UNIT IV: THE AMERICAN POLICYMAKING PROCESS COURSE TWO: POLICY PLANNING AND NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING ACADEMIC YEAR 1985-1986

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DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFFRFNrF
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STAT
E utive Secretary
DEC 85
EXECUTIVE SECRET4RIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
x
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
x
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
18
19
20
21
22
3637 (10-81)
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DATE: / //L /
STAT
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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 203196000
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Executive Registry
85- 4780
UNIT IV: THE AMERICAN POLICYMAKING PROCESS
COURSE TWO: POLICY PLANNING AND NATIONAL
SECURITY DECISIONMAI(ING
ACADEMIC YEAR 1985-1986
RICHARD E. SINER
Colonel, USAF
Course Director
aj e
RICHARD L. KUIPER
Colonel, USAF
Chairman, Department of
Public Policy
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This document contains educational material designed
to promote discussion by students of the
National War College. It does not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Defense University
or the Department of Defense.
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POLICY PLANNING AND NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING
Topic 1
(LD)
Overview and Framework for Analysis of
Policymaking in the Executive Branch
Topic 2
(L)
Role of the Assistant to the President for
for National Security Affairs
Topic 3A
(L&D)
Structure of the NSC and the Work of the NSC Staff
Topic 38
(DR)
National Security Council
Topic 3C
(IS)
Discussion of the NSC and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Topic 4A
(DR)
Department of Defense.
Topic 4B
(LD)
Policymaking in the Defense Department
Topic 5
(L)
Analysis Support and the Role of the Budget in
DOD Decisionmaking
Topic 6A
(DR)
Policymaking in the State Department
Topic 6B
(LD)
Issues Confronting the State Department
Topic 7A
(DR)
The Intelligence Community
Topic 7B
(LD)
Intelligence and the Role of the DCI
Topic 8A
t-OR)
Vietnam Case Study Preparation
Topic 88
(SE)
Vietnam: Case Study in Decisionmaking
Topic 9
(DR)
DOD, the JCS, Congress and Reorganization
Topic 10
(LD)
Providing Military Advice and the Role of the JCS
in National Security Decisionmaking
Topic 11
(L)
Contemporary Perspective on National Security Issues
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OVERVIEW
You have just completed Course 1 of Unit IV, one of the most fundamental
and interesting blocs of instruction in the core curriculum. As a result, you
should be sensitive to the impact of the American political environment upon
the federal policymaking process and the interactions of the major institutions
of government. This course will focus more directly upon the Executive Branch
of the U.S. Government and will help you better understand the elements and
processes of policy planning and national security decisionmaking. In conjunc-
tion with the other parts of the core curriculum, this course will try, in a
modest way, to assist in developing your ability to address and analyze
important national security issues and to formulate realistic solutions to the
problems they pose.
First, we will focus on the highest and ultimately final level of national
security decisionmaking--the Presidential level. We will consider the national
security system established for Presidents to use, and how Presidents use that
system. How does the President view and receive advice from his National
Security Council? What kind of arrangements can he made to ensure timely and
quality advice to facilitate foreign policy and national security decisions?
What is the role of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and the staff of the National Security Council that supports him?
Se-ondly, the course will address the roles of the major executive agencies
which input to and partake in the national security decisionmaking system: the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community.
Each brings to the process a certain perspective unique to themselves because
of their institutional responsibilities and because of the nature of their
leadership. We need to be aware of these differences as we deal in the
decisionmaking process because of the subsequent impact upon policy develop-
ments. We must-be sophisticated enough to see the strengths and weaknesses
inherent in these unique perspectives so as to realistically appraise
recommendations for organizational change--to know when reform will be
meaningful, when it will have an impact upon policy, and when it will just be
a different cover for
doing business the same old way.
In the area of defense, we will take a quick look into the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This is one of the largest and most
structured decisionmaking tools of any government agency in the U.S. or in the
world for that matter, and its effect on defense issues and decisions is
commensurately large. We will receive a presentation on analysis support for
the SECDEF and the role of the budget in DOD decisionmaking.
Next we will look more into the nuts and bolts of the process. By dissect-
ing some very important decisions that led to expansion of the Vietnam War, we
will observe first hand the interactive process of the agencies as they
approached some of the most crucial national security decisions this country
faced in the 1960s.
Finally, we will look at the way the President and the SECDEF receive
advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), evaluate the
effectiveness of the JCS system and examine some proposals for JCS reform.
iv
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A special opportunity to overview policymaking in the Executive Branch and
to gain a contemporary perspective on national security issues will form the
last course meeting with a review by Alexander Haig. This will be followed by
Q&A, and capped off with a pre-holiday festivity.
The course is a combination of readings, lectures, panel discussions, and
seminar sessions designed to give you background on the dynamics of the nation-
al security decisionmaking process so that you can focus on the critical issues
of how to understand and work within the system, and how best to organize and
plan in the future for better results.
