
part of the base. We have identified
these security costs and earmarked
them in the bill. We thus- have a total
that provides the means for adequate
'security; at the same time that it
allows our foreign relations to be con-
ducted and our work in international
organizations and refugee assistance
to continue. Again-it is a total well
below what the administration re-
quested and what the House voted.
But it is an amount adequate to our
needs.
This bill contains a 2-year authoriza-
tion. For the State Department for
1987, we authorized the same amount
as in 1986. This results in a $198 mil-
lion cut from the administration's re-
quest and a figure $209 million below
the House's recommendation. We will
consider a supplemental. if it is neces-
sary-but we will require clear and
convincing evidence. By - authorizing
no 1987 increase the committee hopes
to. make clear that fiscal restraint
Cannot end in 1986, but must become a
habit of good Government. A freeze in
1987 will send a clear signal that this
Senate means what it says about long-
term fiscal restraint.
It is particularly useful to point out
that for the international organiza-
tions account, our 1987 figure is $534
million, 11.5 percent below the admin-
istration's request and just $14,million
above the figure the House attained
after an amendment mandating a 15
percent cut.
S. 1003 also authorizes-in sections 2
and 3-appropriations for the U.S. In-
formation Agency and for the Board
for International Broadcasting-the
parent body for Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty. We approached
these budgets also in the spirit of
economy: let us start with the 1985 ap-
propriation and see if there is any
reason to add to it. The result once
more is a substantial cut from both
they administration's request and the
House's freeze level. The amount we
are authorizing enables these agencies
to help deliver news, explain American
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June 6, 1985
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7589
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]
for himself, Mr. PELL, Mr. HARKIN, and Mr.
KERRY. proposes an amendment numbered
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I as
k
unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert
the following new section:
PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES SECURITY
INTERESTS IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION
SEC. -. (a) The Congress finds and de-
clares that a direct threat to the security in-
terests of the United States in the Central
American region would arise from several
developments including, but not limited to,
the following:
(1) The stationing, installation, or'other
deployment of nuclear weapons or the deliv-
ery systems for such weapons in the Central
American region.
(2) The establishment of a foreign mili-
tary base in the Central American region by
the government of a-Communist country.
(3) The introduction into the Central
American region of any advanced offensive
weapons system by the government of a
Communist country if such system is more
sophisticated than such systems currently
in the region.
(b) If any development. described in para-
graphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a)
arises, the Congress intends to act promptly,
in accordance with the constitutional proc-
esses and treaty commitments of the United
States, to protect and defend United States
security interests in the Central American
region and to approve the use of military
force, if necessary, for that purpose.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the prohibition contained in section
8066(a) of the Department of Defense Ap-
propriation Act, 1985, as enacted by the Act
of October 12, 1984 (Public Law 98-473),
which applies to funds available during the.
fiscal year 1985 to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any
other agency or entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities shall apply
to the same extent and in the same manner
with respect to any such funds available
during any fiscal year beginning on or after
October 1, 1985. For purposes of the appli-
cation of this subsection, the reference in
such section .8066(a) to the fiscal year 1985
shall be deemed to be a reference to the
fiscal year -in which such funds are avail-
able.
(d) There are authorized to be appropri-
ated to the President. $14,000,000 for the
fiscal year 1985 to be available only to
achieve-
(1) the safe and orderly withdrawal from
Nicaragua of all military and paramilitary
forces which were supported by the United
States before October 12, 1984; and
(2) the relocation of such forces, including
members of the immediate families of indi-
viduals serving in such forces.
(e)(1) There are authorized to be appro-
priated to the Secretary of State $10,000,000
which shall be used only as may be neces-
sary to assist the negotiations sponsored by
the Contadora group and to support
through peacekeeping and verification ac-
tivities the implementation of any agree-
ment reached pursuant to such negotia-
tions.
(2) For purposes of -paragraph (1), the
term "Contadora group" refers to the gov-
ernments of Colombia. Mexico, Panama,
and Venezuela.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as granting any authority to the President
with respect to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations wherein involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances
which authority he would not have had in
the absence of this Act.
(g) For purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "Central American region"
refers to the geographic region containing
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, and Nicaragua; and
(2) the term "Communist country" has
the same meaning as is given to it by section
620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, at the
outset, let me explain briefly to my
colleagues the substance of this
amendment.
This is an amendment I sent to all
my colleagues a week or more ago; but,
for the purpose of debate this morn-
ing, let the reiterate the five central
features of this amendment.
The first section of the amendment
is a finding by the U.S. Congress as to
what would constitute a direct threat
to the security interests of the United
States and the Central American
region. It is not all inclusive, as the
amendment clearly points out, but
serves as an illustrative example of the
The third part of this legislation
prohibits any additional funding for
military or paramilitary 'activities
,within the region.
My colleagues will recognize this sec-
tion as being a continuation of the so-
called Boland provisions and this part
of the legislation continues the Boland
language in force.
Thg fourth part of the legislation
provides an appropriation of $14 mil-
lion for fiscal year 1985 to be made
available solely for the safe and order-
ly withdrawal of all U.S.-supported
military and paramilitary forces from
Nicaragua and the relocation of those
forces, including members of their im-
mediate families.
This is the funding that would pro-
vide for the assistance to the Contras
and to their families to disengage.
These are not funds to be provided to
continue the activities of the Contra
operation, but to disengage entirely
from that policy.
The fifth provision of the amend-
ment authorizes to be appropriated a
sum of $10 million to assist thc'Conta-
dora negotiations and to support
through peacekeeping and verification
the implementation of any agreement
States would find to be directly con- those negotiations.
trary to our national security interests There is an additional section of
within this hemisphere.
I identify three examples of such
things that could occur which would
jeopardize those interests: The sta-
tioning or installation of nuclear weap-
ons or nuclear weapon delivery sys-
tems within the Central American
region; the establishment of a foreign
Communist military base within the
Central, American region; the intro-
duction by any Communist nation of
any advanced weapons system which
exceeds the level of sophistication of
those weapons already in the region.
The second part of the amendment
.does not say specifically what the
United States would do. It does not re-
quire that we take a specific.action if
any of those three or other such ac-
tions were to be taken by any country,
including, of course, Nicaragua. But it
does make quite clear that the United.
States, should those security interests
be jeopardized, is prepared to use mili-
tary force to deal with those very le-
gitimate national security interests.
I emphasize again I am not saying
specifically exactly what all of the sit-
. uations are that would provoke mili-
tary response or even in fact that a
military response would be the only
response. I am merely trying to lay out
as clearly as possible what those.secu-
rity interests are in the region and
then also, of course to state unequivo-
cally what the United States would be
prepared to do, including - the use of
military force to protect its very legiti-
mate interests within the region.
The third part of the bill gets to the
matter at hand and that is, of course,
the issue of continued funding for the
Contra operation.
which I should make note to my col-
leagues because I am sure they are apt
to raise the question, and that is a war
powers provision. There are some who
are uneasy about the fact that I said I
am willing to use military force in
terms of national security interests
emerging in the region, but to those
who may be uneasy about that kind of
language, I included a provision which
would cover the language of war
power provisions.
Mr. President, that is the surd and
substance of the amendment. It is a
departure from what will be the
debate throughout the rest of this
day. It will be a departure from what
was debated in the other body where
basically we are going to have an argu-
ment or a debate, if you will, over a
funding level to be continued over this
fiscal year and into the next to contin-
ue to support the Contra operation. '
I believe, Mr. President, that policy
is fundamentally flawed and that the
issue is not whether or not we are will-
ing to provide an additional $14 mil-
lion or $35 million or $36 million or
$27 million, to the Contras. The issue
is not who is going to deliver this as-
sistance, whether it is the CIA or AID
or the United Nations or the Red
Cross. The issue is not who is going to
receive that aid, whether it is the Con-
tras, or'some independent third party
in the region. The issue is not where
those resources will be deliv3red,
whether it is in Honduras or in Nicara-
gua, and that is basically what the
debate will be.
The issue is' not going to be, in my
mind, whether it should be humanitar
ian or lethal or nonlethal.
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S 7590 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE.
Those are all questions which we
will spend the greater part of today,
possibly tomorrow, debating here.
Frankly, that is not the issue. And
we make a mistake if we assume that
is the debate.
The debate ought to be whether or
not this particular decision, this deci-
sion to support the Contras, the
Contra policy, is that in the interests
of the United States? Is a continuation
of support of that counterrevolution-
ary effort in the interest of the for-
eign policy concerns of this country?
That is the fundamental question and,
unfortunately, we are not going to
debate the fundamental question.
Instead, we are going to do what I
think President Reagan has accurately
described and that is. micromanage-
ment of foreign policy. We are going
to spend the next 8 or 10 hours argu-
ing over the nuts and the bolts of a
particular policy rather than the fun-
damental question of whether or not
over the last 4 or 5 years our interests
have been advanced or harmed by this
policy, whether or not there is any
likelihood of the- next several years
this policy is likely to bear the kind of
fruit that those who support it sug-
gest.
We will have discussions and debates
today over whether or not nonlethal
aid means jeeps, or trucks, what consti-
tutes clothing: are fatigues clothing or
not clothing? We will argue over what
shelter is. Is a shelter a field tent or is
it a permanent tent? That is the kind
of debate we are going to have, unfor-
tunately.
We are missing the fundamental
issue, and the fundamental issue is
whether or not this policy is working,
whether or-not it is in our interests:
For the last several years, Mr. Presi-
dent, we have heard people on the so-
called right call the Contras, the polit-
ical equivalent of Jeffersonian Demo-
crats, political equivalent of our
Founding Fathers, all sorts of similar
language to describe them. And on the
so-called left, we have heard people de-
scribe the Sandinistas as the reincar-
nation of the Franciscan Order, who
say that these are pure highly moral,
ethical individuals who are only con-
cerned about the welfare of their
people. And the debate has been
whether or not you support the Con-
tras or the Sandinistas.
We have spent precious little time, it
seems to me, talking about what is in
the interests of our country.
I am concerned as I know my col-
leagues are about what happens in
Nicaragua. I am concerned, as I know
my colleagues are, about what hap-
pens in El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Costa Rica, and every other
country throughout Latin America.
But my interests in those particular
countries are superseded by my inter-
ests in what is important to this coun-
try, what is in the interests of the
United States.
And it seems to me at some point in
this debate we ought to .get back on
June 6, 1985
track and start talking about what is Instead of talking about humanitari-
in our interests, not in the Contras' in. an, nonlethal aid to be delivered. by
terests, not in the Sandinistas' inter- some nonthreatening body to some
or anyone else's interests but what is
in our interests. I do not believe we
have done that.
So today, Mr. President, I offered
this amendment. I should have said at
the outset I have no illusions about it.
I do not expect there will be a great
many votes in support of this amend-
ment. I am tremendously grateful to
my colleague from. Rhode Island, the
ranking minority Member of the For-
eign Relations Committee, Senator
PELL, Senator HARKIN, and Senator
KERRY for cospsonsoring this amend-
ment. But I think all of us recognize
that we are taking a position that is
somewhat different from what our col-
leagues will be engaged in debating
over the remainder of today.
Mr. President, I hope in the next
few minutes to be able to demonstrate
why I think this policy is ill-founded,
why I think it is dangerous, why I
think it is harmful, not only to our-
selves and to our allies, but also that it
is a cruel hoax on the Contras them-
selves.
I believe continued support of this
policy will be a mistake. I think the
sooner we say this to ourselves and to
our allies, the better off we will be.
I know there are those who have al-
ready suggested that it is too late, that
over the past 4 years, we have expend-
ed some $100 million to $150 million of
U.S. taxpayer money, we . have seerr
people lose their lives in this policy,
and that we cannot now go back.
I realize that that is a compelling ar-
gument to some. But I would certainly
hope that people would recognize that
as difficult a choice as that may be, in
June 1985, it does not get any easier.
Tomorrow it will be tougher. In 6
months, it will be tougher. A year
from now, it gets tougher. And I am
sure as I stand here before you today,
we will hear that argument.
We are committed. We spent the money..
We are involved. We cannot change that
policy. We cannot pull back.
No matter how well-founded that natives. It is regrettable that the Con---,-, "
li
b
po
cy may
e, we will march on the tadora process has become a cliche,
road of folly. We will proceed and con- that four good, strong allies of ours in
tinue to pursue a policy despite the this hemisphere, who tried desperately
fact that no one seems to see it con- over the past 4 years to formulate an
tributing to our long-term interests in alternative to the kind of carnage that
the region. we have seen in El Salvador and
Mr. President, I kind-of wish that throughout this region over the past
the alternative to what Lam offering several decades, are being relegated to
here today would be offered. But as I snickering in some corners, of being
look down the list of amendments, it naive, of being foolish, of being a
appears as though it will not be of- waste of time.
fered. I do not think I can adequately
It seems to me there are two choices. today-I am not talented enough-de-
If the Contra policy is working, which, scribe to my colleagues how the good
as I stated already, I do not believe it friends of ours in Latin America feel
is, but for those who think it is, that about us, how disappointed they are
this is having a profound effect on over the fact that we have relegated
Nicaraguan behavior, it seems to me their honest good-faith proposal to
we ought to have the courage here to something of an annoyance. And that
give it the kind of support it deserves is what they think we think of them.
if it is working. That is what the Mexicans, Colombi-
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neutral place,' why do we not talk
about giving the Contras real assist-
ance? I regret there is not an amend-
ment going to be offered today that
says, "Look, if the Contras need $114
million a day, they ought to get it.
And if they need military assistance,
they ought to get it."
I disagree with that viewpoint, but, I
would say to my colleagues this morn-
ing, I have a great deal of respect for
those who argue that position. That is
a credible policy. That policy at least
suggests that they might succeed at
some point in bringing about the kind
of change that is suggested by Presi-
dent Reagan and others.
But to talk about nonlethal humani-
tarian Band-Aids and Jeeps to be deliv-
ered in some place no one knows about
by some third party over the next 2 or
3 years, that is nothing. All that does
guarantee us that we can go back
home in the next couple of days and
say to that constituency in one part of
our State that is opposed to the
Contra aid, "We only gave them
nonthreatening assistance." And to
that part of the constituency that
thinks supporting the Contras is a
great idea, we can say, "We provided
assistance to the Contras."
What we are going to be doing here
today is satisfying a domestic political
problem. We are not advancing foreign
policy interests of the United States at
all. It will be argued that we are
buying time by supporting this ap-
proach. I would argue that we are
losing time; that if we continue to
pursue a policy that is not working, as
I said a mpment ago, we jeopardize not
only our own interests and our allies'
interests, but the interest of peace and
stability in this part of the world.
So this is one of the options, the
viable options, to decide that what we
are doing has not worked, to admit it
to ourselves, and to start traveling on
a different road as soon as possible.
I have tried to offer in this amend- (
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June 6, 1985
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7591
ans, Venezuealans, and Panamanians
think-people in strong democracies,
not mirror images of our our democra-
cy but people struggling to improve
the quality of life for their own
people, not perfect governments but,
God knows, far better than what we
have seen in the Cubas and the Chiles
and the juntas of Argentina. And they
think that we do not think they un-
derstand. They think that we think
that they do not really care.. And, un-
fortunately, that policy is being rel-
egated to a trash heap by the failure
of this Government, our country, both
the Congress and the administration-
I do not lay all the blame at the door-
step of the White House-but unfortu-
nately it is being relegated to the
trash heap because we fail to appreci-
ate the historical significance of this
effort.
For those who have bothered to read
any history of Central America prior
to 1979-and, unfortunately, there are
very few who have, but for those who
have-this is an historic opportunity,
the Contadora process. Never before
in this hemisphere have four countries
been willing to step out and to offer to
take the leadership role in trying to
resolve Latin problems-Latins grap-
pling with Latin problems. For the
first time, they.tried to do this. And,
as I said a moment ago, we have rel-
egated it to certain failure.
Third, Mr. President, I hope that we
might spend some time trying to lend
our support to those people inside
Nicaragua who are not fighting but
who oppose the Sandinista Govern-
ment. They have been virtually forgot-
ten over the last several years, people
like William Baez, in the private
sector, ? people within the Catholic
Church, people within the opposition
political parties, people within the
media, who are not in the mountains,
who are not fighting in the hills with
military hardware, but are trying to
bring about some change within that
country. It seems to me we ought to be
doing more for them.
And, fourth, we ought to provide
some real meaningful assistance in
terms of economic development in the
region. I am pleased to have supported
an amendment that was offered a few
weeks ago that provided for some
long-term assistance; economic assist-
ance, to the region. I think that kind
of signal is extremely important.
So, Mr. President, what I am offer-
ing here, as I said at the outset, is
what I would consider at least an
honest alternative to pursuing the
present policy, recognizing that what
we' have been engaged in over the past
4 years has failed economically, politi-
cally, as well as militarily.
I might also add that it is kind of a
cruel hoax, as I said earlier, on the
Contras themselves. Some people
within that operation are former
Somoza national guard figures. Not all
of them are. A lot of them are very
well-intentioned people who feel as
though their rights have been signifi-
cantly harmed by the Sandinistas.
They are good people. And we are
going to turn them into cannon
fodder. We are going to march them
into that valley because they believe
that we are going to stand behind
them and come in with U.S. forces to
back them up when the Nicaraguans
chew them up. And there is not a
person in this Chamber who believes
we are going to do that. Yet that is
what we are telling the Contras that
we are going to do. That is a cruel
hoax to play on those people, yet we
are engaged in it.
It has been hard to identify exactly
what this administration's foreign
policy is with regard to Nicaragua and
Central America. There have been dif-
ferent messages over the last 4 years.
But, in fairness to them-and I will
wait and see if anyone would funda-
mentally contradict what I am about
to say, because, I tried to synthesize it
as I understand it over the last several
days-it seems to me, with regard to
Nicaragua, the' Reagan administra-
tion's foreign policy objectives have
been: To encourage the Nicaraguans
to reduce the military buildup in their
country, to discourage them from ex-
panding their revolution beyond the
borders of their own country, to dis-
credit them internationally within the
region and, last, to encourage them to
institute some democratic reforms and
live up to the ideals that they es-'
poured prior to their success in 1979 in
the overthrow of the Somozan govern-
ment. That was, at least it seems to
me, to be the broad framework of this
administration's foreign policy objec-
tives when we started the Contra oper-
ation some 4 years ago.
We have expended as I mentioned-
which is public information now-
some $100 million to $150 million on
.this operation, and yet as I look at
Nicaragua today, more than 4 years
after this operation has begun, we find
the Nicaraguan military machine a lot
stronger in May of 1985 than it ever
was in January of 1981 and getting
stronger. We find democratic reforms
inside Nicaragua in worse shape today
than they were in January of 1981,
and we see people like Daniel Ortega
being received as a conquering hero-in
the capitals of Western Europe and
throughout this hemisphere;
It seems to me that the goals, if Jam
at least close in approximating what
the goals were of this administration,
have not only not been achieved nor
have we come close to achieving them,
but in fact it is the goals, it would
appear, of the Sandinistas that have
.been advanced. They are better off
militarily. They are doing what they
want inside their own country, and
they are now perceived as heroes
throughout this hemisphere. If that
has been our goal, if that is what our
foreign policy interests have been over
the last 3 or 4 years, and if we are not
succeeding-in fact losing that battle-
why do we insist upon pursuing a
policy that would seem to have the ab-
solute opposite effect on what we are
trying to achieve? If it is not working.
why do we not have the courage and
the honesty to try something else?
Why do we insist upon pursuing a
policy that is hurting us and dividing
us from our allies?
The President imposed an embargo a
few weeks ago. We had to break a
Honduran arm to find one country to
support us, and in a nothing gesture
with an embargo that meant nothing.
We had to use all of the diplomatic in-
fluence of the President of the United
States to bring the President of Hon-
duras up to this country, and to get on
a bended knee to beg him to support
our embargo-one country.
We are losing the war with our
allies. Do we really want to be isolated
with our Western European allies, and
with our Latin American allies? If we
are isolated today, does it get better or
worse if we pursue this policy? I sug-
gest of course the latter.
So while I recogiize this is not an
amendment that is going to enjoy
broad-based support I hope it will be
perceived at least as a choice we will
ultimately have to make. I tell you
that as certainly as I stand here today.
I promise you that within a matter of
weeks or months we will be back here
making this choice. We will have to
make the choice of whether to really
go in and do something, including the
use of military force, or make the
choice that will not only be a tough
one but also a harmful one when it
comes later-the choice of saying it is
not working, and we are going to pull
back. It is hard enough to do that now.
There is a certain amount of credibil-
ity lost as a result of doing it. I will be
the first one to admit that. But it gets
tougher, and the loss of credibility
grows larger with time, not less. So if
we are'honest with ourselves, honest
with our constitutuents, and honest
with our allies, it seems to me we
would have the courage to make that
choice today. Let us either go in and
give these Contras the kind of support
that they are going to need to have if
they are going to prevail, or- let us
travel down a different road.
I suggest by the way that there is
little or no likelihood that the Sandi-
nistas are going to change fundamen-
tally. There may be some cosmetic
changes. In fact, I was surprised that
some Democrats were surprised that
Daniel Ortega went to Moscow. Where
do my colleages think he was going to
go? Disney World?
This man is a Marxist. We should
not argue aobut that. He is a Marxist.
We know that. But it is disingenuous,
I believe, for those who argue that
there is no way that this government
is going to fundamentally change, and
yet argue that, if we provide a little
more money to the Contras, maybe we
can,get them to change or come to a
negotiating table. The only way the
Sandinistas are going to change to
such a degree that this administration
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S 7592 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
will be satisfied is if the Sandinistas
are overthrown. That is the only
change that is going to achieve the
satisfaction of those who believe that
the Sandinistas are a fundamental
threat to the U.S. security interests
and security interests of allies in the
region. That is the only option. We are
not going to get them to change other-
wise. We are naive if you believe so.
So I say once again the options are
either to go in and get rid of them and
support actions that are likely to
achieve that goal, or to seek a differ-
ent path that at least may identify the
real interests of the United States, to
make it clear that we are prepared to
defend those interests and to try to
build some consensus in our allies
among the regions in Western Europe
so the actions we do take down the
road with regard to Nicaragua may
enjoy some broad-based support, and
to try if we can through this Contra-
dora process, as troublesome as it is, to
come up with some answer for this
part of the world that will bring long-
term stability and hope for these
people. We ought to get about the
business of trying to do that.
What I said does not fit on a bumper
sticker unfortunately. It seems to me
that is the kind of foreign policy that
works today. If it does not fit on a
bumper sticker and you cannot say it
in one sentence, do not bother bring-
ing it up.
But I -hope at least at some point
before it is too late, and before we find
ourselves drawn into this situation
even deeper than we already are that
we would listen to good friends. We
should not see this as an issue of sup-
port for Marxism or nonsupport for
Marxism, but as intelligent choices for
the United States. I commend the
President because he has made them
in other places. I know it was not easy
for him because of his deep-felt views
about Marxism. I know he did not like
raising a glass with Deng Xiaoping. I
know how President Reagan. has felt
about him. But he did it. I know when
he lifted the sanctions on Poland it
was not because he thought General
Jaruzelski was a great advocate of
human rights or that Solidarity was
no,longer a problem. He made a prag-
matic decision and choice. He is sitting
down today with our negotiators in
Geneva trying to work out a SALT or
START agreement, a reduction in the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
That is not because he likes the Rus-
sians, or he likes the People's Republic
of China, or that he likes the Polish
Government. But he understands that
you have to live in this world, you
have to grapple with the problems,
and you try to do it intelligently to ad-
vance our interests.
All I am suggesting today is we do
here what we try to do elsewhere, that
we try to look at this situation with
the same kind of cold eye, the objec-
tive eye of reducing the kind of ten-
sions and troubles that we face if we
proceed in this policy.
One last point I meant to make, Mr.
President, and then I will yield the
floor on this. I tell my colleagues
today that I am deeply concerned and
worried about the immediate expan-
sion of this conflict. By the way, the
news this morning that the Nicara-
guans have shot down two additional
helicopters is tremendously disturbing.
Those helicopters went down appar-
ently in Honduras. I can see the situa-
tion occurring very shortly where the
Nicaraguans will cross that Honduran
border, or they will cross that Costa
Rican border and they will use the
very same argument that Israel used
in June of 1982 when it went into
southern Lebanon-that no self-re-
specting nation would tolerate the ex-
istence of terrorist groups, terrorizing
its people, and that they will go across
that border to ferret out those pockets
of terrorism. They will not stay there
forever, they will tell us, but they will
cross that border, and we will get that
kind of provocative action. I guarantee
you that the Hondurans will then call
upon the United States to come in to
defend their interests. Then we. will
have a kind of catch-22 situation. I
hope that does not happen but I can
see that coming. We seem to be get-
ting closer and closer- to it.
I suggest to you that despite all of
the treaties that we have signed that
would call upon the United States to
go in to defend Hondurans or Costa
Rica in that situation, that in the
world court of public opinion Nicara-
gua would probably look like they -
were doing the right thing. I suspect
in this country there would be a
strong feeling that for us to go down
to engage in a conflict with Nicaragua
in that kind of a situation would not
be the "right thing to do."
I see that happening. I suggest to
you that if it happens it will be be-
cause we pursued a contra policy that
is not getting us anywhere and that is
drawing us into that kind of decision,
which I suspect would do serious
damage to the credibility of this coun-
try, not only in this hemisphere but
throughout the globe.
Mr: President, I reserve the balance
of my time at this point.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would
like to begin our side of the debate
that we will have today on Nicaragua
and the Contras, with an opening
statement and then to address specific
points which have been raised by the.
Senator from Connecticut.
We find ourselves, again today, de-
bating the question of providing assist-
ance to the armed opposition in Nica-
ragua. The Congress has been doing
this at frequent intervals for some
years now-with little to show for it in
terms of contributing to the forging of
effective policy. The reason for this in-
terminable, inconclusive. exercise is
that we have lacked-up to the
present time-bipartisan consensus in
support of a coherent administration
policy. We have not been able to agree
on the nature of the threat to Central
Jun.:e 6, 1 98.5
America presented by the Managua
regime nor on the means by which it
should be confronted. Thus, we have
been unable to decide what, if any,
role our support of the opposition in
Nicaragua ought to play in a compre-
hensive strategy to address the prob-
lem.
Only a strategic consensus of this
nature will allow us to make the firm
and binding commitments necessary
for effective policy. The American
body-politic is now, finally, coming to
such a consensus. The amendment
that will later be introduced by Sena-
tor NuNN and myself expresses this
agreement and prescribes a responsi-
ble and effective way in which our
support of those elements resisting
the Marxist authorities in Managua
can contribute to resolving both the
Nicaraguan question and the chal-
lenge that it poses to our Central
American policy as a whole. And I am
afraid that the amendment offered by
the distinguished Senator from Con-
necticut does not meet these criteria.
Over the past 4 years, our Central
American policy has come a long way
toward producing the positive results
for which we all hoped. These objec-
tives, simply stated, are stable develop-
ment, peace and democracy in this
troubled region. At present, the evolv-
ing situation in Nicaragua presents the
single greatest remaining obstacle to
achievement of these goals.
At this point it behooves us to
review the record. There were clear ef-
forts to treat normally, and even gen-
erously, with the authorities in Mana-
gua during. 1979 and 1980. And the
current administration, although in-
creasingly suspicious of the ominous
trends already clearly evident in San-
dinista policy, attempted to come to a
purely diplomatic modus vivendi with
the Nicaraguan Government through
most of 1981. The members of the rev-
olutionary directorate proved obdu-
rate, however, in their pursuit of poli-
cies aimed at institutionalizing Marx-
ist dictatorship, subverting its neigh-
bors, building up excessive military ca-
pabilities and forging close ties with
Cuba, the Soviet bloc and the whole
spectrum of terrorist organizations.
As a result, the United States began
channeling assistance to armed opposi-
tion elements as a means to blunt San-
dinista subversion of its neighbors,
impede consolidation of a Marxist
regime and provide an incentive to
meaningful negotiations. This ap-
proach became increasingly controver-
sial in a Congress that was slow to rec-
ognize the basic nature of the Nicara-
gua Government or to accept the need
for dealing with it in these terms.
Such assistance has thus been held in
abeyance for more than a year now as
the Congress and the administration
wrestled over policy.
And what have been the results?
The Managua authorities have contin-
ued along their clear course toward
the institutionalization of a Marxist-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7593
totalitarian state. They have persisted
in subverting and threatening their
neighbors. They have escalated their
arms buildup. And they have woven
their ties ever tighter with the Com-
munist powers and the international
terrorist network. At the same time,
the conduct of the commandantes has
produced steadily growing disenchant-
ment among the population. The op-
position to the regime-both armed
and unarmed-has assumed an in-
creasingly broad-based character and
now evidences the clear intention of
compelling the Sandinista leadership
to honor the public commitments of
the revolution to democracy, peace
with its neighbors, and an autonomous
foreign policy.
I, for one, have seen enough of the
Sandinistas to understand the nature
of this regime today and the objectives
which it entertains for the. future. I
have also come to the firm conclusion
that only a change in its fundamental.
structure will secure the modification
of its domestic and foreign policies
necessary to preserve U.S. interests
and those of our regional allies as well.
This, in turn, will require the partici-
pation of the Nicaraguan opposition in
the future political life of that nation.
The resistance has already put forth
a reasonable plan for their incorpora-
tion into the political structure of
Nicaragua. And the Sandinista govern-
ment has thus far refused even to con-
sider discussion of such a process-a
process which I believe to be indispen-
sable to the achievement of peace
within Nicaragua and good relations
between that nation and its neighbors.
But to entertain any hopes for a de-
velopment of this kind we must forth-
rightly support the opposition. We
should not be embarrassed to support
forces struggling against Marxism and
for the establishment of democracy in
Central America. Indeed, brave indi-
viduals of this nature deserve our sup-
port. Assistance to these groups also
serves U.S. interests-another consid-
eration for which we have no reason
to apologize. The armed opposition
has impeded full consolidation of a
Marxist government in the area and
obstructed its efforts to subvert its
neighbors. The existence of these
groups provides the Managua authori-
ties with their only realistic incentive
to negotiate. And finally, aid to the
Nicaraguan opposition sends a power-
ful signal of U.S. resolve to this coun-
try's allies in the region and to those
in Nicaragua who are inclined to resist
the consolidation of Marxist tyranny.
Prudent U.S. assistance to the demo-
cratic forces of Nicaragua and negotia-
tions are not mutually exclusive-as
some contend-but rather indispensa-
bly complementary. In the real
world-and particularly with Marx-
ists-negotiations take place only be-
tween elements with real resources
behind them. The Nunn-Lugar amend-
ment that will later be introduced sup-
ports the Contadora process and any
bilateral negotiations between the
United States and Nicaragua that
could have productive results. But the
basic negotiations that matter are be-
tween Nicaraguans themselves. There
will not be peace in Nicaragua if we
continue to deny even humanitarian
assistance to the Contras. And there
will not be stability in Central Amer-
ica until there is real representation of
democratic elements in the political
structure of Nicaragua.
This amendment of Senator NUNN
and I can resolve the impasse that has
afflicted our Nicaraguan policy and
forge a realistic consensus that both
Houses of Congress, the administra-
tion and the American people can sup-
port. It is not enough to desire or ad-
vocate democracy, negotiations, and
peace in Central America. Given the
importance of the region and the
other forces at work there, we must be
involved if our ideals are ultimately to
prevail. We must demonstrate a way to
construct a framework of incentives
which, while encouraging negotiations,
does not simply acquiesce to the ag-
gressive and antidemocratic instincts
of the Marxists.
We must have a reasonable policy-
but one with substance behind it. And
we must have the resolve to stand
firmly behind this policy over time.
The amendment before us does not
meet these criteria. Our amendment,
which will be offered at a later stage
in the debate, does so and will suceed
in forging effective policy from the
consensus which I now believe finally
exists with respect to Nicaragua. The
amendment of Senator NUNN and I
can mark a significant step toward re-
alization of the hopes for the future of
Central America that I believe all
Americans share. And I earnestly urge
my colleagues in this body to give it
the commanding majority that will
clearly demonstrate the bipartisan
consensus that we have finally come
to on this vitally important issue.
Let me say in respect to the amend-
ment offered by my distinguished col-
league from Connecticut, that he has
presented, a departure from most
analyses of the situation in Nicaragua
and, for that matter, most solutions to
the problems that -we face with that
nation. Indeed, Senator DODD has
called for withdrawal of our support
for the Contras and withdrawal, for
that matter, of the Contras from Nica-
ragua-a separation, in essence.
I think in fairnes to the distin-
guished Senator from Connecticut
that his amendment needs to be recog-
nized as one which suggests that, as
opposed to support of a military char-
acter, humanitarian character, or any
other kind of character, he sees the
issue of one as to whether we ought to
be involved with the Contras-opposi-
tion forces, the freedom fighters-at
all.
He has suggested that an honest op-
posing policy would be one that asks
the Contras what they need and then
the administration ought to provide
those resources. In my judgment, the
amendment had a second major aspect
that is intriguing and certainly argu-
able, because it suggests that the only
real problem is the possibility of
Soviet presence there. Senator DODD
has been forthright in his opposition
to the landing of high-powered or
high-tech Soviet aircraft or other mu-
nitions there and suggests that that is
the real threat and one that ought to
be met overtly. I suspect that a large
number of Senators share his anxiety
and suspicion that, in the event that
such a thing occurred, we would be
united in opposing it.
I think that the dilemma that many
of us will find in the Senator's amend-
ment is that it really offers us no way,
in my judgment, to move toward nego-
tiations. The incentives that are im-
plied in Contra pressure upon the San-
dinista government are removed. In a
way-in a humanitarian way-the
Contras are withdrawn. The money is
used to try to take care of their needs
as that situation is wound down. But
for anybody looking for a reason why
the Government of Nicaragua would
negotiate, it would. be hard to find at
this. point.
One of the intriguing things about
the Dodd amendment is that he sug-
gests that the only way the Sandinis-
tas might change is if they are over-
thrown. I gather he is arguing that
this Marxist regime, which he has
characterized as Marxist-and suggest-
ed that those who had not seen that
really should have. Mr. Ortega is a
Marxist and has been, and is. espous-
ing Marxism. But Senator DODD is sug-
gesting also that Marxists do not
change and that they do not negoti-
ate. If we are even looking at the Con-
tadora process for some possibility of
ameliorating that rather harsh
regime, bringing in political parties,
freedom of the press, democratic insti-
tutions, we are likely to find that a
forlorn hope, suggesting that those
who really value democracy in Nicara-
gua-and I characterize myself as one
of these-had better be prepared to
overthrow that government.
Senator DODD suggests that it is a
Marxist government, is going to
remain a Marxist government, and
that the only way you change it is to
supplant it. Senator DODD is suggest-
ing as a point of analysis that honest-
ly, you really ought to give those who
would supplant it the tools to do that.
really have a civil war of sorts, and fi-
nally hope that your side prevails.
That, I think, is a breathtaking con-
clusion. Senator DODD's analysis of the
regime may ultimately prove to be cor-
rect. There may be many people on
the right and the left of the political
spectrum who would agree that Marx-
jsts never change. They would hold
that the regime of the 'Sandinistas is
beyond negotiation, that despite all
the protestations that they have had
elections,, that La Prensa still prints
even with heavy censorship, it really is
not a collectivized, thoroughgoing
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S 7594 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
totalitarian Marxist system, but
rather a Nicaraguan variety of that
that is less thoroughgoing. And if, in
fact, the Ortega regime will never ne-
gotiate with anyone, we have a very
bleak prospect ahead of us in Nicara-
gua.
Even if that were the case, I would
not favor the Dodd approach of simply
pulling out all the, support behind the
freedom fighters. Nicaraguans who
were part of the Sandinista revolution
have every right and claim to political
participation as the result of its suc-
cess. I think when we talk about the
Contras-and persons may come to
many different characterizations of
the various groups and strains that
comprise them-there is in this opposi-
tion, in the freedom fighter group, 'a
good bit of the original. revolution"that
overthrew Somoza. In my judgment,
the better elements remain-those
who favor plurality political parties,
freedom of speech, democratic institu-
tions. As I indicated in my opening
statement, we ought `to have no apol-
ogy for being in favor of those who'
want to bring about democratic insti-
tutions. We ought to be opposed, it
seems to me, to a policy that would
clearly say Nicaragua is Marxist and
let us leave it alone, let us withdraw
any irritants to their position. If the
Marxists bring in the Soviet Union, let
us strike hard and fast, but barring
that, leave the Marxists to do their
will.
The dilemma of this, I' think, is
clear. And this is the idea of "a revolu-
tion without borders" has meant just
that-subversion of the neighbors-a
very unhappy relationship, at least,
with everybody in Central America
who genuinely wants economic reform
and lives in threat that bridges are
going to be blown _up and roads dam-
aged and all the rest as subversive
groups throughout the area are aided
by the Sandinista government in Nica-
ragua and by the flow of goods and
services through Cuba. and from. the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe; North
Korea, and the almost, United Nations
group that has formed in Nicaragua to
be a part of this experience.
I am hopeful that the Senate will
reject the Dodd amendment because it
appears to me to offer no momentum
for the change that needs to happen.
It clearly offers no bipartisan consen-
sus for a policy that will stir Ameri-
cans, might explain the situation to
Americans or, indeed, offer us any real
point of departure.
Ultimately, it is literally an appro-
priation or an authorization, at least
at this stage, of money for withdrawal.
It is literally money down the drain. I
hope that this is clear to Members.
I add just one more thought because
I suspect this strain will come through
some of the rest of our debate. I noted
yesterday as rhetoric moved into
higher and higher levels in the House
of Representatives that Speaker
O'NEILL commented that down deep,
the reason he opposes assistance of
any kind to the Contras is that he be-
lieves literally that we are headed
toward a war involving American
troops. He sees that absolutely clearly
down the trail: Therefore, he opposes
assistance to the Contras because he
believes in his heart that that is likely
to bring that about. I respect the
Speaker's analysis of this, but I re-
spectfully suggest to him and likewise
to the distinguished Senator from
Connecticut that, in the event that we
have nothing going for democracy in
Nicaragua, we do. not have people who
are Nicaraguans working to obtain
their freedom, working to try to keep
the neighborhood from being subvert-
ed by the Sandinista government,
working to keep pressure on so that
the Soviets and other unwelcome in-
fluences know that they are not wel-
come.
If in fact we wash our hands of the
Contras, offer no aid or, as in the case
of the Dodd amendment; aid only for
withdrawal, then we really do face a
situation in which the Sandinista gov-
ernment will not go away and in which
the problems that are a part of
present circumstances remain and in
which, in my judgment, the dangers to
our country remain. That is not to
imply that we will want to act upon
that for any foreseeable time in the
future. Perhaps we.will simply tell our
friends in Central America that we are
sorry that their governments are being
subverted and as revolutions occur and
as emigration occurs and as many,
.many refugees, almost like a Vietnam
boat people scenario, come to the
United States, we will indicate that we
are sorry all this is occurring.
But anyone who believes that simply
by withdrawal, sort of an antispetic
move at this point, and with the
threat to the Soviets that if they land,
we will do something, I think is an in-
correct analysis, and that is what the
debate on the Dodd.amendment boils
down to in my judgment.
Mr. President, I yield to the majori-
ty leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am not
going to debate the amendment, but I
did-want to indicate that I have had
inquiries from a number of my col-
leagues about the schedule for the re-
mainder of the day and week. As I in-
dicated last evening, much depends on
what happens to the bill before us
today. If we can complete action on
this bill today, we could turn to some
matters tomorrow that are not contro-
versial and probably would not require
rollcall votes.
I would suggest that if Members
have any desire to leave tomorrow,
they can demonstrate that by speak-
ing briefly today. We cannot have it
both ways, but we will try to accom-
modate those-and there are a number
of them-Members on each side who
have official commitments tomorrow.
So we hope we can complete action
on this bill and accommodate as many
June 6, 1985
Members as we can by not having roll-
call votes tomorrow, even though we
will be in session and we will have leg-
islation.
Mr.. HART. Mr. President, I wonder
if the Senator from Indiana will yield
for a question.
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I am happy to
yield for a question.
Mr. HART. I thank the Senator. My
question, Mr. President, is asked in ul-
timate good faith and not knowing the
answer. It is not a rhetorical question.
What does the distinguished chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee think is the long-term. purpose of
continued nonmilitary or humanitari-
an assistance to the Contras? In other
words, where does it lead? Where do
the supporters of that position hope
this situation would be in 5 years as a
result of this continued nonmilitary
support?
Mr. LUGAR. This Senator would
hope that the assistance which may be
authorized today by the Senate would
lead toward negotiations-specifically
negotiations among Nicaraguans,
which are the most preferable kinds.
Also, it would encourage the ' Conta-
dora process, and even a recognition
that direct negotiation between the
U.S. Government and Nicaragua will
.be preferable to no 'negotiations and
no progress. . .
.. It seems to me that through the hu-
manitarianassistance route, but also
the sharing of intelligence, sharing of
political ' information-various sup-
ports that are provided in the Nunn-
Lugar amendment-there is at least a
holding in place of the strength of the
Contra forces. Their presence is obvi-
ous, and with assistance we would
hope from others in the region, from
European countries, from others that
might be brought into the process, a
movement toward negotiations would
lead to a change in the government-
plurality of parties, freedom of the
press, some .movement of reassurance
to the neighbors, some pledge of an
autonomous foreign policy 'so that
there would not be, the threat of
Soviet incursion in there. That, I
think, is a fair statement of where we
hope this would lead. -
Now, the Nunn-Lugar amendment
would also, however, leave open the
opportunity for the President, after
we have tried this process of negota-
tion-bilateral, multilateral, or region-
al-if this simply is not bearing fruit,
to come back to the Senate and to ask,
quite frankly, for military resources
for the Contras so that they might
move ahead in a different way. But
the contemplation at least in the near
term would be to give negotiations a
full opportunity while keeping the
Contras in place. And, in the longer
term, if this does not work, to move
toward military assistance.
Mr. HART. If the Senator will yield
further, it 'is difficult to quarrel with
that hope, and certainly that policy,
which I believe the vast majority of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S7,595
the Members of the Senate and the
American public would support. I
guess it is in fact the word "hope" that
concerns the Senator from Colorado.
What concrete evidence does the
Senator from Indiana have that in
fact the administration has policies to
bring those negotiations about, to the
degree that it- is within our power to
do so? In other words, beyond "hope,"
how does this aid.link to a leadership
position of this administration, not
waiting for things to happen but caus-
ing those negotiations to happen?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I think
the answer to the distinguished Sena-
tor from Colorado is that the Secre-
tary of State has at every opportunity
tried to make things happen in terms
of negotiation bilaterally, in the Man-
zanillo conferences that we have had
with -the Sandinista government, and
also through any number of other oc-
casions in which we have tried to
shore up the Contadora process and
tried to get other of our allies interest-
ed in the situation. I think we have
pressed very hard. As the Secretary of
State has pointed out, at some point
when there does not appear to be any
movement in negotiations-and our
sense is that the Sandinistas have no
incentive to be forthcoming-then a
predicament occurs and the question is
how to get things off dead center. How
do you change the real politik of the
situation in a way in which the Sandi-
nistas might want to negotiate more
seriously with anyone.
Mr. HART. What incentive do the
Sandinistas have to negotiate under
our guidance or direction when we are,
in fact providing the military assist-
ance to try to overthrow them?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, it seems
to me that they would have every
reason to want to negotiate because
the fact is that a cease-fire and peace
would be preferable in Nicaragua to a
civil war. It clearly would be prefera-
ble for the trade embargo to be re-
moved or other obstructions to be
eliminated. In other words, there are a
number of ways in which life in Nica-
ragua might improve, as well as the re-
lationship of the Nicaraguan people to
its Government. These pressures, it
seems to me, are felt. One can argue to
what extent. Some can say they are
felt very much. A core Marxist group
never changes. But I suppose the pro-
ponents of administration policy are
more optimistic about the regime-
hopeful even at this late stage that
there might be some admission of an
opposition and the beginnings of
democratic institutions in Nicaragua.
Mr. HART. But is not the argument
a little like a man in an alley who is
being, assaulted by another man with a
club, and the man with the club as-
saulting him says, "I want to talk to
you," as he is banging him on the
head-"I want to negotiate with you,
and I am going to keep hitting you
until you agree to negotiate with me?"
The formulation of the Senator
from Indiana and the administration
seems to me to ignore a basic fact of
human nature, which is something
called national pride.
. If a nation is under attack indirectly
by the people who are saying "We
want to negotiate," the first thing that
nation does is defend itself and say,
"Well, we are not going to negotiate
under the barrel of a gun. You with-
draw the gun and then you come and
talk to us about negotiations." Is that
not the way human nature works?
Mr. LUGAR. The Senator from Col-
orado is an experienced student of his-
tory. Various countries have negotiat-
ed for all sorts of reasons. I am not
privy to what the Sandinistas may
have determined about their future in
this respect. Clearly a sense of nation-
al pride is there with that government.
But I think other students of Nicara-
gua have noted that essentially a
Marxist government is incompatible
with the nature of the Nicaraguan
people and that there is a friction, by
definition, between the government
and the populace of present. This is
not as yet a totalitarian regime that
has been so thoroughgoing as to have
squeezed out, cell by cell and neigh-
borhood by neighborhood, all opposi-
tion. I think it is a reasonable assump-
tion that negotiations are still possible
and, furthermore, a reasonable as-
sumption that so long as there are
Nicaraguans who have an equal claim
upon the political process of Nicara-
gua, we ought to support them. The
gist of what we are debating today is
whether that is a reasonable thing to
do. I believe that it is, without being
able to predict the success of future
negotiations.
Mr. President, let me say at this
point that there are other Senators
who are asking me for time. If the
Senator from Colorado will withhold
for the moment, I would appreciate it.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask Sena-
tor Donn if he will let me have 8 or 10
minutes.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if I may
inquire first, how much time remains
on the side of the proponents?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Each
side has 15 minutes.
Mr. DODD. I will be glad to yield to
the distinguished ranking member. 7
minutes of those 15.
Mr. PELL. Eight.
Mr. DODD. Eight minutes.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the
Senate, today, has an opportunity to
make a positive contribution to United
States policy toward Nicaragua, an
issue we have been dealing with for
some time now. Needless to say, we
have a formidable task and challenge.
We are being challenged to consider
a policy which is much more than pro-
viding a relatively small amount of
money to an insurgent force bent on
overthrowing the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment. We are being challenged to con-
sider a policy dealing with the much
larger and graver issue of war:,and
peace, with stark implications for this
country because of the prospect that
U.S. military. forces must become di-
rectly involved. Our response to this
challenge ought to be to end the spi-
raling cycle of fighting, violence, and
terror that has placed our Nation in a
difficult international position. In-
stead of voting to continue the war, we
should be constructing a policy that
will contribute to peace and justice in
Central America.
The key to peace in the area is held
by the nations of the region them-
selves. The Contadora nations of
Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Co-
lombia have worked hard against tre-
mendous odds to formulate a treaty
that would bring lasting peace to the
region by gaining commitments re-
garding the arms race, the presence of
foreign troops, arms traffic, verifica-
tion and control mechanisms, national
reconciliation, and political reform.
We all know by now, however, that in
order for a Contadora treaty to be re-
alized and effective, it must have the
full and unfettered support of the
United States. It will take more than
lip service and generalized calls for
peace in the region. The administra-
tion must use all possible means to
convince our friends in the area that
the United States is percent behind
the Contadora process as the best
hope for peace in Central America.
A parallel vehicle for peace in the
region is the mechanism of bilaterial
talks between the United States and
Nicaragua, which were suspended by
the United States. These talks, which
the Nicaraguan Government believed
were moving toward the improvement
of relations, would have provided the
direct contact necessary to resolve the
very difficult issues that have devel-
oped between our two countries. These
talks would be an important comple-
ment to the Contadora process.
In dealing with the amendments
that are before the Senate today, I ask
my colleagues to seriously consider
what their votes mean in terms of war
and peace in the region, the implica-
tions for direct U.S. military involve-
ment, and the standing of the United
States in the* world community of na-
tions.
Mr. President, I congratulate Sena-
tor Donn on his amendment and I am
glad to be a cosponsor. It is an excel-
lent amendment and provides strong
American support for the Contadora
process, authorizing $10 million to
assist in bringing about a negotiated
political settlement.
I think the fundamentally important'
point here, a basic question in consid-
ering whether or not we support the
Contras, is what their role in life is.
I should like to revert for a moment
to the definition of terrorism. I read
the following definition:
International terrorism means activities
that-
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(1) involve viclent acts or acts dangerous
to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation
if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended-
.(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation',
(B) to influence. the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government
by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in terms
of -the .means by which they are accom-
plished ...
Under that definition, it seems to me
that the Contras fulfill the definition
of being terrorists. They are our ter-
rorists, and we should not be shy
about calling them terrorists.
The difference 'between a terrorist
and a freedom fighter is very simple.
Terrorists are indiscriminate in their
targets. They kill men, women, and
children and cause damage to civilian
infrastructure. A freedom fighter, gen-
erally speaking, aims for military ob-
jectives.
If we look down through history,
there is a .difference between freedom
fighters and terrorists. Obviously, very
often, from the subjective, viewpoint,
one country's terrorists will be an-
other country's freedom fighter, but
there is- a difference between the two
that can generally be held.
' I think that if we look at our own
early- history, we realize that our ~fore-
bearers were not terrorists; they were
freedom fighters. Throughout the
years, as countries have achieved inde-
pendence and have had their revolu-
tions, there has been this difference-
whether the people who have been at-
tacked in an indiscriminate form have
been civilians. or whether they have
been military objectives.
- If something- looks like a duck, wad-
dles like a duck, and quacks like a
duck, then it probably is a duck. In my
view, the Contras, by this definition of
terrorists, are terrorists.
We have inveighed against terror-
ism. Some believe it is to our advan-
tage that our terrorists should - be
helped and supported. But if we truly
disagree with terrorism as a means of
affecting the policy of a nation's gov-
ernment-and that is really the pur-
pose of terrorism-then, in my mind,
we should oppose terrorism in any
form, anywhere, on any continent, no
matter under whose auspices, whether
under our auspices or anyone else's.
For these reasons, I am glad to be a
cosponsor of this amendment.
I believe. we should not do anything
to encourage the support for our ter-
rorists, the Contras. In that regard,
the civilian casualties of the Contras
in Nicaragua as of dune a year' ago-
the total civilian victims-were esti-
mated to be 4,038. That is a good
many. These do not include military
people who have been killed.
So, for all these reasons, I think this
is an excellent amendment. From the
viewpoint of public opinion at home-
and while we should not always be the
patsy of public opinion, we should be
guided by it as well as what is in our
country's best interests-the American
people are against U.S. support of the
Contras.
According to a recent Harris survey,
58 percent of the public is opposed to
sending $14 million in nonmilitary aid
to the rebels.
On the trip that Daniel Ortega took,
when he tried to get help from seven
Communist countries-countries under
Soviet domination-he also visited six
countries not dominated by the Soviet
Union: Sweden, Finland, Italy, France,
Spain, and Yugoslavia.
In addition, Vice President Sergio
Ramirez, on earlier trips to Europe vis-
ited Western European countries:
Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, and
France.
So we can see that Ortega was look-
ing for help throughout Europe. I will'
agree that he got more help from the
Soviet Union than anywhere else, and
that is most deplorable and unfortu-
nate-certainly from our viewpoint.
Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, will the.
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. PELL. I yield.
Mr. WILSON. It is a simple question
and can be answered yes or no.
I am wondering whether or not the
Senator from Rhode Island considers
that the guerrillas who were under-
mining and subverting and, I would
say, conducting terrorism against the
Government and the civilian populace
of El Salvador would be characterized
by the Senator as the same guerrillas
who are being armed and directed
from Managua as terrorists.
Mr. PELL. When they are attacking
civilian targets, they are, to my mind,
terrorists. If they are attacking mili-
tary targets, some people might say
they are freedom fighters. That is the
difference between the two.
Mr. WILSON. I thank the Senator
from Rhode Island.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to the Senator from Califor-
nia (Mr. WILSON].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from California.
Mr. WILSON. I thank the distin-
guished manager of the bill.
Mr. President, in listening to my
friend from Rhode Island, I was struck
by what seems tome the inconsistency
of a position that says that those who
are freedom fighters in Nicaragua are
terrorists, while those whom others
would characterize as freedom fighters
in El Salvador-who are indeed terror-
ists, armed and directed from Mana-
gua-are freedom fighters when they
attack government positions.
I would not make the distinction be-
tween terrorists and freedom fighters
in the same fashion. Indeed, I do not
think it is very consistent to find the
same person a terrorist and a freedom
fighter, depending upon the target.
I will agree that innocent civilians
should not be the target of military
action or of terrorism. There is no jus-
June 6, 1985
tifying that, in any instance. But when
the government that is being attacked,
even when it is through its army that
it is being attacked, is that of a freely
elected democracy-that being the sit-
uation in El Salvador-you have a situ-
ation that is enormously different
from that in Nicaragua, where the
Government, whether Marxist or not,
is a Government that seized by power
or force and has governed by force.
I hope no 'one is persuaded that the
charade that occurred there last fall
was in fact the same kind of legitimate
election which elected President
Duarte in El Salvador. It was, instead,
the kind of sham we see 'take place in
the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, earlier today I heard
my friend the Senator from Coruiecti-
cut suggest that we should disassociate
ourselves from freedom fighters' in
Nicaragua because one day the Sandi-
nista regime in Nicaragua will use
them as an excuse to cross the borders
into Honduras or Costa Rica, calling
them terrorists, in much the same
fashion that Israel sought to protect
its northern borders and its popula-
tion from the terrorists attacks of the
PLO, who achieved free rein of south-
ern Lebanon.
Mr. President, what is wrong with
that analysis is that it defies the truth
of the difference in the situations.
The people of Israel were in fact en-
tirely justified in going after terrorists
who were marauding, who were send-
ing rocket rounds in Israel from their
base in southern Lebanon.
To equate that kind of terrorism
with the sort of thing that has been
going on either in Afghanistan or in'
Nicaragua, as freedom fighters have
attempted to fight back, is to simply
say that all who attack a government
whether it is a freely elected govern-
ment or one that is despotic and in
place by force are in fact terrorists
and we must equate them and, there-
fore, we must simply wash our hands.
That simply makes no sense.
Mr. President, the people of Central
America know that they cannot stand
up to a Soviet-Cuban financed regime
of terrorism and subversion, one that
somehow does not quite transcend the
bounds of the Rio Treaty because it is
not open aggression, not overt aggres-
sion. But they know that ultimately
their fate can be sealed unless they
have some support. They are disposed
to resist this revolution santeros that
the Sandinista regime seeks to export
beyond its own borders, violence, sub-
version, and terrorism.
But I think perhaps the clearest ex-
ample of the kind of help they need
has been made clear in a letter of
April 4, 1985, from President -Duarte
to President Reagan, and I know my
friend from Connecticut, the sponsor
of this amendment has a great admira-
tion for President Duarte, one which I
share, one that is deserved by history.
He has hardly been an oligarch; rather
he has been the victim of oligarchy.
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June 6 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Now he is a victim of an attack from
beyond his borders, one, that is fi-
nanced and directed by Managua, one
that--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. WILSON. I ask for an additional
2 minutes.
Mr. LUGAR. Two minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator may proceed.
Mr. WILSON. I thank the Chair.
In his letter, President Duarte wrote
to President Reagan:
We remain concerned as we have been for
some time by the continuing flow of sup-
plies and munitions from Nicaragua to guer-
rilla forces here in El Salvador which are
fighting against my government and our
programs of reformed democracy, reconcili-
ation, and peace. This continuing interven-
tion in our internal affairs is of great con-
cern to us and we deeply appreciate any ef-
forts which your government can take to
build a broad barrier to such activities, ef-
forts which a small country like El Salvador
cannot take on its own behalf.
Mr..President, what the President of
El Salvador is saying is that he needs
help against the kind of subversion
and guerrilla activity that is being con-
ducted against his Government. It is
directed from Managua, it is supplied,
it is financed with money from the
Soviet Union and Cuban bloc.
To try to equate these guerrillas at-
tacking the Duarte government with
the activities of the Contras is to
simply ignore the very differences in
their situation. The Sandinista regime
that seeks to subvert other govern-
ments through just guerrilla activity
in El Salvador is the target of the Con-
tras. If, in fact, we wash our hands, if
we take the money that the Dodd
measure would appropriate to get out
of an association with freedom fight-
ers, then.why do we not do the same
thing with the Afghans who are resist-
ing the Red Army in Afghanistan? Be-
cause. Mr. President, there is a funda-
mental difference. The truth is the Af-
ghans are resisting an invader who has
taken their land by force, and the
same thing is true in Nicaragua,
though the invader happens to be not
the Red army but the Sandinistas.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana,
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to the distingushed Senator
from Minnesota. ? -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. DURENBERGER. I thank the
Chair. Mr. President, I am going to try
to stay within the 5 minutes and make
four or five points.
First, at the heart of each of these
amendments is the issue of who is at
fault for what is going on. The Sena-
tor from Connecticut referred to the
two helicopters that were shot down
and that will lead us into an endless
debate about who started it, who is
perpetuating it, and who is at fault.
The reality is that you cannot blame
the U.S. involvement except indirectly
in the specific acts of violence that are
taking place because we have not had
a presence in Nicaragua since we stood
on this floor a year ago debating
whether or not to continue support for
an alleged covert action.
I think the reality is, and I was in
Costa Rica on Friday at 2:20 in the
afternoon when two of the civil guards
were killed on the border, is now that
the Nicaraguan issue is Nicaraguan
and Nicaragua. And the role that we
play here is in danger of becoming su-
perficial to that issue.
The Sandinistas have been killing E1
Savadorans indirectly for at least 5
years. They are now in the process of
killing Hondurans and Costa Ricans in
a very direct kind of a sense. Yes,
mixed into the reality of why they are
doing the killing, in the case of the
Salvadorans it has something to do
with popular. revolution in El Salvador
which 'I think is successful but they
are still feeding the killing and I think
it has something to do with El Salva-
doran people in FDN need to be at-
tacked from Honduran or Costa Rican
territory so you can indirectly find
some play somewhere else.
But the reality is it is Nicaraguan'
against Nicaraguan today and it is in a'
setting of Central American setting
much more than it is an east-west or
north-south kind of a setting.
I would reply, in elaboration of the
question of the Senator from Colorado
about the long range. The long range
in Nicaragua is democracy. That is the
issue that we ought to be debating
here today. The difficult question is
who are the democrats? I do not mean
in the sense of the folks across the
aisle. But who are the democrats in
Nicaragua?
I originally opposed any involvement
down there because I know there
,would be a day when we would be
wrestling with who the true democrats
are.
The reality is today, and I-met with
some of these people while I was
there, the leadership on the democrat-
ic side in Nicaragua will come from a
large and enlarging group headed up
by the tripe-A. The triple-A include
Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, and
S 7597
ty problem. It is a national security
problem for Central America.
The reality is.that six Central Amer-
ican countries cannot exist with a dic-
tatorship in its heart. The heart of
Central America has always been a de-
mocracy. It has been stifled for years
and years with the help of the United
States. .
Today democracy is alive and well in
those countries and in every country
except Nicaragua.
There is a.grafitti all over San Jose,
Costa Rica which is in Spanish "Co-
mandantes to mismo que Somocistas"
and that says the commandantes are
all Somocistas.
It is common consensus in Central
America that all we have accom-
plished, all the Costa Ricans accom-
plished, with all of that support that
they gave to the anti-Somoza forces,
all they did was trade a military dicta-
torship of one for a military dictator-
ship of nine. That is the heart of the
issue. It is not the U.S. policy as much
as it is the future of Central America.
My distinguished colleague from
Rhode Island referred to the Gallup
Poll in the United States about sup-
port for U.S. involvement in ? Central
America.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will suspend. His 5 minutes
have expired.
Mr. DURENBERGER. I ask unani-
mous consent that I.be allowed to con-
tinue for 2 minutes.
Mr. LUGAR. How much time re-
mains on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two
minutes.
Mr. LUGAR. Two minutes.
Mr. DURENBERGER. I will take I
minute.
Mr. LUGAR. All right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator may proceed.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-?
dent, in this poll taken in Costa Rica'
by the Gallup organization just in the
last couple of months "Do you consid-
er Nicaragua a significant threat to
peace in Costa Rica?" Ninety-eight
percent of the Costa Ricans said yes.
Adolfo Calero. All first names start "Do you consider it necessary to im-
with "A". That is how they get to be prove the capability of the Costa
the triple-A. It is their task to take po- Rican civil guard to deter the'threat
litical charge of an effort which was at from Nicaragua?" Eighty-eight per-
best missed in the military sense. cent of 1,500 sampled Costa Ricans
They told me last weekend, "What- said yes.
ever you do in your resolution next So we can debate U.S. national secu-
week make sure that the democratic rity policy around this amendment
resistance, the democratic revolution ? forever. We will not get to the heart of
in Nicaragua, if it is armed with sup- the, problem. The problem is the
port from the United States that sup- future of Central America, the future
port includes a condemnation of atroc- of democracy, and the reality of "Co-
ity terrorism, indiscriminate killing of mandantes lo mismo que Somocistas."
civilians, and so forth, on the part of Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we have
people in the democratic resistance." but 1 minute remaining. I will simply
They are taking charge of the demo- indicate that I believe sufficient rea-
cratic side. sons have been given for Senators to
They are doing it because the reality vote against the amendment. Keep in
throughout Central America is that mind the Nunn-Lugar amendment
this is no longer a U.S. national securi- coming along the trail later on today
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S 7598 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE .
which, in my judgment, offers a better
foreign policy for our country.
I yield back any remaining time that
we have. .
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Connecticut has 9 min-
utes remaining.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays on my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr: DODD. Mr. President, I do not
anticipate using the entire 8 or 9 min-
utes remaining to me at all. I do not
have any additional requests for time
on this side so I will try to respond, if I
can, to some of the comments that
have been made since I proposed the
amendment in my opening remarks.
First of all, with regard to the likeli-
hood of the Sandinistas changing any
of their policies at all, my good friend
and chairman from the State of Indi-
ana, Senator LUGAR, indicated what I
was suggesting was that there is no
hope at all.
What I was trying to point out is
that if your stated goals have been to
reduce the size of the Nicaraguan mili-
tary, to improve democratic institu-
tions from within, and to at least
lessen the credibility of the Sandinis-
tas internationally, that, over the past
4 years, with the expenditure of a
large amount of money in support of
the Contra operation, we have not
reached those goals.
We are not talking about hopes and
wishes and what our feelings are
about, as I mentioned earlier, mem-
bers of the Contras who are tremens
dously sympathetic because of what
they are trying to do. I am asking my
colleagues here to make a choice about
what makes sense for us. This is not
just a question of wishing or hoping is
it going to work. My response is it is
not. Is it in our interest to continue a
policy that is doing more harm than
good? If one can stand up here and tell
me how, as a result 'of what we have
done in the last 4 years, Nicaragua is
reducing its military buildup, it is
moving to institute some of the demo-
cratic reforms and promises it prom-
ised prior to the overthrow of Somoza,
I would be willing to listen to why we
ought to continue to support the Con-
tras.
But, if you get the opposite effect, it
seems to me we ought to have enough
common sense to say, "Let's try some-
thing else." Either that or give the
Contras the type of aid they need to
do their job. I hear my colleagues say
they deserve our support. If they de-
serve our support, why not give them
support? We are going to argue about
jeeps and band-aids and the United
Nations and the Red Cross. If they
qualify, give them help. If it is not
working, we should try something else
and we ought to have enough honesty
and integrity to say that, as well.
On the question of comparing this,
my good friend from California sug-
gested that there were some differ-
ences between the Nicaraguans and
the Israelis. Of course, there are. I was
not drawing the comparison to the
extent of two governments that are re-
flective of each other in their policy.
The comparison I was drawing was the
reaction of the Israelis to the prob-
lems as they -perceived them and we
perceived them in their northern bor-
ders and the southern part of. Leba-
non. What the. Nicaraguans can point
to is their problems on their northern
border and the southern part of Hon-
duras. And in that court of interna-
tional public opinion, I would suspect
today that the Nicaraguans would
enjoy far more support in crossing
that border to deal with that problem
than they would have 2 years ago, 3
years ago, or 4 years ago; that today
they would appear to be operating
under the color of right, protecting
their sovereignty. .
That is where the comparison begins
and ends, not over the legitimacies of
the two governments or whether or
not you like the two governments or
not, but whether or not they are going
to appear as doing that which was in
their self-interest to protect their sov-
ereignty. That is the extent of the
comparison.
The Gallup and other polls and so
forth that people talk about, I wish
the work word "polls" never enter the
debates around here, and they do too
often. If we are deciding that we are
going to set our foreign policies based
on polling data, God help us. It is bad
enough as it is. We start talking about
whether or not 51 percent of the
people like this policy or 49 percent do
not. It is hard enough to try and fash-
ion something, but if we start doing it
based on polls every day to determine
where a popular opinion is then we are
in far more trouble than I imagined.
So I hope we would keep polling
data as far removed from the debates
as possible. If it is the right thing to
do, then we ought to do it. If it is the
wrong thing to do, then, regardless of
the amount of public support it would
apear to have, we ought to try some-
thing else. -
Again, Mr. President, let me just
conclude by saying that I realize what
I am offering here is a position that is
quite different from what else we will
debate today. But it seems to me it is
the central question. Does this policy
make sense for us? Is it working for us
or is it not?
Unfortunately, we will spend the
rest of the day, and I suspect what we
will adopt here will be adopted in the
House, on some very nice little pack-
age that will be very appealing to all
of our constituencies back home: "We
are giving aid to the Contras, but I
promise you we are not going to give
them anything to fight the fight with.
We are going to give them band-aids.
and trucks and jeeps and we are going
June 6, 1985
United Nations, AID, or the CIA, or
delivered in some neutral' way by
someone who will never be seen. Don't
worry about it."
That is what we are going to argue,
not whether or not this policy makes
sense. If it does, give it the kind of
support it deserves. If it does not, then
try something else.
Mr. President, I thank my colleague
from Indiana for his gracious com-
ments about this, effort. I would' just
say, in conclusion, that we will be back
at this choice. I hope that will not be
the case, but I will tell you at some
point we are going to come back here
to this choice, whether it is' in 5
months, 4 months, or a year. We will
be back here on this point. I hope we
would make it sooner rather than
later.
Mr. President, I yield back whatever
time I have remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GOLDWATER). All time has been yielded
back. The question is on agreeing to
the amendment of the Senator from
Connecticut iMr. DODD]. The yeas and
nays have been ordered, and the clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Alabama [Mr. DENTON]
and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr.
WALLOP] are necessarily absent.
I also announce that the Senator
from North Carolina [Mr. EAST] is
absent due to illness.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON] and the Senator from
Wyoming [Mr. WALLOP] would each
vote "nay."
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE]
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote.
The result was.announced-yeas 17,
nays 79, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 107 Leg.]
YEAS-17
Burdick
Kennedy
Metzenbaum
Cranston
Kerry
Pell
Dodd
Leahy
Riegle
Harkin
Levin
Sarbanes
Hart
Matsunaga
Weicker
Hatfield
Melcher
'NAYS-79
Abdnor
Durenberger
Kassebaum
Andrews
Eagleton
Kasten
Armstrong
Evans
Lautenberg
Baucus
Exon
Laxalt
Bentsen
Ford
Long
Biden
Garn
Lugar
Bingaman
Glenn
Mathias
Boren
Goldwater
Mattingly
Boschwitz
Gore
McClure
Bradley
Gorton
McConnell
Bumpers
Gramm
Mitchell
Byrd
Grassley
Moynihan
Chafee
Hatch
Murkowski
Chiles
Hawkins
Nickles
Cochran
Hecht
Nunn
Cohen,
Heflin
Packwood
D'Amato
Heinz
Pressler
Danforth
Helms
Proxmire
DeConcini
Hollings
Pryor
Dixon
Humphrey
Quayle
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Roth Specter Thurmond
Rudman Stafford Trible
Sasser Stennis Warner
Simon Stevens Wilson
Simpson Symms Zorinsky
NOT VOTING-4
Denton Inouye
East Wallop
So the amendment (No. 271) was re-
jected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. DECONCINI. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
AMENDMENT NO. 272
(Purpose: To urge the United States to
resume bilateral relations with the gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. and to prohibit the
introduction of Armed Forecs of the
United States into or over Nicaragua) '
Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I
send an amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr.
KENNEDY] proposes an amendment for him-
self and Mr. HATFIELD numbered 272.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further read-
ing be dispensed with.
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert
the following sections: `
BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA
SEC. . It is the sense of Congress that the
United States should resume bilateral nego-
tiations with the government of Nicaragua.
LIMITATIONS ON INTRODUCTION OF ARMED
FORCES INTO NICARAGUA FOR COMBAT
SEC. . (a) . Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, none of the funds appro-
priated pursuant to an authorization in this
or any other- Act may be obligated or ex-
pended for the purpose of introducing
Armed Forces of the United States into or
over the territory or waters of Nicaragua for
combat. -
(b) As used in this section, the term
"combat" means the introduction of Armed
Forces of the United States for the purpose
of delivering weapons fire upon an enemy.
(c) This section does not apply with re-
spect to an introduction of the Armed
Forces of the United States into or over
Nicaragua for combat if-
(1) the Congress has declared war; or
(2) the Congress has enacted specific au-
thorization for such introduction,. which au-
thorization may be expedited in accordance
with those expedited procedures set forth in
Section 8066 of the Department of Defense
Authorizations Act (1985), Public Law 98-
473: or
(3) such introduction is necessary-
(A) to meet a clear and present danger of
hostile attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions; or
(B) to meet a clear and present danger to,
provide necessary protection for, the United
States Embassy; or
(C) to meet a clear and present danger to,
and to provide necessary protection for and
to evacuate, United States Government per-'
sonnel or United States citizens.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays on the amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I
asked for a division of the amendment
as indicated on the amendment. The
first division is on the section on bilat-
eral talks between the United States
and Nicaragua. The second division is
on the introduction of U.S. combat
troops in Nicaragua.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has a right to divide the
amendment. The amendment is so di-
vided.
Mr. KENNEDY. Parliamentary in-
quiry, Mr. President. Do we have the
yeas and nays on both?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
yeas and nays having been authorized
for the division, it applies to both.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President,
there are two parts of this amend-
ment, 'one dealing with the bilateral
negotiations and the -second with
regard to combat troops.
The distinguished Senator from
Oregon is a 'cosponsor of the provi-
sions dealing with the combat troops,
and I will be glad to yield to the Sena-
tor to address that particular issue if
he would so like at this time. And then
I will make the presentation with
regard to both sections of the amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. I. thank the Sena-
tor from Massachusetts.
Mr. President, I rise to support the
entire amendment as offered by the
Senator from Massachusetts and
myself, but I would like to make a few
remarks at this time relating to that
section that addresses the question of
the introduction of American troops.
Frequently, we hear the Members of
this body and others say that there
are no parallels between the American
involvement in Central America and
the American involvement in the war
in Vietnam. .
Obviously, there are definite dissimi-
larities between those two actions and
policies, but there are also some irref-
utable similarities. One of them, I
fear, is one that can happen in such a
subtle way that we are caught un-
aware. It was in this fashion that we
found ourselves in the longest war in
American history, a war that was
never declared, a Presidential war that
was supported by the Congress. Why
that occurred was, of course, subject
to many interpretations, but I think
one of them was because the Congress
ducked its responsibility. It was a con-
gressional responsibility from the very
beginning. We failed to draw a distinc-
tion between a Presidential military
response that has always been consid-
ered valid, which is to introduce mili-
S 7599
tary force to defend an immediate
threat to the United States or its citi-
zens and the introduction of U.S
troops to conduct war without ac-
knowledging that it actually is a war.
Thomas Jefferson 'established the
precedent for the former option very
clearly under the African pirate case.
But certainly the war we fought in
Vietnam was not such a case, and the
Congress never did stand up to its re-
sponsibility to officially make a decla-
ration of war.
What this amendment proposes to
do is simply require that there be a
congressional authorization or a decla-
ration of war before American troops
are sent to Nicaragua.
Mr. President, 2 or 3 years ago I ad-
dressed this Chamber in terms of my
concern about that possibility. I did
not want to see the nightmare of Viet-
nam repeated in the case of Central
America. No one thought that it was a
very serious concern to be expressed at
that time. I think it is very interesting
that the New, York Times carried a
front-page story in which they con-
ducted almost 50 interviews with offi-
cials fiom various sources indicating
that discussion of the invasion of Nica-
ragua has been commonplace. in this
administration-discussions of the in-
vasion of Nicaragua. I think there are
some people who would like the dis-
cussion to become a bit more common-
place. I think we have to be aware
that this possibility is not way out. We
are not engaging in some kind of theo-
retical accusation. Nor was there one
being made 3 years ago.,
When we create the image of a
threat to America by this little Cen-
tral America republic today, we are
also creating a responsibility that will
ultimately be ours to destroy it. And if
the forces that are operating there
today cannot demonstrate capability
to destroy it, then we have no other
option but to introduce our own forces
to "destroy this great threat to the
American Republic."
Now, in the debate in April we had a
hate-in-everybody said, "I hate the
Sandinistas more than you do. I just
hate them differently." It was very in-
teresting to watch the debate at that
time on the floor. We had all kinds of
suggestions: "We want to exhaust all
the economic and diplomatic 'hate' op-
tions before we go with the military
option."
Virtually everybody was willing to
create a monster which we could de-
stroy later, and the administration
helped us along with trade sanctions.
Then Ortega helped us along a great
deal with his trip to Moscow-one of
the dumbest things I ever saw pulled
on any political stage. If stupidity
were sufficient reason to set the stage
for war, then Mr. Ortega deserves war,
one might say, but the problem is that
it will not be Mr. Ortega who will pay
the price; it will be the peasants in the
countryside, and the 14-year-old chil-
dren the Sandinistas parade around in
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S 7600 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
uniforms carrying guns, as reprehensi-
ble a regime that it may be. But before
we try to destroy the monster we are
urgently creating, let us make sure
that the American people agree.
I do not want to get into one of
those situations again where Members
of Congress ran. around the country-
side after it wasttoo late trying to say,
"Well, this is President Johnson's
war." Of course it was President John-
son's war, because. you had a gutless
Congress that did not stand up to its
congressional responsibility. But that
in no way justifies it nor did that sanc-
tify the war. It merely made it more
reprehensible because it was such an
unwinnable one. Mr. President, when
we debated this issue in late April I
said that what we do or do not do
today affects the unfolding caricature
of the Nicaraguan regime. I said that
our responsibility is immense, because
the mark we make on that caricature
through our actions will go far in de-
termining whether it will be necessary
to send American troops to war tomor-
row. To the extent that the caricature
of that society is still unfolding; I be-
lieve, Mr. President, we virtually guar-
antee that our most sinister suspicions
will be validated every time we fail to
embrace opportunities to change it. I
also said that everyone here who talks
of a totalitarian, Leninist-Marxist,
Soviet beachhead in Nicaragua better
know exactly what he or she is talking
about because, if a majority of us are
convinced of that now and act accord-
ingly, we are going to have it. We are
going to have it as sure as we are going
to have to stop it one day in order to
save face. We better be careful about
that before we cross that xenophobic
threshold.
I still feel that these perceptions are
not only valid, but that they have
taken on certain new authenticity as a
result of these reports-of discussion
about invasion going on within the of-
ficialdom of our Government.
I think we also have to realize, Mr.
President, that as we ask for this
amendment to be adopted, we are not
in any way blazing the trail for any
new policy or any new proposal or any
strange doctrine. I am merely asking
along with my colleague from Massa-
chusetts that we underscore and reem-
phasize the congressional constitution-
al responsibility. All we are suggesting
in this amendment is that we reaffirm
our basic commitment to the Constitu-
tion. That Constitution states very
clearly that, it shall be the responsibil-
ity of the Congress of the United
States to make a declaration of war
before American troops are introduced
into military action. We must realize
that once those troops are introduced,
with or without our authority, the
President of the United States is still
the Commander in Chief and he pros-
ecutes the war.
I am not suggesting that we take on
the Commander in Chief's responsibil-
ity. We are simply reaffirming our
constitutional responsibility to take a
specific action, prior to the introduc-
tion of American troops into Nicara-
gua. We do not say El Salvador. We do
not say Honduras. We do not say
Costa Rica. We do not say Guatemala.
We say Nicaragua. That is the essen-
tial purpose of this amendment. It is a
simple reaffirmation of our constitu-
tional responsibility.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this
amendment is in two parts; the first
part expresses the sense of Congresss
that the United States should resume
bilateral negotiations with the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua; the second part
sets forth language similar to that
which appears in the foreign aid pack-
age that was passed by the House For-
eign Affairs Committee prohibiting
the introduction of U.S. combat troops
in or over Nicaragua without prior ap-
proval of Congress.
I will deal with the first part of this
amendment first.
Last June, Secretary of State Shultz
met with Daniel Ortega in Managua.
At that time, the American people
were told that the United States would
begin to conduct discussions directly
with the Government of Nicaragua.
Many critics of the administration
suggested that this initiative was po-
litically motivated, that President
Reagan had only agreed to bilateral
discussions with the Sandinistas as
part of his campaign for reelection,
and that as soon as the American elec-
tion was over, the talks would be
halted.
But there were those of us who ap-
plauded the President's decison. We
had argued that military force should
be a policy of last resort. We had con-
tended that the United States should
explore and exhaust diplomatic and
political avenues for resolving our dif-
ferences with the Sandinistas, and
that we should do this before resorting
to direct military pressure. There were
those of us who saw Secretary
Schultz's trip to Managua and the
talks that grew out of that trip as a
promising step forward, a hopeful sign
that, once the two parties began talk-
ing together directly, progress might
be made-not only in resolving differ-
ences between Nicaragua and the
United States but also in dealing with
some of the obstacles that still'stood
in the path of a Contadora agreement.
And so we supported the talks that
ensued at Manzanillo. Those discus-
sions seemed promising. Both parties
sent experienced and high-level diplo-
mats to conduct the negotiations, and
both parties were careful to keep the
contents of their discussions out of the
newspapers. The meetings went for-
ward over the summer, into the fall,
and on into the winter. After the June
2, 1984, meeting between Shultz and
Ortega at the airport in Managua, the
parties sent their respective delega-
tions to Manzanillo, Mexico for the
first set of discussions on June 25-26.
Thereafter, the delegations met on
July 16 in Atlanta and then again on
six other occasions in Manzanillo be-
June 6, 1985
tween the end of July and November
20. The last set of meetings occurred
on December 10-11, 1984. Thereafter
the American delegation announced
that it would not return to Manzanillo
for the January meetings and that the
talks would be suspended.
There were those who expressed a
certain cynicism about the decision to
withdraw from the Manzanillo talks,
pointing to the fact that the talks
were initiated 4 months before the
Presidential election in the United
States and were then halted just 1
month after 'resident Reagan was re-
elected. The decision to halt these ne-
gotiations was all the more disappoint-
ing when we learned that the adminis-
tration also wanted Congress to send
$14 million in additional military as-
sistance to the Contras. It appeared to
many of us that we had returned to
the mistaken policies -of the past and.
that what should have been the course
of last resort-the military option-
was actually this administration's pre-
ferred policy. We then learned, direct-
ly from President Reagan himself,
that it was the policy of the United
States of America to make the Sandi-
nistas "cry uncle" and to "replace" the
Sandinistas with a "new structure." It
is understandable that this adminis-
tration might be reluctant to negotiate
directly with a government that it is
seeking to overthrow, and-in the con-
text of the administration's decision
openly to announce its intention of
overthowing the Sandinistas-I can
understand why the President would
decide to call off the Manzanillo talks.
But there are those of us who still
believe that the United States of
America should not be in the business
of overthrowing governments that we
do not like. There are those of us who
think it is wrong under international
law and wrong morally for the United
States to interfere in the internal af-
fairs of another country the way we
have been interfering in the internal
affairs of Nicaragua. We still believe
that the United States.should turn to
the military option only as a last
resort, when our own national security
interests are clearly at stake, when our
citizens are in danger or when our
treaty obligations require us to do so.
In the absence of those circumstances,
we believe that diplomatic and politi-
cal and other avenues of influence
should be used before resorting to
armed force.
This amendment is very simple. It
states clearly and unequivocally that it
is the sense of Congress that President
Reagan should direct Secretary of
State Shultz to return to the negotiat-
ing table with Nicaragua, to explore
ways in which our differences might
be, worked out peacefully, and to- ex-
haust diplomatic and political avenues.
Recently there was a hopeful sign
that the- United States might be con-
templating a return to the Manzanillo
talks. On May 11, 2, weeks before Con-
gress went into recess, the Security
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD :SENATE S 7601
Council introduced a resolution con-
demning the U.S. trade embargo of
Nicaragua and calling on the United
States to resume talks with the Nica-
raguan Government. Of the 16 para-
graphs contained in that resolution,
the United States vetoed those 3 that
dealt with the trade embargo but ab-
stained on the' paragraph that called
on the United States and Nicaragua to
resume the suspended talks that had
begun in Manzanillo. After the debate,
U.S. Ambassador Jose S. Sorzano said
that the United States was "not
against a dialog" with Nicaragua. I be-
lieve that Congress should go on
record in support of such a dialog.
At a time when Secretary of State
Shultz meets and talks with Foreign
Minister Gromyko, at a time when
President Reagan has expressed his
desire to meet and talk with Mr. Gor-
bachev, at a time when an American
delegation is meeting and talking with
a Soviet delegation in Geneva, at a
time when the nations of the Conta-
dora group are meeting and talking in
a persistent and determined effort to
resolve the conflicts in Central Amer-
ica by way of a comprehensive region-
al agreement, at a time when the
United States has even negotiated
with Mr. Castro about the return of
some of those who had entered the
United States from Marcel Bay, to get
them returned to Cuba, surely it is not
too much to ask the U.S. Government
to open direct discussions with the
Government of Nicaragua.
Mr. President, all we are asking, is
for this administration to "give peace
a chance" and to return to the negoti-
ating table. I urge my fellow Senators
to support this part of the amend-
ment.
Mr. President, I say to the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee
that I would be glad to discuss the
second part of the amendment if he
would prefer, and then we could have
a discussion on either part following
that, or we could talk about the first
part.
Mr. LUGAR. If the Senator will pro-
ceed with-the discussion of the second
part, that is my preference, and I will
attempt to discuss both parts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President. as
the Senator from Oregon has pointed
out, the second section of my amend-
ment, if enacted, will prohibit-the in-
troduction of U.S. combat troops into
Nicaragua without advance approval
of Congress, except in a situation
where the President determines that
U.S. combat troops must be sent to
meet a clear and present danger of
attack upon the United States, its ter-
ritories or possessions, to provide pro-
tection for U.S. Government personnel
or citizens, or where Congress has de-
clared war.
This is not the first time that the
Senate has debated this question, but
I hope it will be the last. At long last,
we should respond to the concerns of
the American people and send a clear
message to this administration: We do
-not want to :slip=slide 4rrto ;a :war in
Central America without full consulta-
tion with Congress, and we should not
send American boys to fight and die in
the jungles of Central America unless
and until Congress and the American
people have had 'a chance to be heard.
I am offering this amendment today
because of the mounting evidence that
this administration is preparing to
send U.S. combat troops to Nicaragua
to finish what the Contras have start-
ed. On May 23, in a speech before the
American Bar Association in Washing-
ton, DC., Secretary of State Shultz
warned Members of Congress that if
they did not approve renewed aid for
the American-backed Nicaraguan
rebels, "They are hastening the day
when the threat will grow, and we will
be faced with an agonizing choice
about the use of U.S. combat troops."
On April 17, the New York Times
cited a classified report from the
White House to Congress in which the
administration stated that it has, for
the time being, ruled out "direct appli-
cation of U.S. military force" in Nica-
ragua but warned that this course
"must realistically be recognized as an
eventual option given our stakes in the
region, if other policy alternatives
fail."
According to the Times:
The document contended that only direct
pressure brought by expanded rebel forces
fighting on Nicaragua's northern and south-
ern borders could force the Sandinistas to
accept United States demands.
The document went on to state that,
in order to "create real pressure on
the Government of Nicaragua," it
would be necessary for Congress to ap-
propriate funds for a 20,000- to 25,000-
man force in the north and a 5,000- to
10,000-man force in the south.
Thus, we see that it is the best as-
sessment of the White House that it
will take no less than 25,000 to 30,000
men to create real pressure on Nicara-
gua" and, says the White House, if
this policy option fails, sending U.S.
troops "must realistically be recog-
nized as an option given our stakes in
the region."
I ask unanimous consent to print the
April 17 New York Times article in the
RECORD. -
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Apr. 17, 1985]
A LARGER FORCE OF LATIN REBELS SOUGHT BY
(By Hedrick Smith)
WASHINGTON, April 18.-The White House,
pressing for $14 million in aid for Nicara-
guan rebels, has told Congress that it wants
to expand the size of the insurgent forces to
put more pressure on the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment.
A document sent to two Congressional
committees said the Administration had for
now ruled out "direct application of U.S.
military force" but warned that this course
"must realistically be recognized as an even-
tual option, given our stakes in the region, if'
other policy alternatives fail."
Publicly, President Reagan has given no
indication of any plan to expand guerrilla
forces. Talking to trade association lobbyists
at a White House gathering today, he ac-
cused Congress. of being "paralyzed over a
mere $14 million in humanitarian aid."
REPERSENTATIVE MICHEL URGES COMPROMISE
Previously, Mr. Reagan had said that if
the money were approved, humanitarian aid
would be provided to the rebels during a 80-
day cease-fire. He said it would then be
shifted to military aid if the Sandinista
Government did not reach a peace settle-
ment with the rebels in that period.
Reflecting the tough battle expected over
the President's request, the Republican
leader in the House, Robert H. Michel of Il-
linois, urged Mr. Reagan today to be ready
to compromise. His,advice came as propo-
nents of the aid argued on Capitol Hill that
it was needed for national security.
DIRECT PRESSURE ON SANDINISTAS
The Administration objective was de-
scribed in the 22-page document marked
"top secret" that was delivered by the
White House to Congressional appropria-
tions committees and later made available
to The New York Times.
The document indicated that the Adminis-
tration was moving on two levels. Publicly,
negotiations are being cast as the first prior-
ity. But the document contended that only
the direct pressure brought by expanded
rebel forces fighting on Nicaragua's north-
ern and southern borders could force the
Sandinistas to accept United States de-
mands.
"Assistance provided to the Nicaraguan
democratic opposition will be structured so
as to. increase the size and effectiveness of
its insurgent forces to a point where their
pressure convinces the Sandinista leader-
ship that it has no alternative but to pursue
a course of moderation," Including major
political concessions, the White House
report to Congress said.
The President's "determination," or offi-
cial request and justification to Congress for
funds, set out the objective of resuming aid
"at levels sufficient to create real pressure
on the Government of Nicaragua (20,000- to
25,000-man insurgent force in the north and
5,000- to 10,000-man force in the south)."
Administration officials now estimate that
the Nicaraguan Democratic Force has
15,000 guerrillas fighting from bases in Hon-
duras on Nicaragua's northern border and
that the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance
has 5,000 guerrillas fighting along Nicara-
gua's southern border with Costa Rica.
Presenting the rationale for the Adminis-?
tration strategy of aiding Nicaraguan rebels,
the White House document contended that
the alternative would be an expensive and
doubtful strategy of "containment" against
Nicaragua. The containment strategy, it
contended, could raise the cost of American
economic and military aid programs in Cen-
tral America from a current level of $1.2 bil-
lion a year to as much as $4 billion to $5 bil-
lion a year "for the immediate future."
"The containment approach is obviously
deficient in that it is passive and does not
contemplate changes in Sandinista behav-
ior," the White House contended. "Only
major direct pressure can Induce change."
Government sources said the document
was delivered to Congress by the White
House Congressional liaison office late on
April 3, the day before President Reagan
publicly unveiled his cease-fire proposal but
after Mr. Michel had been informed of that
plan. Its delivery formally set off Congres-
sional consideration of the aid request.
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S 7602
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 6, 1985
DECLASSIFIED VERSION OF DOCUMENT
The White House put out a 16-page de-
classified version of the document today. It
contained some of the same general materi-
al but excised any references to expanding
the guerrilla forces, the Central Intelligence
Agency operations or the role of third coun-
tries.
Roughly $80 million in formerly covert aid
to the rebels, channeled through the C.I.A.,
was cut off by the House last May. A later
effort to revive it was delayed by Congress
last fall, setting up votes this spring.
The first Congressional action will come
Thursday at hearings of the defense appro-
priations subcommittees of both houses.
The chairman of the House subcommittee is
Representative Joseph P. Addabbo of
Queens, a foe of aid to the rebels. The chair-
man of the Senate subcommittee will be
James A. McClure of Idaho, a leading sup-
porter of the Administration on this issue.
The Administration's official report to.
Congress, titled "U.S. Support for the
Democratic Resistance Movement in Nicara-
gua," enumerated guidelines for the "man-
agement of the program," including "a
small U.S. advisory team" that would
"maintain direct contact" with Nicaraguan
rebel leaders.
ROLE OF THE C.I.A.
Although Congressional sources have said
that in the past some American C.I.A.
agents had entered Nicaragua with rebel
groups, the latest White House document
pledged that C.I.A. staff members and con-
tract personnel would not enter Nicaragua
or "participate in military or paramilitary
operations of any kind."
"U.S. presence will be limited to a small
group of C.I.A. advisers outside Nicaragua
whose function will be to provide intelli-
gence, limited tactical advice based on that.
intelligence and logistical guidance," the
document said.
Mr. KENNEDY. Most recently, in a
lengthy report in the June 4 edition of
the New York Times, Government of-
ficials are quoted as saying that a U.S.
invasion of Nicaragua is now militarily
feasible. In the words of one official,
an invasion of Nicaragua by the
United States would be "like falling
off a log ' ' * (T)hey'd never know
what hit them." According to this
Times report, Col. William C. Comee,
Jr., the director of operations at
Southern Command, has estimated
that it would take the United States 2
weeks to gain control of 60 percent of
the Nicaraguan population. Another
U.S. official predicted that, in the
event of intervention by the United
States, "the Nicaraguan people would
rise up in support of an American in-
vasion and that neighboring armies
would assist the United States eager-
ly"
I ask unanimous consent to print the
'June 4 Times article as well as a relat-
ed article on June 5 at this point in
the RECORD.
[From the New York Times, June 4, 1985]
U.S. MILITARY Is TERMED PREPARED FOR ANY
MOVE AGAINST NICARAGUA
(The following article is based on report-
ing by Bill Keller and Joel Brinkley and was
written by Mr. Keller.)
PANAMA.-In the last.two years, the United
States Southern Command, from its tropical
hilltop headquarters here, has presided over
the establishment of a sophisticated mili-
tary apparatus in Central America.
While President Reagan and his top advis-
ers say the use of American military force in
the region is an unlikely and undersirable
last resort, the military is prepared for con-
tingencies, according to military officers and
diplomats in Washington and Central Amer-
ica. Authorities say this has been accom-
plished with a vigorous tempo of war games,
construction of staging areas and listening
posts, the creation of an elaborate intelli-
gence network and a major effort to fortify
allied armies.
The United States military presence, once
devoted almost exclusively to defending the
Panama Canal, was expanded in the name
of protecting stability throughout Latin
America. More recently, the officials say, its
focus has narrowed on Nicaragua, which the
Reagan Administration believes is the main
threat to peace in Central America.
The military officers and diplomats said in
interviews that the buildup of the Southern
Command, one of six global subdivisions of
the American military, is now largely com
plete and that It is adequate to carry out
any likely emergency in the region.
These officials also challenged what they
called the apparently popular belief that if
the United States was drawn into direct
military involvement in central America, it
would inevitably lead to a Vietnam-style
quagmire.
"LIKE FALLING OFF A LOG"
According to American military and intel-
ligence assessments presented at the high-
est levels of the Government, the United
States could quickly and easily rout the
Sandinistas who govern Nicaragua.
An intelligence official whose opinions
have been solicited by members of the Na-
tional Security Council said that an invasion
of Nicaragua was undesirable "from a prop-
aganda point of view," but that if it became
necessary it would be "like falling off a log."
As Congress begins another round of
debate over how to deal with Nicaragua,
both supporters and opponents of Adminis-
tration policies are examining the military
options embodied In the Southern Com-
mand with renewed interest.
One reason is that the Administration has
begun talking more openly about the risk of
American military involvement if Congress
continues to foreclose less drastic measures,
such as renewed military aid to the United
States-backed Nicaraguan rebels seeking the
overthrow of the Sandinista Government.
Moreover, United States and Central
American officials say, the unpredictable
behavior of the Nicaraguan Government
could increase the likelihood of American
involvement at any time.
PRUDENT, OFFICIALS SAY
American military officials say the activi-
ties at the Southern Command is prudent
preparation for such dangers.
"I can say with some confidence that the
exercises have provided us with a signifi-
cantly improved capability to operate in the
region," said Col. Charles Pearcy, who
heads the command's task force in Hondu-
ras.
Some critics, on the other hand, have long
seen the muscle-flexing at the Southern
Command in a more ominous light.
Eugene J. Carroll Jr., a retired admiral
who is director of the Center for Defense
Information, a group often critical of the
Pentagon, wrote last year that "accelerating
U.S. military preparations" in Central
America "suggest that the decision has al-
ready been made by President Reagan to
send U.S. troops into Nicaragua."
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr.,
brushing aside the . President's consistent
statements that he is determined to avoid
sending combat troops to Central America,
said in April, "I've said all along that?I don't
think the President of the United States
will be happy until American troops are
down there."
THE COMMAND'S MISSION
The decision to use military force would
be made in Washington, but the preparation
and execution are the responsibility of the
Southern Command, known as Southcom.
The headquarters, a cluster of neat frame
buildings under coconut trees, has changed
little in size or appearance since a few years
ago when the command, in the words of its
spokesman, Col. William C. Hansen, was
"one of those final assignments" on the way
to retirement.
But in 1983 the Southern Commands' im-
portance began growing in earnest. That
year the Administration, fighting one anti-
Government insurgency in El Salvador
while underwriting another in Nicaragua,
without fanfare rewrote the command's mis-
sion statement.
Once assigned primarily to defending the
Panama Canal, the command was commit-
ted, among other responsibilities, to
"counter Soviet and Cuban militarization
and other, destabilization undertakings."
"There would not even be a United States
Southern Command today, I am convinced,
had it not been for the propensity of these
Marxist-Leninists to pursue their own goals,
ignoring the aspirations and needs of their
own peoples" in Central America, Gen. Paul
F. Gorman, the head of Southern Com-
mand, told the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee in February, a few days before he re-
tired.
THE CHANGES ARE MADE
General Gorman is widely considered re-
sponsible for changing the command to suit
its new mission.
"When I came to Panama two years ago, I
found an Army component very well de-
signed to defend the Panama Canal against
brawlers and rioters, but ill suited for sup-
porting allies in the region," he told the
Senate committee. He promptly disbanded
the Army's canal-oriented mechanized in-
fantry unit and sent to Washington for ex-
perts in intelligence, communications avia-
tion, medicine and construction.
Within a year of General Gorman's arriv-
al, Southern Command had begun to build
or enlarge eight airfields in Honduras, using
engineering battalions brought in for.mili-
tary exercises. A member of the Senate In-
telligence Committee who has toured the in-
stallations recently described them as "a
pretty sophisticated staging area."
At' Palmerola, in the central highlands
west of Tegucigalpa, the largest airstrip was
dedicated last February. The 8,000-foot,
lighted, all-weather runway shimmers like a
mirage in the midst of a sprawling military
town of wood huts, camouflaged antiaircraft
emplacements and repair shops. It can
handle any plane the United States military
owns, including jumbo C-5 and C-141 trans-
ports and high performance fighter planes.
VERSATILE PLANE SOUGHT
Palmerola is home for Joint Task Force
Bravo, the American operating arm in Hon-
duras, established in 1983 to train Hondur-
ans, build and maintain shared facilities, or-
ganize war games and assist American mili-
tary missions in the area.
In the last year the buildup has contin-
ued. The fiscal 1986 budget, for example,
calls for moving to Southern Command a
detachment of C-7 Caribou planes, a plane
of.1960's vintage that can land on tiny, un-
developed airstrips. General Gorman told
the Senate that, whereas 30 airfields in Cen-
tral America can handle C-130 cargo planes,
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL; RECORD -- SENATE
the little Caribou can deliver troops or ma-
teriel to some 900 locations.
Much of the more recent activity at
Southern Command is not visible at all, in-
volving intelligence-gathering.
In his testimony, General Gorman said
that he had built "a very close working rela-
tionship with the entire intelligence com-
munity" and that he met constantly with
Central Intelligence Agency station chiefs
in his region.
A Congressional source said that within
the last several months the National Securi-
ty Agency had installed "the best technolo-
gy we've got" at electronic eavesdropping
posts ' on Tiger Island, in the Gulf of Pon?
-
seca near Nicaragua, and other locations.
SUPPLIES OF FUEL IN PLACE
The military has been thwarted by Con-
gress in some of its more ambitious propos-
als, including a plan for storing bombs and
rockets at Palmerola and San Lorenzo,
about 40 miles from the Nicaraguan border.
The Southern Command has, however,
stored fuel. According to a classified Penta-
gon report, the Southern Command on Jan.
1 was the only one of the six regional com-
mands that divide responsibility for Ameri-
can military commitments around the globe
that had stored 100 percent of its estimated
oil requirements.
In manpower, the Southern Command is
the smallest of the six commands, with
about 9,600 people stationed at various in-
stallations in Panama and an average of
1,200 troops in Honduras.
But General Gorman noted that this was
deceptive. Southern Command is designed
to have a small permanent staff, but to
draw troops, in event of conflict, from the
United States Readiness Command, based at
MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, and the
United States Atlantic Command, based in
Norfolk, Va., which patrols the Caribbean
and the Atlantic.
BEHIND THE WAR GAMES
Getting those forces to Central America
has been a central point of exercises con-
ducted over the past two years.
Until 1983, Colonel Hansen, the Southern
Command's spokesman, said, the command
staged only one sizable exercise a year, an
annual drill called Kindle Liberty that prac-
ticed defense of the Canal.
Since 1983, the Pentagon has added sever-
al major war games a year, testing on the
playing field of Honduras virtually every
wartime contingency that might arise in the
region.
In an exercise called Big Pine III, complet-
ed May 3, the Americans staged Nicaraguan-
style tank attacks near the Choleteca gap
on the Honduras-Nicaragua border, while
Honduran troops practiced defensive tactics.
Universal Trek, which ended May 5, prac-
ticed landings by Marines and paratroop-
ers-and for the first time tested how the
Pentagon would handle reporters covering
an unannounced military operation.
TROOPS WILL BUILD ROAD
This year's third major Honduras exer-
cise, beginning June 7, will send 1,800 Amer-
ican troops to build a 15-mile road to the
airfield at San Lorenzo and practice para-
trooper attacks against guerrillas.
Colonel Pearcy, the Joint Task Force com-
mandei', said these war games served multi-
ple purposes, including realistic training of
American and allied troops, and served to
remind the Nicaraguans of American re-
solve.
Most of the lessons could be applied to
other regions. But the exercises, American
officials said, have worked extensively on
two abilities that would be essential in a
Central American conflict: moving men and
equipment to the region in a hurry and
working in tandem with the Honduran
Army, which American officals say would be
a likely partner in any American military
enterprise.' -
"What you do on the ground is often less
important than the preparation for going,
getting there an existing," Colonel Pearcy
said.
MILITARY ADVICE PROVIDED
In addition to being host for.exercises and
training, Southern Command has helped
run a gradually increasing program of mili-
tary aid and advice for Nicaragua's neigh-
bors, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica.
In May, the United States sent 20 Green
Berets from the Army' Seventh Special
Forces in Panama to train the Costa Rican
civil guard in basic military skills at a new
camp near the Nicaraguan border.
The Defense Department siad it was the
largest American military training team
ever dispatched to Costa Rica, a neutral
country that does not maintain an army,
and the move prompted' protests from some
Costa Ricans that the United States was
pressing their country to militarize.
THE DEBATE ON INVASION
Whether these preparations are enough
to assure American success in any military
operation that might arise is still a matter
of lively debate.
No one in Government is suggesting that
an invasion of Nicaragua Is imminent or de-
sirable. Still, in recent weeks senior Reagan
Administration officials have for the first
time begun openly discussing this as a possi-
bility.
For example, in a 'speech to the American
Bar Association on May 23, Secretary of
State George P. Shultz warned members of
Congress that if they did not approve re-
newed aid for the American-backed Nicara-
guan rebels, "they are hastening the day
when the threat will grow, and we will be
faced with an agonizing choice about the
use of U.S. combat troops."
Interviews with numerous American and
foreign government officials in Washington
and in Central America indicate that the
possibility of United States military involve-
ment in Nicaragua has become a matter of
open discussion.
THE FEARFUL ANALOGY
One factor that has caused many Ameri-
cans to recoil from the idea of direct mili-
tary involvement in Nicaragua is the Viet-
nam analogy. '
In a conflict with the United States, the
argument goes, the Sandinistas would quick-
ly retreat- to the 'hills like the Vietcong-
jungle-wise guerrillas-and would draw
American troops into a bloody quagmire.
"I think most people think it would be a
very messy business, and don't want to do it
for that reason," said Mark Falcoff, a Latin
American scholar at the American Enter-
prise Institute who was a consultant to the
commission on Central America headed by
former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissin-
ger.
In Nicaragua, where an American invasion
is a topic of constant speculation, Cmdr.
Julio Ramos Arguello, the army Chief of
Staff, also said "this would be a kind of
Vietnam war."
But a contrary view seems to have gained
wide acceptance within the Administration.
The view is that an invasion of Nicaragua,
however undersirable for political reasons,
would not be such a difficult task in mili-
tary terms.
SANDINISTA DEFICIENCIES NOTED
In interviews, American military officers
and other Government officials familiar
with the region argued that the Sandinistas
S 7603
lacked the military skills, the popular base
and the supply lines to prolong a guerrilla
war in the face of an American invasion.