The lecturers are, for the most part, current implementors of the system.
They have all had government experience. You should use the question and
answer periods with them to maximum benefit. Probe their perspectives and
insights to understand how the process worked for them in practice, and to
learn what opportunities and constraints exist for improvement through change.
Challenge the assumptions of the guest lecturers and ask them penetrating
questions in areas you feel they have not been sufficiently clear or vigorous
during their presentations.
In one form or another, you will all be entering the national security
community following graduation from NWC, and it is just possible that you may
be working for or with some of the people who will have addressed you during
the course. In any event, you will be working within that thing called "The
National Security Decisionmaking Process," and we hope this program of
instruction will leave you better prepared for the task.
Acknowledgements
The Cours Director would like to give special thanks to Johanna deOnis-
for timely library assistance and to Sue O'Keefe and Linda Welling for
syllabus preparation and administrative support.
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Topic 1: Overview and Framework for Analysis of Policymaking in the
Executive Branch
Monday
9 December 1985
0830-0945
LD
A. General:
The lecture will give an overview to the course and explain its relation-
ship to the rest of the NWC core program--where you have been to date, and
where you are headed following the Christmas break. It will also focus on how
national security policy is formulated and implemented in the Executive Branch.
We will address the importance of a framework for looking at this process if we
are to better understand and work within it.
Policymakers are faced with constraints arising from the American cultural
tradition, the dispersion of political power, and the complex bureaucratic
relationships of large organizations. The President, his Assistant for
National Security Affairs, the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Director of
Central Intelligence are the major agents in the environment. We will need to
develop an individual framework for analyzing how they and their organizations
play in the process.
The first reading from the NDU book on national security policy is a very
simplified introduction to some of the theories espoused by experts and
scholars on how the "system works. They are attempts to bring order to what
may otherwise be chaos and confusion. The purpose of exposing you to these
ideas is not lo`destroy your mind, or to cause you confusion with the complex-
ity ot~e theory and problems. Rather, it is to let you know: (1) that there
are different ways of looking at the process, (2) that theory and models are
abstractions from reality designed to help you understand the real world, (3)
that it is near to impossible to begin to discuss these issues without some
framework for analysis, and (4) that the framework you adopt should be the one
which best helps you understand the process.
The second reading, "A Bureaucratic Perspective," delves a little deeper
into one of the theories; one which the author's believe is "useful and fruit-
ful." But, as Halperin and Kanter concede, "the"experts cannot agree on what
constitutes the most fruitful level of analysis nor where best to look for the
answers." Don't get hung up on the abstractions. Use them as you see fit to
help you explain how and why policies and decisions are made in the U.S.
B. Issues for Consideration:
1. As you reflect upon the various conceptual approaches to the policy
process, which of them seems most descriptive of the real world that you have
come to know? What practical experiences have you where that approach
explained the outcome of a decisionmaking problem or issue?
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2. Do you believe the rational actor model is descriptive of the American
policymaking and decisionmaking process? What examples do you have where this
approach was clearly working as a basis for decisionmaking?
3. Mr. Jack Valenti (of moviemaking fame) was a close associate and
adviser of both President Kennedy and President Johnson. I once heard him
remark that each step, each decision that was taken during Vietnam at the
presidential level, seemed like it was exactly the"right decision at the
time. Think about that in light of the models described and try to come to a
conclusion as to what his remark really said and why, in the end, those
decisions did not result in victory.
4. Do you view the various approaches as mutually exclusive explanations
of the process, as competing with each other for dominance, or is it possible
that some of the approaches are complementary and can occur simultaneously?
C. Required Readings:
a. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Securit Policy Formulation:
Institutions Processes, and Issues, National De ense University, Washington,
1984, pp. .
b. Halperin, Morton H., and Arnold Kanter, Readings in American Foreign
Polic : A Bureaucratic Perspective, Boston: Litt e, Brown and o., 1973,
pp. 1-42.
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Topic 2: Role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Monday
9 December 1985
1000-1130
L
INTRODUCTION
The United States emerged as a world power in the twentieth century
without a tradition of sophisticated statecraft. World War II forced an
amalgam of organizational innovations--some created, some borrowed--to deal
with the urgent needs of national security policy formulation and implementa-
tion. All were essentially ad hoc. At the end of World War II, critics of
the costly blunders and gross inefficiencies due to lack of organization
clamored for structure to support our national security affairs. Some were
fearful of the autonomy that the President possessed in the ad hoc world, and
some were concerned for the future course of events of a nation now clearly
identified as a leader on the world scene.
The result of these various pressures was,the National Security Act of
1947, which remains the statutory basis of the organization for national
security in the United States. The 1947 Act was a product of the American
political system. It was a package of compromises hammered out between
competing agencies such as the emergent Air Force, which sought an independent
status after World War II; the Navy, which battled to strengthen its place in
the budget ahead; the Marine Corps, which fought for its very survival as an
organization; and the Army, which tried to maintain its leading position.