United States intelligence sources In the
region have told their superiors in Washing-
ton that major Nicaraguan installations are
lightly _defended. In the Managua area, for
example, an intelligence official said the
Sandinistas had 13 potential targets that
were protected by antiaircraft artillery, pri-
marily 57-millimeter and 37-millimeter anti-
aircraft guns.
"If proper tactics and proper ordnance
were applied to those sites, they'd never
know what hit them," an intelligence officer
said.
This officer and others said that with
minimal risk, American pilots could destroy
the small Nicaraguan Air Force, radar, artil-
lery, tanks, supply depots and command
centers.
According to a source who has discussed
the subject with him, Col. William C. Comee
Jr., the director of operations at Southern
Command, has estimated that it would take
the United States two weeks to gain control
of 60 percent of the Nicaraguan population.
Colonel Comee, who has overseen war
games and other operations In Central
America since 1982, declined through a
spokesman to be interviewed. In June he
will replace Colonel Pearcy as commander
of the Joint Task Force in Honduras.
Another United States political-military
officer in the region said the most plausible
scenario in the event of a full-scale conflict
would be this: "The U.S. would come in
heavily for a month or so, mostly with air
strikes against major facilities. Then a new
government would be put into place, and it
would come, with its own army."
It would be up to the new government,
presumably organized from the existing
democratic opposition, to pursue the Sandi-
nistas, several military analysts said.
"The Sandinistas would be up in the hills,
but that would be a problem for the new
Nicaraguan government," an American offi-
cer said. "It wouldn't be our problem. We'd
probably have a program like El Salvador,
advisers and assistants, but no Americans in-
volved in the fighting."
One United States military officer who
has briefed members of the National Securi-
ty Council asserted that the Nicaraguan
people would rise up in support of an Ameri-
can invasion and the neighboring armies
would assist the United States eagerly.
In addition, the officer has told senior of-
ficials in Washington that the Sandinistas
would find the hills inhospitable because
their presumed sanctuaries are now inhabit-
ed by the rebels and by largely conservative
farmers who consider the Sandinistas a
threat to their private property rights.
The officer said, "They've lost the support
of people in the mountains," the officer
said. "They'll get their heads chopped off
up there."
Commander Ramos, whose responsibilities
include the defense of Managua, said in an
interview that this was a dangerous assump-
tion. The initial American assault, he said,
would kill thousands of Nicaraguans. unit-
ing the citizenry in their outrage.
Another problem for the Sandinistas, ac-
cording to several Amnerican military ana-
lysts, is that Nicaragua has no counterpart
of Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh Trail which was
used to deliver the Vietcong ammunition
and Other supplies from the North. In Nica-
ragua, land supply routes would be through
mountainous jungle, while air and sea
routes would be policed by American forces.
"We .could seal that place tighter than a
drum," an American military officer said.
Other officials, noting that the United
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States had been unable to cut off arms traf-
fic between Nicaragua and El Salvador, were
not as confident that blocking arms to Nica-
ragua would be easy.
American intelligence reports show no evi-
dence the Sandinistas have prepared large
caches of ammunition or fuel in the hills,
according to one knowledgeable official.
Commander Ramos said: "We do have some
things. Not many. Some fuel."
Colonel Pearcy, commander of the United
States task force in Honduras, and other an-
alysts noted that for the United States, the
logistics would be much more favorable
than they were in Vietnam. In addition to
shared facilities in Honduras, the United
States has bases in Panama and Puerto
Rico, and Nicaragua is a five-hour transport
plane flight from the American mainland.
Colonel Pearcy added a cautionary note.
"I've been in the Army 24 years, and I've
never seen anything neat."
Other American officials noted that even
the 1983 invasion of Grenada, in which
Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine units
swarmed onto a tiny island, left 18 Ameri-
can servicemen dead and 116 wounded.
Invading Nicaragua, said Senator Sam
Nunn of Georgia, who is the senior Demo-
crat on the Armed Services Committee,
"would be a much tougher military situa-
tion than that."
THE POLITICAL PITFALLS
Many experts say the worst difficulties of
a United States invasion would be political
rather than military.
One would.be assembling a stable govern-
ment in Managua from the contentious mili-
tary and political rebel groups. Another
would be a possible torrent of refugees into
neighboring countries.
A senior Costa Rican official said that in
the event of an invasion, his Government
would probably issue a statement blaming
the Sandinistas for provoking it. But he
"added: "We will suffer the consequences.
We will have the Sandinista leaders in Costa
Rica. We will have hundreds upon thou-
sands or refugees. We will have instability."
An a third consequence, some experts say,
would be a deep and lasting resentment in
Latin America.
"You have to understand the emotional
scar tissue left there by our historical in-
volvement in the region," said a former Ad-
ministration official, who supports the
present White House policy. "The political,
emotional, psychological cost would be
high."
[From the New York Times, June 5, 1985]
NICARAGUA AND THE U.S. OPTIONS: AN
INVASION IS OPENLY DISCUSSED
(The following article is based on report-
ing by Joel Brinkley and Bill Keller and was
written by Mr. Brinkley.)
WASHINGTON, June 4.-Reagan Adminis-
tration officials have begun openly discuss-'
ing a subject they had previously refused
even to speculate about: the possibility that
American combat forces might one day be
sent into Nicaragua.
No one in Government is saying that an
invasion is imminent or desirable. But in the
'last few weeks, President Reagan, Secretary
of State George P. Shultz and other senior
officials have for the first time begun warn-
ing that if other policies fail, the United
States may be left with little choice in the
years ahead: w
Interviews with almost 50 military, diplo-
matic and foreign government experts in
Washington, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicara-
gua and Honduras indicate that discussion
of the issue has become commonplace in of-
ficial circles.
The interviews and other inquiries also
brought to light these points:
Although no one in Congress has publicly
called for United States military involve-
ment in Nicaragua, the mood in Capitol Hill
in the last few weeks appears to have shift-
ed sharply against the Sandinista Govern-
ment. Many members say there is growing
doubt that any of the policy options still
available, including renewed aid to the in-
surgents, is likely to bring fundamental
changes in the Sandinistas' behavior.
The Administration has agreed that a
number of possible situations would leave
the United States little choice but to use
military force. They include Nicaragua ac-
quisition of high-performance fighter
planes and the granting to the Soviet Union
of the right to establish a military base in
the country. -
Both critics and sympathizers of the San-
dinistas say they would not be surprised if
Nicaragua committed an act that provoked
American intervention.
In Central America, American officials
and others assert that Nicaragua's neigh-
bors are growing more concerned by the day
about the Sandinistas' policies. In Nicara-
gua, an American official said, business
groups and others are asking, "When are
you coming?"
In public and in private, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger, the White House national secu-
rity adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, Mr.
Shultz and, most importantly, President
Reagan, all have said they hope the United
States is never called upon- to send Ameri-
can forces to Nicaragua. Still, every official
interviewed said that events beyond United
States control could change that almost
overnight.
CONGRESS IS OPPOSED TO MILITARY ROLE -
Without support from Congress, Adminis-
tration officials agree, military involvement
in Nicaragua is most unlikely. Today, Con-
gress remains implacably opposed.
Many members reacted with alarm last
month when President Reagan, in a classi-
fied report to Congress, said the use of
American military force in Nicaragua "must
realistically be recognized as an eventual
option in the region, if other policy alterna-
tives fail."
In a speech to the American Bar Associa-
tion on May 23, Mr. Shultz warned members
of Congress that if they did not approve re-
newed aid for the American-backed Nicara-
guan rebels, "they are hastening the day
when the.,threat will grow, and we will be
faced with an agonizing choice about the
use of American combat troops."
And in an interview on May 22, Fred C.
Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
warned that if Congress persisted in what
he called "a policy of pinpricks," it raised
the risk of "some variant of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis."
"What are you going to do two or three
years from now, when Nicaragua is fully
armed?" he asked. "Are you going to pro-
voke another Cuban missile crisis? Are you
going to send in the Marines?"
At the same time, the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment's reputation on Capitol Hill has
soured in the last few weeks.
"The Sandinistas don't have any friends
up here any more," an aide to the House
Democratic leadership said. "The change
has been almost palpable."
SANDINISTA'S TRIP COSTS HIM SUPPORT
A key event behind the change was the
trip to Moscow by Nicaragua's President,
Daniel Ortega Saavedra. The announce-
ment came on the day "the House was voting
on renewed aid to the rebels, and many
members of Congress said they were
stunned by the, timing.
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the senior
Democrat on the Armed Services Commit-
June 6, 1985
tee, said: "What he did was rather stupid,
from the Sandinistas' own point of view. It'
certainly cost them support up here."
The clearest demonstration of the
changed view is that both houses are now
considering renewed aid to the Nicaraguan
rebels, even though the House refused to
approve aid in any form just a few weeks
ago.
So far, however, Congress has shown little
interest in granting the type of aid the Ad-
ministration says is most needed* military
aid. And Gen. Paul F. Gorman told Con-
gress in February that, even with renewed
military aid, the rebels could not be expect-
ed to change the Sandinista Government
"in the foreseeable future."
The next most likely step, several officials
said, is the ending of diplomatic relations
with Managua.
"I think that is going to happen," said
Senator Richard G. Lugar, the Indiana Re-
publican who is chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. "But I don't
know how soon."
If relations were ended, "then we might
recognize a government in exile," Mr. Lugar
said, referring to an idea that has been dis-
cussed among Administration officials.
A senior official in the region said "we
could permanently station U.S. forces" in
Honduras. If that fails, the official added, "I
guess the strategy would be a policy of con-
tainment," meaning heavily arming Nicara-
gua's neighbors. But Mr. Ikle said, "We
know from experience that that doesn't
work."
THE CHANGES DEMANDED BY THE
ADMINISTRATION
In general, the Reagan Administration
has demanded that Nicaragua demilitarize,
cut its ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba
and change its form of government to a plu-
ralistic democracy.
But many officials in both the Nicaraguan
and United States Governments believe the
prospects are remote that the Sandinistas
will adopt policy changes that would be sat-
isfactory to the United States.
"They are hellbent on pursuing their
policy," Mr. Ikle said. "The idea that you
can strike a deal with them seems unrealis-
tic."
In a speech in April, Nicaragua's Presi-
dent, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, said: "The
United States still doesn't understand that
this is an irreversible revolutionary process.
Here, there can be no backward steps."
Senator Lugar said some members of Con-
gress already believed that "the time for re-
demption is past" and that "a Marxist gov-
ernment can't reform."
In the months and years ahead, a Senate
aide said, if further diplomatic sanctions are
tried and fail, the military option may seem
more tempting. "If you try everything and
none of it works," he said, "then eventually
you have everyone nibbling at the same
bait."
WHERE THE U.S. DRAWS THE LINE
Asked under what circumstances the
United States might attack Nicaragua,
American and Nicaraguan officials say the
line is most clearly drawn against the acqui-
sition by Nicaragua of high-performance
warplanes.
Last November, American officials said
that they suspected Soviet-made MIG-21 jet
fighters were aboard a cargo ship bound for
Nicaragua and that they would probably
order what they called a "surgical" air
strike to destroy the planes.
If the planes were aboard the ship, they
were never unloaded. But when asked this
month if the Nicaraguan Government had
given tip the idea of acquiring MIG's, Cmdr.
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Julio Ramos Arguello, chief of intelligence
for the Nicaraguan Army, said simply, "No."
At the same time, American officials say
they have not dropped the threat to destroy
any such planes and in fact they have
broadened it to include Czech-built L-39 jet
training planes and similar aircraft.
The idea is that American warplanes
would destroy the new planes and try not to
hit anything else. Then in theory the attack
would end. But it senior Administration offi-
cial said: "I've never been able to see how
that kind of phased operation stops because
it sets off an action-reaction. If we hit the
airport and maybe kill 80 or 90 people, they
could come at the embassy."
In Managua, Commander Ramos said, "If
the airplanes arrive, and if they bomb us,
obviously we will be doing something about
it.,,
Another circumstance would be the estab-
lishment of a Soviet-bloc military base in
Nicaragua.
A senior Administration official said:
"Access for Soviet Backfire or Bear bomb-
ers, port rights-any kind of Soviet military
access, even without the presence of weap-
ons systems. That would be a threshold."
Nicaraguan and Soviet officials say they
have no such plans.
ADMINISTRATION FEARS "A SECOND CUBA"
Still another circumstance, Administra-
tion officials say, would be the consolidation
of Nicaragua's Government into what Ad-
ministration officials often call "a second
Cuba," meaning a heavily controlled, Soviet-
bloc dictatorship that actively promotes
Marxist revolution elsewhere.
A senior American diplomat in the region
said, "Above all, Ronald Reagan is a con-
summately pragmatic man" who would not
use force if the circumstances did not war-
rant it.
But Mr. Ikle said, "Even members of Con-
gress say they are not going to permit a
second Cuba."
With "a second Cuba," Senator Lugar
said, "we might be invited" by Nicaragua's
neighbors to invade "as we were invited in
the East Caribbean." Before the invasion of
Grenada in October 1983, the leaders of sev-
eral Caribbean island-nations formally re-
quested American military intervention.
HOW ITS NEIGHBORS VIEW NICARAGUA
"In public and private," Senator Nunn
said, the other countries of Central America
"would be strongly opposed" to an Ameri-
can invasion of Nicaragua.
But many American military and diplo-
matic officials and others in the region have
reported a different view to their superiors
in Washington.
A senior diplomat in San Jose asserted
that "an awful lot of Costa Ricans" would
in fact welcome an invasion.
A Costa Rican official who opposes the
idea acknowledged that his Government
probably would not condemn it. If the
United States invaded, he said, his Govern-
ment would issue a statement "saying some-
thing like it is unfortunate that the Cuban
and Soviet advisers were invited in, and that
the Sandinistas provoked it."'
Costa Rica's Public Security Minister,
Benjamin Piza Caranza, said, "There,? no
way we can live with a Marxist-Leninist
state on our border that is open to export-
ing revolution." But he declined to specu-
late about how his country would react to
an American invasion.
In Honduras, President Roberto Suazo
Cordova has been quoted as saying that
Nicaragua is "like a cancer: the only cure is
to cut it out."
There is also a large and growing body of
opinion within the Administration that the
majority of Nicaraguans would welcome an
American invasion,, several American offi-
cials said.
An American intelligence officer who has
interviewed dozens of people in Nicaragua
said: "What the people tell me is 'we'd get
out of your way and let you take care of the
Sandinistas'" if American troops landed.
The biggest problem United States forces
would face, he added, would be preventing
"severe retribution" against Sandinista offi-
cers.
POLLING THE PEOPLE ON MANAGUA STREETS
This officer has been called upon to brief
numerous senior Administration officials on
his views, including Mr. Weinberger, Mr.
McFarlane and Gen. John W. Vessey Jr.,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Representative Glenn English, an Oklaho-
ma Democrat who opposes some elements of
the Reagan Administration's policy in Nica-
ragua, said the officer had briefed him too,
but Mr. English was skeptical. So while in
Managua this month, he and Senator David
L. Boren, another Oklahoma Democrat,
interviewed about 15 Nicaraguan citizens
they chose at random on the streets.
"They were pretty strong on condemna-
tion of the Government," Mr. English said.
"Virtually all of them said they wanted a
change in Government, and one lady said
flat out, without being asked, that she
wanted the U.S. to invade."
A spokeman for the Sandinista Govern-
ment, Maria Christina Arguello, said: "They
may criticize the Government now because
of the economy and the shortages" of food
and other items. "But when there is an
emergency, you can be sure they will take
up arms." -
WILL THE NICARAGUANS PROVOKE AN ATTACK?
It is difficult to find anyone, friend or foe
of the Nicaraguan Government, who is con-
fident the Sandinistas will not make a mis-
calculation that could lead to a military con-
frontation with the United States.
Sandinista officials have said they are
being careful not to give the United States a
pretex to attack.
But Edward L. King, a retired Army lieu-
tenant colonel who opposes Reagan Admin-
istration policy in Nicaragua and has spent
months there talking to numerous Sandi-
nista officers, says he believes "the chances
are pretty good" that Nicaragua will err in a
manner that could lead to an American mili-
tary response.
The view of Mr. King, who has wide mili-
tary and civilian experience in Latin Amer-
ica, is noteworthy because he knows the
Sandinistas well and because they say.they,
trust him. After observing them, Mr. King
said, he has concluded that "some of them
hate us so much they almost have a death
wish."
Some members of the Sandinista leader-
ship, he added, "almost want a confronta-
tion with us." "The hotheads say, 'Yeah,
bring the gringos in here' just so they can
kill a few of them."
"I make no case for the Sandinistas," Mr.
King said. "They are real blunderers."
An American official with wide experience
in Nicaragua said it was "martyrdom," not
blundering, that might cause the Sandinis-
tas to prompt the United States to invade.
"I think it is their sense that the revolu-
tion is bogged down anyway, and maybe it
wouldn't be such a bad thing if they could
survive" an invasion "and be a legend."
In Managua, Sandinista officials say all
such speculation is nonsense. Commander
Ramos and others said the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment was interested in negotiation with
the United States, not military confronta-
tion.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President,
these are the words and deeds of a
S7605
government preparing to do what is
necessary to achieve its objectives in
Nicaragua-including sending U.S.
combat troops to war.
Now the administration has repeat-
edly stated it has no intention of send-
ing U.S. combat troops into Central
America. The Secretary of Defense
has told us that the Defense Depart-
ment has no plan, no strategy, no
thought of putting U.S. combat troops
in Central America. We are all encour-
aged by such statements and would
like to believe them.
But the facts give us cause for con-
cern.
First, U.S. military assistance to the
countries in the region has grown by
leaps and bounds over the past 5
years.
Second, the United States has built
an immense military infrastructure in
Central America that is clearly intend-
ed to support the deployment of thou-
sands of American troops in the
region.
Third, the United States has con-
ducted perpertual military maneuvers
in Central America, involving as many
as 5,000 military personnel in the Big
Pine exercises.
Fourth, the United States has ac-
tively intervened in the internal af-
fairs of Nicaragua not only through
our support of the Contra operations
but also with direct action by Ameri-
cans. We learned, for example, that
the Defense Department consciously
sought to intimidate the Nicaraguans,
to make the Nicaraguans think that
the United States was on the verge of
invasion. A senior State Department
official confirmed that there was a
perception management program at
work and said, "Every time there's an
invasion scare, they make some con-
cessions. We -learned that American
surveillance aircraft flew over Mana-
gua with the specific purpose of caus-
ing sonic booms to scare the Nicara-
guans.
Another official stated that one of
the central purposes of the military
exercises was to create the fear of an
invasion. He said that the troops
"push very close to the border, deliber-
ately, to set off all the alarms."
We also learned from a report that
appeared in the Wall Street Journal
last March that CIA personnel were
directly involved in attacking and
mining Nicaragua's harbors, that, in
air and sea raids, Americans flew and
fired directly on Nicaraguan positions,
and that a CIA plane provided sophis-
ticated reconnaissance guidance for at-
tacks by Contra helicopters.
The conclusion is unmistakable:
This administration is preparing for
war in Nicaragua. We are systematical-
ly placing U.S. ships, planes and per-
sonnel in harm's way, by injecting
them into situations where, directly or
indirectly, they are increasingly in-
volved in the hostilities. The trend is
clear, and the Reagan administration's
aims are similarly clear, I do not think
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that the United States should send its
soldiers into Central-America for'the
purpose of fighting a war unless Con-
gress and the American people have
been consulted and given their approv-
al in advance.
I offer an amendment that will cor-
rect this situation by prohibiting the
introduction of U.S. Armed Forces
into or over Nicaragua for the purpose
of combat without advance approval
of Congress.
This amendment reflects the deep
and growing concern of the American
people that this administration' is
taking us to war in Central America.
As stated in the amendment, the
word "combat" means "the introduc-
tion of U.S. Armed Forces for the pur-
pose of delivering weapons fire upon
an enemy." U.S. Armed Forces are not
precluded from conducting military
training in El Salvador. Nor does the
amendment limit flights by American
military aircraft in the region carrying
out reconnaissance activities. Only the
introduction of U.S. Armed Forces for
the purpose of delivering weapons fire
upon an enemy is prohibited.
The amendment does not apply in
all circumstances. The exceptions are
clearly stated:
This prohibition does not apply if
Congress has declared war or enacted
specific authorization for such intro-
duction.
The prohibition does not apply when
such introduction is necessary to meet
a clear and present danger of hostile
attack upon the United States, its ter-
ritories or possessions.
The prohibition does not apply when
such introduction is necessary to meet
a clear and present danger to, and to
provide necessary protection for and
to evacuate, U.S. Government person-
nel or U.S. citizens.
The amendment .leaves to the Presi-.
dent the determination of when force
As necessary under the circumstances I
have just listed. The amendment
thereby preserves the President's au-
thority to respond to threats to the
United States, its embassies, person-
nel, and citizens.
A number of my colleagues have ex-
pressed concern about how this
amendment affects the War Powers
Resolution. We know at the current
time that if -the President of the
United States decides to send Ameri-
can troops into combat in Nicaragua,
he is free to do so and would only nave
to notify the Congress under the pro
cedures of the War Powers Act. He
would then be able to maintain those
troops for a period of 60 days. What
this particular amendment provides is
that, prior to the involvement of
American combat troops in' combat, as
defined in the amendment, the Presi-
dent must obtain positive approval, by
the Congress before sending those
troops. We are simply asking that the
Congress be permitted to act prospec-
tively, not after the fact.
. I believe, Mr. President, that given
the factual situation-the escalation of
American involvement in. the region
with more and more U.S. military per-
sonnel in that area and with the kind
of activities that I mentioned earlier in
my statement, that it is important
that we, the Congress, play some role
in the decision before American
combat troops are sent to Nicaragua
for the purpose of delivering weapons
fire upon an enemy.
President Reagan has stated that he
has no intention of introducing U.S.
Armed Forces in Central America for
combat. And he has promised to con-
sult with Congress before taking any
such action if such action is needed.
This amendment simply takes the
President at his word and puts into
law what has been -stated as the ad-
ministration's official position.
This amendment will not affect the
activities of the current military advis-
ers assigned to El Salvador, nor their
role in assisting in the training of the
Salvadoran military. It will not limit
the current reconnaissance flights by
U.S. military aircraft in the region. It
will not limit the ability of the U.S.
Naval or Air Forces in the high seas or
in the air to monitor Soviet or other
naval activities of concern to our
Armed Forces. -
It will not inhibit any duly author-
ized military operations currently
under way in Central America or else-
where in the Caribbean. It will in no
way limit our treaty. obligations in the
region, or in the hemisphere and it
will allow the President to use U.S'.
combat forces to eliminate any threat
he deems is a clear and present danger
to the United States, and under this
legislation, it will not in any way limit
the President's power to defend our
vital security interests, to use U.S.
combat forces for example in a pre-
emptive strike against any missiles
that might be introduced in Central
America by the Soviet Union.
It will not inhibit the President in
his power to use U.S. combat forces to
protect American lives. Under this leg-
islation, for example, the President
would have been justified in using the
U.S. combat forces to intervene in
Grenada.
Mr. President, a similar amendment
carried overwhelmingly,in the House
last year. While it was defeated last
year in the Senate, I think the situa-
tion in Central America has become
dramatically worse. I think Congress
should be involved in the takeoff, and
not just in the landing, when Ameri-
can troops are to be sent into combat.
I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate, the arguments of the distin-
guished .Senators from Oregon and
Massachusetts. I take as a point of de-
parture the final comment of the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts that, with af-
fairs in Central America moving ad-
versely, the amendment that he and
Senator HATFIELD ' have suggested
ought to be adopted. I would argue
June 6, 1985
and have' argued earlier that in fact
the trend of affairs in Central America
has gone well for this country. It is a
remarkable to consider the progress-
found in El Salvador, when so many
persons on the floor of this Senate
and elsewhere argued that our involve-
ment simply. would come to know
good, that human rights would be vio-
lated, that democracy was impossible,
that we were in danger of involvement
of American troops and forces. In fact
a constituent election has been held, a
President has been elected, and de-
mocracy is infinitely stronger today.
It can be argued, I suspect, with less
force that democracy in Honduras and
even the beginning of democratic insti-
tutions in Guatemala, have proceeded
and that the policies we have adopted
as an administration and a Congress
have helped. Others would argue that
the people in El Salvador, Guatemala
and Honduras have helped themselves;
that perhaps the great heroes are per-
sons in those countries who value free-
dom and value democratic institutions.
I respectfully would suggest that it
is that this amendment-in the con-
text of all that has happened and all
that is being called for-should not
simply draw out of context the
thought of, a demand that we proceed
to the negotiating table in bilateral ne-
gotiations with Nicaragua or that in a
unilateral fashion we declare that this
body must act before the President
has the power to use American mili-
tary forces in Nicaragua. Given all the
exceptions. I would grant, that are
part of the amendment, these are
steps that are unwise in the unfolding
of our foreign policy and the unfold-
ing of any potential success of negotia-
tions.
Let. me point out that, in the earlier
comments that I made with regard to
Dodd amendment, I pointed out that
negotiations and support of the demo-
cratic forces in Nicaragua are not in-
compatible. As a matter of fact, they
move together. I would suggest that
negotiations without support of the
Contras, of the forces that are at-
tempting as Nicaraguans to bring
about democracy in that country,
those negotiations are not likely to be
very productive.
The Senator from Colorado asked
the Senator from Indiana about nego-
tiations, their possibilities of success,
and we went back and forth as to the
probable results of those negotiations.
None -of us know. But I would say
that, in the Nunn-Lugar amendment
we will be considering later on this
afternoon, we encourage the President
to enter into negotiations.
I will state the exact language. We
encourage simultaneous negotiations
to implement the Contadora document
objective, to develop close consultation
and cooperation with other nations
within the region and outside the
region. We ask the President to pursue
vigorously the use of diplomatic and
economic measures to resolving the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7607
conflict, including simultaneous nego-
tiations.
In short, .I think we will find a larger
majority of Members of this body are
in favor of negotiations within con-
text. But let us try to find the source
of negotiations that must happen. I
suppose we are all concerned with the
peace process in the Middle East pres-
ently, and thinking through how that
might, move to a settlement. And I
pick that particular analogy because, it
is topical and it is useful. Negotiations
are a complex business. To throw out
a cliche, "Let peace have a chance, let
negotiations have a chance," is mean-
ingless without the context of why
anybody wants to talk.
To suggest unilaterally that the
President ought to get right to it, send
the Secretary of State and others
down-there to negotiate, without any
reasonable assurance that there is
anyone in Nicaragua that wants to ne-
gotiate, that wants to move off the
dime, is an exercise in futility. It is fat-
uous on the face of it. There is a good'
sound to it. None of us want war. Ev-
erybody wants peace. The suggestion
is go negotiate. Now negotiations occur
successfully, at least as opposed to
simply parties meeting without having
a whole lot to say, if there is some
reason for movement.
The point the Senator from Indiana
will make today is that, as the Senator
from Massachusetts has described it so
well, six meetings have occurred in
Manzanillo without movement. The
Secretary of State has testified public-
ly and privately that the Sandinistas
do not have the slightest reason to
move in any direction and indeed they
do not. To send the Secretary of State
to Manzanillo again and to have done
nothing to have assisted the freedom
fighters to have put pressure upon
that situation is not only to invite fu-
tility in the negotiations but I think
incredulity as to why we are involved
in the action at all, aside from the
cliched thoughts of giving peace a
chance and' talk is better than war and
what have you. ,
The negotiations that must occur
are within Nicaragua-Nicaraguans
with Nicaraguans. For us to believe for
an instant that the significant negotia-
tions are bilateral ones between the
United States and Nicaragua is to be-
lieve the Nicaraguan argument which
is an invalid one. The Sandinistas do
not want to talk to freedom fighters.
Marxists do not want to talk to people
who want liberty. That is what it boils
down to.
Those are the negotiations we
should be urging, if the Senator from
Massachusetts and the Senator from
Oregon were saying:
Let's mandate that the Sandinistas meet
with the freedom fighters. Let's mandate a
truce and a cease-fire. Let's mandate that
people stop shooting each other and that
they provide for at least two parties for free
elections, for freedom of the press, for some
kind of a country that does not threaten ev-
erybody around.
The argument I have heard thus far
from the Senator from Massachusetts
would imply that the United States is
the aggressor, that the Sandinistas are
hapless persons upon whom we are
preying, and the gist of the amend-
ment is to ask us to cease and desist, to
let these persons proceed with what-
ever they want to do in consolidating
Marxism in a totalitarian sense in
their country, in threatening El Salva-
dor, Honduras, or Costa Rica, without
an army or anybody around, to pro-
ceed if they wish to, for that matter,
deal with-any and all countries of the
world in terms of the buildup of mili-
tary. assistance. The Senator from
Massachusetts says that in the event
you see Migs there, Soviet Migs, might
be a time to act, that might be an ex-
ception. That would be a terrible time
to have to act, having failed to put the
pressure that ought to be placed upon
that regime. now so there is not doubt
on the part of the Soviet Union.
If the whole gist of the Senate is to
micromanage our foreign policy to in-
dicate to the Secretary of State that
regardless of his judgment as to how
negotiations might prove successful or
which ones might prove successful and
in what context, that he is to go
anyway, that is our mandate, that is
not a very good way to handle foreign
policy and, as a'matter of fact, in this
case is bound to be unsuccessful.
What the Senator from Indiana is'
suggesting is that negotiations might
be successful if, in fact, the Sandinista
government has some reason and real-
politik to want to talk. And I think
they might have some reason.
The reasons are basically that their
economy is shot. The standard of
living is,. declining very rapidly. Our
Ambassador to Nicaragua testified
before the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee that what was already an $800 per
capita income in Nicaragua-on an
annual basis-has fallen to $500 in the
last 2 years. That does not approach
Bangladesh at this point but it is
moving rapidly in that direction. The
Sandinista economy has been a disas-
trous failure. The Sandinista govern-
ment says, well, we are at war. We are
devoting our resources to fighting off
the Contras, and indeed they need not
fight off persons who were involved in
their own revolution. The Marxists
have no more claim to that revolution
than does Arturo Cruz or various
other persons who are in favor of de-
mocracy and not of Marxism. There is
every reason if we are to put pressure
on this body for negotiations that we
say loudly and clearly to the Sandinis-
tas it is time for you to cease fire and
talk to your own people to try to re-
cover the pledges you made to all the
neighbors around, the OAS, and to the
rest of the world. Why we apologize
for our activities which try to bring
about democracy and freedom I
cannot imagine. There is no reason to
do so.
Let me suggest that to unilaterally
call upon the United States to negoti-
ate out of the context of the Conta-
dora process, of internal talks in Nica-
ragua, is simply to ensure once again
an impasse which leads I suspect to
two courses of action, and neither is
desirable. One was suggested by Sena-
tor Donn this morning, and that is we
just withdraw. The Senate has spoken
on that 79 to 17. The other, of course,
if you have futility of negotiations,
then the Senator is correct. People
then get onto more vigorous measures,
and more difficult measures. That is
not the policy of the President of the
United States. The Senator of Massa-
chusetts characterized President
Reagan correctly in his statement that
we do not want American forces in
Nicaragua, and we do not want them
'in Central America at all in a combat
status. We do want to help people who
want to help themselves. That is what
we are about.
Let me suggest with the second half
of the amendment, namely, that
which suggests that the United States
could not proceed to have armed
forces in that area without specific
action of the Congress that the War
Powers Act which the Senator from
Massachusetts has cited does cover a
number of possibilities. The War
Powers Act was adopted by the Con-
gress because chief executives in a
dangerous world sometimes must act
rapidly for the security of all of us.
Persons who are preoccupied with this
question must still admit that the
President must be our major foreign
policy spokesman. This is an adminis-
tration function, with the advise and
consent of the Senate. The War
Powers Act tightened that up a good
bit. It said notwithstanding any emer-
gencies, any of the ways in which our
President must act, within 60 days
there has to be an accounting for this.
If you have not declared war within 60
days you will have to do so. There is
some latitude given in a dangerous
world to the President of the United
States, and that is the way it ought to
be.
This amendment changes the War
Powers Act rather significantly. As a
matter of fact, it obliterates the War
Powers Act and says before the Presi-
dent in the case of Nicaragua can
move there has to be affirmative activ-
ity except with'the exceptions noted
in the amendment. '
I have noted the exceptions, and
they are important ones. Among this
list I would have thought would have
been our obligations under the Rio
Treaty of 1947-if for example, Nicara-
gua attacks Costa Rica, or if Nicara-
gua is involved with war with Hondu-
ras. These are not far-fetched situa-
tions. In recent days there is evidence
that Nicaragua has in,fact been found
attacking persons in neighboring coun-
tries. The Sandinistas would claim it
was in hot pursuit of Contras or for
various other reasons. Be that as it
may, the dangerous situation present-
ed by an aggressive force, a revolution
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S 7608 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD SENATE
without borders, a, group of people
who have never been able to settle
down within their own territory but
have constantly been meddling in
trying to subvert their neighbors and
felt that was simply their own form of
democracy in action-it seems to me
that the Senator from Massachusetts
would need to contemplate other ac-
tivities in which clearly the have an ob-
ligation and the Rio Treaty would be
one of these.
But I suggest beyond that, to begin
once again micromanaging American
foreign policy before the U.S. Senate,
there could be no movement in what is
a vital security interest of the United
States as perceived by the President,
or by the Contadora group, or the
OAS, or any number of people that
might meet. It is not a good idea. The
surface appeal-the thought that
giving peace a chance, negotiate now,
no troops in Nicaragua, the cliches of
this amendment are all over it-is evi-
dent. But in terms of sound foreign
policy, it is simply lifted out of the
context of what is occurring, and
stands history, in Central America on
its head.
The malfactors in this case are a
group of Marxists who have seized a
revolution from persons who believe in
freedom. That is fundamental, and
that is where the negotiation ought to
be occurring. To try to turn this on its
head, see the United States as the mal-
factor, to be encouraging from the
floor of the Senate at a time that the
Sandinistas are involved in what they
are doing that we ought to rush to the
table, and that we ought to tie the
hands of the President is simply in my
judgment unsound policy. And I hope
the Senate will reject both parts of
the amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I
welcome the view of the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee. I
have a great deal of respect for his un-
derstanding of world history, for his
knowledge of the Constitution of the
United States, but also for our respon-
sibilities to stand up to our constitu-
tional responsibilities.
But, Mr. President, I read the Con-
stitution of the United States some-
what differently from the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee. I
read the Constitution of the United
States to say that the power to make
war resides in the people's elected offi-
cials in the Congress, in the House and
in the Senate of the. United States. I
only suggest to the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee that the
American people ought to have a
voice, ought to be able to express their
views before sending their sons to the
jungles of Central America, and that
this should not be a unilateral decision
made by the President of the United
States. I think the American people
ought to be able to have a voice, ought
to be able to express their views in the.
June 6, 1985
Congress of the United:States. And, I am sure the chairman of the Foreign
cannot believe that the chairman of Relations Committee had briefings as
the Foreign Relations Committee is welt.
willing to give all of that authority to But I can give the assurance to the
the President, to allow him without Members of this body that Manzanillo
consulting Congress to send the sons talks were not as empty and valueless
from his own State of Indiana to fight as the Senator from Indiana has sug-
in the jungles of Nicaragua. I want to gested.
make it very clear that this Senator
from Massachusetts is not prepared to
give up that authority and that re-
sponsibility to this President of the
United States nor to any President of
the United States.
I failed to speak on the same issue
some years ago on the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, and I am not going to
commit that mistake twice, Mr. Presi-
dent. We heard almost similar argu-
ments on the floor of the Senate at
the time of the Gulf of Tonkin resolu-
tion-such as "Let the President of the
United States decide these matters."
"How are we going to have the kind of
information in the Senate of the
United States that the President will
have?" "Let the President make those
decisions; he is going to have the
knowledge, the information, and he is
going to have the briefings from the
NSC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
But Congress made a mistake when
it accepted those arguments. Fifty-five
thousand deaths and hundreds of
thousands of wounded Americans paid
a fearsome price for the failure of the
Senate to, as you call it, "microman-
age" that particular incident.
Mr. President, this amendment is
not about all of Central America. This
amendment is targeted on Nicaragua.
We have had a whole series of events
during the last 3 years-many of
which this body has authorized-with
regard to Nicaragua-not Costa Rica,
not Honduras, not Guatemala, but
with regard to Nicaragua.
We have heard statements, including
statements from the Secretary of
State, talking about the possibility of
the introduction of American troops in
Nicaragua-not in Costa Rica, not in
Mexico, but in Nicaragua.
So this amendment. is directed
toward Nicaragua. That certainly
ought to be understood on its face.
We see that people are dying in
Nicaragua, and we see increasing in-
volvement, increasing American par-
ticipation in that conflict. I hold no
brief for the Sandinista government. I
recognize that the Sandinistas share
responsibility for the ' conflict within
the area and within the region.
But the question comes back once
more. Mr. President: Before we resort
to the use of force, before we send
American military combat troops,
should we not at least make one addi-
The Senator from Indiana has in-
cluded in his own resolution a section
urging the President to go back for
further negotiation with the Sandinis-
tas and wisely so. I gather that the
principal difference he makes between
his urging and our urging .involves the
other different provisions of his
amendment.
But whatever the circumstances,
whatever the framework, I hope the
Secretary of State will resume those
negotiations. We have a President of
the United States who says he is pre-
pared to meet with Gorbachev. Per-
haps Senator LUGAR can tell us what
greater sense of hope he has about
that conversation, based upon our
President's statements about Gorba-
chev and Gorbachev's statements
about the President of the United
States, as opposed to his lack of hope
about talking with the Sandinistas.
We have had negotiations with all
the Eastern European countries on
MBFR. We have also had negotiations
with Fidel Castro about Cuban fami-
lies in the United States and the re-
entry of certain Cubans back to Cuba
following the Mariel boatlift. Why not
talk to the Sandinistas?
We have people dying in Nicaragua
every day, and there. is a real danger
of American involvement in the .form
of American combat troops in the
future-not according to this Senator
from Massachusetts but according to
this administration's Secretary of
State.
So there is a sense of urgency, Mr.
President, that propels some' of us in
this body to offer what constructive
suggestions we might have to try and
see if additional steps can be taken to
make sure that if direct U.S. involve-
ment is to occur, Congress will be con-
sulted.
Mr. President, I would hope that the
Senators will be able to support this
amendment. It simply urges a resump-
tion of talks-that is not microman-
agement-and it makes it possbile for
Congress to speak and to vote before
we send our sons to the jungles of
Nicaragua, and I do not believe that is
micromanagement.
I would hope this amendment will be
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GORTON). The Senator from Indiana.
tional effort at diplomacy. Mr.LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 5
My understanding. of the Manzanillo minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
talks is somewhat different from the Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
understanding of the chairman of the as I was occupying the chair, I listened
Foreign Relations Committee. to the Senator from Oregon talking
I had briefings on those negotia- about the power of war. This is some-
tions. I do not intend, however, to di- thing which has deeply concerned me
vulge the content of those conversa- ever since this body unwisely passed
tions because they were confidential. I the War Powers Act. I would like to
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL -RECORD' -,SENATE
read from the Constitution the powers'
of Congress.
We have the power to declare war.
What does that mean? Just what it
says. The President has called the
troops out, I think, 202 times in the
history of our country and there have
been five declarations of war, two of
those in the same war. We could de-
clare war here all day long. But only
the President of the United States,
under his power as Commander in
Chief, can send troops into war. If we
want to declare war, then, it is a nice
.thing to do and one that the Presi-
dent, I think, would always, enjoy
having done.
We can grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisals and make rules concerning
captures on land and water.
We raise and support armies but no
appropriation of money to that use
shall be for a longer* term than 2
years.
To provide and maintain a navy.
Here is one we have sadly overlooked
our responsibilities in: It has been
since 1922 since we exercised this
power, to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and
naval forces.
I can promise my colleagues that the
Committee on Armed Services is work-
ing on that right now.
Now let us look very quickly at the
power of the President. I have to
admit that this has never been really
clearly defined in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has always re-
fused to make a determination of this
because, as they rightly say, in my
opinion, if we have a situation where
the executive branch and the legisla-
tive branch can make a decision, there
is no need for the Court to get into it.
Section 2:
The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several
States, when called into the actual service
of the United States. He may require the
opinion ...
And so forth and so on.
But only the President, Mr. Presi-
dent, can send our troops to war. If it
is the feeling of Members of this body,
in the Senate or in the House, that
only the Congress should have that
power, then I suggest, Mr. President,
that we prepare a constitutional
amendment and put it up to a vote of
the people. I do not think the Ameri-
can people want 535 people guided by
535 different sources of strength
making the decisions concerning
power in this country. The great
strength of this country, up until
recent times, has been the fact that
the President has the right to formu-
late foreign policy, with the advice and
consent of this body, and has the
power of the troops to back that up.
I think we are treading on very dan-
gerous ground when we keep bringing
up amendments and talking about the
power of this body or the other body
to send troops into war. There is no
constitutional authority for it at all.
I thank my friend from Indiana for
yielding.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I wish
to yield time to the Senator from Min-
nesota. How much time does the Sena-
tor want?
Mr. DURENBERGER. I shall take
only 30 seconds.
Mr. LUGAR. I yield 1 minute.
Mr. DURENBERGER. I thank the
Senator from Indiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator may proceed.
. Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I rise in opposition to the amend-
ment of the Senator from Massachu-
setts.
I do so because it is my belief that
the amendment begs the issue of the
real and present danger that the San-
dinista regime poses to its Central
American neighbors, not to the United
States. No one would reasonably claim
that the United States is in immediate
danger of a Sandinista invasion from
the south. Yet, this amendment de-
mands an immediate response on' our
part to any hostile attack upon the
United States, its Embassy in Mana-
gua, or its citizens in Nicaragua.
Simply stated, I do not feel that this
amendment addresses the real ques-
tion. The threat of the Sandinista
regime to the United States is not the
immediate security problem involved
here. Rather, the issue is whether the
emerging democracies in Central
America are immediately threatened
by the aggressive and hostile actions
of the Sandinistas. I would respond
strongly in the affirmative.
In the past week, we have seen at
least three clear indications of the
Sandinistas' plans for their neighbors.
During this time, the Sandinistas have
launched cross-border incursions using
substantial forces against their neigh-
bors, the Costa Ricans and the Hon-
durans. Yet, the Sandinistas immedi-
ately. rushed before the international
media to claim that they, amazingly
enough, were the aggrieved party.
Their obvious hope is that few people
outside Nicaragua will care to look
into the facts of these examples of
Sandinista aggression.
By shifting the focus of the Sandi-
nista threat away from the Central
American nations and onto the United
States, Senator KENNEDY has missed
the real issue. This debate should in-
stead be one which states this coun-
try's willingness to do whatever is nec-
essary to restore democracy to Nicara-
gua and to recapture the democratic
spirit and the broad popular support
which characterized the 1979 Nicara-
guan revolution. I believe that Senator
LUGAR has made a critical point-the
Sandinistas will negotiate only when
they believe that it is to their advan-
tage or when sufficient pressure has
been exerted upon them. Last week,
during my visit to Central America,
this point was hammered home to me
by nearly all of the Central Americans
with whom I met. Conservatives, liber-
als, socialists, businessmen, religious,
S 7609
and campesinos all stressed that only
the United States possessed the suffi-
cient capability to bring the Sandinis-
tas to the negotiating table with the
Nicaraguan democratic opposition.
Not the, Sandinistas' neighbors. Not
the Contadora group. Not the Organi-
zation of American States.
Clearly the only effective negotia-
tions will be those which consider all
of the factions currently embroiled in
the Nicaraguan civil war. Still, the
Sandinistas have steadfastly refused
to negotiate in good faith with any ele-
ment of the opposition. Just last week,
for example, the Sandinistas inexplica-
bly broke off negotiations with Brook-'
lyn Rivera's Misurasata group. This
week, the Sandinistas showed their
complete disinterest in a democratic
and peaceful resolution of the conflict
with the Miskito peoples by turning
their guns on Rivera's Miskito war-
riors.
How can we let the Nicaraguan
democratic opposition stand alone
when we know that the Sandinistas
will negotiate only in bad faith? We
have seen this demonstrated at the bi-
lateral Manzanillo talks and at the
multilateral Contadora negotiations.
In my view, talks are useful when the
negotiating parties are serious about
negotiations. I have seen no firm evi-
dence that the Sandinistas have acted
with any seriousness in any of these
processes. I therfore see no reason
why we should enter into bilateral ne-
gotiations with a regime which has no
intention of negotiating with the real
aggrieved party in this dispute, the
Nicaraguan people.
The Senator from Massachusetts
talked about sending our sons to Nica-
ragua. Three Members of the body
have sons graduating from high school
in 15 minutes. I am more than a little
upset, I suppose, as one who has spent
more time, or at least as much time as
anybody in the body, dealing with this
issue at the fact that a lot of rhetoric
,kept us from dealing with this issue
.yesterday. Now, somehow, this process
has chosen this particular moment in
my life to make me make a decision
about being with my son or being with
an issue I care a lot about. I intend to
take the option of being with my son.
I hope that, somewhere in this insti-
tutional process, someone would have
the consideration to postpone any fur-
ther votes on this amendment until
after approximately 4 o'clock.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I believe
it would be appropriate to move to the
vote for a number of reasons. I shall
yield back all the time on my side
unless others are prepared to debate. I
think the issues have been well stated.
I say this in conclusion: Obviously.
the Senator from Indiana does not
want to send young men from Indiana
or Massachusetts or Minnesota to war.
As a matter of fact, the whole process
tocay is one in which we try to divine
ti
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S 7610 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD - SENATE
how to make certain we will have
peace in our hemisphere and safety
for our people. I think that is clear.
The question is the matter of the con-
text and the tactics of how negotia-
tions, might work and what the proper
powers of the President and the Con-
gress are.
I think we have had a good debate. I
hope that both parts of the amend-
ment will be defeated.
I yield back all the time on our side.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if
the Senator would withhold on that, I
want to yield 3 minutes to the Senator
from Colorado [Mr. HART].
At this point I wish to . indicate to
the Senator from Minnesota that con-
trol over the timing of this measure
today was not in the hands of those of
us who are calling up this amendment.
I am happy to give the Senator from
Minnesota a live pair on this amend-
ment if he wants to be with his son
this afternoon.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, does the
Senator from Massachusetts have time
remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts has 4
minutes and 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator from
Massachusetts yields to the. Senator
from Colorado.
Mr. HART. I shall not even take
that time if the Senator from Minne-
sota is trying to vote and go some
place else. Is that the case?
Mr. DURENBERGER. Yes, Mr.
President.
Mr. President, I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time has been yielded back. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to division 1 of the
amendment of the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts. The yeas and nays have
been ordered. The clerk will call the
roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Colorado [Mr. ARM-
STRONG], the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON], and the Senator from
Wyoming [Mr. WALLOP], are necessari-
ly absent.
I also' announce that the Senator
from North Carolina [Mr. EAST], is
absent due to illness.,
I further announce that, if present
and voting the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON], and the Senator from
Wyoming [Mr. WALLOP], would each
vote nay.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GORTON). Are there any other Sena-,
tors in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced-yeas 48,
nays 48-as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 108 Leg.)
YEAS-48
Baucus
Chiles -
Gore
Bentsen
Cranston
Harkin
Biden
DeConcini
Hart
Bingaman
Dixon
Hatfield
Boren
Dodd
Heinz
Bradley -
Eagleton
Inouye
Bumpers
Exon
Johnston
Burdick
Ford
Kennedy
Byrd
Glenn
Kerry
June 6, 1985
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin .
Mathias
Matsunaga
Melcher
Mitchell
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Proxmire
Pryor
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Sasser
Simon
Specter
Weicker
Abdnor
Bentsen
Boren
Boschwitz
NAYS-64
Goldwater
Gorton
Gramm
Grassley
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Metzenbaum
Riegle
Zorinsky
Bradley
Bumpers
Hatch
Hawkins
Pressler
? Pryor
Abdnor
NAYS-48
Grassley
Moynihan
Byrd
Chafee
Chiles
Hecht
Heflin
Heinz -
Quayle
Rockefeller
Roth
Andrews
- Hatch
Murkowski
Cochran
Helms
Rudman
Boschwitz
Hawkins
Nickles
Cohen
Hollings
Simpson
Chafee
Hecht
Pressler
D'Amato
Humphrey
Specter
Cochran
Heflin
Quayle
Danforth
Johnston
Stennis
Cohen
Helms
Roth
DeConcini
Kassebaum
Stevens
D'Amato
Hollings
Rudman
Dixon
Kasten
Symms
Danforth
Humphrey - '
Simpson
Dole
Laxalt
Thurmond
Dole
Kassebaum
Stafford
Domenici
Long
Trible
Domenici
Kasten
Stennis
_
East
Lugar
Warner
Durenberger
Laxalt
Stevens
Evans
Mattingly
Wilson
Evans
Long
Symms
Ford
McClure
Zorinsky
Garn
Goldwater
Lugar
Mattingly
Thurmond
Trible
W
Garn
Glenn
McConnell
Moynihan
Gorton .
Gramm
McClure -
McConnell
arner
Wilson
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS
1
ED
Armstrong
Denton
NOT VOTING-4
East
Wallop
-
PREVIOUSLY RECORD
Kennedy, for
NOT VOTING-4
So division 1 of the amendment (No.
272) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the di-
vision '1 amendment was rejected.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to division 2 of
the amendment of the Senator from
Massachusetts. The yeas and nays
have been ordered. The clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on
this vote I have a pair with the distin-
guished Senator from Minnesota [Mr.
DURENBERGER]. If he were present and
voting, he would vote "nay." If I were
at liberty to vote, I would vote "yea."
Therefore, I withhold my vote:
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Colorado [Mr. ARM-
STRONG],. the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON], the Senator from Min-
nesota [Mr. DURENBERGER], and the
Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WALLOP]
are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON] and the Senator from
Wyoming [Mr. WALLOP] would each
vote "nay."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote?
The result was announced-yeas 31,
nays 64, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 109 Leg.]
YEAS-31
Andrews
Hart
Mitchell
Baucus
Hatfield
Pell
Biden
Inouye
Proxmire
Bingaman
Kerry
Riegle
Burdick.
Lautenberg
Sarbanes
Cranston
Leahy
Sasser
Dodd
Levin
Simon
Eagleton
Mathias .
Stafford
Exon
Matsunaga
Weicker
Gore
Melcher
Harkin
Metzenbaum
-
Armstrong Durenberger
Denton Wallop
So division 2 of the amendment (No.
272) was rejected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which divi-
sion 2 of amendment 272 was rejected.
Mr. KENNEDY. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the
unanimous-consent order says that we
will now proceed to the amendment of
the distinguished Senator from Colo-
rado, Senator HART.
I ask that the Chair recognize.Sena-
tor HART.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CHAFEE). The Senator from Colorado
is recognized.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I thank
the Chair.
AMENDMENT NO. 273,
(Purpose: To restrict the circumstances
under which combat units of the U.S.
Armed Forces may be introduced into
Central America)
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I send an
amendment to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Colorado ?[Mr. HART],
proposes an amendment numbered 273. On
page 31, after line 23, add the following:
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further read-
ing of the amendment be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 31, after line 23, add the follow-
ing: -
TITLE VI-MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
RESTRICTION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES INTO CENTRAL AMERICA
SEC. 601. (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the Government of Nicaragua has dis-
regarded ' its commitments to internal plu-
ralism and non-intervention in its neigh-
bors' affairs, and thereby caused grave con-
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June 6. 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
tern in the United States and among the na-
tions of Central America;
(2) the Government of the United States
has placed an economic embargo on Nicara-
gua and resorted to other economic and po-
litical pressures to affect the policies of Ni-
caragau;
(3) the increasingly frequent presence of
American combat troops in Central America
for training exercises, particularly in the
current, extremely tense atmosphere, does
not advance American foreign policy objec-
tives and may lead to military conflicts; and
(4) the Government of the United States
should place its first priority on diplomatic
initiatives in the conduct of its foreign
policy, and such initiatives should precede
any use or threat of military force.
(b)(i) No combat units of the Armed
Forces of the United States may be sent
into the territory, airspace, or waters of
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala. Hondu-
ras. or Nicaragua for training exercises or
any other purpose after the date of enact-
ment of this Act unless- '
(A) the Congress has authorized the p-
ence of such units in advance by a joint res-
olution enacted Into law; or
(B) the presence of such units is necessary
to provide for the immediate evacuation of
United States citizens, or to respond to a
clear and present danger of military attack
on the United States.
(2) In either case described in clause (B)
of paragraph (1), the President should
advise and, to the extent possible, consult in
advance with the Congress.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, Senator
KERRY and I are introducing an
amendment which will increase con-
gressional oversight over the introduc-
tion-of U.S. combat forces in Central
America.
The amendment would require con-
? gressional approval-in the form of a
joint resolution-prior to the introduc-
tion of American combat troops in
Central America for training exercises
or other purposes. It would, however,
allow the President to introduce
troops immediately in the event that
the United States was threatened with
attack or American lives were in jeop-
ardy. Our amendment is intended as a
crisis-prevention measure to place
limits on the increasing numbers of
U.S. forces on maneuver and to reduce
the likelihood that those troops will
become entangled in a conflict in Cen-
tral America.
Mr. President, since the United
States increased the scope and intensi-
ty of military maneuvers in Honduras
in 1983, we have witnessed the nearly
constant presence of American combat
troops on the border of Nicaragua. At
the end of April, that presence num-
bered nearly 11,000.
During these latest maneuvers U.S.
tanks and heavy equipment came
within 3 miles of the Nicaraguan
border.
There is little to suggest that such
displays . of might have advanced
American foreign policy objectives in
the region since they began on an ex-
panded basis in 1983. But the contin-
ued presence of these large numbers
of U.S. troops in close proximity to on-
going fighting between the Contras
and the Sandinistas is a case where a
display of American military power for
symbolic purposes is tangibly increas-
ing the prospects that the United
States will become directly involved in
hostilities.
All too often in the past we have
seen nations start down the path to
war on the basis of miscalculations,
unintentional clashes, and unforeseen
crisis. Promoting the continued pres-
ence of thousands of American troops
so close to forces that are fighting in
earnest-so close to a nation with
which we have such severe disagree-
ments-is like placing a match in a tin-
derbox. -
This amendment would not have the
effect of banning troop maneuvers,
nor would it interfere with U.S. intelli-
gence gathering capabilities nor pre-
vent U.S. military advisers from aiding
friendly nations in the region. We are
not suggesting that the United States
should not conduct any training exer-
cises in Central America.
This amendment would simply
ensure that Congress subjected plans
for the introduction of troops into
Central America to careful and delib-
erate review, to ensure. that such ac-
tions are dictated by U.S. security re-
quirements, are commensurate with
the need to train allied forces in the
region, and are not a form of danger-
ous gun boat diplomacy carried out on
land.
Mr. President, our amendment is es-
pecially important now, in light of the
Reagan administration's decision to
impose an economic embargo on the
Sandinistas and the increasing likeli-
hood that this Congress will provide
some sort of aid to the anti-Sandinista
Contra forces through third parties or
other indirect means.
I oppose these policies. But regard-
less of where one stands on the embar-
go or Contra aid-it is clear that to-
gether they reflect an escalation in
tensions between the United States
and the Sandinistas; tensions which
are already running extremely high.
Now is the time to mandate a thor-
ough congressional debate prior to ad-
ditional massive introduction of U.S.
troops in the region-not after events
have gotten out of hand, and our only
option is to become embroiled in con-
flict.
Our proposal will not in any way
limit the President's prerogative to
protect American lives or respond to
the threat of attack. We are not at-
tempting to interfere with the author-
ity of the Executive. Rather with this"
amendment we have attempted to
strike a reasonable balance between
the President's need for flexibility in
conducting foreign affairs and the
Congress' responsibility for passing
upon policies that could lead this
Nation into war.
Mr. President, the purpose of this
amendment is somewhat similar to the
previous amendment proposed by the
Senator from. Massachusetts, but it is
also somewhat different. Its differ-
ences are these: The purpose of my
amendment is to proscribe the level of
S 7611.
combat forces the United States may
introduce into the region of Central
America, as defined by specific terms,
to those listed countries-unless the
President of the United States has re-
ceived prior congressional authority.
The purpose of this amendment, Mr.
President, and the reason for bringing
it forward on this bill are quite obvi-
ous. There is deepening concern
among the people of the United
States, in this Chamber and through-
out the Congress about whether the
administration may be planning for or
intent upon some sort of military
action against Nicaragua. That con-
cern has. been deepened by published
reports and quotations of anonymous
administration officials and sources in
the Defense Department, 'the State
Department, and the White House
that suggest that those plans have
indeed been made, and that there is a
body of thought within the adminis-
tration which strongly advises that we
be prepared on fairly short notice to
undertake that kind of military oper-
ation.
Mr. President, I will not take the
time of the Senate to parade the po-
tential loss of American lives posed by
American involvement in a Central
American conflict; or to suggest to
each Member of the Senate what this
might mean to their own families or to
the constituents they represent. I will
not take the Senate's time to analyze
and compare this potential to that of
our recent and tragic experience in
Southeast Asia. There are differences.
I realize those differences of geogra-
phy, differences of American interests,
and all the rest. I do not by this
amendment, Mr. President., intend to
draw a one-to-one analogy between
the sad experience we had in Vietnam,
and the potential for an even sadder
experience in Central America.
Suffice it to say, Mr. President, it is
the conclusion of the Senator from
Colorado-and I think reflective of the
view of a large majority of the Ameri-
can people-that to seek to solve the
thorney and complex problems of Cen-
tral America, and our relations with
Nicaragua through an invasion force
or through direct military interven-
tion by the. United States-absent
some more immediate threat to our
own security and our own vital inter-
ests-would be an act of folly of the
deepest dimension.
I, as the Senator from Colorado,
have no particular inside information
about what the administration may
plan or may intend, or what have
those who favor some greater military
presence may have over the thinking
of the President of the United States
or of this administration. But I do
know, Mr. President, that all of the in-
gredients are there for that act of
folly-a willingness on the part of
some 'of the key policymakers in our
Government and a willingness on the
part of some military officials, to re-
solve an increasingly complex problem
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S 7612 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
for U.S. diplomacy by a swift and
hopefully decisive military action.
I think any of us who have studied
the situation in Central America for
even one moment, or who have read.
even 10 pages of military history,
know that action would not be swift,
and it is far from certain that it would
be decisive. In this respect, I think
there is a certain question whether
people have learned any lessons in
Vietnam or not. Nevertheless, Mr.
President, I think any person with
commonsense and reasonable judg-
ment would have to quarrel with the
unnamed' official in the Pentagon
quoted in the New York Times article
saying that we could occupy Nicaragua
and it would be as easy "as falling off
a log."
Mr. President, we are all reluctant to
personalize these judgments and these
decisions. The Senator from Colorado
just happens to be the father of a 19-
year-old son, presumably a son who
would be subject to any involvement
this country might undertake in the
short or long term in Central America
or elsewhere. It is the belief of the
Senator from Colorado that his son,
being as patriotic as any other young
American, would be more than willing
to engage himself in the defense of
this country and its vital interests
whenever called' upon by his Govern-
ment in any kind of legitimate cause. I
think the issue before this Chamber
today is whether a military invasion of
Nicaragua is a justifiable cause, calling
upon the potential loss of many 19-
year-olds similar to this Senator's son.
Mr. President, it has been discussed
here today, and in the highest tradi-
tions of the debates of the U.S. Senate
throughout . history-to debate who
does or should have the authority to
commit this Nation to acts of war or
military enterprises. It was suggested
earlier in a previous debate, a previous
amendment ? by the senior Senator
from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER] that
the Congress has gone too far in
making foreign policy or involving
itself in fundamental decisions about
deployment of American military
forces; that what we ought to. do is
just give the President whatever au-
thority he needs and trust his judg-
ment to do whatever he thinks is best
for this Nation. If any of us are stu-
dents of American history, and try to
sort our way through the history of
ideology in this country, we find argu-
ments of that sort ironic.
For, after all, it was the more con-
servative elements of those who
founded this country, our Founding
Fathers, who insisted-who insisted-
that the Congress of the United
States, and particularly the Senate of
the United States, have considerable
authority in issues relating to foreign
aid ventures by this Nation, interna-
tional relations, or relationships with
other countries.
It was the concern on the part of
those conservatives, those conservative
Founding Fathers, that an all-power-
ful Executive might in fact abuse that
power and unnecessarily involve this
Nation in unwise activities and adven-
tures abroad, military, diplomatic, and
otherwise.
Let me, for example, if I may, Mr.
President, cite Thomas Jefferson on
the question of congressional involve-
ment with respect to declaring and
waging war, or being involved in mili-
tary ventures abroad.
In a letter in 1807 to then-Vice Presi-
dent Clinton, Mr. Jefferson had this to
say:
The power of declaring war being with the
legislature, the executive should do nothing
necessarily committing them to declare war.
In -other words, President Jefferson
in 1807 was saying that the Congress
should not permit itself to get into the
position where Presidents can so pre-
commit this Nation, so expose its in-
terests ' unnecessarily, that the Con-
gress then has no other choice but to
intervene to carry out that commit-
ment.
Thomas Jefferson is saying the
President should not have that power
because the power of declaring war is
with the legislature.
He said earlier to James Madison in
1793:
As the executive cannot decide the ques-
tion of war on the affirmative side-
Let me repeat that.
As the executive cannot-
He does not say "should not"-
cannot decide the question of war on the af-
firmative side, neither can he do so on the
negative side by preventing the competent
body from deliberating on the question.
Once again, anticipating his state-
ment to Vice President Clinton some
14 years later, he is saying that it is ac-
cepted doctrine, constitutional doc-
trine, that the Executive cannot-he is
not saying should not, but cannot-
commit this Nation to war on the af-
firmative side by an affirmative decla-
ration. Therefore, logically the execu-
tive should not have the power to pre-
vent the Congress, which he calls "the
competent body," from deliberating on
that question.
The President cannot, by any nega-
tive means, preclude the Congress
from exercising its constitutional man-
date to determine when this Nation
goes to war.
Then finally, in an 'even earlier
letter to Madison, Jefferson said:
We have already given one effective check
to the.dog of war by transferring the power
to declare war from the executive to the leg-
islative body; from those who are to spend
to those who are to pay.
The "we" he is' referring to is not
only himself and Mr. Madison but the
other framers of the Constitution
who, in their wisdom, were concerned
about a too powerful Executive,. par-
ticularly in the area of committing
this Nation to war. He says:
We have taken that power away. We have
already given one effective check to the dog
of war by .transferring the power to declare
war from the executive to the legislative
body.
June 6, 1985
Namely, those who can spend
money, the President, to those who
pay the bills, the Congress.
Finally, Mr. President, on this same
subject, in the question of constitu-
tional sharing of power in foreign
policy, Alexander Hamilton himself,
known throughout history as a propo-
nent of the strong executive theory,
wrote this in the Federalist Papers on
this subject:
The history of human conduct does not
warrant that exalted opinion of human
virtue which would make it wise for the
nation to commit interests of so delicate and
momentous a kind as those which concern
its intercourse with the rest of the world to
the sole disposal of a magistrate, created in
circumstance as would be a President of the
United States.
Mr. President, I do not think it is
the inclination of the Senate, for
better or worse at the present time, to
debate the history of who, under our
Constitution, does or does not have, or
should or should not have, the power
to commit this Nation to war. I wish it
were, because I think, Mr. President, if
I read what is happening in this coun-
try-in its highest circles of power-
that is exactly the kind of debate we
ought to be having on the floor of the
Senate today, and there ought to be a
goodly number of Senators here.
It is tragic, it is unfortunate, that
crises occur, that decisions are made,
and then the hue and cry arises and
elected officials summon themselves to
the respective. Chambers of the Con-
gress and start debating about how we
got into this mess.
Better, it seems to me, if we were to
spend a tenth of the time today debat-
ing about who should or should not
have the power to commit this Nation
to war. That is what this amendment
is all about.
Mr. President, it is the purpose of
this amendment to limit to the
present levels in Central America ex-
isting numbers of combat forces, and
those are considerable. There are at
least 2,000 forces, as the Senator from
Colorado understands it, in Honduras,
and other military personnel, depend-
ing on how one counts the occasional
naval and maritime presence of the
United States in the region-possibly
several thousand more.
One can ask, what is the concern?
Why offer this' amendment at all?
What are the potentials?
The potentials, Mr. President, are
for ever-increasing and escalating
American military presence in the
region, particularly in Honduras, and
that presence getting itself closer and
closer to what is a less and less defined
combat zone and, therefore, exposing
American military personnel to poten-
tial ' harm; certainly putting them in
harm's way, and therefore necessarily
risking their lives.
It seems to me we are only really the
beneficiaries of fortune that more
Americans have not already been
killed. We have lost tragically, I think,
some 30 or 40 American military per-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.- SENATE
sonnel, largely in exercises and acci-
dents. But, it seems to me, given the
deployment of American forces, it is
almost miraculous that more Ameri-
cans have not been killed in or near
what has been an expanding combat
zone.
We have been through three so-
called Big Pine exercises, each one of
which has been larger than the last.
Big Pine is not a classified code name
but a military code name for combat
exercises conducted by this Nation
with Honduran and regional military
forces. That is not in and of itself any-
thing we should necessarily concern
ourselves about, were it not for the in-
dications that, as the Senator from
Colorado has already mentioned, there
are predisposition on the part of some
policymakers in and out of uniform to
preemptorily try to solve this problem
by increased direct military action.
The chances of that policy prevail-
ing are exacerbated and heightened by
the increasing possibility of Americans
losing their lives in or near that
combat zone, and then some tit for tat
reaction being taken in which we raid
across the border to protect our forces
and they kill more Americans and
then, before you know it, we are in the
soup.
The Big Pine 3 maneuvers have
ended, as has a companion exercise
called Universal Trek '85. Big Pine 3
involved over 4,500 American forces.
Universal '85 Trek involved 6,600
United States troops, including am-
phibious landings. These two exer-
cises, by the way, overlapped by a
period of a week or two, and during
that period, by the calculation of the
Senator from Colorado, there were
over 11,000 combat forces in Honduras
or nearby.
. Mr. President, the disposition of the
administration in this regard or in the
near- or long-term future is beyond
the Senator from Colorado-even in
his capacity as a member of the
Armed Services Committee. We are
not necessarily brought into those
plans. The Senator from Colorado is
informed that later this month, a new
U.S. maneuver involving potentially a
couple thousand or more Americans
who might be involved in rather
benign activities such as road-building,
but also perhaps within 40 miles of the
Nicaraguan border, practicing attacks
and repelling attacks by and against
guerrilla forces.
So, Mr. President, the beat goes on.
It is clearly an instrument of this ad-
ministration's foreign policy in the
region to not only beef up Honduran
capabilities but to show a big stick to
the Nicaraguan Government. That
may or may not be a productive policy.
All this amendment does is say: If
the President of the United States in-
tends to put more combat forces into
the region-Honduras or the sur-
rounding nations-then he should
come to Congress and seek your ap-
proval. Congress, under this amend-
ment, can authorize that presence of
.
whatever units the President wants to
commit in advance, by a joint resolu-
tion enacted into law. The amendment
does not require the removal of
present levels of combat forces, so that
argument cannot and should not be
used in opposition. It specifically is de-
signed not to interfere with the Presi-
dent's ability either to take whatever
actions are necessary to immediately
evacuate U.S. citizens in Nicaragua or
surrounding nations, or to respond to
a clear and present danger of military
attack on the United States.
The amendment does encourage the
President, under those circumstances,
to consult closely with Congress.
So, Mr. President, this amendment is
not designed to intefere with our intel-
ligence capabilities or the presence of
our advisers in the region. It would not
in any way impede our ability to pro-
tect and promote our own interests in
the region. It merely would bring Con-
gress into the process of, deciding
whether we should increase merican
military presence in the region and,
hopefully, if it works properly and is
enacted, prevent any kind of unilateral
action by the President of the United
States which might precommit this
Nation to war in opposition to the
intent of -the Founding Fathers and
the clear intent of the Constitution of
the United States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield
to myself such time as I may require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the
amendment presented by our distin-
guished Senator from Colorado, as he
has mentioned, has many characteris-
tics which are similar to the amend-
ment just offered by the distinguished
Senators from Massachusetts [Mr.
KENNEDY] and Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD],
except for the fact that the Hart
amendment goes beyond the Kennedy-
Hatfield - amendment, beyond' in the
sense that in addition to the introduc-
tion of forces into combat, the Hart
amendment would preclude forces
coming into additional exercises with-
out the advance consent of Congress.
I submit, Mr. President, that Mem-
bers who have already voted, by 31 to
64, against the first amendment,
would be disinclined to vote for the
current amendment because it clearly
goes well beyond it with, regard to the
scope of congressional management of
military policy and the use of force.
The Senator from Colorado has sug-
gested that the. very presence of a crit-
ical mass of forces in Honduras may
lead Americans into some measure of
jeopardy. Indeed, he has suggested
that it is miraculous that more inju-
ries or deaths have not occurred, given
the number of persons in Honduras.
But I think it is important to indicate
that, in fact, these deaths have not oc-
curred nor have combat situations oc-
curred.
57613
In truth, our forces are in Honduras
because they are training for fitness in
military capability. They are assisting
our friends in Honduras who are heav-
ily reliant upon the support they give.
I suggest, Mr. President, that the
War Powers Act, which at least per-
tained to the previous amendment we
discussed, conceivably pertains to this
one, although I understand that the
thrust of the Hart amendment is to
give an additional dimension to that.
It seems to me that this type of
amendment would clearly be a signal
of weakened U.S. commitment to Hon-
duras and other Central American
friends. It would encourage, in my
judgment, if not intensified military
pressure by Nicaragua, certainly a
temptation to attempt those activities
which Nicaragua might feel disin-
clined to attempt given the exercises
proceeding in Honduras.
It seems to me it is indeed another
unwise and rather severe restriction
upon the President's constitutional au-
thority as Commander in Chief. It ap-
pears to me that it would at least.pre-
clude the possibility of the use of U.S..
forces in providing emergency assist-
ance to friendly countries to defend
against sudden attack which currently
we are in a position to give, given the
sure presence of our forces in Hondu-
ras or, as might be the case, exercises
in other areas.
For these reasons, Mr. President, I
ask the Senate to reject the Hart
amendment. It seems to me it would
be an unwise deviation in our foreign
policy. Clearly, it will not be helpful,
in my judgment, in providing for the
stability in Central America which we
all seek.
We have not attempted today, and
will not go far afield, in treating the
positive things that the United States
has attempted to do in promoting
strong democratic institutions, a
stronger economy, stronger humani-
tarian aid. Clearly, our presence in
Central America in a military capacity
and the close ties that the military ex- .
ercises give help to our friends in Cen-
tral America. It seems to me this is an
area in which a degree of Presidential
discretion and congressional oversight
are important. I would think the con-
gressional oversight is exercised in a
number of ways presently and to go so
far as the Senator from Colorado has
suggested would be unwise.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I yield 10
minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Illinois is recognized.
Mr. SIMON. I thank the Chair and I
thank Senator HART for the time.
Mr. President, I rise in support of
the Hart amendment. I do so because I
have the uneasy feeling-more than
just an uneasy feeling, a belief-that
we are moving in the wrong direction.
As I read the Hart amendment, it is a
balanced amendment. It recognizes
that the Government of Nicaragua
has not lived up to some of its commit-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ments, but it also places priority on
diplomatic initiatives, without taking
away the power of the President in a
genuine emergency. But. it sends a
clear signal, "Do not use U.S. troops
unnecessarily."
My own feeling is that many of the
people who are making decisions for
Central America simply are not sensi-
tive to what is going on. The chairman
of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is on the floor, and I ap-
plaud the fact that he is reviewing the
whole panoply of relations of the
United States with the other nations
of the world. My own impresssion,
from some years of travel in Latin
America, is that uncle Sam is viewed
in much of Latin America, as a bully
and exploiter. Sometimes we have
earned that image, sometimes we have
not. But what we ought to be doing is
moving low key in whatever we do,
and we are doing precisely the oppo-
site. i think that is counterproductive.
I remember some years ago before I
was a Member of the House of Repre-
sentatives and certainly before I came
over to the Senate, our family drove
down the Pan American Highway to
San Jose. Costa Rica, a trip I would
not recommendge dm.l:aOSjn6.196 In
San Jose we visited with Jose Figueres,
who was then the President of Costa
Rica, whom I had the opportunity to
know slightly. We visited in his living
room. This is right after Richard
Nixon had become President of the
United States.
On the coffee table in his living
room was an autographed picture of
Hubert Humphrey. I said, "I am curi-
ous, Mr. President, why you have that
autographed picture of Hubert Hum-
phrey." And he responded, "We sensed
that Hubert Humphrey really cares
about us."
Mr. President, what , we in the
United States have to convey is that
we care about the people of Central
America and that we are not just using
them as some kind of a tool' in the
East-West struggle, and we are not
conveying that-tight now.
One of the areas where we ought to
be doing more-and I am pleased to
see this bill, and I commend my col-
league from Indiana, as well as the
ranking Democratic member, Mr.
PELL, and Senator MATHIAS who
worked on this-is in scholarships.
One of the largely ignored points
made, by the Kissenger Commission
was that the United States in all of
Central America provides 391 scholar-
ships, while the Soviets provide about
7,500. And you do not need great
imagination to understand that we can
win a battle and lose a war.
I do not suggest that every, student
who comes back from the University
of Moscow or Partice Lumumba Uni-
versity comes back a dedicated Com-
munist, but there is an ideological tilt, '
just as there is for a student who goes
to the University of Illinois, or South-
ern Illinois University, or Indiana Uni-
versity. or the University of Colorado.
That is the kind of thing, w6 I ought to
be doing.
Our troop involvement in Honduras.
What we are doing there, in my opin-
ion, is destabilizing what is probably,.
the best government that Honduras
has ever. had. I would suggest we seem
to learn the lessons of history slowly.
Libya had a government that was
not, unfortunately, a good govern-
ment, but we had a U.S. base there
and some military leaders and others
were able to say, "This.government is
a puppet of the United States." And a
young colonel by the name of Qadhafi
and some others overthrew the gov-
ernment. It is probable that Colonel
Qadhafi would not be in charge in
Libya today had there not been a U.S.
military base there. I think our pres-
ence in Honduras, rather than stabiliz-
ing Central America, is a destabilizing
factor.
Finally, Mr. President, I am for this
amendment because I hear not a domi-
nant voice around here but an occa-
sional voice-I have heard this from
someone in the administration. I have
heard it from a Member of Congress-
saying, "You know, what we ought to
do is invade Nicaragua."
I want to quiet that kind of talk
quickly, firmly, and without any ques-
tion whatsoever. If there is anyone in
responsible position in this administa-
tion who wants to seriously consider
that, I am going to do everything I
possibily can to help prevent it. It is
not the direction that we ought to go.
The Hart amendment-and I urge
my colleagues, those 'who hear my
voice on their radios in the office as
well as those who are on the floor, to
read the Hart amendment, not the
synopsis of it-is a balanced amend-
ment that I think represents the view
of the majority of the Members of the
Senate. Now, whether the vote is
going to reflect that, I do not know,
but if the Members of the' Senate read
the Hart amendment I think they are
going to vote for it. I commend my col-
league from Colorado for his amend-
ment. It says what we ought to be
doing. It suggests that diplomatic ini-
tiatives ought to be the direction. And
just in general, to reemphasize, we
ought to be low-keying it in Central
America.
Mr. President, if I may use just one
other illustration. I remember after
President Reagan had his first press
conference on Central America, I was
on a call-in radio program at WGN in
Chicago. They also had the Managua
correspondent for Newsweek on the
radio. I said, "What does troop in-
volvement, our aid to the Contras, our
naval flotilla do as far as the Sandinis-
tas are concerned? Does it strengthen
them or weaken them?" And she said,
"Oh, it strengthens them because
Uncle Sam is viewed as a bully who is
trying to dominate Nicaraguan poli-
cies." And I said, "That is exactly
what I thought."
I am not in love with the Sandinis-
tas. They are not Boy Scouts. But let
dune 6, 1985
us adopt policies that pull Central
America in a positive direction. Let us.
not be the big bully. Let us not do
things that just hand the Soviets and
Marxists and others the kinds of
issues that I think, day after day, we
seem to be handing them.
I am pleased to support the Senator
from Colorado. I yield back my time to
him.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Illinois for his very
perceptive remarks. They got beyond
the scope of the amendment to de-
scribe what our policy in the region
ought to be, something that the Sena.
for from Colorado had not attempted
to do. but I fully agree with the thrust
of the idea the Senator from Illinois
has put forward as to what a progres-
sive policy for the United States ought
to be in that region.
If I may respond briefly to com-
ments made by our friend and col-
league, the distinguished floor manag-
er and chairman of the committee, if I
understand his remarks and criticism,
they amount to this. First of all, this
amendment would, in his words, signi-
fy a weakened U.S. commitment in the
region.
Mr. President, I hope the day will
come, not too far in the future, where
strength has a broader definition than
mere military power. I know the Sena-
tor from Indiana, being a thoughtful
and perceptive ' person, does believe
that strength should be defined in
broader terms. But by arguing the way
he did, he implies that the strength of
America is derived simply from mili-
tary power-and military presence.
We all know from studying human
nature and human events that quite
often the strongest individual or the
strongest nation is the one that is so
confident in and of itself in its cause
and principles and values that it does
not need to demonstrate that strength
through constant military presence or
force.
I hope we do not let ourselves get
into this kind of one-dimensional, ideo-
logical, polarizing syllogism which
says, "If you are for strength, you are
for military presence and intervention;
if you are not for military presence
and intervention, then you are for
weakness."
Now, unfortunately, American poli-
tics in the 1970's and 1980's fell into
that trap too often: It certainly does
not elevate the level of dialog and
debate or challenge the intelligence of
the American voter. But the fact is we
can be much stronger in Central
America, a region of vital importance
to this Nation. without increased
American military presence. Let us
give some thought to what strength is.
Let us not let ourselves-and certainly
not someone as intelligent and multi-
dimensional as the chairman of the
committee-get into this business of,
"Well, if we want to be strong, let's
put our troops in. And if we take our
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
troops out, then we are necessarily
weak."
That is, I think the chairman of the
committee would admit, a much too
oversimplified definition of strength.
Strength is defined by whether we are
able and willing to protect and pro-
mote our vital interests in every possi-
ble way, not one way but every possi-
ble way.
He said, further,. that this amend-
ment would weaken the ability of Hon-
duras or a neighboring nation to repel
an attack. This, of course, presumes
that an attack is imminent or that it is
even possible, evidence of which has
yet to be presented to the Senate of
the United States or the American
people.
However, if the President of the
United States-or his Cabinet, the Sec-
retary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, or the national security appara-
tus of this Nation-concludes that an
attack is possible, is likely, is immi-
nent, then, of course, it is his duty to
inform the Members of Congress of
that possibility and to seek our sup-
port and our cooperation in preparing
a neighboring nation to repel that
attack.
I suppose that, in theory, the Sandi-
nistas could prepare an all-out attack
on Honduras or somewhere else over-
night-massive tanks, troop carriers,
artillery, infantry, and everything else
they have-and, 1o and. behold, the
President might be awakened in the
middle of the night by a call:
"Mr. President, this is Bill Casey
calling. The Nicaraguans have just
moved en masse across the Honduran
border."
The first thing he should do when
that happens is fire Bill Casey. We are
not spending billions of dollars, I
hope, on an intelligence organization
that could not find out that those
plans were underway.
Nevertheless, this amendment pro-
vides more than ample opportunity for
the President and the national securi-
ty apparatus to consult Congress and
seek, very quickly, our concurrence in
increasing our military presence in
this region-it is not halfway around
the world; it is within short flight
time-to help the Hondurans to repel
an attack.
Finally, as I understand the Sena-
tor's arguments, he has said that this
amendment would not increase stabili-
ty. Mr. President, I have been to Hon-
duras-not in the last few months but
in the last couple of years, as many
Members of the Senate have-and an
argument can be made, as the Senator
from Illinois has made, that increased.
military presence by the United States
in that countr:-? is not stabilizing.
Mr. President, the. Senator from Col-
orado has met with the political oppo-
sition in Honduras-they are Demo-
crats, they are nationalists and patri-
ots who happen not to agree with the
government in power-and they have
said to the Senator from California
that increased American military pres-
ence is making their nation less stable
rather than more stable, for many of
the reasons the Senator from Illinois
has just stated.
So, whether the argument about a
weakened commitment goes to the
ability of the United States to help
the Hondurans repel an attack, or it
goes to the question of whether it does
or does not help create stability in the
region, I hope that our colleagues in
the Senate will reject those argu-
ments.
This amendment is designed, more
than anything else, to bring Congress,
in a timely way, into decisions that
may affect the livelihood, the safety,
and the survival of young Americans
who might otherwise be called upon,
without that involvement, to enter
into 'an unnecessary and unwise mili-
tary adventure.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the comments of the distin-
guished Senator from Colorado as he
has discussed his thoughtful amend-
ment. I also appreciate the statement
of the Senator from Illinois.
Let me respond briefly by saying
that I suspect that no Senator who
has been involved in the debate would
equate strength entirely as military
strength. In fact, military strength
might be a very small part of the
strength of our country, in the image
we present and the way we conduct
ourselves.
Our efforts in Central America have
been to try to provide democratic insti-
tutions, stronger economies, a thrust
toward a concept of civil rights and
human rights that would grow. Our
strength clearly lies in the image we
have and in the activities we have
fashioned to show the strength-of our
own constitutional principles, and
where these can be adopted, to try to
encourage them to be adopted.-
I think the other side of the coin,
however, is that strength does not pre-
clude military strength. One can argue
how the balance is perceived. Both the
Senator from Illinois and the Senator
from Colorado have argued that our
presence in Central America, in the
Western Hemisphere, has been inter-
preted as a bullying presence in a way
that not only destabilized situations,
but also brought enemies for our coun-
try.
However, the present amendment, as
I perceive it, is one in which we are ar-
guing about who should manage mili-
tary exercises in Central America. The
thought of the Senator from Colorado
is that prior to military exercises,
which are conducted extensively-the
three Big Pine operations in Honduras
have been mentioned specifically-
Congress should push those along by
an affirmative gesture.
It has been argued, further, I be-
lieve, that the Senators, in proposing
this amendment and supporting it, be-
lieve that the sheer numbers of per-
sons we have had in Honduras may
have led to dangers to our forces or
dangers to our friends in Honduras.
S 7615
That, I think, is arguable. My own
general assumption is that the Hon-
durans wanted our presence. There
have been negotiations from time to
time as to how extensive they wanted
it and what quid pro quo was required
in addition. Those complexities are im-
portant; and if we were discussing the
advisability of any one exercise, it is
arguable both ways.
I fail to see that our foreign policy is
going to be enhanced by taking away
from the President of the United
States and his administration the abil-
ity to train troops in Central America,
provided that we do so in conjunction
with friendly countries, and provided,
of course, that they want us there, and
in my judgment they do. It has not
been a situation of bullying or a situa-
tion in which we have prevailed
through our own strength. As a matter
of fact, we have lent our strength to
our Honduran friends and perhaps to
others.
Finally, I suggest that one of the dif-
ficulties, in a practical sense, about
precluding our exercises-and this is
the reason I made an argument for
stability-is that the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment currently, with a "revolution-
without-borders" concept, with the de-
stabilizing efforts made by that gov-
ernment toward neighboring nations,
is, unhappily, the sort of government
that does have an element of surprise,
an element of covert activity, an ele-
ment of subversion.
I am suggesting that the very pres-
ence of American troops in Honduras,
for example, by invitation of the Hon-
duran Government and in conjunction
with a training mission with Honduran
forces, has at least led to a second
thought on the part of the Sandinista
government with regard to any activi-
ties that might be conducted toward
Honduras.
I think that is all to the good. I do
not know what the course of activity
of Nicaragua would have been other-
wise. I am simply saying that the
physical presence of our forces there
has precluded adventures that would
have been inadvisable, and I think
that is all to the good.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, if the
Senator will yield-I know that we
have some distinguished visitors-I
will respond very briefly.
It is not the intent of the sponsor of
this amendment to manage troop exer-
cises. It is not the intent of the spon-
sor of this amendment to preclude
troop exercises. It certainly is not the
intent of the sponsor of this amend-
ment to prevent the President from
taking actions that. are necessary to
defend and protect this country's in-
terests or those of our allies.
All this amendment says is that if
the President is convinced of the need
for an increased American military
presence in Central America and if
there is no emergency, then he must
come and convince Congress of that. It
simply involves Congress in any deci-
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S 7616 CONGRESSIONAL' RECORD -'SENATE
sion to increase our military presence
in the region, absent an emergency.
I believe that, given any clear read-
ing of the history of the Constitution,
that is what our responsibility and
role are designed to be.
If the President cannot convince the
majority Members of the Congress
that we ought to.have more troops in
Central America then we probably
should not have more troops there.
VISIT TO THE SENATE BY A
GROUP OF BRITISH-AMERICAN
PARLIAMENTARIANS
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Indiana asks the 'Chair to
recognize the distinguished Senator
from South Dakota for an introduc-
tion of a distinguished delegation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I am
proud to introduce to the Senate a dis-
tinguished visiting group of parliamen-
tarians from Great Britain, the Brit-
ish-American parliamentarian group.
They are headed by Mr. Joplin. There
are three parties represented here.
They are visiting the United States
and they. are here to get the wisdom of
the U.S. enate.
I am honored topresent them to the
Senate.
[Applause.]
RECESS
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
stand in recess for 3 minutes for a
greeting by Senators of the delegation.
There being no objection, the
Senate, at 3:50 p.m., recessed until 3:53
p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassem-
bled when call to order by the Presid-
ing Officer [Mr. CHAFES].
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORI-
ZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS
1986 AND 1987
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (S. 1003).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I dis-
cussed the situation with the distin-
guished Senator from Colorado and we
both agreed that the debate may draw
to a close in the next few minutes for
our side. I would be pleased to yield
back all the time and I believe the
Senator from Colorado wishes to be
recognized for a closing statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Colorado.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished floor manager. I'
shall be brief, lest other Senators in
support of the amendment wish to be
heard. Then after 2 or 3 minutes of
concluding remarks, it will be my in-
tention to yield back the time of the
proponents. The Senator from Indiana
may want to reserve time in case the
Senator from Colorado turns unneces-
sarily provocative in the 2 or 3 min-
utes.
Mr. President, the intent of this
amendment is quite simple. It is to re-
quire the President of the United
States to seek the support of Members
of Congress before increasing the
American military- presence in Central
America. It does not preclude that in-
crease and it does not require a de-
crease. It merely says if it is a central
part of this Nation's `foreign policy in
this critical region to have increasing
permanent or semipermanent military
presence, then the President of the
United States should seek the endorse-
ment and support of Congress before
increasing that American military
presence.
It is an amendment born of concern
that the United States is increasingly
seeking only a military solution to a
complex web of problems in that area
of the world. It is admittedly born of
increasing concern by the Senator
from Colorado that the administration
or some elements of the administra-
tion might, in fact, seek the ultimate
military solution to this problem and
that is some sort of an invasion, pro-
voked or 'otherwise, by American
combat forces, without the consent or
approval of the Congress.
Mr. President, I think that policy
would be folly. It would be a policy the
Senator from Colorado would be pre-
pared to strongly oppose without more
evidence of its necessity to our nation-
al security.
But, Mr. President, it is the concern
of the offerer of this amendment that
Congress and the Senator from Colo-
rado would not even have the chance
to reflect our views before that action
were taken.
I hope, Mr. President, Members of
Congress do not vote against this
amendment and awaken some morning
unhappily to be notified that this
Nation is involved in combat against
Nicaragua.
I think that would be a sad day for
this country in terms of its constitu-
tional process, in terms of the preoga-
tives of Congress in declaring war and
in terms of the unnecessary loss of
young American lives.
Mr. 'President. I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The' PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. HART, Mr. President,- I yield
back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All
time having expired on the amend-
ment, the question is on agreeing to
the amendment of the Senator from
Colorado.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Colorado [Mr. ARM-
STRONG], the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON] and the Senator from
Wyoming [Mr. WALLOP] are necessari-
ly absent.
June 6, 1985
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Alabama
[Mr. DENTON] would vote "nay".
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from West Virginia [Mr.
ROCKEFELLER] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from West
Virginia [Mr. ROCKEFELLER] would
vote "nay."
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
QUAYLE). Are there any other Sena-
tors in the Chamber wishing to vote?
The result was announced-yeas 15,
nays 81, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 110 Leg.]
YEAS-15
Burdick
Inouye
Pell
Cranston
Kennedy
Proxmire
Harkin
Leahy
Sarbanes
Hart
Matsunaga
Simon
Hatfield
Metzenbaum
Weicker
Abdnor
Ford
McClure
Andrews
Garn
McConnell
Baucus
Glenn
Melcher
Bentsen
Goldwater
Mitchell
Biden
Gore
Moynihan
Bingaman
Gorton
Murkowski
Boren
Gramm
Nickles
Boschwitz
Grassley
Nunn
Bradley
Hatch
Packwood
Bumpers
Hawkins
Pressler
Byrd
Hecht
Pryor
Chafee
Heflin
Quayle
Chiles
Heinz
Riegle
Cochran
Helms
Roth
Cohen
Hollings
Rudman
D'Amato
Humphrey
Sasser
Danforth
Johnston
Simpson
DeConcini
Kassebaum
Specter
Dixon
Kasten
Stafford
Dodd
Kerry
Stennis
Dole '
Lautenberg
Stevens
Domenici
Laxalt
Symms
Durenberger
Levin
Thurmond
Eagleton
Long
Trible.
East '
Lugar
Warner
Evans
Mathias
Wilson
Exon
Mattingly
Zorinsky
NOT VOTING-4
Armstrong
Rockefeller
Denton
Wallop
So the amendment (No. 273) was re-
jected.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President. I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I move
to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the .table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
minority leader is recognized.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, may we
have order in the Chamber? '
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will please be in order.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thought
I might ask the distinguished majority
leader how he sees the program for
the rest of the day, how late we may
go, what the prospects are for finish-
ing this bill, keeping in mind tomor-
row depending on how the day goes,
and for Monday.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may
we have order so we might hear?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Mississippi is correct.
Will those Senators conducting con-
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June 6, 1985
CONGRESSIONAL-RECORD -. SENATE S 7617
versations please retire to the cloak-
rooms?
The Senate will be in order.
The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. I thank the Chair.
I would say first of all I have dis-
cussed with the chairman of the com-
mittee, Senator LUGAR, that we would
like to complete action on this bill to-
night. If we do not, we will complete
action on the bill tomorrow. That is
where we will start from. If we do
finish this evening, we would be in ses-
sion tomorrow but I can assure Mem-
bers that there would not be any mat-
ters requiring rollcall votes.
I am also advised by. the chairman
that once we get beyond the so-called
Contra amendments that it will move
fairly quickly. A number of amend-
ments will be accepted. There are
some that will require some debate,
and maybe a rollcall, but overall, we
will move rather quickly.
I am rather optimistic at 4:25,
though I may not be that optimistic at
6:25.
I would suggest to Senators who
have Contra amendments, and I know
they all have great merit, if we could
use less time we might be able to
finish the entire bill by 8:30 or 9
o'clock this evening, which would ac-
commodate a number of Senators on
each side who have official commit-
ments elsewhere tomorrow.
On Monday, if we did not finish this
bill, we would still be on the bill. But it
is my hope to take up the clean water
legislation.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished majority leader. I
have one further question, that being
what would be the business on tomor-
row which would cause the Senate to
come in but not require rollcall votes?
Mr. DOLE. A number of bills have
been reported by the Commerce Com-
mittee which we understand .have been
cleared on both sides. Obviously, if
they have not been cleared, we will not
try to address them. But there will be
no rollcall votes. I can assure that. If
something did develop, we would post-
pone action until Monday. I believe
they are allfrom the Commerce Com-
mittee. I can double check and give
the distinguished minority leader a list
of those we have in mind.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the distin-
guished majority leader.
Mr. President, if the distinguished
majority leader would accept one final
suggestion, when the Senate moves on
beyond the Biden and Nunn amend-
ments, I wonder if it might be possible
for Members to indicate their willing-
ness to limit time on the remaining
amendments.
Mr. DOLE. I would hope that would
be the case. The managers of the bill
might consult with Senators. I might
say I have one amendment and I am
prepared to yield all time back at the
appropriate time. I want to try to set a
pattern for others to follow. .1 have the
last amendment and I do not really be-
lieve I will need to offer it. Maybe the
managers between now and the next
vote can encourage others not to take
the full 60 minutes or 90 minutes,
whatever it is.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank
the majority leader. I thank the Chair
for getting order . and maintaining
order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the next
amendment in order is an amendment
to be offered by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Delaware.
AMENDMENT NO. 274
(Purpose: To establish. terms for TI.S. policy
toward Nicaragua)
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an
amendment to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN7
proposes an:amendment numbered 274.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further read-
ing of the amendment- be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
At the end of the bill, add the following
new title:
TITLE VI-U.S. POLICY TOWARD
NICARAGUA
PROHIBITION ON MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY
AID
SEC. 601. The prohibitions contained in
section 8066 of Public Law 98-473 and in
section 801 of Public Law 98-618 shall
remain in full force and effect with respect
to all material, financial and training assist-
ance: Provided, however, that the assistance
authorized by section 602 shall be permit-
ted. -
AID TO NICARAGUANS CONSTITUTING A
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
SEC. 602. (a) During fiscal year-1985, not
more than'$14,000,000 may be expended for
the provision of food, clothing, medicine
and other humanitarian assistance to resist-
ance forces which are- opposed to the
present Government in Nicaragua: Provid-
ed, however, That-
. (1.) such assistance is provided in a manner
such that the nature and extent of such as-
sistance is independently monitored;
(2) the United States resumes bilateral ne-
gotiations with the Government of Nicara-
gua: and
(3) the Government of Nicaragua and re-
sistance forces which are opposed to the
Government of Nicaragua each agree to in-
stitute a cease fire.
(b) In the event the Government of Nica-
ragua refuses to enter into a mutual cease
fire. as described in subsection (a)(3), or to
resume bilateral negotiations with the
United States as described in subsection
(a)(2), the humanitarian assistance author-
ized by this section may be provided.
(c) In the event a mutual cease fire de-
scribed in this section is seriously or sub-
stantially violated by resistance forces op-
posed to the Government of Nicaragua, no
humanitarian assistance authorized by this
section may thereafter.be provided: Provid-
ed, however, That if the Government of
Nicaragua has earlier, and seriously or sub-
stantially, violated such cease fire, this pro-
hibition shall not apply.
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSISTANCE
SEC. 603. (a) The $14,000,000 described in
section 602 may be provided only-
(a) by the Department of State;
(b) from funds previously appropriated to
the Department of State; and
(c) upon a determination by the Secretary
of State that the assistance is necessary to
meet the humanitarian needs of resistance
forces opposing the Government of Nicara-
gua.
FORM OF ASSISTANCE
SEC. 604. The assistance described in sec-
tion 602 may be provided only in the form
of goods and services, and no direct or indi-
rect financial assistance may be provided.
PROHIBITION ON OTHER ASSISTANCE
SEC. 605. No assistance may be provided by
the United States to resistance forces op-
posed to the Government of Nicaragua
except as authorized and for the purpose
described in section 602, and no funds may
be used to provide the assistance authorized
in section 602 except as provided in section
603.
SUPPORT FOR CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS
SEC. 606. (a) It is the sense of the Congress
that the United States should encourage
and support the efforts of the Contadora
nations (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and
Venezuela) to negotiate and conclude an
agreement based upon the Contadora Docu-
ment of Objectives of September 9, 1983.
(b) In the event that less than $14,000,000
is expended for the humanitarian assistance
authorized in section 602, the remainder of
such amount and any necessary additional
funds may be made available for payment to
the Contadora nations for expenses arising
from implementation of the agreement de-
scribed in this section including peacekeep-
ing, verification, and monitoring systems:
Provided, however, That in the event,
$14,000,000 is expended for the humanitari-
an assistance authorized by section 602.
other funds may be made available for pay-
ment of such expenses. Any funds made
available for the purpose described in this
subsection may be provided from funds pre-
viously appropriated to the Department' of
State.
PRESIDENTIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
SEC. 607. The President shall submit a
report to the Congress every 90 days on any
activity carried out under this title. Such
report shall include a report on the progress
of efforts to reach a.negotiated settlement
as set forth in section 602 and 606, a de-
tailed accounting of the disbursement of hu-
manitarian assistance, and steps taken by
the democratic resistance toward the objec-
tives described in section 611.
SUSPENSION OF EMBARGO AGAINST NICARAGUA
SEC. 608. The national emergency declared
in the President's executive order of May 1.
1985, prohibiting trade and certain other
transactions involving Nicaragua, shall be
terminated, and the prohibitions contained
in that executive order shall be suspended,
if the Government of Nicaragua enters into
a cease-fire and negotiations with opposi-
tion forces.
UNITED STATES MILITARY MANEUVERS NEAR
NICARAGUA
SEC. 609. It is the sense of Congress that
the President should order a suspension of
U.S. military maneuvers in Honduras and
off Nicaragua's coast if the Government of
Nicaragua agrees to a cease fire, to open a
dialogue with the democractic resistance,
and to suspend the state of emergency.
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S 7618 I CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
FUTURE LOGISTICAL AID TO NICARAGUANS
CONSTITUTING A DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
SEC. 610. The President may request the
Congress to authorize additional logistical
assistance for resistance forces opposed to
the Government of Nicaragua, in such
amount and of such a nature as he deems
appropriate, including economic sanctions
with respect to the Government of Nicara-
gua, in the event that-
(a) the Government of Nicaragua refuses
to resume the bilateral negotiations with
the United States, as described in section
602; or
(b) following an agreement between the
Government of Nicaragua and the United
States to resume the bilateral negotiations
which are described in section 602, the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua refuses to enter into
a mutual cease fire, as described in section
602. A request submitted to the Congress
under this section shall be handled by the
Congress under the provisions of section
612.
PRECONDITION FOR FUTURE AID TO NICARA-
GUANS CONSTITUTING A DEMOCRATIC OPPOSI-
TION
SEC. 611. (a) Congress finds that United
States assistance to a Nicaraguan democrat-
ic opposition can be justified, and can be ef-
fective, only if such opposition truly repre-
sents democratic and humanitarian values.
(b) Therefore, Congress shall consider fur-
ther assistance to the democratic opposition
only if such opposition has eliminated from
its ranks all persons who have engaged in
abuses of human rights.
(c) The President shall submit any future
request for assistance for opposition forces
only in accompaniment with a detailed cer-
tification, which shall be subject to congres-
sional hearings, that the opposition has in
fact effectively to eliminate from its ranks
all persons who have engaged in violations
of human rights.
EXPEDITED PROCEDURE FOR FUTURE AID
REQUESTS
SEC. 612. (a) A "joint resolution which is in-
troduced within three calendar days after
the Congress receives a Presidential request
described in section 610 and which, if en-
acted, would grant the President the au-
thority to take any or all of the actions de-
scribed in such section, shall be considered
in accordance with procedures contained in
section 8066 of Public Law 98-473: Provided,
however, That-
(i) references in that section to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of each House
shall be deemed to be references to the ap-
propriate committee or committees of each
House; and
(ii) amendments to the joint resolution
are in order.
(b) This section is enacted by Congress as
an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
Senate and House of Representatives, re-
spectively, and as such it is deemed a part of
the rules of each House, respectively, but
applicable only with respect to the proce-
dure to be followed in that House in the
case of a resolution described in subsection
(a), and it supercedes other rules only to the
extent that it is inconsistent with such
rules.
(c) With full recognition of the constitu-
tional right of either House to change the
rules (so far as relating to the procedure of
that House) at any time, in the same
manner and to the same extent as in the
case of any other rule of that House.
FUTURE AID TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA
SEC. 613. (a) If the Congress determines
that progress is being made toward peace
and development of democratic institutions
in Nicaragua, Congress will consider initiat-
ing a number of economic and development
programs, including but not limited to-
(1) trade concessions;
(2) Peace Corps.programs;
(3) technical assistance;
(4) health services; and
(5) agricultural and industrial develop-
ment.
(b) In assessing whether progress is being
made toward achieving these goals, Con-
gress will expect, within the context of a re-
gional settlement-
(1) the removal of foreign 'military advis-
ers from Nicaragua;
(2) the end to Sandinista support for-in-
surgencies in other countries in the region,
including the cessation of military supplies
to rebel forces fighting the democratically-
elected government in El Salvador;
(3) restoration of individual liberties, po-
litical expression, freedom of worship, and
independence of the media; and
(4) progress toward internal reconciliation
and a pluralistic democratic system.
NICARAGUA: THE PRESIDENT PRESENTS A
HOBSON'S CHOICE
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, late in
the 17th century, a Englishman
named Thomas Hobson adopted a
rigid, rather inhospitable practice in
the operation of his riding stable near
Cambridge. To students from the
nearby university who came to rent a
horse, Mr. Hobson offered a simple
choice: take the one nearest the stable
door, or none at all.
Today, as we renew discussion of
American policy toward Nicaragua, we
unfortunately are presented a choice
no better than that offered by the
metaphorically famous Mr. Hobson.
But just as there was only one stable
near Cambridge, we have only one
American foreign policy. Consequent-
ly, we must deal with the choice we
? face.
The essential issue before us is
whether, and on what conditions, to
aid the Nicaraguan resistance-the
Contras. I deplore the circumstances
under which we are forced to deal
with this issue because I think that
the administration has failed in an im-
portant responsibility, which is to ex-,
haust all avenues of diplomacy before
shifting to a policy that emphasizes
military force. By its denigration of
the Contadora process, by its apparent
willingness to supply aid to any and all
elements opposed to the Sandinista
regime, and by its hastily imposed em-
bargo, the administration has man-
aged to generate for Mr. Ortega an
international sympathy which his gov-
ernment could never have earned for
itself.