Advisers to the President sought to protect his freedom of action in the 1947
Act.
Fundamentally, the distribution of power between the executive and
legislative branches remained the constant concern regardless of how the
issues varied. Overriding every issue was the theme of centralization versus
decentralization. Congress struggled, in the face of pressure for centraliza-
tion, to keep power from the executive and in its own branch through ensuring
multiple actors and greater decentralization of the national security
organization. This bargaining to design the national security structure for
the future took place before the full effects of the Cold War and atomic
weapons were recognized. The resulting National Security Act of 1947 and its
amendments contained these principal initiatives:
1. It established the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body
to the President for national security matters.
2. A new cabinet-level agency--the Department of Defense--was established
with the Army, Navy and Air Force as co-equal parts of the Department of
Defense.- The Air Force became a separate military service.
3. The committee of Chiefs of the armed services, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), was given a statutory basis and designated the principal military
adviser to the President and the Secretary'of Defense.
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4. The Central Intelligence Agency was created with high-level intelli-
gence functions and coordinating authority.
It should be emphasized that the 1947 Act did not change the Constitutional
position of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs and national
security matters. Until the Korean War, President Truman did not personally
take part in NSC meetings in order to show that neither the President's respon-
sibilities nor his freedom of action were circumscribed by'the creatio of the
National Security Council. The new legislation tended to formalize the layer
of national security professinals and establishment, "inners-and-outers,"*
which had developed during World War II to coordinate the politico-military
effort of the nation. These persons manned key positions in the new Department
of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council Staff,
where they tended to extend the President's reach down into the policymaking
structure.
As you see, the fundamentals of this act establish the main areas of
interest for this course.
A. General:
The Congress established the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 to
"advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign,
and military policies relating to national security so as to enable the
military services and other departments and agencies of government to cooperate
more effectively in matters involving the national security." The key word
here .is "advise."
As a formal committee of the President's senior advisers, the National
Security Council usually serves to formalize options and recommendations which
have been rea.hed through intragovernmental deliberations. Actual presidential
decisions usually have been made prior to NSC meetings or are made by the
President in privacy after meeting with his advisers. There are four statutory
members of the NSC: The President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State,
and the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence is the
principal intelligence adviser. The Chairman, JCS, is the statutory military
adviser to the council as the JCS representative. The Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs attends in his dual roles as Adviser
to the President, and as head of the NSC staff. Other senior officials, such
as the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of the
Treasury; or the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are
invited to NSC meetings when the issue to be discussed is related to their
responsibilities.
In Washington and in interagency forums, we tend to use the terms "NSC,".
"NSC meetings and "NSC structure," in a very loose and overlapping manner.
*oInners-and-outers" is a term used by Professor Richard E. Neustadt to
describe appointed noncareer and often nonpolitical officials in government.
The United States has a much larger and more influential group of inners-and-
outers compared with the major states. The importance of this layer of policy-
makers, and the fact that it changes character with each change of Administra-
tion, is a unique and often overlooked aspect of our system of government.
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It is important for you to keep straight in your mind what the NSC is
statutorily, and then realize the differences when the term is more loosely
applied to the "NSC system."
In the case of the Reagan Administration, the NSC structure has evolved
from a Cabinet system with a very strong Secretary of State to one that is
more centralized in the White House. The initial interagency process involed
three independent groups; one dealing with foreign policy chaired by the
Secretary of State; one dealing with defense policy chaired by the Secretary
of Defense, and one concenred with intelligence matters chaired by the Director
of Central Intelligence. In addition, the President formed a crisis management
team which was chaired by Vice President Bush. With the departure of Richard
Allen as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Alexander
Haig as the Secretary of State, the Assistant for National Security Affairs
and the NSC staff have assumed a more active role as facilitators and coordina-
tors of policy. On certain issues, they have also become advocates of
particular policy positions.
This session will allow us to address the position and office of the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This is your first
opportunity to probe a practitioner by asking those penetrating questions on
organization and function as well as policy issues and decisions which leave
you a little confused as to their rationality (who said decisions had to be
rational?).
Most acknowledge that an NSC system will be fashioned to fit the needs of
a President. The search by the Reagan administration for stability in the
Adviser's position is portrayed by a story of shifting power relationships
between personalities, organizations and ideas within the Executive Branch.
B. Issues foX consideration:
1. In your view what function should the National Security Council
serve? Should it provide,a forum for advising the President? Should it have
a formal and mandatory process in the decisionmaking loop? Should it and its
staff be the President's highest level staff for working day to day decisions,
plans development, and sometimes decision implementation?
2. Do different presidents and their personalities really have an
influence on how the NSC will work?