We thus find a situation involving
three flawed players: a Sandinista
regime which shows little disposition
to fullfill the promise. of the Nicara-
guan revolution, a resistance which in-
cludes some truly democratic leaders
but also a number of unsavory figures
responsible for unjustifiable behavior,
and an ideological administration
which appears to be spoiling for a
fight as the only satisfactory solution:
To return to the metaphor of Mr.
Hobson, some would argue that we
should walk away-that because we
June 6, 1985
are offered no attractive choice, we
should have nothing to do with the
situation. But as emotionally satisfy-
ing and politically popular as that
might be, I cannot judge it to be the
responsible course. Nor, however, do I
think we should simply accept the
horse offered by Mr. Hobson-in this
case, Mr. Reagan. Instead, I think we
must impress upon him the need for a
better horse-a better, more balanced
approach-and that is the purpose of
the amendment I wish to offer today.
A BALANCED APPROACH
The amendment I offer is a modifi-
cation of the proposal-concerning so-
called humanitarian assistance to the
Contras-made by my, party during ne-
gotiations with the White House on
this issue several weeks ago. Those
terms were embodied in a resolution
[S.J. Res. 120] introduced by the
Democratic leader. The principal
modifications I have made are to place
strict conditions on any future U.S. aid
to the Nicaraguan resistance and to
add certain elements. of inducement,
including a possible suspension of the
U.S. embargo, should the Sandinistas
wish to adopt a more cooperative atti-
tude toward negotiation with the Nica-
raguan opposition. I shall summarize
briefly the provisions of this amend-
ment:
CURRENT AID TO THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
First, the amendment contains pro-
visions relating to current aid to the
Nicaraguan opposition. It does so by
maintaining in law the Boland amend-
ment, prohibiting military or paramili-
tary assistance, while providing $14
million in so-called humanitarian as-
sistance. I note, Mr. President, that
some of my colleagues have expressed
concern about closing loopholes which
might allow some of this money to aid
the Contras militarily. I must say that
I find any such concern to be misfo-
cused. The fact is that this aid will
ipso facto. help the Contras militarily
because it will help them economical-
ly; it is as simple as that, so let us
speak candidly. We are providing this
aid in the form of so-called humanitar-
ian assistance because we wish, at this
time, to confer on the Nicaraguan re-
sistance some measure of legitimacy
and practical assistance without af-
firming the political and moral com-
mitment entailed by overt military
support. Accordingly, my amendment
requires that the aid be distributed by
the State Department from State De-
partment funds, in order to minimize
the dangers arising from the presence
and involvement of U.S. military or
CIA personnel in the field.
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
Second, in addition, the amendment
seeks to promote negotiations by con-
ditioning the availability of this aid on
the demonstrated willingness of the
administration and of the Contras to
enter into talks with the Nicaraguan
Government; and urging full U.S. sup-
port for the Contadora process, to
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
which the administration has accorded
far too little support heretofore, while
authorizing the expenditure of State
Department funds to support the im-
plementation of any agreement
reached through that process. -
INDUCEMENTS TO THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT
Third, and relatedly, the amend-
ment offers to the Sandinista govern-
ment certain inducements to negotia-
tion by providing for a suspension of
the U.S. economic embargo if the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua enters into a
ceasefire and negotiations with opposi-
tion forces; declaring, as does the
Nunn resolution, that the President
should suspend military maneuvers
near Nicaragua if the Sandinista gov-,
ernment agrees to a cease-fire, talks
with the opposition, and an end to the
country's declared state of emergency;
and setting forth, as does the Hamil-
ton resolution in the House, certain
conditions under which Congress
would consider establishing programs
of assistance to the Nicaraguan nation.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUTURE AID TO THE
NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
Finally, and of central importance,
the amendment declares that, beyond
the funds authorized in this bill, Con-
gress shall consider further aid to the
Nicaraguan opposition only if the op-
position has acted effectively to
remove from its ranks 'those persons
who have engaged in serious abuses of
human rights. An associated and cru-
cial provision is that the President
shall be required to submit, in con-
junction with any future request for
further economic or military aid for
the Nicaraguan opposition, a detailed
certification that such house cleaning
has in fact occurred. I should under-
score that any such certification would
be subject to Congressional secutiny in
the course of hearings on the Presi-
dent's request for further aid.
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. AID TO THE CONTRAS
Mr. President, Nicaragua has al-
ready been subject to .prolonged
debate in this body. But I do judge
that certain observations are in order
concerning the implications of U.S. aid
to the Contras, which many draw as a
moral issue in terms of black and
white, but which I must confess to
finding a complex foreign policy issue
suffused only by shades of gray.
LEGITIMACY OF U.S. AID
As to whether it is legitimate for us
to aid a Nicaraguan opposition, I
simply do not find it persuasive to
argue that such action is intrinsically
improper. The Sandinistas themselves
received ample international assist-
ance in overthrowing Somoza, and few
observers-no matter how high
minded-found fault with that. More-
over, the Sandinistas themselves have
declared that their own ideology
impels them to provide assistance to
other revolutions, as they have indeed
done. So unless one is an advocate of
the Brezhnev doctrine that all Com-
munist revolutions must be regarded
as irreversible, the providing of Ameri-
can aid to the Nicaraguan opposition
is hardly a violation of sacrosanct
international principal. I believe the
essential criterion-and it is a practical
one-is whether what we do will
employ reasonable means to produce a
desirable result.
IMPLIED COMMITMENT
As to whether my amendment com-
mits the United States to further sup-
port for the Contras, the answer is
that it does not; it leaves-that question
fully open for the time being. What it
does do, however, is express that the
United States ascribes political legiti-
macy to the concept of a Nicaraguan
democratic opposition. Simultaneous-
ly, however, the amendment estab-
lishes a framework -which will divorce
us from the opposition if it does not
complete its evolution from being a
symbol of the worst of Nicaragua's
past to being the repository of the
best hope for Nicaragua's future. If
the diplomatic efforts encouraged by
this amendment fail, Congress will in
the future face a tough choice on, the
issue of further economic and/or mili-
tary aid. But that question is not prej-
udiced by our action now in providing
an increment of economic aid while
putting the military approach, as Sen-
ator NUNN has put it, on the back
burner. The question of future aid
would be prejudiced only if we failed
to keep the option open.
U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
Finally, and of fundamental impor-
tance, we face the question as to
whether we are paving the way for U.S
military involvement, a specter repeat-
edly invoked and, in veiw of this ad-
ministration's apparent propensities,
worth considering with great care.
Some argue that any support at all for
the Contras is, for the United States, a
step on the road to war. But it can, I
believe, be argued with comparable
force that a hands off policy would be
equally, if not more, likely to lead to
war-by inviting Soviet and Nicara-
guan advanturism and by allowing fur-
ther polarization and instability in
Central America. In considering any
further aid to the Contras-particular-
ly military aid-we will have to weigh
carefully the measure of our implied
or explicit commitment to them. But
it is a dangerous and perverse oversim-
plification to argue that the only way
to avoid war is to dissociate ourselves
from supporting those who represent
democratic values. The key test, as my
amendment emphasizes, is whether
the Nicaraguan opposition truly repre-
sents such values. If it does not, it
cannot represent a sound option for
American policy.
CONGRESSIONAL MEDDLING
The imperative that American for-
eign policy reflect a real concern for
human rights brings me to a final
matter: The recurrent charge that
Congress, moved by a foolish or timid
idealism, is meddling in the policymak-
ing process and thereby tying the
President's' hands. These are familiar
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themes. But to refute this charge, one
need look no further than our recent
policy toward El Salvador.
At the outset of President Reagan's
first term, the alarm bells sounded and
we were told that the Communist in-
surgency in El Salvador must be com-
bated at all costs. Those in Congress
who criticized a policy that would
have blindly supported the brutalities
of the Salvadoran right were described
as victims of the Veitnam syndrome.
But congressional pressure continued
nonetheless. The result was a tortuous.
policymaking process and a hybrid
policy-a policy that nobody had in-
tended and few liked. Yet that policy
appears to have worked-by blending
the administration's emphasis on mili-
tary aid with congressional emphasis
on the practical reality that popular
support in a civil war cannot be won
by death squads, which serve only to
feed guerrilla strength.
The turning point came in 1983. El
Salvador's Communist guerrillas had
hoped that congressional pressure
would result in a cutoff of U.S. aid to
the Salvadoran Government. Instead,
they found themselves confronting a
balanced American policy that contin-
ued military and economic aid, while
placing heavy pressure on the Salva-
doran Government to clamp down on
the rightwing death squads, to over-
haul the armed forces, and to continue
the process of domestic reform. In
sum, the administration had finally
accepted that public support-here
and among the Salvadoran people-de-
pended upon curbing the abuses of the
Salvadoran right. The result was a
constructive policy-shaped by con-
gressional meddling-that has contrib-
uted to the encouraging, though obvi-
ously still tenuous, progress in El Sal-
vador that we see today:
CONCLUSION
While any analogy between El Salva-
dor and Nicaragua is imperfect, two
principles clearly apply to both. The
first is that an American policy which
supports the use of force must attend
carefully to the purposes and means
which govern its use. The second is
that, in civil conflict, the outcome
must finally be determined by those
directly involved; for the United
States to seek, or drift into, a central
role is to ensure failure.
Mr. President, Mr. Hobson has not
been easy with us on the subject of
Nicaragua. Here, as on several other
issues, he appears to be working hand
in hand with Mr. Reagan. But I be-
lieve that through this amendment we
can obtain something better than the
choice between no horse at all and ad-
ministration's armored and blindered
war horse. We can obtain balance-by
placing due emphasis on negotiations
and by infusing our policy with an es-
sential concern for democratic values
and human rights.
I urge adoption of the amendment.
Mr. President, before I yield the
floor, I ask unanimous consent that
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s 7620 CONGRESSIONAL: RECORD.- SENATE
Senators BRADLEY, SASSER, and GORE
he added as cosponsors to this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.-
Mr. COHEN and Mr. SASSER ad-
dressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senators from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I want
to take this opportunity to commend
my colleague. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time to the Senator from
Maine?
Mr. LUGAR. I will be pleased to
yield time.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator from
Delaware yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time to the Senator from
Maine?
Mr. BIDEN. How much time does
the Senator have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twelve
minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the
Senator from Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Maine is recognized for 2
minutes.
Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator
for yielding. I want to commend the
Senator from Delaware for trying to
strike a balance between the polar ex-
tremes, between no aid at all, as some
have advocated, or unlimited aid as
some would like. I believe it has been
apparent that we cannot build a for-
eign policy on partisan planks or pos-
turing. I think the Senator from Dela-
ware has offered at least one option to
avoiding this partisan wrangling we
have had for the past several years on
what to do about Nicaragua.
I have another question I should like
to pose to the Senator from Delaware,
however, One of the attractive fea-
tures I find in the Lugar-Nunn amend-
ment is that it seeks to avoid bringing
this subject to the floor time after
time but, rather, have some sense of
continuity and time to develop and
evolve this policy. I notice that the
Senator from Delaware, I' believe, has
offered funding for 1 year only and
that the Lugar-Nunn proposal is for 2
years or through 1986. I was wonder-
ing whether or not the Senator from
Delaware would consider an amend-
ment which would extend that time
frame to grant a little more time for
continuity and not force it back upon
the Congress again in a very short
period of time?
Mr. BIDEN. I think the case that
the Senator makes is a valid one. I am
somewhat ambivalent about it. The
Senator probably does not have the
amendment in front of him, but the
first section, section 602(a), says,
"During fiscal year 1985 not more
than 15 million," et cetera.
I would, depending on the attitude
of my cosponsors, with whom I would
like to take time to check, be willing to
suggest that during the fiscal year
1985 and again during fiscal year 1986
not more than-in other words, adding
1986 because it does not' seem to do vi-
olence to what my approach is because
the conditions still must be met in
each of those years. I would be willing
to do that, but I ask the Senator if he
would withhold making a formal re-
quest and give me an opportunity to
consult with my cosponsors.
Mr. COHEN. I will certainly with-
hold that request and await any judg-
ment the Senator might have.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield time to the Sena-
tor from Tennessee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Tennessee is recognized.
Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished Senator from Dela-
ware.
Mr. President, 15 months ago, when
I visited Honduras, I found the
Reagan administration had been con-
ducting what amounted to a secret
military buildup in that region of the
world.
Since coming to office, the adminis-
tration has been engaged in a Central
American policy that has left open few
options except military solutions.
The administration has failed to ag-
gressively seek diplomatic solutions to
the Central American crisis. Indeed, in
the past months we have witnessed
the erosion of diplomatic alternatives.
Early last year when I visited the
region, it appeared the Sandinista
Government of Nicaragua was en-
gaged in what amounted to only a de-
fensive military buildup to repel the
Contra invaders. Furthermore, it ap-
peared the Government of Nicaragua
could be persuaded to permit free elec-
tions and engage in talks on the legiti-
mate security issues of the region.
In the past months, however, the
world has witnessed a continual mili-
tary buildup of men and equipment in
Nicaragua which some believe exceeds
the requirements of solely a defensive
posture. Likewise, those efforts which
have been made to enter into negotia-
tions, for whatever reason, have failed
to produce results.
Except for brief moments of public
.relations theater when the Sandinistas
embraced a draft Contadora treaty
and the Reagan administration agreed
to bilateral talks in Manzanillo, the re-
ality of the situation is that all sides
have dug in their heels,. hardened
their positions, and cut away much of
the middle ground.
Today, we see a Sandinista govern-
ment determined to hold and consoli-
date power at any cost-even if that
cost is the bankruptcy of its nation,
the repudiation of its officially- pro-
claimed nonaligned foreign policy, and
the potential invasion by foreign
armies.
Today, we also see the Reagan ad-
ministration determined to prevent
the consolidation of that Sandinista
power, even if such a policy weakens
our standing in the world community,
divides our country, and leads to a
direct U.S. military intervention.
June 6, 1985
So, that is where we are today, Mr.
President. There is little middle
ground left. Someone-the Sandinis-
tas, the Contras, or the United
States-has to compromise, or there is
going to be a war in Central America,
and the blood of thousands of Ameri-
cans and Nicaraguans will be spilled.
Now, we could argue on this floor
forever about the history of the'con-
flict in Nicaragua. It is clear the
United States has a dismal history in
Central America. And our recent his-
tory is completely in character with
our past.
It is also clear that administration
policy toward Nicaragua has failed.
Indeed, it has not achieved any of the
President's stated goals: The Sandinis-
tas today are stronger, more pro-
Soviet, and more determined to hold
power than ever.
But, the failure of administration
policy to date, unfortunately, cannot
be changed. Who is at fault for the
crisis in the region is no longer the
central question.
The simple fact of life is: There is a
crisis. The Sandinistas, for whatever
reason-either in response to adminis-
tration pressure or by their own
design-have turned increasingly
toward the Soviet bloc for military aid
and assistance.
And as the Sandinistas grow deeper
in debt to the Soviet Union, United
States security interests in the region
begin to take on a new context.
Mr. President, I have consistently
opposed funding for the covert Contra
war, directed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. That approach has
been demonstrated to be, not only in-
effective, but also -morally deficient
for a great country such as the United
States. Furthermore, it is abundantly
clear that the Contras cannot, alone,
bring about change inside Nicaragua.
The best hope for change and recon-
ciliation remains the Contadora peace
process. The United States cannot dic-
tate a lasting settlement to the region-
al conflict. That can only be achieved
by the nations most' affected, the
Latin American countries themselves.
Yet, the United States must be seen
as promoting that process if Contadors
still has a chance to succeed.
Some amendments being offered to
this bill appear to achieve that goal.
But the time has come when we must
do more than merely endorse the Con-
tadora peace process. We cannot pro-
vide a carrot without a stick. History
has taught us that neither the stick
nor the carrot, alone, is sufficient to
achieve progress toward a negotiated
settlement in the region.
Other amendments appear to pro-
vide substantially only a stick. And if
we repeal the Boiand amendment pro-
vision, it is likely to result in an even
deeper involvement of the Central In-
telligence Agency in the prosecution
of the Contra war. So, I cannot sup-
port amendments. which could return
this Nation to a policy which was
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
found deficient over a year ago. Such
amendments risk an every growing
military involvement of the United
States.
But, Mr. President, it has become
clear that this Nation must adopt a
new policy toward Nicaragua. We must
adopt a policy which includes both a
.carrot and a stick.
Mr. President, last year it appeared
the Sandinistas were being persuaded
to begin to enter negotiations in good
faith. That no longer appears to be
the case, at least for now. For after
the Congress turned down further
military assistance to the Contras,
President Ortega immediately went to
Moscow to negotiate instead with
Soviet leaders.
Certainly, a case can be made that it
is the policies of the Reagan adminis-
tration which have pushed the Sandi-
nistas toward the Soviets. That may
be true. But, President Ortega had a
choice. Instead of immediately going
to. Moscow, he could have seized the
moment to probe opportunities for
reinstituting a dialog with the United
States and the opposition within his
own country.
Mr. President, I will vote for the
Biden amendment today. And my vote
should be interpreted as more than just
a protest vote against the Ortega trip.
I am voting for this amendment be-
cause it offers a new- approach to
American policy in Nicaragua. The
Biden amendment provides an oppor-
tunity to promote a, new nonmilitary
solution to ending the crisis. First, it
endorses the Contadora peace process.
But it takes even more concrete steps
which can reduce the tension in the
region. Most importantly, it offers the
opportunity for the United States to
pull back from the military abyss in
Central America. Yet, by providing
nonmilitary aid to the Contras, it
maintains the option to renew military
pressure should efforts to achieve a
cease-fire and new negotiations fail.
Therefore, the Biden amendment,. in
my judgment, provides substantial in-
centives to all sides to attempt, at least
one more time, to achieve a peaceful
solution without resorting to military
action.
Mr. President, I also support the
Biden amendment because the Sandi-
nistas need to know. that there are
limits to their activities in the region.
They need to understand that the le-
gitimate interest of the United States
cannot tolerate enhanced Soviet influ-
ence in this vital region of the world.
Mr. President, the Biden amend-
ment represents a new opportunity
which must be embraced by those who
seek peace in Central America. With-
out it, we will be able to exert no lever-
age over either the Sandinistas or the
Contras. Without it, the Congress
leaves the development of Central
American policy solely to the tender
mercies of the Reagan administration.
Without this new approach, the Nica-
raguan crisis will be merely left to de-
teriorate.
Mr. President, we cannot sit idly by
and permit the Nicaraguan crisis, to
embroil our Nation in another costly
and unnecessary foreign war. The
Biden amendment gives all sides an
opportunity to take stock of their posi-
tion. It provides an incentive for a
cease-fire, a cooling-off period to allow
moderation and peaceful purpose to
replace belligerence and armed con-
flict.
Mr. President, the remaining middle
ground is growing soft. There is little
time left to halt the drift toward a
Central American war.
This Congress must enact a legisla-
tive framework which attempts to
strengthen the middle ground and
gives us another chance to achieve a
peaceful settlement to the crisis.
The Biden amendment, I believe,
offers us that opportunity.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I reserve the remain-
der of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. I yield myself such
time as I may require.
Mr. President, I appreciate the
thoughtful amendment by the Sena-
tor from Delaware and the cosponsors.
The Senator from Delaware and
those with whom he is associated in
this amendment have taken seriously
the fact that the carrot and the stick
must be involved, and have worked to
try to apply a measure of both. My op-
position to their amendment will come
on certain particulars that I want to
enumerate, but I suppose more gener-
ally from the standpoint that I believe
that the Nunn-Lugar amendment is a
better alternative. Essentially, ' to
adopt both, in a parliamentary situa-
tion, would render the conference
committee's task very difficult.
Both amendments track along cer-
tain points. Perhaps both arise from
negotiations that occurred at the
White House a few weeks ago and sub-
sequently, in an attempt to find a bi-
partisan foreign policy that could help
our Secretary of State work for better
success in Central America. So I ac-
knowledge the origins of a number of
the activities described in both the
Biden . amendment and the Nunn-
Lugar amendment.
It, appears to me, however, that the
Biden amendment attempts to have
more restrictions on the Contras, the
freedom fighters, than the Nunn-
Lugar amendment provides for. It has
some problems in bringing about
changes in the situation that we would
deem desirable.
Let me say quickly, as a matter of
overall philosophy, that it seems to me
that the purpose of our activity today
is to provide a context in which negoti-
ations ultimately between the forces
in Nicaragua itself may come to pass.
Those are negotiations that are mean-
ingful, ones that open up a govern-
ment that needs political freedom, po-
litical opportunities, freedom of. the
press, and, other desirable safeguards
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with regard to surrounding nations
and safeguards to our Nation from a
surprise visit by the Soviets or others
who might implant weapons and mate-
rial in Nicaragua.
We have come to some differences of
opinion as to how these negotiations
within Nicaragua are best to be fos-
tered. I think there is a growing con-
sensus in Congress that we should do
all we can to support the Contadora
process and the activities of neighbors.
It seems to me that in both instances
we have come to the conclusion that
there may be desirability for negotia-
tions between the United States and
Nicaragua under some situations. This
may advance the process, although
clearly it will not end the process. It is
one facet of it, in the context of nego-
tiations that finally must proceed to
the Sandinistas, themselves, taking a
look at democratic elements that
should be part of the Government and
working out a settlement at that stage.
It seems to me that the Biden
amendment is less forceful in bringing
about those circumstances, because
the amendment, first of all, does not
repeal the Boland amendment. This, I
suppose, is a matter of some judgment;
but,, clearly, the Nunn-Lugar amend-
ment does repeal Boland. It does try to
take away all of the restrictions that
the Boland language has brought to
bear on the situation.
There are perhaps some Senators
and some Members of the House who
are deeply mistrustful of the adminis-
tration and, to put it another way,
much more trustful of the ability of
Congress to micromanage foreign
policy. The Boland amendment is that
type of situation. I suppose it is a
fielder's choice.
The distinguished Senator from
.Tennessee said that if we do not go
the route of the Biden amendment, we
might leave Nicaragua and Central
American.policy at the tender mercies
of the Reagan administration, as if
this were a hideous type of alterna-
tive. There are many people who like
the President of the United States,
who feel essentially that it would not
be at all bad if the President of the
United States had a lot more to say
with regard to a Central American
policy than Congress collectively. I am
not certain, given that alternative,
that I would have selected the Biden
amendment.
On the other hand, I suggest that
there is in the Biden amendment in-
herently an attempt, in a mechanistic
fashion, as the Senator from Delaware
has pointed out, to set up an analogy
to what Congress attempted in El Sal-
vador.
I suppose, once again, we might have
a difference of opinion historically as
to why the American policy in El Sal-
vador has had some success. In part, of
course, as we mentioned this morning,
it has been because there were some
very good El Salvadoran leaders. We
were fortunate that that was so. To
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S 7622 CONGRESSIONAL, RECQRD - SENATE
the extent that our micromanagement
of El Salvador was helpful, more
power to Congress.
My own judgment is that it is argu-
able to the extent to which that
worked out that way.
This leads me to the same sort of a
problem, I suppose, with the Biden
amendment. Even given the good
things that I admit are similar to the
Nunn-Lugar effort and the best inten-
tions of the authors. I do not see it as
sufficiently strong.
I simply suggest that the Biden
amendment is an effort that is con-
structive, but I would hope that it
would not be adopted-simply because
I believe that it does not have the
thrust of Nunn-Lugar and that that
thrust is essentially one in which sub-
stantially more funds will be available
under less restrictive terms. Thus
there is an extra degree of pressure
imposed through the new resources
transferred to the Contra forces,
albeit in the area of humanitarian as-
sistance. This will lead, I believe, to
the proper degree of pressure that will
make negotiations more probable in
terms of their potential success.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield on one point?
Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield.
Mr. BIDEN. The Senator indicated
concern about the Boland amendment.
We all have different reasons why we
did not want the Boland amendment
in. If I could take a moment to explain
to the -Senator my rationale, I want to
get something passed. Quite frankly if
the Boland amendment is in what the
Senate passes, it is not going to get
anywhere in the House of Representa-
tives. No. 2, whether or not it gives the
President a free hand, leave that aside
a moment whether he should or not
have that, what the repeal of Boland
does by implication by what went
before it is to say the CIA is back in
the game, it is a red flag that went up.
I do not think it does any violence, in
my opinion, to Nunn-Lugar to not
have Boland.
The rationale for Senator NUNN
originally, and I assume the Senator
from Indiana for having the amend-
ment the way it was, is that we would
not be able to allow it to be shared in-
telligence data. That was the rationale
offered to me.
I argue you can do that even under
Boland. Without belaboring the point,
that was the Senator's rationale for
excluding Boland from the Biden
amendment.
Mr. LUGAR. I appreciate that point.
-The Senator's judgment may be sound
in terms of the conference procedures,
the strong position taken by the
House of Representatives. I think all
of us are looking toward a policy that
has a good chance of getting a two-
House bipartisan proposition. I would
still indicate it appears to me that the
Boland language at least in this con-
text is not a good idea in terms of pro-
cedure.
I know the President feels strongly
about this because I have heard it
from him and talked to him about it as
recently as 2 days ago. So I take that
into consideration, too, even with my
great respect for our colleague, Mr.
BoLAND and the Speaker, who have
very strong feelings, also.
Let me conclude this particular part
of the argument by saying once again
that I appreciate the general thrust of
what is occurring here, but it seems to
me it is a micromanagement, and that
word is being overused, but it is still
descriptive in which a group of well-
meaning persons such as ourselves and
the 435 Members of the House of Rep-
resentatives are attempting to set up a
number of conditions and the net
effect, at least as I read the amend-
ment, is one in which it is unlikely
that the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua will be willing to negotiate
seriously, that the pressures of the
Biden amendment are insufficient to
make that likely.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield
for a question?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
Mr. BIDEN. What pressures? I am
not being facetious. What pressures
within the Nunn-Lugar amendment
would in fact encourage that, that are
not in the Biden amendment?
Mr. LUGAR. First of all, and per-
haps the Senator is in the process of
amending his amendment, but the
Nunn-Lugar amendment provides for,
in addition to the $14 million and the
repeal of the Boland amendment in
the first year, $24 million in a second
year which is a sustained effort. The
Sandinistas really have to know that
there is some staying power involved
in that situation.
I would say beyond that that it ap-
pears to me that the constrict of the
Biden amendment, and I would refer
to section 602 in which the $14 million
comes only if the United States re-
sumes bilateral negotiations with the
Government of Nicaragua.
That. fits in a little different way
than the Nunn-Lugar language. We
encourage the President as part of a
number of things that might be help-
ful.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question on this
point?.
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
Mr. BIDEN. Has he had an opportu-
nity to read section (b) of 602 which
indicates that if in fact the Nicara-
guans refuse, then there no longer has
to be a condition of bilateral negotia-
tion?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I have read that,
and I appreciate that that does obviate
No. 2 and No. 3 to the extent that the
Sandinistas, do not want to go that
route.
I think a part of. our debate in the
earlier amendments today was the pre-
occupation of Senators in demanding
that we get together with the Sandi-
nistas, that this is the essential set of
negotiations. But for this to be the
June 6, 1985
central focus seems to me to be unfor-
tunate.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for another question?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator believes,
and I am inclined to think he is cor-
rect, that the Sandinistas have no in-
dication and no desire to bargain in
good faith, then I ask the Senator
what have we lost by including this in
an amendment to satisfy my friends
who believe, that in fact they would
negotiate? Is it not better to make
that a condition, be assured the Presi-
dent attempted it under amendment,
demonstrate that they would not and
then move forward? Does that not aid
the Senator's objective of having to
sustain policy in the region which rec-
ognizes the threat with respect to the
Sandinista presence?
Mr. LUGAR. I suggest that, as the
Senator has presented the idea, it is
helpful in terms of gaining broader
support in the Senate because it is ob-
vious, given the offering of this type
of negotiation at least twice before,
but people feel very deeply about it.
Mr. BIDEN. I was moved by the Sen-
ator's speech. at the National Press
Club where he called about the need
of a broad based, bipartisan long-range
policy.
Mr. LUGAR. This is reaching for
that, probably gathering a few more in
the fold.
Mr. BIDEN. I am not being face-
tious.
Mr. LUGAR: Of course not. It seems
to me and the Senator cannot have
the thing in focus that the thrust of
the negotiating procedure misses. In
other words, we have the situation in
which granted to include people who
believe that really we are mainly the
ones that are at fault and it is our lack
of willingness to talk and engage in
these activities, that is really the fault.
There is nothing in this procedure
that I can see that leads to the type of
internal negotiation within Nicaragua
or at least'indicates that those are the
sort of most important ones and that
anything beyond that are in a support-
ing role.
The nuances of the amendment may,
have escaped me, but it just seems the
thrust of it is once again one in which
we are sort of pounding ourselves over
the head for our inability to do a cer-
tain number of things with the
thought that really down deep we are
at fault.
Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield
for a question again--
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, I wonder
if my colleague will permit me to ask a
question of the distinguished manager.
Mr. BIDEN. The Senator from Dela-
ware really has no time and I was
asking the Senator a question. It is
fine by me if the Senator will allow
the Senator from Illinois to ask him a,
question on his time. I will be willing
to yield my time.
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD'- SENATE
Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, will the
distinguished manager permit me to
ask a question of him?
Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to do that.
Mr. DIXON. May I say to the distin-
guished manager I think he knows my
record on this issue. I am one on this
side who has regularly supported
Contra assistance, as recently as the
last time a rollcall took place, and I
want my distinguished friend, the
chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee and the distinguished man-
ager of this bill, to know that I am
prepared once again to support the
proposition that will be offered short-
ly by the distinguished manager and
the distinguished Senator from Geor-
gia, so that he understands the-mean-
ing in which the question is asked.
But I am prepared to support this
proposition by my distinguished friend
from Delaware as well, and I wonder
whether the manager has thought in
terms and whether others on his side
have thought in terms of the accept-
ability of this whole question in the
other Chamber.
(Mr. RUDMAN assumed the chair.)
After all, this proposition has to pass
two Houses to have any meaningful
result. I would point out to the Sena-
tor that- my friend, the distinguished
Senator from Delaware, maintains the
prohibition against support of military
or paramilitary operations while my
distinguished friend, the manager of
this bill, strikes that provision. My dis-
tinguished friend from Delaware
would funnel the aid through the
State Department, while the other
proposition would provide for the CIA
to distribute the funds and the Nation-
al Security Council to exercise over-
sight.
I wonder whether my friend sees
that there is some broader appeal, if
we really want to do something in this
area, as this Senator does, in the other
Chamber for what my distinguished
friend from Delaware is trying to do.
That must be readily apparent to my
friend.
Mr. LUGAR. I appreciate the ques-
tion, as well as the observation by my
friend from Illinois.
I think these aspects of Senator
BIDEN's amendment would be more ap-
pealing in the House of Representa-
tives to the extent that this is the au-
dience that we are looking for and con-
ceivably might find it. I am not certain
that is so, but it might be.
I would say- the National Security
Council oversight of whatever agency
is involved-and the Senator from Illi-
nois assumes it would be the CIA in
our bill, and we assume that it would
be, too-would continue as it is and I
would also assume that we-would not
rule out paramilitary, as the Senator
from Illinois has suggested. He may
not want to do that and many Mem-
bers of the House may not want to do
that.
I think it is foolish on our part to ar-.
bitrarily rule out those options, even if
we are trying to appeal to the Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives.
But I think those are two distinctions
between the bills.
I have not tried to nitpick and find
each and every one of these situations.
But the Senator from Illinois has per-
formed a useful service by pointing
out two small ways, albeit very small
ones, in which the bills differ, which
leads me back to my point that what-
ever merit the Biden legislation has, in
my judgment it is less at prospect than
the Nunn-Lugar amendment that will
be heard next. Therefore, it ought to
be rejected so that the way is still
clear for a statement that will come on
the fifth amendment to be considered
today.
Mr. DIXON. Will my friends yield
just one more time?
Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to do so.
Mr. DIXON. I am prepared to go
through this with my friend from In-
diana and, as I say, I am prepared to
support the proposition that will be
offered shortly by the distinguished
manager of the bill. But I wonder how
many times we have to march up the
mountain and back down before we ul-
timately realize that the perception of
this issue is different in the Senate
than in the House.
I wonder whether there would be
more appeal if we realistically tried to
recognize that there are some sharp
differences that probably cannot be
reconciled and that there is more
probability of reasonable acceptance
by the House of slightly more moder-
ate Senate proposition-I? am prepared
to vote for the Senator's proposition-
but a more moderate proposition than
my distinguished friend from Indiana
wants to offer right now might help to
bridge the gap.
Mr. LUGAR. Let me respond that in
the pleasant event we get to a confer-
ence with our colleagues in the House
and the Nunn-Lugar amendment, at
least, is part of that conference on the
State Department authorization,
whatever else is in the context. I will
keep firmly in mind the footnote that
my distinguished friend'was prepared
to vote for both propositions and gave
some good advice as to how we might
find comity with our colleagues. But I
think there is another factor that even
as we are seeking comity with our col-
leagues in the House, at least this Sen-
ator-and perhaps most of us, I would
hope-is also trying to retain some ties
with the administration. The adminis-
tration is a major factor in our foreign
policy, some would argue the major
factor with the proper oversight con-
trol of this body. So there are several
layers in the drama. Some are congres-
sional and some are outside, but also
important to it.
I would plead with the Senator that
many of us have been trying to work
with the White House, with the De-
partment of State, and, in addition,
working with our colleagues on both
sides of the Capitol. We may or may
not be successful in the exercise, but it
will not be for the lack of trying.
S 7623
These are some of the conditions that
have brought me to, at least, the con-
clusions I have in the next amend-
ment.
Mr. DIXON. May I say to my friend
that I thank him for his response. I
will not take any more time. I know
the time is precious for my distin-
guished friend from Delaware.
I say to my friend from Indiana that
I hope when I support his amendment
later today that that is not the propo-
sition that once again closes the door
and that we are not passing up a
chance to adopt a proposition that
might open it. That is the only point
this Senator wanted to make to his
friend and colleague, from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to amend my
amendment as follows: In section
602(a), after "1985" add "and again
during fiscal year 1986."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Without objection,
the amendment is so modified.
Mr. BIDEN. Very briefly, Mr. Presi-
dent, this will have an effect of leaving
approximately 1 year during which
the Contras will have to evolve to a
point where they can meet the higher
standards set by the -amendment and
for the other parties to, in fact, fulfill
their portion of the responsibilities in
the amendment.
In response to the comment made by
the. Senator from Indiana, our only
difference in dollars is $28 million as
opposed to $38 million.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will
the Senator from Delaware please
send the modification to the desk?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
The modification reads as follows:
At the end of the.bill, add the following
new title:
TITLE VI-U.S. POLICY TOWARD
NICARAGUA
PROHIBITION ON MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY
AID
SEC. 601. The prohibitions contained in
section 8066 of Public Law 98-473 and in
section 801 of Public Law 98-618 shall
remain in full force and effect with respect
to all material, financial and training assist-
ance: Provided, however, that the assistance
authorized by section 602 shall be permit-
ted.
AID TO NICARAGUANS CONSTITUTING A
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
SEC. 602. (a) During fiscal year 1985, and
again during fiscal year 1986. not more than
$14,000,000 may be expended for the provi-
sion of food, clothing, medicine and other
humanitarian assistance to resistance forces
which are opposed to the present Govern-
ment in Nicaragua: Provided, however,
That-
(1) such assistance is provided in a manner
such that the nature and extent of such as-
sistance is independently monitored;
(2) the United States resumes bilateral ne-
gotiations with the Government of Nicara-
gua; and
(3) the Government of Nicaragua and re-
sistance forces which are opposed to the
Government of Nicaragua each agree to in-
stitute a cease fire.
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S 7624 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - SENATE
(b) In the event the Government of Nica-
ragua refuses to enter into a mutual cease
fire as described in subsection (a)(3), or to
resume bilateral negotiations with the
United States as described in subsection
(a)(2), the humanitarian assistance author-
ized by this section may be provided.
(c) In the event a mutual cease fire de-
scribed in this section.is seriously or sub-
stantially violated by resistance forces op-
posed to the Government of Nicaragua, no
humanitarian assistance authorized by this
section may thereafter be provided: Provid-
ed, however, That if the Government of
,Nicaragua has earlier, and seriously or sub-
stantially, violated such cease fire, this pro-
hibition shall not apply.
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSISTANCE
SEC. 603. (a) The $14,000,000 described in
section 602 may be provided only-
(a) by the Department of State;
(b) from funds previously appropriated to
the Department of State; and
(c) upon a determination by the Secretary
of State that the assistance is necessary to
meet the humanitarian needs of resistance
forces opposing the Government of Nicara-
gua.
FORM OF ASSISTANCE
SEC. 604. The assistance described in sec-
tion 602 may be provided only in the form
of goods and services, and no direct or indi-
rect financial assistance may be provided.
PROHIBITION ON OTHER ASSISTANCE
SEC. 605. No assistance may be provided by
the United States to resistance forces op-
posed to the Government of Nicaragua
except as authorized and for the purpose
described in section 602, and no funds may
be used to provide the assistance authorized
in section 602 except as provided in section
603.
SUPPORT FOR CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS
SEC. 606. (a) It is the sense of the Congress -
that the United States . should encourage
and support the efforts of the Contadora
nations (Columbia, Mexico, Panama, and
Venezuela) to negotiate and conclude an
agreement based upon the Contadora Docu-
ment of Objectives of September 9, 1983,
(b) In the event that less than $14,000,000
is expended for the humanitarian assistance
authorized in section 602, the remainder of
such amount and any necessary additional
funds may be made available for payment to
the Contadora nations for expenses arising
from implementation of the agreement de-
scribed in this section including peacekeep-
ing, verification, and monitoring systems:
Provided, however, That in the event
$14.000,000 is expended for the humanitari-
an assistance authorized by section 602,
other funds may be made available for pay-
ment of such expenses. Any funds made
available for the purpose described in this
subsection may be provided from funds pre-
viously appropriated to the Department of
State.
PRESIDENTIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
SEC. 607. The President shall submit a
report to the Congress every 90 days on any
activity carried out under this title. Such
report shall include a report on the progress
of efforts to reach a negotiated settlement
as set forth in section 602 and 606, a de-
tailed accounting of the disbursement of hu-
manitarian assistance, and steps taken by
the democratic resistance toward the objec-
tives described in section 611.
SUSPENSION OF EMBARGO AGAINST NICARAGUA
SEC. 608. The national emergency declared
in the President's executive order of May 1,
1985, prohibiting trade and certain other
transactions involving Nicaragua, shall be
terminated, and the prohibitions contained
in that executive order shall be suspended,
If the Government of Nicaragua enters into
a cease-fire and negotiations with opposi-
tion forces.
UNITED STATES MILITARY MANEUVERS NEAR
NICARAGUA
SEC. 609. It is the sense of Congress that
the President should order a suspension of
U.S. military maneuvers in Honduras and
off Nicaragua's coast if the Government of
Nicaragua agrees to a cease fire, to open a
dialogue with the democratic resistance, and
to suspend the state of emergency.
FUTURE LOGISTICAL AID TO NICARAGUANS
CONSTITUTING A DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
SEC. 610. The President may request the
Congress to authorize additional logistical
assistance for resistance forces opposed to
the Government of Nicaragua, in such
amount as he deems appropriate, including
economic sanctions with respect to the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua, In the event that=
(a) the Government of Nicaragua refuses
to resume the bilateral negotiations with
the United States, as described in section
602; or
(b) following an agreement between the
Government of Nicaragua and the United
States to resume the bilateral negotiations
which are described in section 602, the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua refuses to enter into
a.mutual cease fire, as described in section
602. A request submitted to the Congess
under this section shall be handled by the
Congress under the provisions of section
612.
PRECONDITION FOR FUTURE AID TO NICARA-
GUANS CONSTITUTING A DEMOCRATIC OPPOSI-
TION
SEC. 611. (a) Congress finds that United
States assistance to a Nicaraguan democrat-
ic opposition can be justified, and can be ef-
fective,, only if such opposition truly repre-
sents democratic and humanitarian values.
(b) Therefore, Congress shall consider fur-
ther assistance to the democratic opposition
only if such opposition has eliminated from
its ranks all persons who have engaged in
abuses of human rights.
(c) The President shall submit any future
request for assistance for opposition forces
only in accompaniment with a detailed cer-
tification, which shall be subject to congres-
sional hearings, that the opposition has in
fact acted effectively to eliminate from its
ranks all persons who have engaged in viola-
tions of human rights.
EXPEDITED PROCEDURE FOR FUTURE AID
REQUESTS
SEC. 612. (a) A joint resolution which is in-
troduced within three calendar days after
the Congress receives a Presidential request
described in section 610 and which, if en-
acted, would grant the President the au-
thority to take any or all of the actions de-
scribed in such section, shall be considered
in accordance with procedures contained in
section 8066 of Public Law 98-473: Provided,
however,
(i) references in that section to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of each House
shall be deemed to be references to the ap-
propriate committee or committees of each
House; and
(ii) amendments to the joint resolution
are in order.
(b) This section is enacted by Congress as
an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
Senate and House of Representatives, re-
spectively, and as such it is deemed a part of
the rules of each House, respectively.' but
applicable only with respect to the proce-
dure to be followed in that House in the
case of a resolution described in subsection
(a), and it supercedes other rules only to the
June 6, 1985
extent that it is inconsistent with such
rules.
(c) With full recognition of the constitu-
tional right of either House to change the
rules (so far as relating to the procedure of
that House) at any time, in the same
manner and to the same extent as In the
case of any other rule of that House.
FUTURE AID TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA
SEC. 613. (a) If the Congress determines
that progress is being made toward peace
and development of democratic institutions
in Nicaragua, Congress will consider initiat-
ing a number of economic and development
programs, including but not limited to-
(1) trade concessions;
(2) Peace Corps programs;
(3) technical assistance;
(4) health services; and
(5) agricultural and industrial develop-
ment.
(b) In assessing whether progress is being
made toward achieving these goals, Con-
gress will expect, within the context of a re-
gional settlement-
(1) the removal of foreign military advis-
ers from Nicaragua;
(2) the end to Sandinista support for in-
surgencies in other countries in the region,
including the cessation of military supplies
to rebel forces fighting the democratically-
elected government in El Salvador;
(3) restoration of individual liberties, po-
litical expression, freedom of worship, and
independence of the media; and
(4) progress toward internal reconciliation
and a pluralistic democratic system.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President. I yield 5
minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I will be brief and I may not take
the 5 minutes. I regret that I was not
here to listen to all of what I am sure
was a most able argument on behalf of
the amendment by our colleague from
Delaware.
My sense, however, is that the pro-
posal by the Senator from Delaware
appears on the surface to come much
closer to the reality of a peaceful ne-
gotiation through dialog, dialog on 'the
part of the United States with the na-
tional directorate in Nicaragua and a
dialog among or between Nicaraguans.
The problem that I see with it-and
I wish to say to my. friend from Dela-
ware that I do not pretend to have any
greater expertise or any greater in-
sight into the, solution of this issue
than he has, but I come perhaps just a
little bit fresher from having discussed
all of these amendments with a lot of
our friends in Central America. The
point that I made this morning in the
debate, and I think the Senator from
Delaware recognizes this in his amend-
ment, is that we sometimes make the
mistake of seeing this problem vis-a-vis
the national directorate, the Sandi-
nista dictatorship in Nicaragua, as a
U.S. national security issue. We have
been deluged with the fact that this is
the Soviets marching up from Nicara-,
gua. We have been deluged with the
fact that it is the start of refugees and
the launch of,Soviet missiles into San
Antonio and St. Paul and places like
that. So we tend to look at it that way.
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.---SENATE
The reality, however, is much closer
to the fact that this is a Central Amer-
ican problem. It is a Central American
security problem. And the observa-
tions of our friends, if you will, the
other democracies or fledgling democ-
racies in Central America is that they,
in effect, have facilitated the replace-
ment of one dictatorship in Nicaragua
with another. It just happened to be
nine more people in this one than in
the other. But this dictatorship, being
a dictatorship, having been launched
from the ship of democracy but
having been captured by the pirates of
the dictatorship, lives in fear of the
democracies around it.
But they cannot do anything about
it. They have a 100,000-person army.
They have their refugees spilling all
over Central America. As I said this
morning, they have been killing Salva-
dorans for 5 years. Now they are start-
ing to kill the Hondurans and Costa
Ricans. There is not anything the
Central Americans can do about it.
They are participating in the Conta-
dora process. They have some faith in
that process but not a lot because at
the last meeting of the Contadora the
Sandinistas came to the meeting and
they changed their minds about some
of the rulings of the game. They came
in with a couple of brand new. amend-
ments that had not been on the table
before. They did that same thing in
the nine meetings with Shlaudeman
and Tinoco. Every time they got close
to some kind of a negotiation, Tinoco
would show up on behalf of the na-
tional directorate, and he had a new
proposition to lay on the table. The
bottom line, seen from the eyes of the
Costa Ricans, the Salvadorans, Guate-
malans, Hondurans, Panamanians, and
others is that the United States must
supply them with some additional
pressure to be defined in some magic
way I guess in this amendment that
comes up next. There are a series of
urgings in there that speak to that.
But without that kind of pressure
they know the Sandinistas will not ne-
gotiate in good faith. As I read your
amendment, as I listened to the argu-
ment on behalf of the amendment of
the Senator from Delaware--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. DURENBERGER. I ask unani-
mous consent for another 1 minute.
The problem with it is there is no in-
centive for the Sandinistas to dialog.
There is a presumption underlying the
amendment that somehow they want
to negotiate an end to this process.
But I do not see in it any particular in-
centive for them to concede. They may
go dialog. They are very good at that.
They will talk, talk, talk but there is
no reason for them after a cease fire
to forever concede anything in a
dialog. It is that our friends find objec-
tionable.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield
for a question?
Mr. DURENBERGER. Yes.
Mr. BIDEN.Is the Senator aware
that in fact it does not require dialog,
that it requires there to be negotia-
tions, and if the Sandinistas do not ne-
gotiate, then section 2 and section 3
are not operative? Then the same
pressure that exists in the amendment
of the Senator from Indiana. becomes
operative. I know from working with
the Senator in the Intelligence Com-
mittee that he is aware that we need
public support for a plan which is per-
ceived by the public now to be over-
whelmed, and in fact not accurately
protrayed by the President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time allotted to the Senator from Min-
nesota has expired.
Mr. BIDEN. I guess I used up your
time with a question. I, appreciate your
courtesy. [Laughter.]
Mr. DURENBERGER. I thank my
colleague. I find him incorrect. But I
thank him.
Mr. LUGAR. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator from Kansas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Kansas.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President,
the Senator from Minnesota was
touching on the question I had. It was
the fact that this aid, the $14 million,
would not be forthcoming. unless the
President resumed bilateral negotia-
tions with the Government of Nicara-
gua. I think it is a mistake to insist
that the President resume these nego-
tiations. I think this does not really
portray an accurate picture of the sit-
uation. It reflects on a concern, I
think, that the Senator from Delware
has about focusing on bilateral negoti-
ations, and second, my own concern
about directing from here the Presi-
dent to enter into bilateral negotia-
tions. Otherwise, I find much attrac-
tive in this, but I think this is a flaw
that is troubling to me as it is present-
ly drafted.
Mr. BIDEN. If I may answer--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time allotted to the Senator from
Kansas has expired.
.Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, how
much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Each
side has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will
speak for 1 minute and yield 1 minute
to the distinguished Senator from
Tennessee.
Mr. President, I ask that the Biden
amendment be carefully considered
but rejected by the Senate on the
basis that the amendment that is to
follow is a superior course for the rea-
sons that I have suggested, and that
others have suggested on our side. I
say this with full appreciation for the
intent of the amendment, with full ap-
preciation that there are many paral-
lel thoughts, and with full apprecia-
tion of the thoughts of my friend from
Illinois who has suggested there are
many factors in the amendment that
may be appealing to the House, and
that which we will have to deal with in
a practical way. But I am hopeful that
S 7625
the track will still be clear by the time
we get to the Nunn- Lugar offering. I
ask Senators to take that into consid-
eration, and to vote against the cur-
rent amendment.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President,. despite
the small sum of money involved, we
all know that we are voting on a
matter of great consequence. What we
are really dealing with here is the
question of the future course of Amer-
ican policy in Central America.
The President's policy objectives in
respect to Nicaragua have continuous-
ly shifted, but his preference as to
means has inclined steadily toward the
use of violence. In rejecting military
aid to the Contras, Congress has
wisely chosen to block at least one
such approach: continued and escalat-
ing violence by proxy.
There remain, however, many other
gradations beginning with other forms
of aid to the Contras, and extending
up to the possibility of a U.S. military
expedition into Nicaragua: an option
the administration has never been
willing to rule out, and which it has
now begun to speak about in more
concrete terms.
The amendments that we are deal-
ing with today offer us ways to more
clearly define what parts of that re-
maining spectrum of possibilities are
open to the President, and which parts
are-for the time being-to be closed
off.
Of these amendments, the only one
that deals comprehensively with the
elements of a U.S. policy for Nicara-
gua, and the one which, in my opinion,
comes closest to striking a balance ap-
propriate to the needs of the moment,
is the amendment offered by Senator
BrDEN.
The Biden amendment, in common
with those offered by others, proposes
to dispense humanitarian aid to the
Contras. It does not, however, seek to
use this aid as the means to induce the
disarming and disbanding of the Con-
tras, nor does it seek to use this aid in
a manner which does as much as possi-
ble to keep the Contras in fighting
trim.
Under the amendment, any aid
would have to be independently moni-
tored, to assure that the intentions of
Congress-namely, that it be humani-
tarian in character and no more-be
respected.
What the amendment fundamental-
ly seeks to do with aid is to use it as a
means for estabishing the kind of dip-
lomatic process we should have had
from the President, but have not.
The conditions for aid to flow in-
clude the resumption of bilateral talks
between the administration and the
Government. of Nicaragua, and the es-
tablishment of a cease-fire to which
the Contras must agree. Should the
Sandinistas, on the other hand, refuse
a cease-fire, aid would flow to the Con-
tras.
The embargo against Nicaragua,
which many of us feel the President
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S 7626 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
too hastily imposed after suffering
defeat on military aid to the Contras,
will clearly not shake the dominance
of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. But
under the approach in this amend-
ment, our offer to suspend the embar-
go could bring' about Nicaraguan
agreement to accept the prerequisites
for serious diplomacy: a cease-fire;
talks with the Contras; and an end to
the state of national emergency.
Mr. President, this is a delicate
moment. The country, by and large,
does not believe that the Sandinistas
are prepared, 'if totally relieved of all
pressures from the United States, to
turn their energies inward and leave
their neighbors alone. Neither is the
country prepared to see a sharp esca-
lation of military pressure against
Nicaragua through the Contras, less
alone by way of direct U.S. interven-
tion.
What the country instinctively
wants is what in fact we should be
having, what the administration is re-
fusing to provide, and what the Biden
amendment is all about: a serious
resort to statecraft and negotiations-
with other options , in existence but
under firm restraint, until we have ex-
hausted other remedies.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President,
I rise to support the Biden amend-
ment. This amendment would provide
$14 million in humanitarian aid to the
Contras this year and give incentives
to both sides of the Nicaraguan con-
flict to reach a negotiated settlement.
To my mind, the Biden amendment
represents the best approach at this
point, to the situation in Nicaragua,
one which encourages negotiations
and diplomacy over military conflict,
while protecting our interests in the
region.
The situation in Central America is
difficult and potentially dangerous.
The United States has a real stake in
what happens in that country. Daniel
Ortega's visit to the Soviet Union to
seek $200 million in economic aid only
underscored the ties the Nicaraguan
Government has to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets would like to exploit re-
gional unrest to increase their influ-
ence in the area. But, Mr. President,
the issue before us is not support for
or opposition to communism in Nicara-
gua. The issue is how best to protect
our security interests in the region. I
believe at this point in the conflict
that that is best done by encouraging
nonmilitary, negotiated solutions.
Certainly we want to prevent Soviet
or Cuban bases on Nicaraguan soil. We
want to see all Cuban and Soviet mili-
tary advisers leave Nicaragua. We
want to secure a regional agreement in
Central America that pledges that all
of the countries in the region-espe-
cially Nicaragua-refrain from inter-
fering in the internal affairs of their
neighbors and supporting an armed in-
surrection in the region. And we have
an interest in pressuring the Nicara-
guans to make good on the democratic
promises of their revolution.
This amendment seeks to safeguard
those interests by giving the parties to
the conflict every incentive to seek
peace.
The Biden amendment would pro-
vide $14 million in humanitarian as-
sistance in fiscal year 1985 for 'the
Contras to be funneled through the
State Department. By installing the
State Department as the agency ad-
ministering the aid to the Contras, we
remove the taint of CIA involvement
in the region. At the same time, by
continuing the Boland amendment
prohibition on military or paramili-
tary aid to the Contras, we avoid, at
least for now, resort to the military
option.
The conditions imposed on that aid
under the Biden amendment in my
view provide the impetus for a peace-
ful solution to the conflict. To the
Contras, we say, "Lay down your arms
and negotiate." To the Nicaraguans,
we say: "Make good on your promises.
Stop exporting your revolution and es-
tablish human and civil rights within
your country."
In order to receive humanitarian aid,
the Contras must agree to a cease fire,
and to negotiations with the Nicara-
guan Government. And because U.S.
assistance to the Contras can be justi-
fied and effective only if such opposi-
tion truly represents democratic and
humanitarian values, we will provide
further aid to the Contras only if they
first purge from their ranks those re-
sponsible for the abuse of human
rights.
This approach also provides incen-
tives to the Nicaraguan Government
to negotiate with the Contras. If that
Government agrees to a cease fire and
to negotiations with the Contras, we
will lift the trade embargo. The
amendment also expresses the sense of
Congress that the President should
order a suspension of U.S. military ma-
neuvers in Honduras and off the Nica-
ragua coast if Nicaragua agrees to the
cease fire and negotiations above, and
suspends the state of emergency.
Finally, the amendment requires
that the humanitarian aid can only be
provided if this country sits down with
the Nicaraguan Government and nego-
tiates.
The approach represented by this
amendment is one that will keep eco-
nomic and diplomatic pressure on the
Sandinista government and on the
Contras to reach a negotiated solution.
And by continuing aid to the Contra
resistance, it keeps the pressure on the
Nicaraguan Government, and thereby
decreases 'Nicaragua's ability to inter-
fere in the affairs of others.
This amendment only applies until
the end of this fiscal year, giving us
needed flexibility in a fluid situation.
It leaves the door open for a new look
at the situation in 4 months. If, at
that time, no progress has been made
in reaching a settlement, or Nicaragua
continues going down an undesirable
path, then we can reconsider our ap-
proach. In the meantime, we can use
June 6, 1985
our aid to pressure the parties to the
conflict and make clear our dissatisfac-
tion with the policies of the Sandinista
government.
By continuing the Boland amend-
ment prohibition on military or para-
military aid to the Contras, we avoid
at least for now, resort to the military
option. And by installing the State De-
partment as the agency administering
the aid to the Contras, we remove the
taint of CIA involvement in the
region.
I believe that the Biden amendment
represents a balanced and thoughtful
framework for seeking. peace in the
region. We provide all of the carrots
and sticks at our disposal to the chief
adversaries in the conflict. We give the
diplomatic process every chance, to
work in Central America before we are
faced with a situation in which no
other option but the military one is
possible. I urge my colleagues to sup-
port this amendment.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous con-
sent that Senator Cohen be added as a
cosponsor
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. .
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as the
Senator from Indiana has very forth-
rightly stated, there are a lot of simi-
larities between our two amendments.
There are two big differences. No. 1, in
his amendment.he urges the adminis-
tration to negotiate. I ask them to
demonstrate. they have attempted to
negotiate, a distinction with a slight
difference but more political than a
factual difference. -
Second, Mr. President, I argue that
the only real difference here is that
we attempt in this amendment to, if
you will, purge the Contras of those
who are the unsavory elements in it. It
makes sense to support the Contras if
they are truly the democratic force. If
they turn out not to be, it makes no
sense. There is the real difference be-
tween the two amendments along with
the difference in the Boland amend-
ment. To my friend from Kansas, I say
that in fact I do not think they should
worry so much about the section 2. We
are not demanding the President in
fact negotiate. We are demanding that
he attempt to resume bilateral negoti-
ations, and if. they do not come for-
ward, that would be the end of it.
Mr. President, I really think this is a,
critically-obviously, we all do-impor-
tant issue. I think it is important to
acknowledge the legitimacy of sup-
porting legitimate opposition forces to
dictatorships around the world,
whether they be Communist or totali-
tarian of another stripe. I think this
does it. I think it does it the best we
can from this body which is imperfect.
I urge the adoption of my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from Delaware.
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONA:L?. RECORD SENATE
has expired. The Senator from Indi-
ana has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would
like to offer a correction. On page 3,
item 3 of the Nunn-Lugar amendment,
we call upon the Nicaraguan demo-
cratic resistance to remove from their
ranks any individuals who engage in
human rights abuses. I would suggest
there is a purging element in fact in
our amendment. I want to make that
clear so that the parallel significance
is clear. I yield back the remainder of
our time.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment of the Senator from Delaware.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from South Dakota [Mr.
PRESSLER] and the Senator from Wyo-
ming [Mr. WALLOP] are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Wyo-
ming [Mr. WALLOP] would vote "nay."
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from West Virginia [Mr.
ROCKEFELLER] is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from West
Virginia [Mr. RocKEFELLER] would
vote "yea."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber desiring to vote? P
The result was announced-yeas- 22,
nays 75, as follows:
(Roilcall Vote No. 111 Leg.l
YEAS-22
Baucus
Hart
Pell
Biden
Hatfield
Pryor
Bingaman
Inouye
Riegle
Bradley
Lautenberg
Sarbanes
Byrd
Levin
Sasser
Cohen
Matsunaga
Simon
Dixon
Melcher
Gore
Mitchell
NAYS-75
Abdnor
Garn
Mattingly
Andrews
Glenn
McClure
Armstrong
Goldwater
McConnell
Bentsen
Gorton
Metzenbaum
Boren
Gramm
Moynihan
Boschwitz
Grassley
Murkowski
Bumpers
Harkin
Nickles
Burdick
Hatch
Nunn
Chafee
Hawkins
Packwood
Chiles
Hecht
Proxnfire
Cochran
Heflin
Quayle
Cranston
Heinz
Roth
D'Amato
Helms
Rudman
Danforth
Hollings
Simpson
DeConcini
Humphrey
Specter
Denton
Johnston
Stafford
Dodd
Kassebaum
Stennis
Dole
Kasten
Stevens
Domenici
Kennedy
Symms
Durenberger
Kerry
Thurmond
Eagleton
Laxalt
Trible
Fast
Leahy
Warner
Evans
Long
Weicker
Exon
Lugar
Wilson
Ford
Mathias
Zorinsky
NOT VOTING-3
Pressler Rockefeller wallop
So the amendment (No. 274), as
modified, was rejected!
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was rejected.
Mr. DOLE. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, a number
of Senators have made inquiries about
the program for the remainder of the
evening. I do not really see how we are
going to finish this bill this evening, so
it would appear at this moment we are
going to be on it tomorrow. But that
will depend on what .might develop in
the next 2 to 3 hours. We are now
about to take up what I consider the
principal amendment, a bipartisan
effort to do something in this area,
that I hope will pass. Following that,
there are four other amendments that
I would just as soon not be brought up
at all, including one of mine.
There is still 31/2 or 4 hours on
amendments on the Contras. We have
had votes of 70-something to 15, 80-
something to 15, or whatever. So I
think there is a fairly clear expression
on almost every conceivable pattern of
amendments, and I would hope that,
after disposition of this amendment,
the others would just sort of go away,
if that is possible. If not, we are going
to sort of go away because I do not
think we ought to keep people in until
1 or 2 o'clock in the morning if we
cannot finish the bill. I know the
chairman would very much like to
finish the bill, but in addition to the
Contra amendments there are 40
other amendments.. A number of those
would be accepted, but there would
still be probably three or four rollcalls,
plus debate on those amendments. So
I think it is fairly clear that we are
looking at midnight or after.
That is an optimistic assumption. So
I would guess, after the vote on the
principal amendment, we might be in
a position to make an announcement
so that Members who have obligations
this evening would know what to do.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will
argue in favor of an amendment that
has been proposed and will be intro-
duced--
Mr. STENNIS. Mr.. President, may
we have quiet? We cannot hear back
here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Mississippi is correct.
The Senate is not in order. The Sena:-
tor will please suspend until the
Senate is in order.
The Chair will remind the Senator
from Indiana that under the previous
order, the Senator from Georgia [Mr.
NUNN] was supposed to be recognized.
The Senator did not seek recognition.
S 7627
Mr. NUNN. I will yield to my col-
league from Indiana. We are coauth-
ors of the amendment. We are working
for the same purposes.
How is the time allocated, Mr. Presi-
dent?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time is equally divided between the
Senator from Georgia and the Senator
from Indiana.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, is the
time divided between the Senator
from Georgia and the Senator from
Indiana 45 minutes each?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we are on
the same side on the amendment, and
in all fairness I know there are going
to be opponents of this amendment.
So I think we are going to have to find
some way to equitably divide the time.
Of course, this is in our favor. But I
know there will be Senators who will
want to speak on the other side of this
amendment.
Mr. LUGAR. If the Senator from
Georgia will yield for just a
moment-
Mr. NUNN. I yield.
Mr. LUGAR. My purpose in seeking
recognition is to say that in all fair-
ness, it would be wise if the Chair
would allocate 45 minutes in opposi-
tion to my distinguished colleague
from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL) so that
he might manage the 45 minutes in
opposition, and there will remain 45
minutes for the proponents. At this
time I yield the floor to my distin-
guished colleague from Georgia [Mr.
NUNN].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does
the Chair understand the Senator
from Indiana that the 45 minutes is to
be under the joint control of the Sena-
tor from Indiana and the Senator
from Georgia and 45 minutes under
the control of the Senator from Rhode
Island?
Mr. LUGAR. That is my proposal.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. NUNN. There will be no objec-
tion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Will the Senator from Georgia
please send the amendment to the
desk.
AMENDMENT NO. 275
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I sent an
amendment to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Georgia [Mr. NUNN]
(for himself, Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. BOREN. Mr.
CHILES. Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. DOLE. Mr. LUGAR.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. DECONCINI, Mr.
ROCKEFELLER, and Mr. NICKLES) proposes an
amendment numbered 275.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further read-
ing of the amendment be dispensed
with.
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S 7628
CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD - SENATE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert
the following new section:
SEC. . (a) Notwithstanding section 405 of
the International Security & Development
Cooperation Act of 1985 as contained in S.
960 (99th Congress, 1st session) or any other
provision of law, there is authorized to be
appropriated $24,000,000 for Fiscal Year
1986 to be expended by the President for
humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistence.
(b) Subsections 8066(a) and (b) of the De-
partment of Defense Appropriations Act,
1985, as contained in the joint resolution en-
titled a "Joint Resolution making continu-
Ing appropriations for the fiscal year 1985,
and for other purposes", approved October
12, 1984 (Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1935),
and section 801 of the Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for fiscal year 1985 (Public Law
98-618; 98 Stat. 3304) are hereby repealed,
provided however that the funds made
available by this section may only be used
by the President for humanitarian assist-
ance to the Nicaraguan democratic resis-
tence.
(c) The President shall direct the National
Security Council to monitor the use of
funds for the purpose authorized in subsec-
tions (a) and (b).
(d) Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to impair or limit in any way the
oversight powers of the Congress.
(e) The President is hereby urged and re-
quested-
(1) to pursue vigorously the use of diplo-
matic and economic measures to resolve the
conflict in Nicaragua, including simultane-
ous negotiations to:
(A) implement the Contadora Document
of Objectives of September 8, 1983, and
(B) develop, in close consultation and co-
operation with other nations, trade and eco-
nomic measures to complement the econom-
ic sanctions of the United States imposed by
the President on May 1, 1985 and to encour-
age the Government of Nicaragua to take
the necessary steps to resolve the conflict.
(2) to suspend the economic sanctions im-
posed by the President on May 1, 1985 and
the United States military maneuvers in
Honduras and off the coast of Nicaragua if
the Government of Nicaragua agrees (A) to
a cease fire, (B) to open a dialogue with all
elements of the opposition, including the
Nicaraguan democratic resistence, and (C)
to suspend the state of emergency in Nicara-
gua;
(3) to call upon the Nicaraguan democrat-
ic resistence to remove from their ranks any
individuals who have engaged in human
rights abuses; and
(4) to resume bilateral discussions with
the Government of Nicaragua with a view to
encouraging-
(A) a church-mediated dialogue between
the Government of Nicaragua and all ele-
ments of the opposition, including the Nica-
raguan democratic resistence, in support of
internal reconcilation as called for by the
Contadora Document of Objectives; and
(B) a comprehensive, verifiable agreement
among the nations of Central America,
based on the Contadora Document of Objec-
tives.
(f) The President shall submit a report to
the Congress 90 days after the enactment of
this act, and every 90 days thereafter, on
any actions taken to carry out subsections
(a) and (b). Each such report shall include
(1) a detailed statement of the progress
made, if any, in reaching a negotiated settle-
ment referred to in subsection (e)(1), (2) a
detailed accounting of the disbursements
made to provide humanitarian assistance
with the funds referred to in subsections (a)
and (b), and (3) a statement of the steps
taken by the Nicaraguan democratic resist-
ance to comply with the request referred to
in subsection (e)(3).
(g) As used in this section, the term "hu-
manitarian assistance" means the provision
of food, clothing, medicine, other humani-
tarian assistance, and transportation associ-
ated with the delivery of such assistance.
Such term does not include weapons, weap-
ons systems, ammunition, or any other
equipment or materiel which is designed, or
has as its purpose, to inflict serious bodily
harm or death.
(h) Nothing in this section precludes shar-
ing or collecting necessary intelligence in-
formation by the United States.
(i)(1) No other materiel assistance may be
provided to the Nicaraguan democratic re-
sistance, directly or indirectly, by any
agency or instrumentality of the Govern-
ment of the United.States from any funds
under its control or otherwise available to it
unless an additional request is presented to
Congress by the President and then only to
the extent it is approved as provided in this
section.
(2) If the President determines at any
time after the date of the enactment of this
act that negotiations based on the Conta-
dora Document of Objectives of September
8, 1983 have failed to produce an agreement,
or if other trade and economic measures
have failed to resolve the conflict in Central
America, the President may request the
Congress to. authorize additional assistance
for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in
such amount and of such a nature as the
President considers appropriate. The Presi-
dent shall include in any such request a de-
tailed statement as to why the negotiations
or other measures have failed to resolve the
conflict in the region.
(j)(1) A joint resolution which is intro-
duced within 3 calendar days after the day
on which the Congress receives a Presiden-
tial request described in subsection (i) and
which, if enacted, would grant the President
the authority to take any or all of the ac-
tions described in subsection (1) shall be con-
sidered in accordance with procedures con-
tained in paragraphs (3) through (7) of sub-
section (c) of section 8066 of the Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985,
as contained in the joint resolution entitled
a "Joint Resolution making continuing ap-
propriations for the fiscal year 1985, and for
other purposes", approved October 12_1984
(Public law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1935), except
that-
(A) references in such paragraphs to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate
the House of Representatives shall be
deemed to be references to the appropriate
committee or committees of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, respectively;
and
(B) amendments to the joint resolution
are in order.
(2) This Section Is enacted by Congress-
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking
power of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives, respectively, and . as such it is
deemed a part of the rules of each House,
respectively, but applicable only with re-
spect to the procedure to be followed in that
House in the case of a resolution described
in subsection (a), and it supersedes other
rules only to the extent that it is inconsist-
ent with such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitu-
tional right of either House to change the
rules (so far as related to the procedure of
that House) at any time, in the same
manner and to the same extent as in the
case of any other rule of that House.
June 6, 1985
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not
know how we are going to allocate the
time. We are going to have a number
of speakers. But I ask that the Chair
to notify me in 5 minutes. I may have
to take a few more minutes beyond
that, but I would like to take 5 min-
utes, if that is satisfactory to my col-
league from Indiana.
Mr. President, this amendment is co-
,sponsored by myself as well as Senator
BENTSEN, Senator BOREN, Senator
JOHNSTON, Senator CHILES, Senator
LUGAR, Senator DECONCINI, Senator
DURENBERGER, Senator NICKLES, and
Senator DOLE. The amendment would
provide humanitarian assistance to
the democratic resistance in Nicara-
gua.
Everyone in this Chamber is well
aware of the recent debate as to
whether humanitarian assistance
should be provided to the democratic
resistance in Nicaragua. The adminis-
tration proposal, which was very simi-
lar to this-it was not similar in legis-
lative form but similar to the Presi-
dent's later commitment was a strange
legislative vote, but I think most
people understood the intent-passed
the Senate by a narrow vote, 53 to 46,
but failed in the House.
Shortly after the Senate vote, Sena-
tors BENTSEN, JOHNSTON, BOREN, and I
introduced a resolution; Senate Joint
Resolution 129, which would have re-
leased the $14 million fenced last year
but limited use of those funds only for
humanitarian assistance.
Since then, we have revised this
amendment in some substantive areas,
but the thrust of it has not changed in
appreciable ways.
The amendment we are introducing
today would unfence the $14 million
and authorize an additional $24 mil-
lion of humanitarian assistance for
fiscal year 1986. It provides that the
money is to be expended by the Presi-
dent only for humanitarian assistance
to the. Nicaraguan democratic resist-
ance and that the National Security
Council is to supervise the expenditure
of the money.
In listening to the debate on the
floor, I was struck by the fact that
most Senators seem to agree on what
our policy objectives in Central Amer-
ica should be. Nobody believes that
the Sandinistas are acting in accord-
ance with the commitments they made
to the OAS or commitments they
made to their own revolution.
The purpose of this amendment is to
help develop a sustainable policy that
can enjoy the support of the Congress
and the American people. A number of
other Members of Congress have made
similar suggestions. Regretfully no
such compromise was reached during
the last debate, and, as a result, our
policy toward Central America re-
mains in disarray.
All Senators seemed to agree that we
should support democracy in Nicara-
gua and the rest of Central America,
that Nicaragua cannot become a base
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
for the Soviet Union or Cuba or their
surrogates, that the Sandinistas must
not threaten or subvert their neigh-
bors, and that they should live up to
the promises they made to the OAS in
1979 to adopt a pluralistic, representa-
tive government. Those are the goals
that I believe most people in this body
would agree with.
The problem is how we should ac-
complish these objectives. That is
where the failure has been. The ad-
ministration has yet to produce a
policy which enjoys sufficient support
of the American people and the Con-
gress to make it sustainable.
We might adopt something stronger
than this amendment in this Chamber
today, but I believe it would be coun-
terproductive, because it would set in
motion a counterreaction in the House
and it would solidify opposition. Even
if it were to go through the House and
the Senate, it would not send the in-
dispensable signal that must be sent if
our policy has any chance of succeed-
ing in Central America, and that is a
signal that we are going to have
enough support on both sides of the
aisle to continue a policy, for whatever
time is necessary, to accomplish our
goals and objectives.
That is the heart of what we are
trying to do here. We can argue about
the definition of humanitarian aid,
but we are trying to get enough of a
consensus on both sides of the aisle so
that we send that indispensable mes-
sage, that we are not going to be down
there for 6 months, 1 year, or. 2 years.
We do not have Lebanon-type provi-
sions in this amendment. There are no
time limits. We are going to continue
this kind of -policy as long as necessary
to accomplish our goals. If that mes-
sage goes out of this Chamber with
the vote today, then, in my opinion,
the amendment will have been a suc-
cess. The policy itself may take a long
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ARMSTRONG). The Senator has used 5
minutes.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask that
I be notified in 5 minutes, and I will
try to accelerate my comments.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair will notify the Senator.
Mr. NUNN. Furthermore, in the
public's eyes U.S. policy has become
unjustly, and most inaccurately re-
duced to the issue' of aid to the Con-
tras. There is plenty of blame to go
around for this-to the administration
for inappropriate activities undertak-
en by the CIA, and the lack of a coher-
ent Nicaraguan policy framework in
which to place the Contra program,
and to Congress for its inadequate
oversight of the problem as well as its
repeated, protracted, divisive debates
which have served little to clarify the
larger Central American issues in-
volved.
This amendment is intended to be
the first step in rectifying this situa-
tion. By providing aid we are affirming
our support of those who stand for
freedom and democracy in Central
America. But by providing humanitari-
an aid we are also signalling our will-
ingness to support nonmilitary means
of achieving peace and democracy in
the region. In El Salvador, we have
supported President Duarte's efforts
at dialogue with the rebels; we should
do no less in Nicaragua, nor should we
expect less of the Sandinistas than
that they talk to the armed opposi-
tion.
By providing now funding for hu-
manitarian assistance in 1985 and 1986
we resolve, for a crucial period of time,
the issue of what, if any, aid to give
the Contras. With this basic aspect of
our policy decided, the administration
will have time free from legislative
battles in which to reshape and re-
structure our complete Nicaraguan
policy as it fits into our policy frame-
work for the region. This is vital work.
It must be done.
It must be clear to one and all at
home and abroad that aid to the Con-
tras is only part of a region wide strat-
egy to deal with the challenges we
face. -
No one should have any doubt about
those challenges. We face a struggle
between brave men and women fight-
ing for democracy and a better life on
one side and, on the other side, the en-
emies of freedom both of the left and
right. And no one should have any
doubt about where America stands in
that conflict. We must stand with the
forces of democracy.
We have stood with the democratic
center in El Salvador, we have sup-
ported the delicate transition to demo-
cratic government in Guatemala, Hon-
duras and Panama, and we must stand
with the democratic resistance in Nica-
ragua. There has been much rhetoric
about the Contras. The President has
suggested that they are just like our
Founding Fathers. Others regard
them as right wing terrorists..I believe
the President overstates the case, but
the facts are that genuine democrats,
men like Arturo Cruz, who were im-
prisoned by Somoza and were early
supporters of the Sandinistas, now be-
lieve that the Contras offer the true
path of democracy. Because men like
Cruz are the leaders of the Contras, it
is our obligation to help them.
Many believe that we should never
have begun providing assistance to the
Contras, that the Sandinistas are a le-
gitimate revolution, and that the
United States should not intervene in
the internal affairs of another coun-.
try. Regardless of how one feels about
the initial decision to support the Con-
tras, the fact is that we did. Regard-
less of how one feels about the legiti-
macy of the Sandinista revolution-
and, like a lot of other Americans, I
applauded the overthiow of Somoza-
the facts are that the Sandinistas have
betrayed their revolution. Regardless
of how one feels about U.S. interven-
tion; the facts are that the Sandinistas
are actively supporting subversion of
their neighbors. And, the facts are
S 7629
that the Contras began as a small
group of Nicaraguans and grew as
other Nicaraguans became increasing-
ly disenchanted with the Sandinistas.
I am convinced that they would have
grown with or without our aid.
Moreover, it is clear that the Con-
tras have been able to generate pres-
sure on the Sandinistas and the Sandi-
nistas would very much like to termi-
nate any aid to them. In my judgment,
we must design a policy that continues
pressure on the Sandinistas but moves
American promotion of military action
to the back burner.
Our policy must also avoid the "Leb-
anon syndrome" in which the Presi-
dent and Congress establish arbitrary
and unrealistic time limits to complex
foreign policy, goals.
The American people must believe
that all avenues of diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and political pressure have
been exhausted if there is to be any
lasting support for military related op-
tions. That is not the case today.
Right or wrong, the American people
perceive that the military option
through the Contras has been on the
front burner and is, the President's
course of first resort.
The.challenge, I believe, is to move
forward with political, diplomatic, and
economic pressure, and continue the
possibility of military pressure itself.
The proposal we are offering today
would achieve these objectives.
Let me explain the principal ele-
ments of this amendment.
First, it authorizes $24 million for
fiscal year 1986 and unfences the $14
million from last year, but provides
that those funds may be only used by
the President for humanitarian assist-
ance which is defined as food, cloth-
ing, medicine, other humanitarian .as-
sistance, and transportation. It does
not include any weapons, weapons sys-
tems, or ammunition. Because we be-
lieve that it is important that the
democratic resistance be able to
defend itself, the amendment specifi-
cally does not preclude the provision
of intelligence information to the
democratic resistance or the collection
of necesary intelligence by the United
States. In making these funds avail-
able, the amendment repeals the
Boland amendment, but, as I will ex-
plain more fully below, does so in a
way that no further assistance may be
provided to the Contras unless Con-
gress specifically authorizes.
The amendment provides that the
President is to administer the assist-
ance and that the NSC is to monitor
the program. I recognize that many
Senators believe that aid should be ad-
ministered by the Agency for Interna-
tional Development or the State De-
partment. They do not want the CIA
involved. I understand their concerns,
particularly as the CIA has not. han-
dled this project well in the past. How-
ever, I believe that the United States
should use our assistance for.the Con-
tras as a lever to assist in fostering a
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S 7630 ~ CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD - SENATE
regional solution to: the conflict. Ac-
cordingly, I believe that the maximum
flexibility should be given to the Presi-
dent to administer this assistance. The
President must make a detailed report
to the Congress every 90 days and, if
he chooses to have the CIA involved, I
can assure him that Congress will be
watching very closely. I know I cer-
tainly will be.
Second. It urges the President to vig-
orously pursue diplomatic and eco-
nomic measures, including negotia-
tions, to implement the Contadora ob-
jectives, and to develop, in close coop-
eration with our allies, trade and eco-
nomic measures to pressure the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. The President
is also urged to suspend the economic
sanctions he imposed on May 1 and to
suspend military maneuvers in Hondu-
ras and off Nicaragua's coast if the
Government of Nicaragua agrees to a
ceasefire, opens a dialog with the
democratic resistance, and suspends
the state of emergency.
Mr. President, our amendment urges
the President to suspend the economic
sanctions if the Sandinistas take the
steps I mentioned, because we think
he made a serious error in imposing
them unilaterally and without any at-
tempt to use them as a lever in the ne-
gotiations. When a number of Mem-
bers of Congress, including Senator
BENTSEN and I, called for economic
and trade sanctions, we urged that
they be done in concert with our
allies-not unilaterally. We also ex-
pected that the President would use
the prospect of sanctions as a lever to
persuade the Sandinistas to negotiate
seriously in the Contadora process.
But the President did not do that. On
the eve of departing for Europe, the
President hastily imposed the sanc-
tions. There was, so far as I know,
little or no consultation with our
allies. It should be no surprise, then,
that only El Salvador has come out in
support of the sanctions. What is
worse, some of our best friends in the
region and in Europe have condemned
the sanctions and said that they would
offset the sanctions by increased trade
with Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have
been having a propaganda -field day,
exploiting the lack of support for the
sanctions and blaming them as the
cause of the serious shortages of food
and other necessities that, in fact,
have been caused by their own inept-
ness and adherence to the Marxist/
Leninist economic theories. Some
sanctions.
Third, the President is also urged to
call upon the democratic resistance to
remove from its ranks any individuals
who have engaged in human rights
abuses, and the President is urged to
resume the bilateral discussions be-
tween the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua.
Fourth, the President is required to
report to Congress every 90 days and,
fifth, the amendment prohibits any
further aid from any U.S. Government
source unless the President requests
such assistance' from Congress and
Congress votes to approve. In order to
request this additional aid, the Presi-
dent must determine that negotiations
based on the Contadora principles or
the other economic and diplomatic
steps have failed to resolve 'the con-
flict. Expedited procedures are set out
for the consideration of that request.
As I mentioned, our amendment re-
peals the Boland .amendment; but I be-
lieve the approach we are suggesting is
preferable to that taken by the Boland
amendment, which prohibited any as-
sistance, directly or indirectly, to
groups engaged in military or para-
military operations in Nicaragua.
Those who wish to preserve the
Boland amendment have suggested
that we could enact a provision giving
humanitarian aid to the Contras "not-
withstanding any other law." The
problem with that formulation is that
it left it up to the administration to
decide what assistance was humanitar-
ian and thus could be provided, and
what aid assisted directly or .indirectly
military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua and thus could not be pro-
vided. That approach would have cre-
ated a vast gray area in which no one
could be certain what could be provid-
ed and what could not be. Our ap-
proach is much more direct. It permits
humanitarian aid to be provided,
strictly defines humanitarian assist-
ance, and prohibits any further aid
from any U.S. Government agency
unless the President specifically re-
quests it from Congress and we vote
our approval. Thus, there could be no
further military assistance, overt or
covert, by the CIA or State or AID or
.anyone, unless Congress specifically
approves. This addresses the concerns
which led many Senators to support
the Boland amendment, but permits
humanitarian aid to be provided with-
out ambiguity and makes it clear that
no further assistance can be provided
without specific approval by Congress.
Mr. President, this amendment sets
forth the humanitarian assistance
that may be- provided to the Nicara,
guar democratic resistance. By that
term we mean those Nicaraguans who
have taken up arms against the Sandi-
nistas and are engaged in armed resist-
ance.
This amendment incorporates ele-
ments from the major proposals that
were considered recently, including
the resolution favored by the adminis-
tration, the one advanced by Senator
BYRD on behalf of several Democrats,
and the recommended -economic sanc-
tions suggested by Senator BENTSEN
and myself. Finally, it does not include
the language of Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 106-to which many Senators ob-
jected-that would have .authorized
supporting, directly or indirectly, mili-
tary or paramilitary operations In
Nicaragua. Indeed, it makes it very
clear that only humanitarian assist-
ance may be provided unless Congress
gives further authorization.
June 6, 198
I hope, therefore, that this amend-
ment will enjoy broad bipartisan sup-
port.
This approach is . a regional ap-
proach. All parties are required to do
certain things. The Sandinistas are re-
quired to do only what they have al-
ready promised to do.. The democratic
resistance is obligated to' insure that it
is a truly democratic movement by
purging from its pranks individuals who
are responsible for human rights
abuses. The United States must
pursue bilateral negotiations with the
Sandinistas and be prepared to sus-
pend maneuvers if the Sandinistas
take the steps that I have mentioned.
This approach calls the Sandinistas'
hand. They say they are democratic. I
say 'OK, let them prove it. This hu-
manitarian aid will sustain the demo-
cratic resistance; it will keep the flame
of liberty and hope alive.
Moreover, humanitarian aid instead
of military aid should facilitate negoti-
ations both within the Contadora
framework and between the United
States and the Sandinistas. Changing
the nature of renewed U.S. Govern-
ment assistance to the Contras will
also serve to emphasize our new ap-
proach, characterized by our deter-
mined interest in a negotiated settle-
ment. Finally, it permits the aid to be
used as a lever to pursue our objec-
tives.
This amendment puts military aid in
the background but leaves the military
option open. If the President con-
cludes that the economic and diplo-
matic paths have failed, he may come
back to Congress and request addition-
al assistance. If he has made a good
faith effort to exhaust these courses
and if the Sandinistas {lo not modify
their behavior, then the President's
request for additional assistance will
meet a very different reception in the
Congress. '
Mr. President, this amendment is de-
sighed to develop a longterm course,
one that can enjoy broad bipartisan
support and provide the President the
basis to conduct a coherent, sustain-
able foreign policy. I urge my col-
leagues to support it.
Mr. President, for the purpose of
clarity I shall read the cosponsors
again. Myself, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr.
BOREN, Mr. CHILES, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr.
DOLE, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. DURENBERGER,
Mr. DECoNcnNI, arid Mr. DixoN.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Ind`.iana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, shortly
I will ask that the Chair allocate 7
minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Texas.
? Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I am
disappointed, frankly, with all of the
proposals offered so far which concern
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. Some
suffer from a tendency to treat the
Sandinistas and the interests of the
United States naively while others
would make ineffective or inappropri-
ate policy.
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Let there be no doubt, the United
States has reason to be concerned
about Nicaragua because American in-
terest`s are involved, but this doesn't
mean that we must actively seek the
overthrow of the Sandinista regime or
support the Contras just enough to
keep up the killing without a hope of
success. In my estimation, it is not
clear at this time that we can't reach
an acceptable accord with the Sandi-
nistas that sets the groundwork for
peace and stability in the region. The
administration, which has tried fund-
ing the anti-Sandinista revolutionaries
and unsuccessfully sought the over-
throw of the Sandinista regime, has
not taken the opportunity presented
by this pressure to strike a bargain for
peace.
I urge the administration and my
colleagues to consider the options that
are available to us in a sober and ob-
jective fashion.-These options, which I
will discuss briefly, include continued
use of various means to gain intelli-
gence and show American resolve, eco-
nomic pressure, aid to the Contras,
and diplomacy.
Our understanding of the challenges
posed for us in Nicaragua derives from
intelligence gathering-and we must
have the very best. We need to know if
and when the Sandinistas ship arms to-
rebels in neighboring states. We need
to know what the Soviets and Cubans
are up to. We need to know all we can
about Nicaraguan military policies,
arms acquisitions, base construction,
and activities that might lead to offer-
ing the Soviets or Cubans base privi-
leges. Our efforts in this regard, with
the exception of some needlessly pro-
vocative actions on several occasions,
have been appropriate, indeed, Impera-
tive.
In addition, the United States has
been right to show its resolve-so long
as there is a serious problem-through
a military presence in the region. This
presence serves notice to the Sandinis-
tas, Soviets, and Cubans that under-
mining peace in Central America or
the Caribbean will not be tolerated.
We need not, as some have suggested
here today, stipulate in legislation
what might constitute sufficient
reason to intervene with those forces.
I believe existing law which checks
Presidential war powers is sufficient.
Carefully defining what would consti-
tute reason to intervene would simply
suggest to those who might exploit
the situation what 'they could get
away with.
At the urging of some of my col-
leagues in the Senate a month and a
half ago, the President embargoed
trade with Nicaragua. Instead of being
a response to particular Nicaraguan
behavior, it was timed to serve as a
substitute for aid to the Contras fol-
lowing the defeat of aid in the House.
It appeared to be a weak, second-
choice means to show American re-
solve. Not only was. the timing poor,
but my guess is that it will be counter-
productive The embargo will largely,
if not entirely, be offset by the trade
from other countries and will assist
the Sandinistas in blaming the prob-
lems in Nicaragua on us. It might very
well strengthen Ortega's popular sup-
port. But now that we have taken this
step, in spite of these shortcomings,
we should see it as a flexible instru-
ment to be reconsidered in light of
Sandinista behavior.
The effects of the embargo are simi-
lar to those of funding the Contras.
That aid backfired in two ways. First,
it bolstered the Sandinista's fallacious
assertion that the rebels were nothing
more than ex-members of the Samo-
zan national guard funded by the
United States, and thus it lent support
to the Sandinista's claim to embody
Nicaraguan nationalism. Second, it
gave them an excuse to continue their
military buildup.
The difficult conditions in Nicara-
gua, sharpened by the pressure exert-
ed by the administration, have not
been fully exploited in the peace proc-
ess. The depressed economy, anarchy
in parts of the countryside, and a gen-
eral- sense of national insecurity in
Nicaragua afford us an opportunity, it
seems to me, to make a serious at-
tempt to drive an acceptable bargain.
Unfortunately, I just don't see evi-
dence of that kind of effort by the ad-
ministration. We need to take greater
initiatives within the Contadora
framework and, at the first instance of
good faith exhibited by the Sandinis-
tas, restart bilateral talks. That course
of action, however, should not be man-
dated by the Congress because such a
mandate will reduce to zero the
chance of gaining any change in San-
dinista policies in return.
Mr. President, let me summarize and
conclude briefly. We should maintain
our presence and surveillance in the
region. We should use the embargo
flexibly in response to Sandinista
policy. And, above all, we should spare
no effort in exhausting diplomatic ave-
nues toward a regional peace agree-
ment. Before we seek to overthrow a
foreign government, we should fully
explore the alternatives. The policy I
have outlined above-needs a chance to
prove its viability. If it proves unsuc-?
cessful, then a reassessment will cer-
tainly be necessary.?
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Indiana yield for a, unan-
imous consent request?
Mr. LUGAR. I yield.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Senator ExoN
of Nebraska be added as a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous .consent that Senator
GOLDWATER be . a cosponsor of the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out.objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the dis-
tinguished Senator from Rhode Island
has indicated that he will have an
opening statement. Notwithstanding
S 7631
that, if I may ask the indulgence of
the Senator, so Senator BENTSEN may
speak at this point for our side, we will
appreciate it.
I yield 7 minutes to the distin-
guished Senator from Texas.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Indiana.
Mr. President, in a bipartisan 53 to
46 majority, we voted to release $14
million in funds for the Contras that
were included in the continuing reso-
lution for fiscal year 1985. Unfortu-
nately, that proposal, did not become
law, and that is one reason we are dis-
cussing the issue once again.
I realize that many Members of this
body oppose our current policy toward
Nicaragua, and others who do not
oppose it are skeptical of the way it
has been conducted. I. too, wish we
could go back to the beginning and
start over. But we do not have that
luxury; , we have to proceed from
where we are now, consider what our
national foreign policy goals ought to
be, and decide how? we can go about
achieving them.
Now there is a great deal about the
actions of the Government of Nicara-
gua that I do not like. I do not like its
Marxist-Leninist orientation; I do not
like the way it censors the press or the
Cardinal Obando y Bravo's homilies: I
do not like the way it uproots people
from their land and places them on co-
operative farms. But having said all
this, let me say something else: If this
were all that the Sandinistas were
doing, then it would be difficult to jus-
tify governmental support for the
Contras. If everything the Sandinistas
did had only an internal effect, then
as much as I might oppose them, and
as much as I would want them to
change their ways, and as much as I
might want to apply pressure on them
because of their violations of human
rights, then Government support for
the Contras would not be my choice.
But the Sandinistas are not just a
leftist group that is engaging in inter-
nal repression and experimenting with
socialism as a possible way of solving
the problems of a developing country
in Latin America. Neither the political
ideology of the Government of Nicara-
gua nor its particular philosophy of
property ownership is the issue here.
The issue is what they are doing that
threatens the peace and stability of
Central America and the long-term in-
terests of the United States in that
region, and how we can diminish this
threat.
The Sandinistas are actively engaged
in training guerrillas who are trying to
overthrow by violence the govern-
ments of El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica. We have discussed the
control and communications facilities
that the Sandinistas admit they are
providing for the five guerrilla fac-
tions in El Salvador. We have dis-
cussed the arms and ammunition the
Sandinistas have been providing to
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87632 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
many of these same guerrillas. And we
know that much of this has been
going on almost since the time the
Sandinistas took over in Nicaragua.
This is a group that came to power
promising democracy and respect for
its neighbors.
We have discussed on more than one
occasion recently the size and composi-
tion of the Sandinista armed forces,
which have grown so large that they
are in a position to intimidate their
neighbors. I do not see any need to
talk about the specific numbers again;
we should all understand by now the
implications of the Sandinista military
buildup and what it portends for the
peace of the xegion.
Let's discuss last April's congression--
al vote on Contra aid and our policy
toward Nicaragua. . Many Members
wanted to give the Sandinistas an op-
portunity to show their good faith,
and to do so they voted against aid to
the Contras. Well, we saw immediately
just what good faith on the part of the
Sandinistas means. Hardly had the
last votes been cast than Daniel
Ortega was off for Moscow to greet
Mikhail Gorbachev and to ask .him for
additional aid. This action should not
have been too surprising, and .I believe
it underscores one of the ultimate dan-
gers posed :by ,the direction the Sandi-
nistas are presently heading.
The same people are saying the
same things. That somehow the
United States drove the Sandinistas
into the -arms of the Russians. That
the United States has been hostile to
he Sandinistas from the beginning.
Well, that is just not true. While we
were sending aid, they were establish-
ing the second Soviet satellite in this
hemisphere and the first on the .North
American Continent. Today, an armed
.Nicaraguan minority, advised and
backed by 3,000 or so Russian, Cuban,
East German, Bulgarian, and PLO
military advisers is busy suppressing
the Nicaraguan majority.
From the beginning, the United
States tried to help Nicaragua's revo-
lution fulfill its original promises. Im-
mediately after the ouster of Presi-
dent 'Somoza in 1979, we airlifted food
to feed the thousands of people dis-
placed by the conflict. Over the next 2
years we gave the new government
five times as much aid as we had ,given
its predecessor during its last 2 years.
This Senator voted for such aid. In
fact, our $117 million was more than
Nicaragua received from any other
nation in the world during those first
few years.In addition, we helped ar-
range rescheduling agreements with
commercial banks and new loans in
multilateral development banks, and
we made special efforts to- strengthen
the private sector of Nicaragua's econ-
omy.
But while the United States was
trying to lend a helping hand, the
Marxist hardliners among the revolu-
tionaries were consolidating their
power, radicalizing their :programs,
driving out those who did not share
their-ideology, and beginning to pro-
vide military assistance to guerrilla
movements in neighboring countries.
The Sandinistas leave few illusions to
comfort their supporters in this coun-
try. Tomas Borge brags of their revol-
tution without boundaries, and they
flaunt their increasing ties to the Sovi-
ets. They spurned our friendship and
refused to accept even our Peace
Corps volunteers. They abandoned
their professed commitments to de-
mocracy, and they embarked on a
course of action that has. gotten
them-and us-to the point we have
reached today.
Mr..President, I think it is now tune
for us to acknowledge that the hopes
which many of us had for the Sandi-
nista regime have been disappointed;
that their revolution has turned sour
and become a threatening presence in
Central America.
I believe there is a substantial senti-
ment in this body in support of actions
to persuade the .Sandinistas to change
the direction in which they are so
clearly headed. What :is being offered
here today is a comprehensive propos-
al for doing precisely this. This
amendment endeavors to codify the
consensus on U.S. policy which I be-
lieve already exists in the Senate and
which may well be emerging in the
othq body as well. It provides a mix-
ture of pressures and incentives for
Nicaragua to change course at home
and in its dealings with .its neighbors.
I believe this measure is a strong
signal of U.S. support for the demo=cratic opposition. It provides encour-
agement and support for the diplomat-
ic process. It is not draconian; it is not
one sided. It calls upon our own Gov-
ernment to reenter .bilaterial negotia-
tions with the Sandinistas; and it says
we should refrain from military ma-
neuvers near Nicaragua and suspend
the trade embargo if the Sandinistas
will agree to a cease-fire. to a dialog
with the democratic resistance forces
in Nicaragua, and to a suspension of
the state of emergency.
It calls upon the Contras to elimi-
nate from their ranks any individuals
who have engaged in human rights
abuses.
Furthermore, this amendment rec-
ognizes the legitimate concerns of the
Congress about the way the Nicaragua
program has been conducted in the
past by limiting assistance to the Con-
tras to the funds released and author-
ized in this statute. It does not provide
a backdoor for any other aid to the
Contras, whether covert or overt.
No one can be sure what the Sandi-
nista response to these proposals will
be. I hope that they will see our deter-
mination and will turn aside from the
course they have been pursuing.
But I am convinced they will do so
only if there is sufficient pressure on
them from within. A crucial compo-
nent of this package, consequently, is
release of the $14 million in human-.
tarian assistance for the democratic
resistance forces in Nicaragua for this
year, plus the authorization of $24
million in such assistance for fiscal
year .1986.
Today, even wil:hout U.S. assistance,
the Contra forces have grown to twice
what they were last year, and they are
continuing to grow at a rate of '500 a
month. It is not at all unusual for a
patrol to go out with 20 commandos,
as they -call themselves, and return to
their base camp with twice that many.
They are raising private funds, but it
is vital that we give their efforts our
stamp of approval, both for the
morale boost, it offers the Contras and
for the message it sends both to the
Sandinistas and to the other govern-
ments in the regions.
I want to emphasize, too, that the
Contras are not mercenaries, despite
the Sandinista propaganda claims.
Almost all of them are simple peas-
ants-Campesinos-who say they are
fighting because they have had their
land taken from them, because they
have been placed on cooperative
farms, because they want to be left
alone to raise their crops and their
families. They are not receiving any
pay for their service, only beans and
rice and bullets. They are willing to
give their lives for their own interests
in Nicaragua, but in doing so they .are
also fighting on behalf of the interests
of the United Stares.
In closing, I want to emphasize that
if the Sandinistas succeed in eliminat-
ing the Contra,; and consolidating
their power with Nicaragua, they will
pose an even greater threat to the
peace and stability of the region. The
primary obstacle to this is the pres-
sure exerted on them by the Contras;
and if we take the pressure off, if we
abandon the one force that is current-
ly engaging their attention, then lain
confident the Sandinistas will increase
their active support of insurgencies,
and their violence, censorship and sup-
pression will spread to the other coun-
tries of Latin America. The stream of
refugees headed toward Mexico and
the United States will turn into a tor-
rent, and San Antonio, the 10th larg-
est city in the United States, will be
well on its way to becoming the first.
It is legitimate, necessary, and right
that the United States be concerned
about the safety of its neighbors and
that it exert its influence against
those who would subjugate a free
people. We are a leader among the na-
tions of the free 'world and we should
measure up to that .responsibility. We
cannot abdicate that responsibility
with a return to the short-term -cop
out of isolationism. We should do
what we can to discourage the Sandi-
nistas' regional ad.venturism and ?to* en-
courage the elimination of their mili-
tary ties with the Soviet bloc, and I
urge your support of this amendment
as a reasonable and comprehensive
way to achieve this objective.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield
myself such time as is necessary.
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECOR
Mr. President, I want to commend
the sponsors of this amendment for
their real efforts to find a middle-,
ground position that might attract bi-
partisan support to achieve peace in
Central America. In particular, 'their
effort to define more clearly what con-
stitutes humanitarian aid .is an im-
provement over the earlier versions of
the approach embodied in this amend-
ment.
Regrettably, however, I believe it
still falls short of constituting what I
would consider an approach that leads
to peace rather than a continued con-
flict, because, as I read this amend-
ment, it would not clearly prohibit the
provision of trucks, jeeps, communica-
tions equipment, and other items that,
whole nonlethal in and of themselves,
would support the continuation of a
conflict in violation of our commit-
ment under the OAS charter and in
violation of our own national interests.
But even If the definition of humani-
tarian aid were further clarified to
prohibit providing the equipment I
have just described, giving humanitari-
an aid would still permit the. Contras
to divert funds now being used for
such things as food, medicine, and
clothing to be used to acquire military
equipment.
More importantly, however, para-
graph (i)(2) of the amendment is dan-
gerously flawed and, if enacted, would
come close to constituting the sort of
Gulf of Tonkin kind of open invitation
to the President to take whatever
action he considers necessary to re-
solve the conflict. As one of the few
Senators left who made the bad mis-
take of voting for the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution some years back, I am
always perhaps extra sensitive to any
analogy in this regard.
The two bases for the Presidential
determination contained in this para-
graph appear, in fact, to be designed
to encourage the President to escalate
American support for or direct in-
volvement in the Contra effort to
overthrow the Government of Nicara-
gua.
Why do I believe this? First of all,
the determination relating to the Con-
tadora document of ? objectives does
not require that Nicaragua be respon-
sible for any failure to reach an agree-
ment based upon that document. Only
a few months ago, Nicaragua and
other Central American countries
were prepared to sign a Contradora-
sponsored treaty, but pressure from
our own administration caused the
other Central American Governments
not to sign. Furthermore, we should
remember it was the United States
that unilaterally broke off the bilater-
al talks with Nicaragua in Manzanillo
that might have resolved United
States-Nicaraguan, differences regard-
ing the Contadora treaty.
Nothing has happened since then
holds out any promises that the ad-
ministration is really serious about re-
solving differences with Nicaragua so
as to achieve a treaty.
The second determination relating
to the failure of trade and economic
measures to resolve the conflict in
Central America is also destined to be
a foregone outcome. Most, if not all, of
our allies in the region and in Europe
have absolutely refused to cooperate
in the American sanctions effort, and
Nicaragua has already taken steps to
negate the effects of the sanctions.
These sanctions, which will affect
mainly the middle income and the pri-
vate sector groups in Nicaragua, will
not, in my view,, prove effective. The
vacuum will be quickly filled up by
other willing suppliers. Frankly, I
think the application of ? economic
sanctions usually is the same as if one
shoots one's self in the foot.
So the President will have no prob-
lem in making either of the determi-
nations provided for in paragraphs
(i)(2). I predict that if this provision
becomes law, the administration will
be back with requests that will boggle
the mind. The language in this para-
graph that states "The President may
request the Congress to authorize ad-
ditional assistance for the democratic
resistance in such amount and of such
a nature as the President considers ap-
propriate" could, as I read it, be esca-
lated to include the sending of U.S.
military forces to fight in Nicaragua.
I think, in general, while this
amendment is a true effort at achiev-
ing a bipartisan approach, it does not
do the job that I would like to see it
do.
Finally, from my own viewpoint, I
think we should be honest with our-
selves. To my mind, the Contras really
are terrorists. The definition of terror-
ism is the changing of the policy of
government through violence and
murder and the like. This is exactly
what the Contras are seeking to do'
now in Nicaragua.
In addition to that, the difference
between a freedom fighter and a ter-
rorist is, to' my mind, pretty clear. A
freedom fighter is.somebody who goes
after military objectives, military tar-
gets, and installations of the govern-
ment that they are trying to overturn.
A terrorist is far more indiscriminate
in the damage that he or she does and
a good many civilians get killed in the
process.
About a year ago, the rough esti-
mate was that some 4,000 civilian casu-
alties had taken place as a result of
the action of the Contras. Now, terror-
ism, I think, should be opposed, and
we do -inveigh against it. But when it is
practiced, we should be honest with
ourselves and recognize that we, too,
are using terrorism as a weapon.
So, for all of these reasons, I find
myself in opposition to this amend-
ment but in praise of the motives that
caused it to be written.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Rhode Island yield
me 5 minutes?
Mr. PELL. I yield 5 minutes to the
Senator from Massachusetts.
S 7633
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Massachusetts is recog-
nized.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I will
vote against providing so-called "hu-
manitarian assistance" to the Contras
because of one undeniable, irrefutable,
nondebatable fact: This assistance is
nothing more than logistical support
for the Contras war against the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua, and I do not be-
lieve that the United States of Amer-
ica should be in the business of over-
throwing governments.