3. What kind of a Special Assistant to the President would you choose
depending upon how you answered question #1, and what duties would you ask him
to perform?
4. Do you think the Special Assistant should have the "last" word of
advice to the President on national security issues, or should he attempt to
be impartial and objective by merely summarizing options?
C. Required Readings:
a. Destler, I.M., "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some
Lessons From Thirty Years," World Politics 29 (January 1977): pp. 143-176.
b. Fritz, Sara, with Dennis Mullin and Robert S. Dudney, "The First Shake
Up," U.S. News and World Report, January 18. 1982, pp. 16-18.
5
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b. Fritz, Sara, with Dennis Mullin and Robert S. Dudney, "The First Shake
Up," U.S. News and World Report, January 18. 1982, pp. 16-18.
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Topic 3A:
ueT s~
10 December 1985
0830-1130
LAP
Topic 3B!
Tuesday
10 December 1985
1330-1630
DR
Topic 3C:
Wednesday
11 December 1985
0930-1130
IS
Structure of the NSC and the Work of the NSC Staff
The National Security Council
Discussion of the NSC and the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
A. Gbneral:
These sessions will continue our inspection into the NSC and the NSC
system. Many cogent observers of the national security process believe that
the staff of the NSC, much like the staff of Congress, has grown not only in
size, but in quality and stature as well. For many young intellectuals, a
request to serve as a member of the NSC staff is akin to an invitation from
heaven--a prestigious and sought-after opportunity.
On Tuesday, we will have the benefit of hearing from current and previous
members of the NSC staff. They have seen and participated in the advising
role to the P~elident. This is your opportunity to glean from them some
further pieces of the puzzle--pieces that will help you develop an under-
standing of how the process really works and how closely it aligns with the
framework you are adopting to analyze national security decisions in the
future.
The readings are designed to bring you through some historical
developments and trends of the NSC system and the functions it as well as its
personalities have performed. The purpose is to allow you to develop some
conclusions of your own regarding the importance of the Council, the value of
its advice, its status and the status of the NSC staff today, and what one
might expect throughout the remainder of the Reagan Administration as well as
what a new administration might bring forth.
B. Issues for Consideration
1. Does it make a difference as to how the NSC is organized for
successful policymaking in the Executive Branch?
2. Are there any national security policy issues that should not be the
collective responsibility of the NSC but rather the individual responsiblity
of a cabinet secretary? Why or why not?
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3. Presidents Johnson and Carter tended to meet weekly with their
Secretaries of State and Defense. They only infrequently met with the NSC as
a whole, where the Chairman of the JCS and the DCI, among others, were
represented. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such procedures?
4. The Defense Department has called for and chaired very few SIG
meetings whereas the State Department has had many on foreign policy issues.
Why do you think that is so?
5. From the material in this and other courses as well as your own
reading of current events do you detect any trends in power relationships
regarding the NSC staff, the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and other advisers to the President (Cabinet or non-Cabinet). If so,
what and why? Who seems to be gaining influence?
6. Is the NSC staff becoming more influential in policy implementation
than it has been in the past? If so, why? Is it effective? What are the
risks in such a development?
Y. Odeen stresses the importance of the institutional functions of the
NSC staff, i.e., identifying issues and forcing decisions, managing the inter-
agency decision process, and overseeing implementation. Too much emphasis on
policy advice and too little on these institutional functions would be a
mistake. Do you agree? How do the members of the panel feel on this question?
Which aspect of their duties would they rather pursue and why?
8. The following four cases deal with decisions on organizational
structure and relationships for national security that confront a president
early on in an administration. These cases raise the critical issues which
will be addre sed during the rest of the course. Use them to form a platform
for discussion during your seminar session.
Case 1
The formulation of national security policy occurs through an interagency
process, with representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence Community, and the NSC staff.
Etch new President must set up his own NSC structure and interagency
process. The most critical issue has traditionally been to define the role of
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
(1) What responsibility should the Assistant to the President have in
coordinating the'national security policymaking process? Should he chair all
Interagency groups, including the NSC crisis management group? Or, should the
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense respectively chair interagency
meetings.on foreign and defense issues? Whoever is chairman has the obvious
advantage of setting the agenda, defining the policy choices, and presenting
the results to the President.
(2) How active a role should the Assistant to the President play in the
formulation and exposition of U.S. national security policy? Should he:
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--include his own recommendations on memos to the President from the
Secretaries of State and Defense;
--meet with the President each morning to brief him on current
intelligence issues;
--give speeches and meet with the press to explain American foreign
and defense policies;
--make trips abroad to carry out special diplomatic tasks for the
President?
You are currently on the NSC staff. The new President would like your
recommendation on these positions and to know what differences his choices
will make in terms of policy decisions.
Case 2
Historically, Presidents at the beginning of their Administration tend to
give the Secretary of State responsibility for both defining and implementing
U.S. foreign policy. But gradually, the President and-his-White }louse and staff have taken over primary responsibility for the substance of U.S. foreign
policies.
You are on the staff of the Secretary of State. He has asked you to
outline why this happens and what he should do in terms of organizing the
State Department so this will not happen to him.
Case 3
Members of the transition team have catalogued a number of criticisms of
the current JCS system. The Chiefs are not able to provide timely and high
quality advice; to set aside their parochial biases; to address contentious
issues, e.g.,xoq roles and missions, and to make recommendations for resource
allocations which are inconsistent with their service views. The new
President understands that a number of proposals for reform have been made.
But first, he wants to know whether these criticisms are fair, and then how
any organizational changes could be expected to remedy the problems.
You are currently in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The new
Secretary of Defense has asked your views.
Case 4
The new President wants to organize the intelligence community to make
sure that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is the principal spokes-
man for the intelligence community and that his judgments will be relied on by
all the members of the NSC. At the same time, he wants to avoid the biases
that tend to arise when intelligence analysts work either for Departments
(State and Defense) with policy preferences, or for the CIA which also has the
clandestine service operators.
As a member of the intelligence community staff, you have been asked to
comment on whether these are the right objectives, whether they can be
achieved, and whether organizational changes are required.
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C. Required Reading:
Topic 3A: Structure of the NSC and the Work of the NSC Staff
1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Securit Polic Formulation:
Institutions, Processes and Issues, National Defense University, Washington,
D? ?? . pp. .
2. Safire, William, "The NSC After Clark," The New York Times, November
29, 1982, p. 19. Reprinted in Current News Main ton, ovember 1982.
3. Kirschten, Dick, "Insider Clark Decides Now is the Time to go Public
on NSC Policy Issues," National Journal, June 11, 1982, pp. 1217-1220.
4. Gelb, Leslie H., "McFarlane Carving His.Niche," The New York Times,
March 28, 1984, Section 2, page 10, column 3.
j. Cannon, Lou, "McFarlane's Hidden Hand Guides U.S. Foreign Policy," The
Washington Post, February 15, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part TT;
Main Edition, February 15, 1985, pp. IF, 2F, and 16F.
6. Morganthau, Tom, with John Walcott and Margaret Gerrard Warner,
"The Crisis Manager: McFarlane Now Faces his Toughest Test," U.S. News and
World Report, July 1, 1985, p. 23. Reprinted in Current News, Part
sin
on, June 25, 1985, p. 11F.
7. Evans, Rowland and Robert Novak, "McFarlane's New Influence," The
Washington Post, August 28, 1985, p. 19. Reprinted in Current News, Part II,
.Main Edition, August 29, 1985, p. 2F.
8. "ThislB1d's on View," Newark Star-Led er (Editorial), August 27,
1985. Reprinted in Current News eecen ion, August 30-September 2, 1985,
p. 3E.
9. Omang, Joanne. "McFarlane Aid Facilitates Policy," The Washington
Post, August 11, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News Weeken ton,
August 9-11, 1985, pp. 1-2F.
10. Gwertzman, Bernard, "U.S. Calls Hanoi Talks 'Most Positive in 12
Years,'", The New York Times, September 4, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current
News, Part Early Bird Edition, September 4, 1985, pp. 3-4.
Topic 3B: The National Security Council
1. Rockman, Bert A., "America's Department of State: Irregular and
Regular Syndroms of Policy Making," American Political Science Review, Vol.
75, Dec,riber 1985, pp. 911-927.
2. Odeen, Philip A., "Organizing for National Security," International
Security, Sumner 1980, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 111-129.
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Topic 3C: Discussion of the NSC and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
1. Janka, Les, "The National Security Council and the Making of American
Middle East Policy," Armed Forces Journal International, March 1984 (16),
pp. 84-8?.
2. Richburg, Keith B., "CIA Work on Manual Discounted, McFarlane
Advocates Firing Any Officials Involved in Primer," The Washington Post,
October 22, 1984, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News Morn ng on, October
22, 1984, p. 6.
3. "McFarlane Reassures Latin Allies," The Baltimore Sun, January 21,
1985, p. 2. Reprinted in Current News, January ZZ, , p. 6.
4. O'Leary, Jeremiah, "U.S. Officer Advises Contra Chiefs," The Washington
Times, August 9, 1985, p. 3. Reprinted in Current News, August 9, 1985, p. 7.
5. Boyd, Gerald M., "Role in Nicaragua Described by U.S. Administration
Says Contacts With Rebels Were Legal," The New York Times, August 9, 1985, p.
4. Reprinted in Current News, August 9, , p. 7.
6. Cody, Edward, "Leader of Contras Describes Contacts with White House,"
The Washington Post, August 14, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I,
August , pp. 3, 9.