U.S. support for this war has been a
mistake from the beginning. It is a
mistake to continue it today. The
policy is wrong-legally, morally, and
practically. It has been a failure to
date, and it has no hope of success in
the future. It has also been an embar-
rassment to the United States
throughout the world.
Within 6 weeks after President
Reagan took the oath of office in 1981,
he endorsed the CIA's plan to organize
and to fund paramilitary activities
against the Sandinista Government in
Nicaragua. This decision brought the
United States into anoallia.nce with an
army that was, at that time, dominat-
ed by the leaders of Somoza's notori-
ous and hated national guard. We
should not have signed on with the So-
mocistas then; we should not be sup-
porting them today. In 1981, Mr.
Reagan turned -to the secret use of
military force as his course of first
resort, he signed us up to support a
covert war run by the forces of reac-
tion and repression, and our policy
toward Nicaragua has been hostage to
that decision ever since. It is high time
that we changed course.
The issue today is really no different
from what it was a year ago, or just
last month, when the Congress reject-
ed providing military assistance to the
Contras. That issue is: Should the
United States - of America help the
Contras in their efforts to overthrow
the Government of Nicaragua?
Changing the label from military as-
sistance to humanitarian assistance
does not change the fundamental
issue. Clothing given to people fight-
ing a war is called uniforms; food given
to armed forces in combat is called ra-
tions; footwear for soldiers is boots;
and medical assistance to men in
battle is used to treat the wounded.
In fact, the use of the term "human-
itarian assistance" is totally mislead-
ing. We are not talking about provid-
ing "humanitarian assistance" here;
we are talking about providing logisti-
cal support for the Contra combatants
fighting to overthrow the Sandinistas.
The definition of "humanitarian as-
sistance" as set forth in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols requires
that humanitarian assistance, be ad-
ministered by an organization inde-
pendent from the parties of the con-
flict, that it be distributed to noncom-
batants only and then only on the
basis of need, and that it be available
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S7634 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
impartially to all affected civilians on
both sides of the conflict. This pro-
posed assistance flunks the test on all
counts. Simply put, this is more
money for more war.
If this assistance were really "hu-
manitarian," the cosponsors would not
be asking for so much. This amend-
ment authorizes the appropriation of
$24 million. This is an arbitrary, in
fact, an irrational sum that bears no
relationship whatsoever to the legiti-
mate humanitarian needs of those
Nicaraguans who have left Nicaragua
and now live in Honduras. To see how
irrational this figure is, one only needs
to compare it with actual expenditures
being made today by the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees
[UNHCR] which has a full-blown refu-
gee. assistance program for Nicara-
guans living in Honduras.
According to most recent counts, the
UNHCR provides assistance for 19,093
Nicaraguan refugees inside Honduras.
In 1983, the UNHCR budget for the
Nicaraguans was $4 million; the.
budget 1984 was $4.08 million. That
amounts to an expenditure of $213 per
Nicaraguan per year.
Now it is proposed that Congress
make available $24 million to the Con-
tras in fiscal year 1986. Assuming that
-the Contras now number somewhere
between 15,000 and 20,000 combatants,
this amendment would produce an ex-
penditure of between $1,200 and
$1,600 per Contra per year. This figure
.should be put in the context of an av-
erage annual per capita income for
Nicaraguans living inside their coun-
try of around $500.
Make no mistake about this vote: A
vote for this $24 million in so-called
humanitarian assistance will put $24.
million worth of guns and bullets in
the hands of the Contras just as
surely as if we were to deliver these
weapons directly. A vote for this
amendment is a vote for more war in.
Nicaragua and more killing by the
Contras.
Although the issue has not changed
from our earlier debates on this sub-
ject,. in many -ways, the debate has
been clarified. No longer are we oper-
ating under the illusion that, by assist-
ing the Contras, the United States is
simply trying to halt the flow of arms
from Nicaragua to the guerrilla forces
inside El Salvador. No longer are we
told that we must support the Contras
to pressure the Sandinistas into restor-
ing basic freedoms inside Nicaragua.
No longer is the purpose of the Presi-
dent's policy in any doubt: President
Reagan wants Congress to support the
Contras because he supports the aim
of the Contras-to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua by force. The
issue before the Senate today is
whether we will authorize the expend-
iture of $24 million to be used to over-
throw a government that we do not
approve of. That is a goal unworthy of
the United States of America, and we
should reject it.
And who are the people who will be
receiving this assistance? Are they
worthy of our support? Do they de-
serve our assistance? Do they repre-
sent the best ideals of America?
On this question, there has also been
some clarification over the past few
months. No longer is it possible to be-
lieve that the Contra commanders are
the moral equivalent to our Founding
Fathers. In fact, it is a travesty to
compare Enrique Bermudez to
Thomas Jefferson or John Adams or
James Madison. On the contrary,
there have been repeated and reliable
reports of gross atrocities by the
Contra combatants, of prisoners being
executed, of innocent women and chil-
dren being raped and mutilated, of ci-
vilians being murdered. How can the
Congress, in all conscience, provide an
additional $24 million to support
people engaged in this kind of outra-
geous and criminal conduct.
But one more clarification is needed:
We are not engaged today in a debate
about the political shortcomings or
character defects of the Sandinistas.
No one here is proposing a resolution
of support for the Sandinistas, and I
doubt that there is much disagree-
ment here about the nature of the
Sandinista leaders or about their ideo-
logical proclivities. I am no fan of the
Sandinistas, and I think we all under-
stand that the Sandinistas are not
champions of freedom and democracy.
The real question is what the United
States should do about it-consistent
with our own best values and in con-
junction with our own best friends and
allies.
Daniel Ortega's trip to Moscow was
shocking, but not for the reasons most
people give. After all, Ortega has been
to Moscow on other occasions, and his
fellow commandantes have also visited
such bastions of freedom as Libya and
Bulgaria. The fact that the Sandinis-
tas are friends of the enemies of free-
dom is not new.
Ortega's trip was shocking because
of its deliberate timing. His decision to
go to Moscow right after Congress
voted to withhold further assistance
from the Contras demonstrated both
arrogance and insensitivity. But arro-
gance and insensitivity is nothing new
from the Sandinistas. Ortega's trip to
Moscow was troubling to me for an-
other reason; it showed that the San-
dinistas care more about the views and
opinions of the leaders of the Soviet
Union that they do about the respect
and good will of the people of the
United States of America; it showed
that the Sandinistas are just as unwill-
ing to live with the reality of Ameri-
can influence and power in Central
America as some Americans are to live
with the reality of the Sandinista rev-
olution in Nicaragua. If the Sandinis-
tas want continued confrontation with
the United States, they should know
that there are plenty of Americans
who are happy to oblige them. But
that kind of collision course, in my
view, would be a disaster for Nicara-
guans and Americans alike.
But Ortega's trip is also evidence of
the increased influence of the Soviet
Union inside Nicaragua. I believe that
this, at least in part, is attributable to
President Reagan's alliance with the
Contras and his unequivocal state-
ments that he seeks, to make the San-
dinistas cry uncle.
The President's policy toward Nica-
ragua has not 'only failed; it has been
postively counterproductive. We share
the President's concern about the poli-
cies of the Sandinista Government.
We share his concern about the influ-
? ence of the Soviets and the Cubans in
the region, and, more particularly
about their presence and influence
inside Nicaragua. We share his con-
cern about Sandinista efforts to
export their revolution and to subvert
neighboring countries, although the
evidence is far from clear on this
point. We share his concern about the
increased size and strength of the Nic-
araguan military. And we share his
concern about human rights abuses
inside Nicaragua-particularly the
Sandinistas' inhuman treatment of
the Miskito Indians and other indige-
nous populations inside that country.
But when you examine what has
happened with respect to each one of
these concerns; the Reagan ap-
proach-continued support of the Con-
tras war-has made matters worse, not
better. Rather than reducing Soviet/
Cuban influence inside Nicaragua, the
Reagan policies have, over the past 5
years; resulted in an increase in that
influence. Rather than reducing .the
size of the Nicaraguan military estab-
lishment, the Reagan policies over the
past 5 years have prompted a growth
in the size of. the Nicaraguan Army
that is unprecedented in that nation's
history. Rather than undermining the
influence of the Sandinistas in the
region, the Reagan policies have trans-
formed Daniel Ortega into a heroic
David doing battle with a bullying
American Goliath. Rather than pro-
ducing greater freedom inside Nicara-
gua, the Reagan policies have only
given the Sandinista hardliners a pre-
text to crack down on dissidents inside
Nicaragua.
U.S. support of the Contras has
failed, it, cannot succeed, and we
should terminate it altogether.
But what about the trade embargo?'
This amendment calls upon Presi-
dent-Reagan to "develop, in close con-
sultation and cooperation with other
nations, trade and economic measures
to complement the economic sanctions
of the United States imposed by the
'President on May 1, 1985." The Presi-
dent's decision to declare a national
emergency and to impose a unilateral,
comprehensive trade embargo on Nica-
ragua was a gesture, not a policy, and
it will only 'compound our problems in
the region.
As a matter of principle, I have
nothing against economic sanctions,
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
when they make sense. In fact, I have
introduced legislation with Senator
WEICKER that would impose certain
economic pressures on the Govern-
ment of South Africa in an effort to
encourage nonviolent change and the
dismantling of apartheid in that coun-
try.
But I do not believe that a wholesale
trade embargo against Nicaragua, im-
posed unilaterally by the United
States, in the absence of any consulta-
tion or support from our friends and
allies in the region makes any sense.
First, this trade embargo only
heightens the perception that the
United States is no different from the
Soviet Union in its treatment of its
smaller and weaker neighbors, that
the United States is a bully, and that
Nicaragua is a victim. Daniel Ortega
will only become an even greater hero
among the people of his country and
among the people of the hemisphere,
particularly among the youth. Outside
observers perceive Nicaragua to be our
Poland, our Czechoslovakia and per-
haps ultimately, our Afghanistan. The
embargo will only fuel anti-American,
anti-Yankee feeling in Nicaragua and
in the region generally. -
Second, because of the embargo, all
the failures of the Sandinista revolu-
tion can now be laid at the feet of the
Americans. The Nicaraguan economy
is failing now because of serious mis-
takes by the Sandinistas themselves;
the embargo will only permit the San-
dinistas to escape responsibility for
their own errors and to blame the
United States for all economic prob-
lems inside their country. Whenever a
Nicaraguan cannot get a spare part,
whenever he or she must stand in line
for 3 hours to buy soap or toothpaste
or toilet paper, whenever a car breaks
down and cannot be fixed whenever
the buses run late, whenever crops
fail, whatever bad that happens will
now be blamed on the U.S.-sponsored
trade embargo. As a result, the stand-
ing of the Sandinistas inside Nicara-
gua will only be enhanced.
Third, a unilateral trade embargo
will inevitably be counterproductive.
The trade embargo will not reduce the
influence of the Soviets inside Nicara-
gua; it will only increase it. The em-
bargo will not reduce the strength or
resolve of the Nicaraguan military; it
will only increase the garrison state
mentality inside that country.
Fourth, this trade embargo will do
most serious damage to the opposition
forces inside Nicaragua who depend
upon trade with the United States for
their independence and existence. The
private sector is the backbone of La
Coordinadora, the most important op-
position force functioning inside Nica-
ragua today. The embargo strikes , at
the lifeblood of, the private sector and
damages its ability to operate separate
and apart from the Government. It is
for this reason, I, presume, that both
Arturo Cruz and Cardinal Obando y
Brava-two of the most,eloquent and
outspoken critics of the Sandinistas
inside Nicaragua-have been so critical
of the embargo.
Finally, this trade embargo damages
our standing with our friends and
allies. in the region and undermines
the Contadora. process. In this hemi-
sphere, the lack of support for Presi-
dent Reagan's initiative has been dra-
matic. Only El Salvador has supported
the President's action. This kind of
unilateral initiative by the United
States can only serve to undermine
the multilateral efforts of the Conta-
dora nations to achieve a comprehen-
sive resolution of the conflict in Cen-
tral America.
Opposition to this embargo has not
been limited to this hemisphere. Right
after President Reagan declared the
national emergency and imposed the
embargo, he traveled to Europe where
he met with some of our most impor-
tant allies. Not one of those allies has
endorsed President Reagan's initiative.
Many were openly critical, some are
openly assisting the Sandinistas ef-
forts to overcome the embargo.
In addition to providing additional
funds for the Contras' war, this
amendment repeals the Boland
amendment and unleashes the Central
Intelligence Agency to work with the
Contra forces by sharing intelligence
information.
? These provisions, If enacted, will for
the first time, permit Americans to
participate In the conduct of the Con-
tras' war against the Sandinistas. Con-
gressman BOLAND'S language stated
that no funds available to the CIA or
the Defense Department could be ex-
pended for the purpose or which
would have the effect of supporting,
directly or indirectly, military or para-
military operations in Nicaragua by
any nation, group, organization, move-
ment or individual. Now that the
President has owned up to his real in-
tentions and made clear what his true'
objectives are, Congress should not re-
verse itself and give carte blanche to
the CIA to assist the Contras in their
efforts to overthrow the Government
of Nicaragua. By the same token, Con-
gress should not liberate the CIA to
participate in the Contras' military op-
erations, as is also proposed in this
amendment. These two provisions-
the repeal of Boland and the licensing
of the CIA to share intelligence infor-
mation with the Contras-can only
result in the direct involvement of
U.S. personnel in the conduct of the
Contras' war against the Sandinistas.
Make no mistake about the implica-
tions of these provisions; by enacting
this amendment, the Senate will be
giving the CIA and the DOD explicit
authority to participate in the Con-
tras' war against the Sandinistas. In
this respect, this amendment is tanta-
mount to another Gulf of Tonkin reso-
lution. In future years, historians will
look, back and say this was our first
step onto a slippery slope that will
lead to massive involvement of Ameri-
cans in the war in Nicaragua. The
CIA's participation today will only
lead to our GI's involvement tomor-
row.
Mr. President, I oppose this amend-
ment because, in so many ways, it
magnifies and perpetuates the most
serious flaw in President Reagan's ap-
proach toward Nicaragua over the past
5 -years, our pursuit of unilateral meas-
ures at the expense of ongoing multi-
lateral efforts to achieve a comprehen-
sive regional settlement. In our efforts
to influence the direction of events
inside Nicaragua, we should under-
stand, first and foremost, that the his-
tory of that country has revolved
around frequent and repeated unilat-
eral interventions by the United
States. We should understand that, by
,persisting in our efforts unilaterally to
influence events inside Nicaragua, we
are engaged in a self-defeating enter-
prise. For every action by the Ameri-
cans, there is an equal if not greater
anti-American reaction of the Nicara-
guans. The revolution inside Nicara-
gua today is being fueled by high-
octane anti-Americanism, and this
amendment will rev up the anti-Ameri-
can engine to a fever pitch.
We should instead be working
through multi-lateral channels, work-
ing with friends in the region, and we
should support the Contadora process.
For all these reasons-and for all of
the reasons I outlined earlier in sup-
port of other amendments-I urge my
fellow Senators to oppose this amend-
ment.' In casting our votes against
more war in Central America, howev-
er, let us also send a message to the
Sandinistas: "You too must change
course. You too must move towards
national reconciliation. You too must
give peace a chance. Time is running
out."
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield
10 minutes to the Senator from Okla-
homa, Senator BOREN.
The PRESIDING, OFFICER. The
Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Indiana.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I have
sponsored and cosponsored many
amendments in the past 6' years of
serving in this body. The vast majority
of them I supported from a firm con-
viction that their passage was in the
best interests of the people of my
State and this Nation. Some others I
have supported, not just as measures
representing the best interest of the
people, but as legislation that was vital
to the interests of this Nation. I place
this amendment in the latter category.
I truly believe the passage of this
amendment, at this time, in this
forum, is vital to the interests of the
United States.
A year and a half ago, I was privi-
leged to serve as an observer of the
Presidential elections in El Salvador.
Recently, with Congressman GLENN
ENGLISH, I returned to the region for
talks with a wide cross-section of polit-
ical, religious; and civic leaders in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
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S 7636 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
including the Presidents of the first
two nations and the Vice President of
the third.
Certainly, on the basis of two visits
to the region, I do not claim to be an
expert on Central America. I ? have,
however, endeavored to learn as much
as I possibly could and the two. oppor-
tunities for a firsthand view certainly
enhanced my understanding and
opened my eyes to developments that
had previously escaped my attention.
I went to the region inclined to favor
aiding the Contras, but skeptical
about the chances for changing the in-
ternal course in Nicaragua away from
Marxist control. I came back'believing
that, there is a deep and widespread
desire of the people there for true de-
mocracy and that given the right com-
bination of circumstances there is a re-
alistic chance to prevent the establish-
ment of a Communist government in
Nicaragua without any direct use of
American military force.
To achieve success, however, the
United States must continue to give
the tools to the local people them-
selves to bring political, military, and
diplomatic pressure to bear against
the Sandinista government..
I am also convinced that if we fail to
give support to the local forces in the
region which are fighting for freedom,
we will ultimately endanger the securi-
ty of all of the nations of Central
America and our own security as well.
The best way to assure that young
Americans will not ever have to fight
and die in Latin America to protect
our national interests is to give the
tools to Central Americans to defend
freedom themselves, in their own
homelands.
As a preeminent power in this
region, there is no way that we can
avoid taking action. As President Na-
poleon Duarte of El Salvador said to
me, "Even a failure to act by the
United States constitutes an action."
He meant that if we fail to exert any
pressure on the Sandinistas, it will
send a message of nonsupport to our
friends and it will embolden our en-
emies.
The situation in El Salvador whicl1 I
found in May was markedly improved
from a year earlier. The Duarte gov-
ernment won a clear majority for the
moderate center in the parliament. Po-
litical violence is a fraction of what it
was 1 year ago. The strength of Com-
munist guerrilla forces has declined
and the number of polling places
where they disrupted elections was
down by 500 percent from 1 year ago.
Important -judicial and land reforms
are progressing. There are many rea-
sons for the progress and President
Duarte himself deserves much credit
for his moderate and courageous ap-
proach.
The pressure placed on the Sandi-,
nista government by the Contra activi-
ty and by brave. opposition political
leaders inside Nicaragua has also
.clearly reduced the level of help which
has been coming from Nicaragua to
Communist guerrillas in El Salvador.
The surest way to destabilize El Sal-
vador and forfeit the gains made is to
make the, pressure off the Sandinista
government.
My recent visit to Nicaragua also
firmly convinced me that if we with-
draw all support from opposition
forces in Nicaragua the inevitable
result will be the consolidation of a
Communist regime there. We will have
another Cuba in our own backyard.
This time it will not be surrounded by
water, but will be connected by a con-
tinuous,land mass which joins our own
borders. Its own boundaries with its
immediate neighbors are hard to de-
termine geographically and easy to
penetrate.
If anyone is naive enough to believe
that the present Sandinista govern-
ment will moderate and allow for a
pluralistic democracy voluntarily, they
are closing their eyes to all clear evi-
dence. They should ask themselves,
why is the church being oppressed?
They should ask, why must the ser-
mons or homilies of former Archbish-
op and now Cardinal Bando Y Bravo
be submitted to government censors 24
hours before they are delivered? They
should ask, why are the church
schools forced to allow special teach-
ers to begin Marxist indoctrination at
age 10? They should demand to know
why is the free press, including La
Prensa, which so valiantly opposed the
Samoza regime, so heavily censored?
One day after Congress defeated aid to
the Contras and on the day before
President Ortega departed to Moscow,
the paper was so heavily censored that
it could not even go to press.
That was one of the photos censored
from La Prensa, a photo showing the
special store where only special Sandi-
nista officials can buy.
Those who believe that this govern-
ment will change should ask, why are
political block captains being used to
control food ration cards necessary to
obtain food and sparsely stocked mar-
kets? They should ask, why are special
well-stocked stores reserved only for
shopping by privileged Sandinista offi-
cials if this is truly a government dedi-
cated to equality? They should ask,
why are small farmers in the northern
areas being forcibly relocated to camps
after the government burns their
small houses, and takes their live-
stock?
The pattern is all, too clear. As one
Nicaraguan said to me, "I fought
against Samoza. I was a true Sandi-
nista and still consider that I am a
true revolutionary for democracy, but
the Communists have stolen our revo-
lution from us. In the earlier broad-
based junta and government which
was broadly representative, those with
democratic philosophies were placed'
in nonsensitive jobs and the Marxists
took control of the army, and police
and instruments of control." The pat-
tern, Mr. President, is all too tragically
reminiscent of many other places in
the globe like Eastern Europe.
As I : said earlier, I wish that every
Senator could have shared in my expe-
riences. I wish that they could have
joined Congressman, ENGLISH as he vis-
ited with the people on the streets of
Managua, away from the ears of gov-
ernment officials and found them vir-
tually unanimous in their opposition
to the current government. I wish that
the entire Senate could meet Violetta
Chamarro who, with her brother-in-
law, publishes "La Prensa." Her hus-
band was murdered by Samoza and
the paper was burned. She joined the
revolution and served in the first San-
dinista Junta. She resigned after the
Marxists took over. Now she struggles
on against censorship and threats to
continue her fight for freedom against
the Marxist dictatorship as bravely as
.she and her husband fought against
the dictatorship of the right under
Samoza.
I wish that every member of Con-
gress could talk to Cardinal Bando Y
Bravo who himself has narrowly es-
caped machinegun attacks twice. How
can there possibly tie any justification
in any free country for the continu-
ation of censorship of his words to his
flock? Clearly the Pope, in elevating
this Archbishop to the position of Car-
dinal, has sent a clear message to the
world. Even so, the Marxist regime is
now financing its own created so-called
peoples church to try to undermine
the continuation of the free church.
I wish that they could have met Vir-
gillio Godoy, who had the courage to
resign as Minister of Labor when he
found that the government was creat-
ing its own state labor union to des-
tory the free labor movement.
I wish that all of my colleagues had
been with me when the Chamarros
and Virgellio Godoyy asked me, "Are
you going to abandon us? Are you
going to walk away and leave us here
to fight alone?" I, for one, could not
look them in the eye and answer yes
to those questions.
These people know what it is like to
live under the Sandinistas. They know
what a block committee is and how
those committees report on neighbor-
hood activities. They know 'about in-
doctrination techniques and the spe-
cial tours arranged for visiting Ameri-
cans and others who are given an ef-
fectively slanted and carefully con-
trolled view when they come as guests
of the Sandinistas.
Mr. President, finally, I wish that
the American, people could have joined
me in paying a visit to a group of Con-
tras inside the battle zone. I talked
first hand with a small group of about
50 Contras returning from a patrol.
With all due respect to the Senator
from Rhode Island, if he could have
been there with me and talked to the
young people, I think he- would have
joined in calling them freedom fight-
ers. -
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Some had been fighting for as long
as 3 years. Others were recent recruits.
One was a 16-year-old girl carrying a
machinegun. After talking with them
I had a better understanding of why
the Contra forces are growing so rap-
idly, perhaps at a rate of increase of
500 or 600 per month. I had a better
understanding of why the morale is so
high and why, if given the tools, I be-
lieve they have some chance of ulti-
mate success and can certainly prevent
total consolidation of the Sandinista
regime.
They are all Nicaraguans from the
grassroots of the country. They are
mainly very young-not old enough to
have been in uniform under Samoza.
They are not mercenaries. They get no
salary, only about 45 cents per day
worth of rations and second-hand
clothes. They fight with captured East
Block weapons.
One after another told me that he
joined the Contras after the Sandinis-
tas took his farm and burned their
houses or took his parents to what
they all called concentration camps
where they also collected the few
cows, pigs, and chickens which the
farmers had previously owned. One
was a young teacher who told me he
was a Christian and refused to teach
communism to children so he was
fired. They are a grassroots force to be
reckoned with and they are growing.
While I was in Managua they succeed-
ed in raiding a major town in the cen-
tral area 45 miles east of the capital
and severed road traffic.
For those who see parallels to Viet-
nam, they should consider that here it
is the Communists who must fight
against a grassroots group using effec-
tive raiding tactics in very rough ter-
rain. Here it is the Communists who
are burning out small farmers and
hamlets and are turning the people in
the countryside against the govern-
ment just as they are alienating the
religious community and city dwellers
through food rationing, the military
draft, and favoritism for high govern-
ment officials.
All of these experiences leave me
with the conviction that we must
devise a method of assistance that can
be supported openly by this Congress
and the American people. I beleive we
have found it in this amendment.
One of the best things about this
amendment is its bipartisan nature. I
have spoken before on this floor about
the need for bipartisanship in the Na-
tion's foreign policy.
If I may return a moment to my
recent meeting with President Duarte,
he emphasized the need for a united
bipartisan approach. He went on to
say that in his opinion the battle for
the Third World is a battle between
ideologies, not a battle between na-
tions. If the democracies of the world
do not have a strategy, the other side
does.
A united front, he said, is what the
resistance to Communist aggression in
Central America needs most. The
Communists exploit the unique Ameri-
can propensity to speak in many
voices. They want to negotiate because
they expect to win through the inac-
tion of Congress what they cannot win
in battle.or from the voluntary sup-
port of their own people.
This Congress and this country
should be exporting democracy, not
withdrawing from the field.
This amendment in that sense is an
export amendment-it seeks to export
democracy. It provides $24 million in
carefully defined humanitarian aid to
the Contras-overtly provides and it
sets up a mechanism for monitoring
and reporting to Congress every 90
days.
While it unfences the $14 million al-
ready approved by repealing -the so-
called Boland amendment, it contains
language that reinstitutes the intent
of Boland by prohibiting any further
assistance without the specific request
of the President and the approval of
the full Congress. This is a reasonable
approach. and in my view virtually the
least this Senate should do to aid the
Contras, the region and our own na-
tional interests.
Mr. President, I close by returning
one last time to my conversation with
President Duarte. One of the
strengths of the Communist countries,
he said, was that they help each other.
In Nicaragua today are Cubans, Sovi-
ets, East Germans; Bulgarians, and
some reports say even. the PLO. One
of the problems we have'with the San-
dinistas now is that they aid other rev-
olutions in neighboring states and
even in South America, despite their
own internal difficulties. They help
each other.
One of the difficulties with democra-
cies is that, by and large, they are in-
wardly focused and pay not enough at-
tention to what is occurring outside
their own borders, unless it has a
direct and immediate effect on them.
Democracies seem ill equipped to pa-
tiently pursue a consistent policy over
a long period of time which helps their
friends.
Mr. President, it is time to take a
small step toward altering that equa-
tion. This amendment is the instru-
ment of that step and I urge my col-
leagues to support it. -
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to the Senator from Iowa.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Iowa is recognized.
Mr. HARKIN. I thank the distin-
guished Senator for yielding me time.
With regard to the amendment of-
fered by the distinguished Senator
from Georgia, I' have some questions
which I would like to propound to the
Senator from Georgia during the time
I have been allotted. I have a couple of
questions which I discussed earlier
with him which I would like to have
clarified, if I could, prior to voting on
the amendment.
S 7637
As I understand the Senator's
amendment, further material assist-
ance to the Contras above that specifi-
cally contained in this amendment
would be prohibited unless the Con-
gress were to vote to approve such
funds.
While I am pleased that the amend-
ment protects this body's prerogative
to authorize and appropriate funds for
the Contras and assures another op-
portunity to assess the situation fur-
ther down the road, I am extremely
concerned that while well intentioned,
the prohibition for further assistance
in this measure may in fact not be
loophole free.
My colleagues are familiar with the
Boland amendment which has been in
effect for 2 years. Before this body,
takes a new approach to the problem,
it is my. hope that the distinguished
.Senator from Georgia would be willing
to answer some questions about the
intentoand effect of his amendment.
As I understand it, the Boland
amendment prohibits all funds avail-
able to the CIA, the Defense Depart-
ment, and all other U.S. agencies in-
volved in intelligence activities from
being obligated or expended for the
purpose or which would have the
effect of supporting, directly or indi-
rectly, military or paramilitary oper-
ations in Nicaragua by any national
group, organization, movement, or in-
dividual. That is the ? language in the
Boland amendment.-
It is clear to the point, that, as best
this Senator can determine, it does the
job it must do. It prohibits all funding
of all activities that would support
military operations in Nicaragua. That
law includes, but specifically is not
limited to, and that is my point, fund-
ing of the army commonly known as
the Contras or, as some people call
them, the freedom fighters.
My first concern about the pending
amendment is that while it prohibits
funds above the amount that it au-
thorizes from being provided to the
democratic resistance in Nicaragua, it
does not prohibit U.S. ? funds from
being used in other ways to support or
to conduct military operations in Nica-
ragua.
I see only one way to read this
amendment. Unlike the Boland
amendment, it would allow the CIA to
conduct independent paramilitary op-
erations in Nicaragua. In other words,
it seems clear that what is not prohib-
ited is, in effect, authorized. That is-
the lesson we have learned over the
past 2 years as we struggled to legis-
late and limit some of these covert op-
erations. Nothing in the Senator's
amendment before us limits U.S. funds
from being used to conduct covert
military operations in Nicaragua.
What I would like to know is, is that
the intent of the amendment of the
Senator from Georgia? If not, how
does this amendment deal with the
funds. available to the CIA in its con-
tingency reserve to conduct such oper-
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S 7638 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ations absent a distinct prohibition
against such operations?
Mr. NUNN. The question my friend
raises is one I have struggled with a
great deal in preparing this amend-
ment and redrafting it and discussing
it with others who are my cosponsors
of this amendment. I know the Sena-
tor from Indiana has looked very care-
fully at this. His staff and my staff
have worked "together. It is a compli-
cated area.
Let me see if I can answer it in a way
that is understood.
. This amendment deals only with the
question of providing assistance to the
Contras.
The Senator has raised the matter
of unilateral action by the CIA in Cen-
tral America that is not related to the
assistance to the Contras. In my opin-
ion, that must be dealt with under ex-
isting law. Under existing law, Nicara-
? gua would be like any other country.
It would be regulated by the laws and
procedures governing the intelligence
community. There would be congres-
sional oversight by the Intelligence
Committee. It would require a finding
by the President that would be sent to
the Intelligence Committee.
Let me go a little further, and I will
come back to that.
With respect to the assistance to the
Contras, I would say this amendment
is absolutely clear that whether they
used the contingency reserve funds or
not, the CIA could not provide human-
itarian beyond the scope of this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. PELL. I yield an additional 5
minutes.
Mr. NUNN. It is also my feeling, my
strong feeling., that if the CIA wished
to provide any further assistance to
the Contras, the President would have
to come back to the Senate under the
provisions of this amendment and re-
quest the assistance, and we would
have to approve it in the pertinent
committees and also on the floor.
Now, regarding the unilateral action
by the CIA which is not in support of
the Contras directly or indirectly-
which is the Senator's question. I
think it is a very legitimate question.
Let me read the Boland amendment
to the Senator, because his question
presumes that the Boland amendment
precludes that kind of assistance. I
think that is the understanding of a
lot of people.
I think the question of whether the
Boland amendment precludes that
kind of activity by the CIA is a much
more difficult question.
Reading the Boland amendment, it
says, "No funds available to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Depart-
ment of Defense, or any other agency
or entity of the United States involved
in intelligence activities may be obli-
gated or expended--I want the Sena-
tor to listen carefully to these words-
"for the purpose or which would have
the effect"-and now the key word 'in
my opinion legally-"of supporting-
directly or indirectly, any military or
paramilitary" operations in Nicaragua
and so on.
Mr. President, it is my view that if
the word "supporting" is interpreted
broadly, then we could perhaps strain
the Boland amendment and say that
CIA activity totally unrelated to the
Contras but which was adverse to the
Nicaraguan Government would be pre-
cluded. I do not read the Boland
amendment that way, though. I read
the Boland amendment as being more
narrow than that. I do not believe the
present Boland .amendment precludes
independent CIA activity that is not
supporting the Contras.
So, if you read the Boland amend-
ment narrowly, as I do, then there is
no diminution of that amendment in
our amendment. If, on the other hand,
you read the Boland amendment
broadly and believe that the present
Boland amendment precludes inde-
pendent CIA activity that has nothing
whatsoever to do with supporting the
Contras, then our. amendment would
change the Boland amendment. It
would be my intent to change the
Boland amendment if it is broad.
Let me give an example. For in-
stance, let us suppose tomorrow morn-
ing, before we pass anything, our intel-
ligence community comes in and in-
forms the President of the United
States that there is a terrorist training
base in Nicaragua and those terrorists
are funneling all over Central Amer-
ica. They are coming to the United
States, they are carrying out bomb-
ings, they are carrying out assassina-
tions, and it has nothing whatsoever
to do with the Contra movement, and
the CIA or the Defense Department
recommends that we take some type
of action against that base. If you read
the Boland amendment broadly, then
it would preclude that action unless
the President came to Congress and
we had a debate and unless the House
and the Senate repealed the Boland
amendment. '
I do not believe that is what the
Boland amendment intended. But if it
is what it intended, I think it ought to
be repealed. If it is not what it intend-
ed, then we do not change the intent
of the Boland amendment.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I think
what the Boland amendment is seek-
ing to do is stop activities like the
mining of harbors. Again, this is an in-
dependent activity, undertaken basi-
cally without the consent of Congress,
by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Under the Senator's amendment;
would the CIA be able to do that kind
of activity
Mr. NUNN. The answer is no, be-
cause I would interpret the mining of
harbors as in direct support of the
Contras.
Mr. HARKIN. But is was not done in
support of the Contras; that is the
point. My position is that it lifts the
restrictions of the Boland amendment.
However, I might be opposed to the
Senator's amendment here, I am
greatly opposed to it if, in fact, we do
not have two things-one, the Boland
amendment which again, aside from
the Contras itself, would restrict the
kind of activities that the Boland
amendment sought to restrict. I think
most people here and on the other
side of the Capitol have interpreted it
very broadly-I ask for 2 or 3 more
minutes. I am sorry to take so much
time.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 2
more minutes to the Senator.
Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I have one more ques-
tion.
Mr. NUNN. Would the Senator in-
terpret the Boland amendment as pre-
cluding a CIA or it Pentagon move
against the terrorist training camp in
Nicaragua?
Mr. HARKIN. That was exporting
the terrorism outside the borders of
Nicaragua?
Mr. NUNN. Yes.
Mr. HARKIN. No, Mr. President.
Mr. NUNN. Then the Senator does
not have to be concerned about this.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I am
concerned because obviously, that is a
very narrow interpretation, but I keep
saying again in terms of the CIA, what
we have learned over the past few
years is that what is not prohibited is
authorized and if we. do not prohibit
them from doing certain things, they
will go off on their own and do mining,
for instance. If there is a terrorist
camp there, they have recourse. They
can come-to the Intelligence Commit-
tees and ask for authorization.
Mr. NUNN. They cannot if the
Boland amendment, is interpreted
broadly. The Intelligence Committee
'cannot do or approve anything contra-
vening the law of the country.
Mr. HARKIN.. The Boland amend-
ment speaks only to the purpose of
overthrowing the Government. If you
were to go in and take out a terrorist
camp that was expporting terrorism
outside of Nicaragua, that would not
have the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of Nicaragua. Mining the
harbors would.
Mr. NUNN. Nothing in the Boland
amendment ever mentioned over-
throwing the Government.
I know I have taken the Senator's
time, Mr. President.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have
one other question. 'Leaving aside this
question of what the term "humani-
tarian" assistance encompasses, the
amendment would authorize funds
and then prohibit further materiel as-
sistance but not preclude the sharing
of intelligence information. My ques-
tion again concerns what is not includ-
ed in a prohibition against further ma-
teriel assistance and what role would
be created for the CIA in addition to
the sharing of intelligence informa-
tion. It is my understanding that if hu-
manitarian assistance were to be ap-
proved and the Boland amendment
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7639
were in effect, the Contras could re-
ceive the funds but the CIA would not
be back in the business of running the
Contra war. Without the Boland
amendment, the Senator's. amendment
would allow the CIA to resume its role
in advising and training the Contras
for combat operations and would put
us back in the business of managing
this war.
Again, I ask, Is this the Senator's in-
tention?
Mr. PELL. I yield time so the Sena-
tor from Georgia may reply.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I say to
the Senator that is not this Senator's
intention. I think the amendment is
clear. As I interpret the amendment,
and I think it is clear on that, humani-
tarian assistance would not include
training the Contras for military activ-
ity.
The Senator has used the word "ad-
vising." He say "advising and train-
ing."
Mr. HARKIN. Advising, training.
Mr. NUNN. I would think the
amendment presumes somebody in our
Government is going to advise the
Contras of certain things. Hopefully,
they will advise them to negotiate bi-
laterally with the Sandinistas. Hope-
fully, they will advise them to purge
their ranks of human rights abusers,
but not give military advice.
. Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, not
giving military advice or training.
Mr. NUNN. That would not be in
keeping with the humanitarian defini-
tion of the amendment.
Mr. HARKIN. I thank my friend
from Georgia for clearing that up with
me.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President; will
the Senator from Indiana yield me 6
minutes?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I agreed
to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
South Carolina first and I shall be
happy to yield to the Senator from
Louisiana when he has concluded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Sena-
tor from Indiana.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
rise in support ' of the Nunn, Lugar,
Boren amendment.
What we are debating here today is
not a question of right versus left. It
concerns freedom: freedom from tyr-
anny and oppression, freedom of reli-
gion, freedom of the press, and the
freedom of people to determine what
form their government shall take
gather than have that decision dictat-
ed by a handful of despots. The
United States has fought numerous
times to protect these freedoms, and
today we are debating whether or not
to support people who want to fight
for the same freedoms.
We have boiled the argument down
to whether or not-to give these free-
dom fighters humanitarian aid, or no
aid at all, when we should be providing
them with the military assistance that
they so badly need. I for one am glad
that Lafayette did not come to Amer-
ica with only humanitarian aid to pro-
vide for our Continental Army, or we
might still be British subjects.
It is unfortunate that some Mem-
bers of Congress serve as apologists for
a Communist dictatorship that offers
to let the Soviets station missiles in
their country and which also attempts
to subvert neighboring states by force
of arms.
Mr. President, the United States
stood by as the Sandinistas came to
power with their promises of free elec-
tions, freedom of religion, and free-
dom of the press. They have instead
formed a dictatorship that makes a
mockery of these freedoms. Because of
their repressive practices, people have
again taken up arms against the gov-
ernment, and now more men are fight-
ing the Sandinista government than
ever bore arms against the previous
regime. -
There are those who would have us
believe that the Contras are the cre-
,ation of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and that everything would be
fine in Nicaragua if we would halt our
support for the Contras. This asser-
tion is totally false; 15,000 people do
not risk their lives and the lives of
their families fighting a dictatorship
just to help out the CIA. The last time
I checked, the CIA was not that popu-
lar in developing areas of the world.
Also, there are no retirement benefits
for the Contras, and there is little or
no pay; so other than the hope of a
better way of life, there is not any
reason for these men and women to
take the risks that they do.
Mr. President, when we strip away
all the arguments, we come to one
simple decision. We can support forces
who oppose Communist dictatorships,
or we can vouchsafe the spread of
communism by our inaction. Twenty-
four years ago, in his inaugural ad-
dress, President John F. Kennedy
stated:
Let every nation know, whether it wishes
us well or ill, that we shall pay any price,
bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup-
port any friend, oppose any foe to assure
the survival and the success of liberty.
Mr. President, unfortunately for
some, the price has grown too high,
the burden too heavy, and the hard-
ship too great for our Nation to sup-
port the survival of liberty. For some,
the continued enslavement of people is
somehow preferable to our becoming
involved. Not only this, the failure to
provide assistance to the freedom
fighters would constitute a threat to
our own freedom.
Mr. President, I urge .all of my col-
leagues to support continued assist-
ance to the Nicaraguan freedom fight-
ers.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me 6 minutes?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes; I yield 6 minutes
to the Senator from Louisiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GRAMM). The Senator from Louisiana
is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President,
when Fidel Castro was in the moun-
tains of Cuba, he called himself an
agrarian reformer pursuing democracy
and a friend of the United States. It
took us a few months after he took
over to find out that was not to be.
Mr. President, there are those who,
in spite of the evidence, indelible evi-
dence since 1979 of the nature of the
Sandinista revolution, would want to
tell us that they also are agrarian re-
formers pursuing the rights of the
people, trying to improve the lot of
the people.
Mr. President, if there is not enough
evidence now, I do not know when
there will ever be as to the essential
nature of the Sandinista revolution.
They are bent upon revolution with-
out borders. They are bent upon ex-
porting that revolution to El Salvador,
as they are doing at the very moment.
The command and control of the
FMLN in El Salvador is at this
moment in Nicaragua, and so is the di-
rection of other revolutionary activity
which has been stopped, if at all, only
by the pressure of the Contras.
Now, Mr. President, lest we think
that a poor country of about 4 million
people in Central America can do no
harm, I would like for the Senate to
stop for a moment and consider the
harm that Cuba does throughout the
world with only a population of 10 mil-
lion. Even though Cuba is a very poor
nation, with a gross domestic product
of $16 billion, at the very bottom of
the list in terms of wealth of nations-
and in 1950 before the revolution it
had the 3d highest per capita income
in Latin America, now it is 15th-Mr.
President, what that small country is
able to do in terms of harm through-
out the world is amazing. They have
an armed force of 153,000, 250 aircraft,
850 heavy tanks, with defense expendi-
tures of $1.3 billion.
Even though Canada has two and
one-half times the population, they
have five times the armed force of
Canada. With their militia, they have
12 percent of their population armed
and trained and under arms. There are
74,000 Cuban troops in 24 foreign
countries. Consider what they do in
Angola alone-16 motorized infantry
regiments, an artillery regiment, an
antiaircraft defense brigade, 500 air
force personnel, 500 support troops,
and 1,000 advisers. In Angola alone, a
total of 31,000 men. They have suf-
fered 6,200 casualties in Angola.
Mr. President, the list of countries
where they have troops includes:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cape
Verdes, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lesotho,
Libya, Malagasi, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Sao Tome/Principe, Sierra Leone,
Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen,
and Zambia.
Mr. President, this is the reality of
Cuba today. They continue to grow in
terms of arms expenditure and in
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S 7640 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
terms of exporting revolution around
the world.
There was a time when we had an
opportunity, Mr. President, to do
something about the Cuban infection.
Many will say that we should have
done something about it in the time of
Batista. and I agree. We made serious
and terrible mistakes at that time.
Those mistakes we cannot recall.
There were other times when we had
an opportunity to do something about
Cuba, and we failed to do it-too little,
too late, too ineffectively.
Mr. President, that time in Nicara-
gua is upon us today. We have an op-
portunity to do something about Nica-
ragua, something other than to put
our head in the sand, something other
than involving American troops. It is
to put a sure and steady pressure on
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, using
their own people who have formed
their own opposition force.
Make no mistake about it, the. CIA
did not create and did not form the
Contra organizations. They are en-
demic. They are native. They are run
by their own people. Indeed, we are
not at this time giving aid.
Mr. President, we have an opportu-
nity to strike a middle ground in this
amendment, a middle ground between
giving arms and sending American.
troops, on the one hand, and inviting
the Nicaraguan-Sandinista revolution
to become another Cuba-another
Cuba, perhaps smaller in terms of
numbers of people but, a Cuba con-
nected by a land bridge to Mexico and
the United States.
Mr. President, the middle ground as
indicated in this amendment is the
proper course for. this Senate at this
time. There may be a time when we
will need to take a second step and
send the arms themselves, but for now
this compromise is the right action.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Maryland.
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, sever-
al Senators this afternoon have re-
ferred to a national consensus in favor
of this or that policy. They have re-
ferred to this or that poll. They have
referred to the state of public opinion
on American policy toward the critical
problems of Nicaragua and Central
'America.
It is clear to me, however, that there
is no national consensus on what
might be the most effective policy. In
fact, if anything, the polls underline a
deep and enduring confusion about
our policies and purposes. So clear is
this that I feel confident in saying
that we lack the depth of public sup-
port to sustain the kind, of dramatic
shift in our foreign policy that seems
to be taking place.
It is also clear to me that a sea-
change in our policy toward Nicaragua
is taking place. Though the adminis-
tration's appeal for more funds is
couched. in terms of "humanitarian"
aid. I see no guarantee that these
money would not continue to be used
directly to support, or replace other
funds to support, military and para-
military activities by the Contras.
There is virtually no way that you
could impose such a guarantee.
Originally, the Senate approved
funds for the Contras on the grounds
that they would be used to block the
flow of arms to rebels trying to over-
throw the Government of El Salva-
doran objective that has in large
measure been attained. Now we are
coming close to open support for the
.overthrow of the Government of Nica-
ragua-a policy that I do not believe
shares the support of the American
people, nor one that is warranted by
the limited diplomatic efforts under-
taken to reach a peaceful solution to
these problems, nor one that has won
the backing of many of our most im-
portant allies in the region and the
rest of the world. By-region, I do not
mean just the immediate region of
Central America.
Several of the governments in the
immediate area generally support the
administration's overall efforts, but
they also are disturbed by lack of dip-
lomatic progress. But there are many
other countries in the broader region
of Latin America with whom we
should consult more closely as we try
to devise a prudent and positive policy.
I have consulted with a wide range
of representatives of the leading coun-
tries of Latin America. And these in-
quiries - reveal considerable doubt
about the shift in American policy in
recent weeks and months.
For example, our friends in the Con-
tadora countries, Colombia, Venezuela,
Mexico, and Panama,. do not appear to
favor this kind of aid to the Contras,
which they regard as direct interven-
tion in the affairs of Nicaragua. Ar-
gentina, Brazil and other vital neigh-
bors of ours, countries destined to
become ever more important to us,
also remain deeply concerned about
the thrust of these policies.
With their domestic political and
economic problems, all these countries
are likely to be more deeply affected
by what may happen in Central Amer-
ica than we are. And yet I see no sign
that we have consulted closely with
them in devising an effective strategy.
I see no sign, furthermore, that we
have consulted closely with our Euro-
pean allies on the best course of
action.
There are, Mr. President, several at-
tractive provisions of this amendment:
the call for a church-mediated dialog
between the Government of Nicaragua
and the resistance forces; continued
support for the Contadora process. I
am still confident that a genuine com-
promise can be worked out. But I do
not believe we have reached the point
where we should take an irrevocable
step that would discourage such initia-
tives and lead to a widening of hosti-
lites.
For these reasons, I shall vote
against the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
' Mr. LUGAR. I yield 2 minutes to the
Senator from, Minnesota.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, , I compliment the original co-
sponsors of this amendment, on the
amendment itself and the work they,
have put into it. I believe I am a co-
sponsor as well.
I compliment the cosponsors on the
special effort they have made in in-
forming themselves in particular with
regard to the special problems of Cen-
tral America and the way in which
those problems have changed over the
4 years or so in which we have been
deeply involved in those problems and
in discussing them on the floor.
I particularly compliment the Mem-
bers of the minority party on the floor
for their efforts.'
I urge all Members to support this
amendment. It is not great policy. It is
mainly implementation of a policy
which remains vague.
Mr. President, I have just returned
from a 6-day trip to Central America. I
went because I am convinced that this
is a critical moment in relations with
Central America. I wanted to under-
stand the perspective of the leaders of
the region on the major issues.
In the course of the trip, I met with
a wide variety of people. I talked with.
our own Embassy staffs. I met with
political leaders and shared their
hopes for a democratic future. I talked
to military leaders. l[ exchanged ideas
with business leaders. I talked to pub-
lishers, churchmen, and people work-
ing for international organizations in
these countries.
In all of these conversations, I found
a common theme-an absolute com-
mitment to the development of democ-
racy throughout the region, and a
common demonstration of courage to
take risks necessary to achieve that
goal.
In Guatemala, Chief of State Gener-
al Mejia has put the reputation of the
military on the line in avowing public-
ly, without reservation, that he will
step down from office and remove the
Army from the political process-
whatever the results of the election in
October.
In El Salvador, President Duarte has
assumed not only personal risks, but
risk to the democratic ideals of his
party by taking firm steps in curbing
human rights violations, returning the
Army to a nonpolitical role in support
of, rather than in opposition to, the
democratic process and', most signifi-
cantly, in opening a dialogue with the
political and military elements of the
insurgency.
In Costa Rica, President Monge has
taken dramatic steps to build within
the existing security structure of his
country the capability to eliminate the
threats of subversion of his democra-
cy, and to defend his border against
Nicaraguan incursions. Though his
country is extremely vulnerable, he
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has supported the democratic. opposi-
tion to the Sandinistas and welcomes,
the refugees from that regime..
In Honduras; President Suazo walks
a narrow line in maintaining the mo-
mentum of his, democratic: revolution
against those who are critical' of his
role in supporting the FDN and coop-
erating with the United States and
those who do not feel he has gone far
enough.
Throughout Central America,- the
church has had the courage to speak
out and act in preservation of social
justice and the dignity of man-
whether the danger comes from right,
or left. The church is acting as media-
tor in El Salvador, and it sustains
those in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
who publicly condemn the abuses of
Sandinistas. As a demonstration of
this consistency of principle, church
hierarchy from all of Central America
will gather in Managua on June 1.0, to
celebrate mass with the new prelate of
the Central America church-Cardinal
Obando Y. Bravo:.
Mr. President, there is a common
concern expressed by these political,
religious, military and business lead-
ers. It is a concern that. there are root
causes of instability in the region
which are threats to achievement of
democracy. One root cause is the eco-
nomic difficulty each country faces
from an ever widening gap between
revenues and expenditures-a balance-
of-payments crisis' that stands in the
way of social programs and reestab-
lishment of a healthy business sector
which can create jobs andrelieve the
burden of an over-extended govern-
ment.
There is instability' caused by the in-
security of the governments faced
with active attempts at subversion=
subversion supported directly from or
through Nicaragua.
There is instability caused. by the.
added burden of refugees created by
the current political upheaval-refu-
gees who exacerbate the economic
problem and increase, the threat of
subversion. There are now over
100,000 Nicaraguans' in Costa. Rica-
about 10 percent of the population as
estimated by the U.N. Refugee Com-
mission. In the last. 3 months, 10,000
Nicaraguans have turned up in Guate-
mala. This is the first time. Guatemala
has had a refugee influx from Nicara-
gua.
These are regional problems-prob-
lems that cannot be resolved individ-
ually by each nation. The leadership
of Central America is expectant-
hopeful that the United States will
join with them In working toward so-
lutions. The United States has already
done a great deal. The Jackson plan is
a clear signal that the United States
recognizes that the region is of vital
interest and that we alone have the
means which if applied in concert with
the Central American countries. can
tip the balance in favor of democracy.
But the solutions are not regional
alone. They depend as well on keeping,
alive the hope for democracy in Nica-
ragua. Mr. President, the money being
discussed here today, $38 million for
humanitarian aid to the democratic re-
sistance, is not in, and of itself suffi-
cient to tip the balance. It is not, di-
rected. at balancing the books economi-
cally-nor is it sufficient to stop. sub-
version in the. region or to restore to
Nicaragua the democracy stolen by,
the military dictatorship which the
Sandinistas have imposed' in exact. du-
plication of the old Somoza dictator-
ship..