7. Williams, Dan, "Contra's Raids Send Message to Managua," Los Angeles
Times, August 13, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, ugus
1985, pp. 9-10. '
8. Diaz,{TOm, "Post Story Imperils NSC Aide and Family," The Washington
Times, August 14, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part August 14,
T985, pp. 3-4.
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Topic 4A: Department of Defense
e nes ay
11 December 1985
1330-15.5
DR
Topic 4B: Policymaking in the Defense Department
'Thursday
12 December 1985
0830-1130
LD
A. General
The Department of Defense has continued to evolve in size, shape and
characteristics since the National Security Act of 1947. Its size today
dwarfs other government agencies as well as most corporations in America.
Leadership of this mammouth organization has turned out to be an enormous
problem. The organization's interactions with other agencies of the federal
government and corporate. America have created a labyrinth often difficult to
penetrate, sometimes impossible to understand, and always a challenge to work
within.
Decisionmaking within the Department reflects the environment and nature
of our society and government as a whole--where pluralism is the essence of
the process and special interest groups prevail but take on names like the
Army and Navy, or the R&D community and the force structure people, the
operators or the programmers. The first readings try to capture the nature of
this competition and the need to understand special relationships that develop
between interests as they attempt to influence decisions and outcomes of
conflict situations.
A critical issue regarding reorganizations of the national security
community has been the trend toward centralization of control over the defense
organization--a trend that has been in existence since the 1947 National
Security Act. A review of past Secretaries of Defense is provided for
background, but the essence of the issue rests in the question posed in the
article headed, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make A Difference?" Although
there has been a trend to greater centralization of control and leadership
within the Secretary's office, it is a fact of life that power in the Defense
Department is decentralized, as it is in the rest of the government. The
Secretary of Defense has three major responsibilities: (1) to advise the
President on the military aspects of national security policy, (2) to act as
the President's deputy in the military chain of command; and (3) to manage the
Department of Defense. Secretaries of Defense have exhibited different
management styles, ranging from the centralized approach of Robert McNamara to
the decentralized approach of Melvin Laird. Whatever the style, they must
work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services; they do not
direct them.
The Chiefs of Staff have individual responsibility for managing their
respective services and joint responsibility for providing advice to the
President and the Secretary of Defense on national security policies and
operational planning. The Chairman of the JCS has no independent power of
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decision, but must seek consensus among the service chiefs. He also commands
no forces, for that is the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs)
who report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. But, the
CINCs lack complete control over their component service commands which tend
to be more responsive to their individual Service Headquarters in Washington,
D.C.
This decentralization and sharing of power creates a number of problems.
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
exercise their influence primarily by building consensus. Planning for
military operations and the preparation of budgets must go through complex and
time-consuming procedures. Often, the resulting policies are characterized by
compromise and the postponement of difficult issues, particularly with respect
to issues affecting service roles and missions.
From this background, we may conclude that the answer to the question "Can
the Secretary of Defense make a difference?," lies partly in who that
Secretary is, how much of himself he gives to the-job of managing the system,
and what issues he gives his attention to.
The readings in Topic 5 show where the current Secretary of Defense has
elected to concentrate his main attention and that has been on the issue of
budgetary increases for the Defense Department to attempt to hold off a
growing Soviet threat. In addition, this Secretary has been exceptionally
tough on the issue of arms control. The ideas and the main implementer of the
ideas behind this hard line arms control approach have resided with a strong
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD/ISP) Mr.
Richard Perle. We hope to have Richard Perle address the Class on the topic
of policymaking in the Defense Department. This session will prove most
helpful in gaining a better insight into the interaction of ideas,
organizations a personalities in the decisionmaking process.
B. Issues for Consideration:
1. Is it inevitable that decisionmaking within the DOD will be
characterized by the pluralistic model? Should the process become more
centralized or less centralized? Why?
2. Historically, Secretaries of Defense have resisted any NSC review of
defense issues. Should the members of the NSC and their staffs collectively,
and on a regular basis, participate in DOD decisions on force disposition,
weapons acquisition, and force structure decisions?
3. In the area of arms control, how is it possible that members of the
military within DOD can appear to be more supportive of a major SALT agreement
and members of the civilian community within DOD can appear to be more opposed?
4. Can a Secretary of Defense, as an individual really make a difference
in regard to military service policies, weapons acquisition, and budget
expenditures or is he at the mercy of the "process" and the "system"? What
issues are more conducive to centralized control by the SECDEF?
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C. Required Readings:
Topic 4A: Department of Defense
1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Securit Policy Formulation:
Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National a ense University, Washington,
pp. 51-8b.
2. Lynn, Laurence E. and Richard I. Smith, "Can the Secretary of Defense
Make A Difference,?" International Security 7 (Summer 1982): pp. 45-69.
3. Bauer, Theodore W. and Harry B. Yoshpe, "Unity or Confederation," In
American Defense Policy, Fourth Edition, pp. 258-264, edited by John E.
Endicott and Roy W. fford, Jr., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1977.
Topic 4B: Policymaking in the Defense Department
1. Hiatt, Fred, "Perle's Distrust Shapes U.S. Policy," The Washington
Post; January 2, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, January 2,
TM. pp. 1, 2, 7, and 8.
2. Hiatt, Fred, "A Richard Perle Sampler," The Washington Post, January 2,
1985, p. 20. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, January 1985, p. 7.
3. Wilson, George C., "Adviser's Conflict on Salt II," The Washington
Post. June 4, 1985, p. 20. Reprinted in Current News, Part June 1985,
pp.-), 2, 8.
4. Cannon, Lou, "Dismantling of Sub Opposed by Advisers," The Washington
Post, June 4,'1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, June 1985,
pp* 1. 2, 8.
D. Supplementary Reading:..
Almanac, Defense 85, September 1985. (Separate student issue earlier this
year), skim for overview of Defense Department.
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Topic 5: Analysis Support and the Role of the Budget
in DOD Decisiomaking
Friday
13 December 1985
0830-1000
A. General:
In all phases of decisionmaking, analysis of some sort is a fundamental
prerequisite. It can help in defining issues, analyzing the issues, and
eventually selecting r1 options, i.e., making the actual decision. The
Secretary of Defense has within his organization a Director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). Depending upon the nature of the issue and
the timing of a decision, this Director can be a most influential participant
in the decisionmaking process especially regarding budgetary decisions and
other programmatic issues.
We have today an opportunity to hear from the Director (PA&E), Dr. David
Chu. His presentation on the nature and importance of his function and his
relationship to other members of the OSD staff, the services and the Joint
Staff should help shed some light on the decentralized nature of the
decisionmaking process within the DOD.
You should take the opportunity to ask some very direct questions of Dr.
Chu particularly regarding the PPBS and how he relates to such activities as
the Defense Resources Board (DRB) meetings. He has a unique perspective on
most of the issues in DOD decisionmaking. We will not address the specifics
of how military weapons systems are acquired during this course (the separate
management process for DOD decisions on the acquisition of major weapons
systems is the-Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) process).
However, you i*ay. want to ask how Dr. Chu's office relates to the Office of the
Under Secretary for Research and Engineering (USDR&E) on those issues. USDR&E
provides the necessary cost, testing and production schedules and performance
factors to make decisions-on individual weapons.
We have already looked at the budget process from the congressional
standpoint and have found it extremely complicated. One wonders how any
resultant could possibly conform to some larger plan or strategy. Indeed, the
amounts of budget authority, appropriation and outlay are significant
influences upon our current and future capability. We have mentioned how
Secretary Weinberger has pushed for increases in the defense budget, and
commented on how successful he has been in getting increases approved because
of his tenacity. However, it helps to look somewhat closer at the figures to
understand all that was sought certainly has not been achieved, and how the
PPBS is constantly bubbling in efforts to make adjustments to reality vice
plans.
A historical look at the five year defense expenditure plan in 1981 shows
that by FY86 the difference between plan and reality was in excess of $150
billion. As this syllabus is prepared, the Defense Department is operating on
a continuing resolution, but it appears that the FY86 authorization and
appropriation will total around $300 billion. This figure is $10 billion less
than was requested for FY1985.
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The picture for the next five years portrays a continuation of the trend
that has been in effect since 1981--more for defense, but nowhere near the
amount that was anticipated or planned for. Some in the Pentagon believe the
actual cuts over the next five year period will exceed $400 billion from April
1985 planned expenditures. The following chart shows OMB estimates of the
differences.
MORNING, 17 SEPTEMBER 1985
PENTAGON FUNDING
White House Estimates of Money Available
for President Reagan's Rearmament Program
(in Billions of Dollars)
F I SCAL
APRIL 1985
SEPT. 1985-
CUT
-
186
$313.7
$294.3
$T
?187
354.0
314.7
39.3
'88
401.6
337.5
64.1
'89
438.8
361.5
77.3
'90
477.7
386.8
90.9
SOURCE: OMB Mid-Session Review, FY '86
If you think you are having trouble running your household budget, you can
believe the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries and chiefs are
having trouble running theirs as well. Some of the implications of these
trends are self-evident and materialize quickly, e.g., cancellation of the AF
T-46A trainer jet and HH60 Blackhawk helicopter for special operations,
cancellation of DIVAD gun system, reduction in M-X missile (peacekeeper)
planned production, and a close look at many other programs (anti-satellite
systems, ammunition and spare parts, composition of 600 ship Navy (less
cruisers/destroyers), JVX assault aircraft for Marines, etc.) But the larger
issues are more perplexing, more enduring, and more serious and they involve
the impact upon our national and military strategies.