But. our vote is. of great significance
as a sign of Central America that the
U.S. Government, both executive and
legislative, recognizes the role our
country should play, and' are willing to
assume that role. The democrats who
recognize that the Sandinista govern-
ment has as its fundamental objective
imposition of 'a dictatorship which, is a
threat to the hopes for democracy are
pursuing those principles' throughout
Central America at. great. personal
'risk. We share that risk in a positive
vote on. this assistance because we, are.
not sure who the real democrats are
and how this funding, is really contrib-
uting to achieving a democracy with
Nicaragua. Though this vote is neces-
sary to show our resolve. and' commit-
ment,, it is. not enough. We cannot
close the subject with a symbol-a.
symbol the ultimate effect, of which is
unknown.
Mr. President,. we must move on to
the bigger issue of peace and' stability
in the region and work at the. highest
levels in conjunction with the demo-
cratic nations to forge a common. for-
mula-a policy of commitment of
American means, American knowledge
and resources in support of mutually
shared. objectives. Only then will we
resolve the root cause of. trouble
within the region.
The narrow issue we face today is
short-term humanitarian assistance to
people from one country. The stakes
are high, but they are high as much
for reasons of symbolism as for mate-
rial progress. We must move beyond
debating whether to symbolically ful-
fill our commitments' to democracy,
and instead undertake a, debate on ae-
tally fulfilling those commitments
themselves. In other words,, the debate
today will not end our, attention to
Central America. It will only set the
stage for a larger debate on a larger'
policy question-whether this country
will play a positive role in the region.
We cannot go it. alone. We must
work with the nations of Central
America, and must listen to them and
learn from them. As a first step
toward bringing about, the -reconcilia-
tion which must precede significant,
progress on economic and political
questions, I think it is time for the
President to convene a meeting: of the
heads of state of all the countries in
the region, including Nicaragua. A.
major conference could' bolster, the
Contadora process. President. Duarte
has. shown, us the way, and, we should
S7641
seek to do on a regional scale what he
has undertaken in his own, country.
But talk is not. enough'. The history
of Central America is a history of talk
and broken promises from the United
States. We must demonstrate that our
long.-term. commitment to the region is
backed. by the public and its Congress.
A tangible sign 'would be immediate
consideration and passage of the Jack-
son plan in a multiyear package. It. is
time to go beyond debating, economi-
cally marginal programs, whether
they involve humanitarian assistance
or other items, and do what we all
know must be done.
Beyond these immediate programs,
'however, we must learn to live with di-
versity in the 'region. A commitment to
democracy does not mean that every
nation must look like ours. So long as
a nation's core values involve a com.-
mitment to the democratic process, we
should welcome it as a. friend, not
shun it because of some kind of ideo-
logical litmus test. Policy disagree-
ments among democracies . are ulti-
mately far less' important than their
adherence to common.. values.
Finally, we must recognize that it is
in Central America Itself that the
greatest wisdom resides about the
future of that region. We can, help;
but we cannot lead, except by exam-
ple. We must look to Central Ameri-
can unity and leadership to set the,
course. This means on one, hand' that
we must ask leaders in the region to
say publicly what they say privately.
But it means on the other hand that
we must give them the confidence' to
say it, in part by assuring them that
we. will assist them over the long haul.
Mr. President, as I have said so
many times before, the real issue
which we too often avoid Is Central
America and its' future-a future
which will be shaped by far more than
the narrow item we, debate today. I
strongly believe that we must vote to
provide the humanitarian ? assistance
requested. But I also believe that we
must break the habit of reducing a
vital and complex issue to a simple yes
or no vote on a few million dollars
aimed at an immediate issue. We must
begin to craft a larger policy, and then
to debate It. If we fail in this, we will
condemn ourselves to- years of debates
over issues of this kind.
Mr. PELL.. Mr. President, I yiel'd' 5
minutes to the Senator from Michi-
gan.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator
from Rhode Island.
Mr. President, I wonder if the Sena-
tor from Georgia might. help me in my
effort to understand.this language..
I have been one who has been will-
ing to support the Contras with non-
lethal assistance under certain condi-
tions. In the past, I' have worked' on
various forms of resolutions which
would provide nonlethal assistance to
the Contras and set forth the condi-
tions. I do commend all the people
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S 7642 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
who have been involved in drafting
this amendment for their efforts.
I am troubled, however, by section
(i)(1), and I ask the Senator from
Georgia about that section. The
amendment repeals the Boland lan-
guage. The Boland language prohibits
assistance to the Contras, directly or
indirectly, by the CIA, the DOD, or
any other agency. So that this amend-
ment wipes out the Boland language.
In its place is section (i)(1), which
says that "No other materiel assist-
ance may be provided to, the Nicara-
guan democratic resistance, directly or
indirectly," other than what has al-
ready been set forth in this amend-
ment, and that is the humanitarian as-
sistance as defined.
The word "materiel" is a very trou-
bling word to me, because it could
mean that nonmateriel military assist-
ance could be provided: for example,
support activities; for example, train-
ing-which is not materiel but which is
directly in support of a military oper-
ation.
I did hear the answers. of the Sena-
tor from Georgia to the questions of
Senator HARKIN, and I thought they
were helpful; but I am afraid that the
language in the amendment is differ-
ent from the assurances which were
given., I wish that the assurances
which my friend gave were put forth
so clearly in the amendment.
I suppose my question is this: It says
"No other materiel assistance." Train-
ing of a military operation is nonma-
teriel assistance. Is it intended that
training would be prohibited? If so, is
there a way of making that clear in
the amendment-that training in mili-
tary support activities is intended to
be prohibited?
Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator
from Michigan that the reason why
the word "materiel" was added-and it
was added; it was not part of the origi-
nal amendment-was that if we do not
have that word, there is a strong possi-
bility that other legitimate actions by
the United States would be precluded
that might be considered indirect as-
sistance to the democratic resistance,
and thus barred. Let me give the Sena-
tor an example.
'If we insist in the context of the
Contadora negotiation that. Sandinis-
tas should talk to the Contras, as I
think all of us believe they should, it
could be argued if the word "materiel"
was not in there, that we were assist-
ing the Contras because one of their
objects is to force talks directly with
the Sandinistas.
So the word "materiel" was added to
,prevent that interpretation.
The Senator has raised the other
question, the other side of the coin.
Every word you add is a coin that has
two sides. I think the Senator has a le-
gitimate question.The Senator's ques-
tion is, Does that word "materiel"
mean only substance, something tangi-
ble, or would it include things like
military assistance?
My view of it is that as the author of
the amendment, and I think the Sena-
tor from Indiana ought to listen to
this, too, I would like for him to re-
spond. My view is that materiel assist-
ance would include any kind of mili-
tary training, even though 'that would
not necessarily be tangible. I consider
that military training is tangible in
the sense that this amendment has
been offered. I think that if this
passes we need to find a better word in
conference to make it clearer that we
are allowing certain types of activities
on behalf of the Contras, political
speeches, that kind of thing, petitions
to OAS, petitions to the Contadora
process, to include them in the talks
with Sandinistas, but we are not by
that word in any way implying that we
intend to have military training or
other intangible things. I would like
the Senator from Indiana to respond.
Mr. LUGAR. That is my understand-
ing.
Mr. LEVIN. Could I ask about mili-
tary support activities, for instance,
driving the boat for which Contras
leave to set mines?
Mr. NUNN. I believe that. would be
violative of the amendment. It is not
humanitarian. It is support of military
activities. I think it would be preclud-
ed under the amendment. Would the
Senator from Indiana answer?
Mr. LUGAR. I concur.
Mr. LEVIN. I am glad to get these
interpretations and I think they are
important.
Mr. NUNN. But I would not want to
have the words "military support"
written in because then you have to
ask what the definition is and the Sen-
ator asks with an example. If you in-
clude "military support" as food, and
clothing which is in the nature of mili-
tary support under some interpreta-
tions then clearly we permit that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time yielded to the Senator from
Michigan has expired.
Mr. LEVIN. If there is an additional
time I wish 1 minute.
Mr. PELL. I yield 1 additional
minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Michigan may proceed.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
I think it would be extremely useful
if this amendment passes, which I
expect it would, that this, interpreta-
tion which is critical if we are going to
eliminate the Boland language be
taken to conference. I frankly do not
know how I am going to vote on this
amendment in light of the interpreta-
tion of the sponsor.
The words "materiel assistance" to
me means what it says, which is provi-
sion of materiels. Support services are
not materiels. Training is not materi-
els.
Mr. NUNN. But you know the word.
"materiel" can be taken in two con-
texts. The Senator I think is using the
narrow definition of materiel, meaning
substance or meaning something tan-
gible. Materiel can also mean some--
thing of significance, important, and I
would interpret the word "materiel"
here in a broader context, not in the
narrow context.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend.
Mr. NUNN. I assure the Senator
that word will be looked at carefully if
this amendment passes. I am not going
to be in conference but I know the
Senator from Indiana will give his
pledge on that.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank you both Sena-
tors very much.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 1
minute to the Senator from Califor-
nia.
Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I rise
only to say that '[ will support this
measure and would ask that I be
added as a cosponsor.
Mr. President, I will be offering an-
other other amendment later on. I do not
find what I will be offering in any way
incompatible with the present amend-
ment. In fact, whether it is in it or not
they will achieve some of the same
purposes.
Mr. President, I urge support and
passage of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, the Senator is added as
a cosponsor.
Who yields time?
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 1
minute to the Senator from Kansas.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM Mr. President,
the key problem facing us in our
policy toward Nicaragua is how we can
help produce a political solution for
the- present confrontation between
Nicaraguans and between the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua and the United
States.
I do not believe that this confronta-
tion can be resolved by military
means-whether by the actions of the
Contras or by direct intervention of
the United States.
Neither do I believe that we can
simply turn our back and hope it all
works out for the best. Clearly, the
Government of Nicaragua has goals
and policies that have produced both
internal turmoil and external tensions
with their neighbors. Left free to act
as they wish, the Sandinistas very
probably would sharply increase this
turmoil and tension-with very serious
consequences for Nicaragua and for
us.
Given all of that,'it is essential that
we remain involved in seeking a settle-
ment for this problem. The present
amendment offers one course for us to
follow, and I support it.
However, I would like our policy and
our intentions to be clear to every-
one-most of all to the Sandinistas
and the Contras.
For our policy to have any hope of
success, I believe it is essential for the
Sandinistas to be confronted not
merely with a military resistance but
with an effective political alternative
for the people of Nicaragua. My con-
cern is how the present amendment
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE. S 7643'
would bring us closer to that possibili-
ty.
To be effective, any opposition force
must have a claim to legitimacy in the
eyes of Nicaraguans.. It must not. be
seen as a throwback to the days of
Somoza or as a puppet of American
policy.
This point was made very effectively
by the Senator from Delaware during
debate on the previous amendment..
The point is less clear in the present
amendment.
This amendment calls, for but does
not require the Contras to remove
from their ranks those who have en-
gaged in human. rights abuses. I hope
that the intent. of the sponsors is that
such action must be carried out, by the
Contras and that a. failure to move ef-
fectively would jeopardize any existing
or future funding.
Second. Mr. President,, I hope that
the political leaders. of the Nicaraguan, opposition will have a role or voice in
the distribution of the assistance we
provide rather than leaving the distri-
bution solely to military leaders.
AID TO THE RESISTANCE. FORCES IN NICARAGUA
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise.
in full support of the amendment by
my distinguished colleagues, Senators
NuNN, LuaAR, BoREN, BENTssN, CHILES,
JOHNSTON, and KASSEBAUM. I am
wholly supportive of the fine biparti-
san manner in which this proposal has
been drafted. This' issue is much too
important to be reduced to partisan in-
fighting and, pettiness.
This amendment will accomplish a
number of important objectives. First,.
by resuming aid to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance, we continue our
support for those individuals. who are
pressing the Sandinistas to live up to.
the revolutionary promises they made
when they overthrew Somoza and his
excesses. We cannon allow the Sandi-
nistas to conveniently forget their
basic pledges to promote political', plu-
ralism, civil liberties'. human rights,
and a nonaligned foreign policy.
Second,. by designating the aid to be
used only for food, medicine, clothing,
and other assistance for the survival
and well-being of the opposition
forces, we encourage steps that are
taken for a peaceful settlement of the
conflict.
Third, this amendment encourages a:
change in the behavior of the Sandi-
nistas. We offer to. suspend the eco-
nomic sanctions imposed upon Nicara-
gua and to, suspend U.S. military ma-
nuevers in Honduras and off the coast
of Nicaragua if the Sandinistas agree
to a cease fire, to open negotiations:
with the opposition forces, and to sus-
pend the state of emergency in Nicara-
gua. By that offer we. can attempt to
press the Sandinistas into a resolution.
of the destructive conflict.
Fourth, by resuming bilateral nego-
tiations with the Sandinstas we can
encourage church-mediated dialog be-
tween the Sandinistas. and the demo-
cratic resistance and we can work
toward a, comprehensive and verifiable
agreement among the nations of Cen-
tral America based upon the Conta-
dora objectives.
The United States must continue to
pursue those four main objectives-ob-
jectives which have not changed a
whit. during the massive disinforma-
tion campaigns of the past, several
years. They are:
First,. to end Nicaraguan support for
guerrilla groups in neighboring coun
tries and retract their stated. goal of a.
"revolution without. borders";
Second, to sever Nicaraguan military
and security ties to Cuba, and the
Soviet Union;.
Third, tp' reduce Nicaragua's mili-
tary forces to levels, that would restore
military equilibrium to the region; and.
Fourth, to fulfill the original Sandi-
nista promises. to support democratic
pluralism and respect. for human and
civil rights.
I believe that this amendment. will
assist in setting us on the path toward
achieving these objectives. The United
States is in a unique position in the
free Western World'-by virtue: of our
continuing efforts, to bring peace
throughout the international commu-
nity, and our geographic proximity to
the region-to play a. key role in at-
tempting to restore stability through-
out Central, America..
Our own tradition of democracy im-
poses upon us a duty to do all that. we.
are able in order to break the. endless
cycle of poverty, political instability,
and revolution, and to attempt to re-
store some measure. of economic,
health and real political freedom.
We cannon simply ignore the si,tua
tion and' hope that: it will', improve
without our help-even if we could
assume that Cuba and the. Soviet
Union would take a similar "hands-
off" posture. We must decide not
whether-but how best-to exercise.
most responsibly and fairly the duty
that our position and stature in the.
world has thrust upon us..
I would urge my colleagues to sup-
port this amendment. I believe it. is, a.
balanced compromise which allows us
to pursue peaceful negotiations with
the Sandinistan government, while, at
the 'same moment, it allows us to lend
our tangible support, to those who
fight for freedom, democracy,. civil lib-
erties, and a lasting peace.
Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I rise to
support the amendment of the Sena-
tor from Georgia.. At this point, there
are few more critical, tasks for Ameri-
can foreign policy than creating a
more secure Central America and deg
fuzing the explosive militarization of
the region.. I believe that this amend-
ment offers a bridge between the un-
certain policies of the present. and,,
what I hope will be a more cohesive
set of policies in the future.
The Nicaraguan military buildup is,
seen by its neighbors as, the single
greatest threat. to their stability. The.
Sandinistas claim they need this mili-
tary force to combat the Contras. But
we know better. The Nicaraguan milii-
tary buildup started before the politi-
cal opposition to, increasing. Sandinista
dominance became a. fighting force.
Unfortunately, this buildup, and the
resulting responses by neighboring
states, continues a dangerous: pattern
of escalation and counterescalation.
This pattern must be broken. But, I do
not believe it can be broken by the
United States simply walking away
from the Nicaraguan resistance move-
ment.
The complete and' continuing with-
drawal of U.S. support for the Nicara-
guan resistance would not only dra-
matically weaken our negotiating le-
verage with Nicaragua, but it would
also break faith with our allies and
create potentially disastrous problems
for neighboring states. I also believe
that a U.S. withdrawal can only lead
other countries in Central America to
question our reliability as an ally.
But even with passage of this
amendment, I continue to be con-
cerned that up here, on Capitol Hill,
and down in the executive branch, at-
tention remains focused on the appro-
priation of money-whether for the
Contras or for our economic and mili-
tary assistance programs. I have this
feeling that the administration be-
lieves that when the money is appro-
priated, the job is done.
Well, the job is not done when the
money is. appropriated-the job only
begins.
There have been, and continue to be,
critical problems in implementing our
programs in Central America. Over
the past year,. reports of waste and
mismanagement in the Central Ameri-
can aid effort have been called to our
attention. But we have taken no
action.
We authorize billions, of dollars-2
weeks ago we authorized $5 billion. in
economic aid to Central America be-
tween 1986 and 1989. But, we still do
not seem to have a handle on the eco-
nomic situation and needs of the coun-
tries in the region. For example, even
though all countries, in the region face
severe debt crises,, only one, Costa
Rica,. has a stabilization program, with
the international monetary fund. Are
we maintaining a balance between the
actions we are taking in, order to
secure military commitments and the,
tougher steps needed to ensure that
the countries in the region undertake
the economic reforms which are essen-
tial to their future economic stability
and growth? I think not..
It is' critical that this Nation shift
the debate away from: "How much
and under what conditions," to: "Are
our efforts well coordinated and doing
the things we, want them to do in the
region." If our efforts aren't doing the
things we want them to do, then how
do we improve them.
What Central America needs. is. an
economic rebirth.. Such a rebirth will
require economic assistance from the
United States, and much, much more.
Such a rebirth requires: more than.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. June 6, 1985
money, more than Contras-it requires
imagination, energy, and, most of all, a
commitment to excellence. This kind
of excellence was seen when this
Nation committed itself to helping re-
build Europe from the ashes of World
War II.
I do not believe that our efforts in
the region are well coordinated. We
cannot continue to let our Central
American efforts be managed the way
they have been over the past 4 years. I
believe it, is critical. that we pull to-
gether our Central American pro-
.grams. We need an organization that
can integrate all of our economic and
military assistance activities within
the region-and bring more Central
Americans into the process as well.
We need an organization that can
focus all of its attention on Central
America-like the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration did for our Euro-
pean Aid Program under the Marshall
plan.
I believe this was the true intention
of the National Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Central America.
I had hoped that the administration
would review the management of its
Central American Program over the
past year. Unfortunately, it chose not
to do so.
Delay, however, may serve us well.
Last year, my good friend, the chair-
man of the Budget Committee [Mr.
DOMENICI], and I, with help from
members and staff from the Kissinger
Commission, drafted legislation in this
area. But such an effort should not be
undertaken unilaterally by the Con-
gress. It should be worked- out jointly,
with the executive, as was the case in
the Marshall plan, when the White
House, working closely with the
Senate, accepted congressional sugges-
tions for a single cohesive manage-
ment structure to implement the Eu-
ropean development effort.
Our proposal called for the develop-
ment of a new.mechanism to imple-
ment the Central American effort fol-
lowing, the same management princi-
ples used for the Marshall plan. And I
cannot think of another regional aid
program as successful as the Marshall
plan. Specifically, .this proposal would
include:
First, a multiyear authorization, as
approved by the Senate in the 1986
Foreign Assistance Act. As I said earli-
er, the magnitude of the effort re-
quired and the importance for the
United States to demonstrate its re-
solve and commitment to aiding the
nations of Central America, clearly-
calls for a multiyear response.
Second, appropriation of $6 billion
in financial and economic aid and
guarantees for the period between
1986 and 1989. This would be in keep-
ing with the National Bipartisan Com-
mission's recommendations, but at
somewhat reduced levels. I understand
that some members of the Commission
believe that properly managed, a $6
billion program-some $2 billion less
than the President's request-would
be adequate to support the 'region's
needs. This is below authorized levels,
but I believe this would greatly reduce
the likelihood of providing resources
in excess of what can be effectively
managed or usefully absorbed by the
local economies. It would also reflect
the need for restraint in Federal
spending.
Third, creation of a new organiza-
tion, in the Executive Office or possi-
bly as an independent office, which
would be charged with overseeing and
carrying out or Central American Aid
Program. This Office would not dupli-
cate existing aid mechanisms. Instead,
it would integrate their efforts by pro-
viding a central focal point for all gov-
ernment tivities in the region. The
director othis Office would be a Pres-
idential appointee, -subject to confir-
mation by this body. This individual
would be responsible 'for overseeing
the development, justification, and
execution of the Central American Aid
Program. The Director of this New
Central American Development Office
would have the clout to effectively
manage all our activities in the region
and also serve as a much needed
spokesperson before Congress on our
activities in the region. The confirma-
tion process would allow continued
congressional oversight and account-
ability for the success or failure of the
program.
This new organization would be sup-
ported by an advisory board made up
and chaired by Central Americans and
other donor countries. The role of this
board would be similar to the role en-
visioned by the Kissinger Commission:
it would advise the Director to our. Aid
Program and issue public reports. It
would not, however, have direct con-
trol of U.S. aid dollars.
This Office would not become a per-
manent fixture. Our proposal calls for
the Office to dissolve in 1990. This
would help energize the organization
and give a clear sense of timeliness to
our aid efforts in the region. This
again was the formula used so success-
fully under the Marshall plan.
Now, I've mentioned the Marshall
plan several times-and I would like to
say that this approach ' hopefully-
would repeat the success of the Mar-
shall plan.
Indeed, there are similarities in the
two approaches.
The nature of the response, the in-
tensity of commitment and the man-
agement mechanism we would pro-
pose, all parallel that of the Marshall
plan.
Nonetheless, the challenges in Cen-
tral America are quite different. The
Marshall plan was a temporary effort
to fill gaps caused by the wartime dis-
ruption of an already industrial econo-
my.In Central America, our aid effort
will require U.S. support for political
and social change as well.
Let me conclude by saying that
much work remains to be done. We
have authorized and are likely to ap-
propriate over $1 billion in aid to Cen-
tral America for fiscal year 1986. But
unless swift action is taken to improve
the management of -this program, I
fear this money will do little to change
the nature of the conflict in the
region.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I
have listened with interest to the re-
marks of my friend, the distinguished
ranking minority member of the
Budget Committee. Last year, on Oc-
tober 4, he and I had a similar discus-
sion about the problems of implement-
ing an effective program of economic
aid to Central America, and some of
the problems discussed at that time
Those of us interested in the welfare
of our Central American neighbors
have had several notable achievements
since then. Congress provided in-
creases in economic assistance close to
what the National Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Central America and President
Reagan had requested. The trade
credit insurance program has been es-
tablished, and links established with
the Central. American Bank for Re-
gional Integration. I am particularly
proud that a program to support indig-
enous energy development in Central
America is now mobilized under the di-
rection of Los Alamos National Labo-
ratory.
A few weeks ago the Senate author-
ized funding for economic assistance
to Central America on a multiyear
basis. This was a very important rec-
ommendation of the bipartisan com-
mission, and I agree with Senator
CHILES that this action demonstrates
the 'resolve of the United States as
well as its commitment to help the
people of Central America.
Despite the progress I have cited,
implementation of the Central Ameri-
can program continues to suffer from
lack of unified, firm, and clear direc-
tion. It is clear that the President and
much of Congress support a bold and
innovative longer term. program of
economic and humanitarian assistance
to Central America. It is far less clear
that most of the civil servants who are
charged with carrying out the pro-
gram share the- innovation and bold-
ness of vision that are essential. Too
much of the program continues to be
poured into the same old molds, and
almost every project suffers from an
imbalance between caution and the ur-
gency that is needed.
With the help of American tax dol-
lars, the economic decline in most of
Central America ? has been stemmed.
That is a genuine achievement. It is
less clear that the Central American
nations and our aid officials have set
in place the economic policies that will
result in self-sustaining growth and
development. Here too, imagination
and leadership is needed to get these
economies back on track.
I would encourage senior officials in
the executive branch to look behind
the rhetoric to find out what is really
going on with our economic aid pro-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7645
grams. If they are not satisfied, and
there are reasons to believe they won't
be;' then I would encourage them to
consider establishing an office or an
individual responsible to the President
for overall implementation of our Cen-
tral American economic assistance pro-
gram. In consultation with Congress
and subject to Senate confirmation,
such a structure could help Americans
account for our aid, and help Central
Americans renew their economic de-
velopment in an equitable manner.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the
Senate has spent a great deal of timg
debating what to do and how much to
spend on Central America. We have
talked about all of these great new
programs and all the benefits we are
going to bring to the people of the
region. But, my good friend from Flor-
ida is right. All we have done is au-
thorize a great deal of money for more
of the same.
It's time to get on with the job of re-
building Central America. We've
talked about the Kissinger Commis-
sion; we've made many statements
about bringing peace and prosperity to
the region; but, I do not believe the
current organizations of the executive
branch can effectively manage all of
our efforts in the region. We need to
do more.
It's time to move away from all of
the empty sense of the Senate resolu-
tions we are so proud of passing and
get on with some real legislation. Sen-
ators CHII.zs and DOMENICI have of-
fered some new ideas in this area and.I
hope we will have a chance to debate
the merits of their proposal before the
end of the year.
The current approach of our aid
agencies toward developing the econo-
mies of our friends in Central America
is too slow, too cumbersome, and, I be-
lieve, will end in failure. Instead, we
need to implement a new kind of aid
program, one which will provide cap-
ital to the entrepreneurs of the region.
It is these entrepreneurs, developing
new industries and new markets, that
will help revitalize the region's econo-
my. There is a vast market in the
United States for goods that could be
produced in that region that has re-
mained untapped. If the United States
was so willing to aid in developing and
in providing the market, for the vari-
ous industries in Southeast Asia over
the past three decades, so should we
be willing to assist in developing simi-
lar capabilities in Central America. I
have long felt that success toward
righting the various wrongs existing in
Central America will only come from
an economic revitalization. The cur-
rent approach won't work but empha-
sis on the economic order could.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, again
today we find ourselves debating the
proper direction of. U.S. policy toward
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
Again, we will have to decide-despite
both moral objections and internation-
al obligations, and despite the fact
that our commitment of substantial
resources to date has not worked-
whether we will continue to support a -
band of rebels whose intention is to
overthrow a government with whom
we maintain diplomatic relations.
Polls show that the American people
are understandably confused and un-
certain about the proper direction of
U.S. policy in Central America. But
there is one point on which they are
not confused: they know that despite
what the President may say, the Nica-
raguan Contras are not the moral
equivalent of our Founding Fathers.
The American people know-and we
know-that George Washington and
Thomas Jefferson did not cape, tor-
ture, and terrorize-and I think Presi-
dent Reagan should be mortified by
mentioning the Contras and our
Founding Fathers in the same breath.
Mr. President, I am no apologist for
the Sandinistas. Our differences with
them are well known. We oppose their
denial of basic rights and democratic
freedoms at home and their support
for revolution abroad. As we should
with totalitarian regimes of both the
right and the left, we must maintain
pressure for change-for respect for
human liberty and for the right of the
people to freely choose their govern-
ment. But the pressure we bring to
bear in this instance should stop short
of pushing for the military overthrow
of a government by rebels whose com-
mitment to human rights and demo-
cratic principles is' questionable at
best. That does not mean, however,
that we need not be concerned about
the potential threat Nicaragua poses
of its neighbors or about the repres-
sion of democratic liberties that the
Sandinista regime is pursuing at home.
To deal with the external threat, I
'believe we should be willing to provide
Nicaragua's neighbors with appropri-
ate economic and military assistance
to enable them to resist revolution and
to address the economic deprivation
which enhances Marxist revolutionary
appeal. In particular we should give
our full support to the efforts of the
Contadora nations to negotiate a re-
gionwide agreement to protect the
peace and stability of the region. In
'fact, this should be the centerpiece of
our policy, not just a sideshow. I
submit that the Contadora process
offers the best available forum for a
negotiated resolution because it is at
least partially insulated from the acri-
mony of the United States-Nicaraguan
bilateral relationship.
As for the repression of democratic
liberties inside Nicaragua itself, I
agree that we should be willing to use
both economic and diplomatic leverage
to help bring about reforms. But the
Reagan administration's total embar-
go went too far too fast. and destroyed
whatever leverage we might otherwise
have had. Once' you impose a total em-
bargo, you have expended all of your
ammunition and you have no other
economic pressure left to bring to
bear. I prefer the use of calibrated
sanctions which can be tightened or
eased depending on actions of the Nic-
araguan Government,.
Last, we should apply in conjunction
with our regional friends, strong and
constant diplomatic pressure on Nica-
ragua to end internal repression, to
pursue democratic reforms, and to end
support for revolution abroad.
By doing these things, I believe we
would send a strong and clear mes-
sage-both to the Sandinistas and to
our allies in this hemisphere-that we
will do all we must to protect both
ourselves and our friends and to pro-
mote democratic liberties-and that
we will firmly adhere to our own prin-
ciples in the process. It is my fervent
hope that the Sandinistas will respond
.to the actions I have outlined so that
more stringent and far-reaching steps
do not become necessary.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am
pleased to cosponsor this amendment,
which will provide $38 million in hu-
manitarian aid during fiscal year 1985
and fiscal year 1986 to the democratic
resistance in Nicaragua.
This amendment is a carefully craft-
ed compromise. As others have already
noted, it provides a reasonable level of
assistance, consistent ?with the real
need for nonlethal aid. It meets the es-
sential needs of the President and is
supported by ? the administration, but
it also takes into account the legiti-
mate concerns expressed on both sides
of the aisle about aspects of our in-
volvement in Central America.
The amendment puts our support
for the democratic resistance in a clear
and compelling policy context. It un-
derscores that we want a negotiated,
not a military, solution to the Nicara-
guan situation, while recognizing that
there is no prospect of serious negotia-
tions unless the Sandinistas have some
incentives to negotiate. It maintains
the Contras as one important point of
leverage on Managua, but it also urges
the use of other political and economic
measures as part of our overall strate-
gy.
This amendment insures that our
'support for the democratic resistance
forces will be closely and properly
monitored, both by the executive
branch and by the Congress. It reiter-
ates basic congressional oversight au-
thority and directs that the NSC mon-
itor the use of funds. It mandates fre-
quent Presidential reports to the Con-
gress on the status of any negotia-
tions, the use of provided funds and
the efforts undertaken to remove any
undesirable personalities from the
ranks of the Contras. In sum, it will
insure that our activities will continue
to be consistent with our goals and
policy, as affirmed by the Congress.
At the same time, the amendment
restores to the President the policy
flexibility he needs to conduct an ef-
fective policy. It rescinds some earlier
and unwise restrictions on the Presi-
dent's freedom of movement and pro-
vides expedited procedures to consider
future Presidential requests for action,
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should hope for negotiations break
down or political and economic sanc-
tions prove ineffective in pursuing our
legitimate and limited goals vis-a-vis
Nicaragua.
Mr. President, this issue has been
with us for many months. The fits and
starts of our consideration of this
matter have served the interests of no
one, except perhaps the Sandinistas
and their Communist allies-
The case for continued support to
the Contras, meanwhile, has become
even more compelling. As we all know,
following the earlier, misguided House
effort to extend a kind of olive branch
to Managua, Commandante Ortega
ran off to Moscow, to solidify his alli-
ance with the Soviets and to get new
bankrolling for the dangerous activi-
ties of his regime. More recently, the
Sandinista Army has undertaken new
aggression against both Costa Rica
and Honduras, despite the conscien-
tious efforts of both those govern-
ments to diffuse their border situation
with Nicaragua. It is hard to see how
there could be much doubt in anyone's
mind about the true nature of the
Sandinista regime and its real aims in
Central. America.
It is time to act, clearly and decisive-
ly, on this issue. We can do that by
voting for this amendment and sus-
taining strong support for it through
the conference process ahead.
(By unanimous consent the names of
Mr. 'STENNIS, Mr. DoMENicr, and Mr.
MATTINGLY were added as cosponsors.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MATHIAS. Vote.
Mr. EVANS.. Mr. President, I rise to
vote against the amendment before us,
as I have voted' against all the propos-
als concerning military operations in
Central America offered here today. I
do so with reluctance, as many of
these amendments contained thought-
ful, constructive proposals of consider-
able merit. Unfortunately, the unani-
mous-consent order we are under does
not allow for further amendment of
the proposals. In fact, the amendment
before us now, the so-called' Lugar-
Nunn proposal, requires some very ap-
pealing actions on the part of the
President.. Actions such as: reiterating
our support for the Contadora process
by implementing the 1983. Contadora
Document of Objectives: resuming bi-
lateral discussions with Nicaragua to
encourage both a dialogue between
the Government. of Nicaragua and all
elements of the opposition and a com-
prehensive, verifiable agreement
among the nations of'Central America
based on the Contadora Document of
Objectives; pursuing multilateral trade
and economic measures to complement
the U.S. economic sanctions; and, sus-
pending the sanctions:. and U.S. mili-
tary maneuvers in. Honduras and off
the coast of Nicaragua if the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua takes certain. ac-
tions.
These proposals recognize the diplo-
matic means that exist to help bring
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
stability to this troubled region. Were
we to pursue such positive actions, we
would likely find support both within
and outside the region for our efforts.
Our efforts thus far have brought us
little outside support and yet a sus-
tainable policy for this region around
which'a consensus can be built. is pre-
cisely what we need.
As wholeheartedly as I support the
positive proposals, in this amendment,
I cannot support it. The amendment
calls for humanitarian aid to be given
to the Contras operating in Nicaragua.
But what is this humanitarian aid? Its
practical effect will be anything but
humanitarian-by providing the Con-
tras food, clothing, and .other non-
lethal items, they will be able to spend
more of their other moneys' on guns
and bullets. To think. otherwise is to
be less than honest with ourselves.
Therefore, we are faced with the
same nagging questions that have fol-
lowed us for some time: what are our
long-term objectives and policies for
Central America? This question must
be answered' before we proceed with
the dangerous investment now, pro-
posed.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President,. I would
like to note that Senator ORRIN HATCH
is giving a commencement address for
his daughter's graduating class and
that obligation prevents him from
being here to vote for this amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL. Mr. President.' I yield 5
minutes to the Senator from Vermont.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Presi-
dent.
I thank the distinguished Senator
from Rhode Island.
Mr. President, as I understand this
amendment, subsection (a) of the
amendment would appropriate $24
million for humanitarian assistance to
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.
My question I had is under the
amendment, would any funds other
than the $24 million. be available for
obligations in fiscal year 1986? Or is
the $24 million in effect a cap on ex-
penditure for the activities authorized
by the amendment during fiscal year
1986?'
Mr. LUGAR. It is a cap on the total
amount for that year.
Mr. LEAHY. For 1986.
Mr. LUGAR. For 1986..
Mr. LEAHY. I thank the distin-
guished chairman.
Subsection (b) of. the amendment re-
peals subsections (a) and (b) of section
8066 of the continuing resolution, the
so-called Boland restriction. Subsec-
tion (d) of section 8066, which would
remain in force, provides during fiscal-
year 1985 funds approved by the reso-
lution for the purpose of supporting
directly or indirectly military or para-
military operation in Nicaragua should
not exceed $14 million. -
If any of the $14 million is not ex-
pended in fiscal year 1985, would that
be available for expenditures in 1986
as well? I ask the distinguished chair-
man.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask my
distinguished colleague from Georgia
to affirm my interpretation. It appears
to me that there are two distinctly
separate funds. One is the $14 million
that is being unfenced in 1985. The.
second is the $24 million authorization
for 1986. But the funds from. 1985.
would not spill over into 1986. That is
at least my interpretation.
Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct.
That is also my interpretation. It is
not by reason of a provision in this
amendment but by reason of the
standard appropriation language
which is incorporated every year relat-
ing to intelligence activities, which ba-
sically says the funds that are not ex-
pended do, not carry over.
Mr. LEAHY. If any of the $14 mil-
lion is not expended in 1985 it does not
become available in :1986. '
Mr. NUNN. That is my interpreta-
tion. I concur with the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. LEAHY. That is the distin-
guished chairman's interpretation.
I thank the Senator.
The term "humanitarian assistance"
is defined in subsection (g) to include
the provision of food, clothing, medi-
cine, other humanitarian assistance,
and transportation 'costs associated
with the delivery of such assistance. It
is defined to exclude weapons, weap-
ons systems, ammunition, or any other
equipment or materiel which is de-
signed or has as its purpose to inflict
serious bodily injury or death. Obvi-
ously there is a gray area here of
items that are nonhumanitarian but
also nonlethal. That would include
military related supplies ' or equipment
which could but are not themselves
lethal.
I wonder would the following items
be included within the scope of hu-
manitarian assistance. Military-type
uniforms?
Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator
from Vermont I prefer not to go down
a list here. I think he can go on and
on. I understand the Senator's point. I
have done some of that with the Sena-
tor's concurrence in the Intelligence
Committee.. We had considerable dis-
cussion on this. I think what I like to
say is it is our intent to have humani-
tarian taken literally by the CIA. I
think we have defined it as food, medi-
cine, clothing. For instance, military-
type uniforms, without binding myself.
to continue this point by point, I
'would say if you gave a multiple
choice question and said, would the
CIA be permitted to provide military-
type uniforms or would they be re-
quired to give them three-piece suits
or tuxedos?
Mr. LEAHY. How about radars?
Mr. NUNN. Or bathing suits or Ber-
muda shorts. I would say military-type
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June 6, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
uniforms are permitted by this amend-
ment.
Mr. LEAHY. It was a question the
distinguished Senator from Georgia
asked in another form that gave me
the idea for this. I am wondering
about things like radar, for example.
Would radar be included?
Mr. NUNN. I would say if radar is in-
cluded to be used in battle manage-
ment it would not be in keeping with
the definition of humanitarian.
On the other hand, if it was set up
in a camp outside of Nicaragua for
their protection against air raids, I
would say that would be a different
answer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from Rhode
Island has expired. .
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 1 minute and 33 seconds.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today's
edition of the Christian Science Moni-
tor carried a very persuasive article,
addressing the threat which inter-
national communism presents in Nica-
ragua. The article was written by Mr.
John Lenczowski of the National Secu-
rity Council staff who is an expert on
Soviet affairs. I commend this article
to the attention of my colleagues and I
ask unanimous consent that the arti-
cle entitled "International Commu-
nism and Nicaragua-An Administra-
tion View," be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the Christian Science Monitor, June
6, 1985]
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND NICARAGUA-
AN ADMINISTRATION VIEW
BY JOHN LENCZOWSKI)
It is often unpleasant to resurrect what
many think are the unpleasant ghosts of
the past. Unfortunately, that is what we do
when we talk frankly about the forces of
"international communism" at work in our
hemisphere. It has long been politically the
safe thing to do to ridicule any mention of
this alleged phenomenon. Professors and
pundits have assured us for years that
"international communism" as such no
longer really exists-which is why it is redi-
culed as a "phantom," the object of irration-
al phobias of extremists, know-nothings, or
people living in the past. It has been ex-
plained to us that we can no longer clinical-
ly and accurately use this loaded expression
because of the Sino-Soviet split, the Yugo-
slav-Soviet split, the Albanian-Soviet split,
and other manifestations of polycentrism.
Perhaps communism is no longer a mono-
lithic force subsuming all Marxist-Leninist
states under the Soviet banner. Neverthe-
less, how can one label the presence today
in Nicaragua of Cubans, Bulgarians, Liby-
ans, Czechs, North Koreans, East Germans,
Vietnamese, Soviets, and communist ele-
ments of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion? If this is not some facsimile of interna-
tional communism, then we are at a loss at
how to explain the common thread that
binds these forces together. If we must pay
our dues to the gods of polycentrism, then
perhaps we might refine our terminology by
calling this phenomenon "Soviet interna-
tional communism," since neither Maoist,
Titoist, or Albanian brands of communism
are at work.
Since we so rarely discuss the facts about
international communism, here are a few
that should be remembered in the context
of the debate on Nicaragua:
The people do not want communism.
Never in history has a majority of a free
electorate democratically chosema commu-
nist form of government. (There is only one
exception: the minuscule state of San
Marino.)
Communists have always come to power
through violent takeovers. These takeovers
have always involved the seizure of power
by a well-organized and externally assisted
minority over an unorganized and unwitting
majority. Such takeovers consistently entail
the use of a "popular front" of communist
and noncommunist elements; the establish-
ment of a communist party that uses an ide-
ological party line to enforce internal con-
formity and identify and eliminate devi-
ationists; the use of camouflage to disguise
the party's true intentions and full political
program; the use of propaganda and disin-
formation to manipulate the international
news media; the use of violent and ruthless
methods to eliminate all organized opposi-
tion; and finally, the use of gradualism in
the process of eliminating opposition and
applying internal security-so that the
people do not realize what is happening to
them until it is too late.
No communist regime that has consolidat-
ed its power has ever been overthrown and
replaced by a noncommunist order. (The
only exception is Grenada.) Every other
form of government offers people the
chance to retain a system of trial and error.
It is easy to overthrow a Shah or a Somoza
after trial has been granted and error per-
ceived. But once communism is firmly in
place, the possibility of trial and error is no
more. A vote against aid to. the "freedom
fighters" is a vote to consign Nicaragua to
an indefinite period of no freedom of choice.
The human cost of communism exceeds
most Americans' expectations. The number
of people murdered by communist regimes
is estimated at between 60 million and 150
million, with the higher figure probably
more accurate in light of recent scholarship.
The greatest tide of refugees in world histo-
ry flows from communist states to noncom-
munist ones: Today it comes from Ethiopia,
'Afghanistan, Indochina, East Europe, and
Nicaragua. (During the entire Vietnam war
there was nary a refugee fleeing from Indo-
china. It was not until communism tri-
umphed that life became so unbearable that
people who could withstand decades of war
fled to the seas.) Communism invented the
concentration camp. Millions have been im-
prisoned and executed, have worked and
starved to death, in these camps. Commu-.
nisi regimes will not permit enterprising
Western reporters near these camps, so you
don't hear about them on the news. Com-
munist regimes recognize no restraint on
their absolute power. From this they estab-
lish ideological falsehoods as the standards
of right and wrong and the standards by
which deviationism is measured; from this
stems the systematic denial of all individual
human rights. The quality of life always de-
teriorates under communism: the militariza-
tion of society; the destruction of the con-
sumer economy; the rationing of food; the
deterioration of housing and insufficient
new construction to meet population
growth; the destruction of medical care
through lack of medicine and medical sup-
plies; the destruction of religion; the de-
struction and political control of education
and culture; the rewriting of history and de-
struction of monuments to the national her-
S 7647
itage; and the assault on family life and pa-
rental jurisdiction over children.
Soviet-style communism invariably means
.the export of terrorism, violence, and revo-
lution. Soviet proxy states participate in an
efficient division of labor: Cubans as troops,
Bulgarians and Vietnamese as arms suppli-
ers, East Germans as secret-police trainers
and military advisers. Since Soviet proxies
are present on our continent today, it is no
accident that the communist Sandinista
regime is an active collaborator in this divi-
sion of labor.
The Sandinistas are communists. Nicara-
guan President Daniel Ortega has said:
"Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine
that guides our revolution .... [W]ithout
Sandinismo we cannot be Marxist-Leninist,
and Sandinismo without Marxism-Leninism
cannot be revolutionary." The identical pat-
tern of communist takeover, internal poli-
cies, and external behavior is repeating
itself in Nicaragua. There can be no doubt.
given the vast evidence we have accumulat-
ed, that Nicaragua is becoming another
Cuba.
Communist regimes, including the Nicara-
guan regime, spend vast resources on disin-
formation-to deceive the international
news media and foreign political decision-
makers. A principal goal is to disseminate
false information about the nature of their
own system: The principal disinformation
theme of all communist regimes is to con-
vince others that they are not really com-
munist. This is done in many ways by the
Sandinistas, but most prominently by the
"guided tour." Countless American visitors
are taken on this guided tour and see nice
things and talk to "average citizens" who
tell them what the regime wants them to.
Nobody wants to believe that he has been
fooled. But if Congress is to believe the tes-
timony of constituents and reporters who
base their information on the "guide tour,"
Congress may as well believe everything it is
told on identical guided tours in Moscow,
Havana, East Germany and North Korea.
Congress must decide whether it will
resist international communism on our con-
tinent or let it prosper. Isolationists in Con-
gress may base their opposition to the ad-
ministration on the principle that other
countries should be allowed self-determina-
tion. Unfortunately, in Nicaragua today
there can be no self-determination, because
of the reality of "foreign-force determina-
tion." The foreign force is the USSR and its
proxies, otherwise known as the forces of
'international communism. Will the Nicara-
guans be given enough assistance so that
they will be able to determine their future
on the basis of a balance of foreign forces,
or will Congress permit an imbalance, an im-
balance against democracy, against any
system of trial and error? If Congress choos-
es to deny the Nicaraguan friends of democ-
racy a chance for self-determination, it will
be voting in favor of the first victory of the
Soviet strategic offensive on our own conti-
nent.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for
the support of all Senators on this
amendment. It is an amendment that
has come from the work of Senators
on both sides of the aisle in a genuine
bipartisan attempt to give a very
strong supporting gloss about our for-
eign policy in Central America.
When President Napoleon Duarte
visited our country recently, he made
the point again and again that our
voice is seen as divided in Central
America-divided by party, divided by
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S 7648
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE '. June 6, 1985
House and Senate, divided by Congress
and the administration.
I appreciate very much the work of
the distinguished Senators: from Geor-
gia, Oklahoma,. Florida, and so many
other Senators on the Democratic side
of the aisle. Likewise, I appreciate the
work from my majority leader, Sena-
for DOLE, from Senator WILSON, and
from the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, Senator DURENBERCER, in
particular, who has been so thought-
ful in drafting this amendment.
We have forged, a statement for
/America that is very important. I hope
we will have a very strong vote this
evening in support of it.
Mr.. NUNN. Mr. President, may I say
I thank the Senators from. Indiana
and Minnesota and the majority
leader, who cosponsored this amend-
ment. I hope we have a general con-
sensus here.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield
back our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. All
time is yielded back. The question is
on agreeing to the amendment. All
those in favor, say, "aye."
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President,. I ask for
the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment. The yeas and nays have been or-
dered and the clerk will call the roll:
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the
Senator from Arizona [Mn GOLD-
WATER] and the Senator from Wyo-
ming (Mr. . WALLOP] are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that,. if present
and voting, the Senator from Wyo-
ming [Mr. WALLopl would vote yea.
Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that
the Senator from West Virginia [Mr.
RoCKEFELLER1 is necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from West
Virginia [Mr. ROCKEFELLER]. would
vote yea.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are
there any other Senators in the Cham-
ber wishing to vote?
The result was announced-yeas 55,
nays 42, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 112 Leg.]
YEAS-55
Abdnor
Ford
McClure
Andrews
Garn
McConnell
Armstrong
Gramm
Murkowski
Bentsen
Grassley
Nickles
Boren.
Hatch
Nunn
Boschwitz
Hawkins
Pressler
Byrd
Hecht
Quayle
Chiles
Heflin
Roth.
Cochran
Heinz
Rudman
D'Amato
Helms
Simpson.
Danforth
Hollings
Stennis
DeConcini
Humphrey
Stevens
Denton
Johnston
Symms
Dixon
Kassebaum
Thurmond
Dole
Kasten
Trible
Domenici
Laxalt
Warner
Durenberger
Long
Wilson
East
Lugar
Exon
Mattingly
NAYS-42
Baucus
Gorton
Mitchell
Biden
Harkin.
Moynihan
Bingaman
Hart
Packwood
Bradley
Hatfield
Pell
Bumpers
Inouye
Proxmire
Burdick
Kennedy
Pryor
Chafee
Kerry
Riegle
Cohen
Lautenberg
Sarbanes
Cranston
Leahy
Sasser
Dodd
Levin
Simon
Eagleton
Mathias
Specter
Evans
Matsunaga
Stafford
Glenn
Meicher
Weicker
Gore
Metzenbaum
Zorinsky
NOT VOTING-3.
Goldwater
Rockefeller Wallop
So the
agreed to.
. Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to..
Mr. DOLE. Mr.'President, I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me in-
dicate to my colleagues who are here,
and to those who may be listening on
their squawkboxes? that we will con-
vene at 8:30 in the morning and be'.
back. on the bill 'at 9 o'clock. There are
still five Contra amendments'. I will
still make the offer that I will with-
draw my amendment if the other four
will withdraw theirs. That may not
sell..
I encourage my colleagues to help us
by perhaps shortening the time. Each
of the remaining amendments has 60
minutes each. If there is some real
need' to offer the amendment, maybe
we could help on the time side.
The distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. KERRY] has indi-
cated he is prepared to yield back a
sizable portion of his time. I hope that
a couple of the amendments would not
be offered.
I know a number of my colleagues
have official engagements elsewhere
tomorrow afternoon and evening. We
want to try to accommodate everyone
we can. But. it seemed to me that we
were going to be at least until mid-
night. on the Contra amendments to-
night and there are still about 40
other amendments, is that right?
About 40 is right. That looked like to
much to do in one evening.
Many of those amendments can be
accepted, with maybe three or four
rollcall votes. We shall try to aceom,
modate those Senators who must
depart by 3 o'clock tomorrow. Some
may have to leave a bit earlier. So if
we. come in and show a willingness to
help work it out, because we would
like to complete action on his bill so
we can take up the clean water bill' on
Monday. And we have a full calendar
again next week.
There are only 2 weeks after next
week before we are back in recess.
I might add, Mr. President, since I
understand there will be a division
asked for on the first amendment, the
amendment by the distinguished Sena-
tor from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN), that
votes could occur as early as 9 or 10
a.m. tomorrow. I think Senators
should be on notice that it may not be
as late as noon.
Mr.. DIXON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. DOLE.. Mr. President, I yield to
the Senator from Illinois'.
Mr. DIXON. I wonder if the majori-
ty leader would indicate what time he
anticipates rollcalls on Monday after-
noon?
Mr. DOLE. Very candidly, Mr. Presi-
dent, I think that may depend on how
we. get along tomorrow afternoon.
Mr. DIXON. Will he indicate tomor-
row afternoon?
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, there will
not be votes on Monday until Monday
afternoon. If we are back on this on
Monday, then votes could occur early
Monday afternoon but not in the
morning.
REDUCTION OF TIME FOIL KERRY AMENDMENT'
Mr. DOLE.. Mr. President, I under-
stand that the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts [Mr. KERRY] will
be willing to reduce his time, the total
time, from 1 hour to 40 minutes equal-
ly divided. I therefore ask unanimous
consent that, when the Kerry amend-
ment. is offered, the total time be 40
minutes equally divided.. That is 20 for
certain for the Senator from Massa-
chusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (.Mr.
WARNER). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr.:President, I thank
the majority leader very much.
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be a
period for the transaction of routine
morning business not to extend
beyond 8:30 p.m., with statements
therein limited to 5 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection,. it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS DEAL-
ING WITH AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARD NICARAGUA
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, as
the Senate embarks upon yet another
debate regarding American policy
toward. the Sandinista Government of
Nicaragua, each offered in the form of
an amendment to the pending State
Department authorization bill, I think
it appropriate to state at the outset
that I expect to be recorded in opposi-
tion to each of the :proposals likely to
be brought to a vote today.
While there are elements in each
that I could support, and in fact would
like to see pursued by the President, it.
seems to me that none of these
amendments, or any combination of
these amendments, provides a reasona-
bl'e? or responsible basis on which to
formulate and puruse a foreign policy
in Central America. For, the problem
here is not one amenable to solution
by legislative action alone. What is
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