B. Issues for Consideration.
1. Each service submits a budget request to the Secretary of Defense in
the form of a Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The defense guidance is
designed to set the conceptual framework (strategy and policies) and fiscal
restrictions for these POMs. How can POMs possibly make any sense from a
stra&egic standpoint if they are not integrated during preparation and before
submission to SECDEF? What is the role of the OSD staff to help the Secretary
of Defense determine what is the best mix of programs from each service?
Should the Secretary ask his staff for this help and information? Should he
ask the Chairman of the JCS?
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2. The FY85 POM inputs to the FY85 DOD budget were well in excess of $300
billion. The President requested $305 billion from Congress. The Congress
eventually granted approximately $290 billion to DOD for FY85. The facts on
decreased amounts for defense are further highlighted in the syllabus and
readings. What do these reductions mean for the whole PPBS? Will these
reduced monies have an impact on our strategy? Should they? Or does the old
cliche, ?"a billion here a billion there, soon (but not yet) we will be talking
about real money," have a ring of truth in this process?
C. Required Readings:
1. Bellinger, John, "Strategic Planning and Decisionmaking in the Defense
Department," September 1985. (An unpublished paper)
2. Philpott, Tom, "Budget Debate Culminates Five Step Process," Air Force
Times, February 13, 1984, p. 12.
3. Hoffman, David, "Reagan Backs $305 Billion Defense Request," The
Washington Post, December 14, 1983, p. 4. Reprinted in Current News, P rt I,
December 14, 198pp. 1-2.
4. Carrington, Tim and Jane Mayer, "Weinberger Said to Seek $333.7
Billion for Defense in '86, Overruling Joint Chiefs," Wall Street Journal,
November 28, 1984, p. 2. Reprinted in Current News, Par, oNovember Za,
1984, pp. 1-2.
5. "Defense $$: Stockman v. Weinberger," Special for USA Today, USA Today
November 29, 1984, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edi'otni
November 29, 1984, pp. 1-2.
6-., "Weinberger Balks on Budget Cuts," Special for USA Today, USA Today,
December 11, 1984, p. 5. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, Main Edition,
December 11, 1984, p. 2-F.
7. Carrington, Tim, "Weinberger Finds His Well-Worn Strategies Always
Succeed in Blunting Defense Budget Ax," Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1985, p.
48. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, March 1985, pp. 1-2.
8. Keller, Bill, "Weinberger Under Political Siege, But Few Expect Change
of Course," New York Times, July 23, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News,
Part 1, July -277M5, pp, 1, 2, 8.
9. Wilson, George C., "Separate Vote Set on Defense Trims House Liberals
Press for $10 Billion Reduction for Pentagon," The Washington Post, p. 8.
Reprinted in Current News, September 6, 1985, pp. 1-2.
10. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officers
Guide 1984, pp. 5-3, 5-6 thru 5-11. (Separate student issue
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T ic,?A: Policymaking in the State Department
~y
13 December 1985
1330-1630
DR
Topic 6B: Issues Confronting the State Department
_nay
16 December 1985
0830-1130
LD
A. General:
We turn our attention now to the role of the Department of State. As an
entity of goverment within the Executive Branch, it is one of the oldest,
most influential and well known institutions around the world. The readings
p rovide excellent background material on the historical evolution of the
Department and its "official" relationship with some of the other agencies of
the "foreign policy machinery."
Bulletins from the Department of State inform that "as chief foreign
policy adviser and spokesman, the Secretary of State is responsible for
executing the President's policies." Also, they go on to say, "Day-to-day
work of implementing foreign policy is done in the United States by the
Department of State and abroad through its diplomatic and consular missions."
We have already been exposed to some who tend to challenge the reality of
these mission Statements. Graham and Szanton address this issue and highlight
the continuedicomplaints by the State department that, "extraneous actors were
crowding the foreign policy stage." The authors argue that speed of travel
and communications has shifted the primary role of major foreign policy
direction to Washington D-,-C. and to the White House. They propose a major
role of "Advocacy" to the Department of State, i.e., arguing at every stage
that the interests of the U.S. would be "most reliably advanced bl policies
and actions that meet the legitimate requirements of all nations. This
argument is supported by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Power and Principle (pp.
533-535) where he argues that:
As the United States moves into the twenty-first century, with its
global involvement so intense and so central to our national
survival, the nerve center for national security is bound to be
increasingly the White House....In addition, Secretaries of
State.... tend to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy. What they
forget is that diplomacy is a technique for promoting national
objectives abroad and not an end in itself.
One of the larger questions in the area of national security and foreign
policy is the determination of the spokesman within the administration for
these areas. The President is and should be the ultimate determiner of the
positions and policy we adopt. However, whose policy is it when it is
announced or delivered by the SecState or SecDef or the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs or the White House Press Secretary or
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a lesser member of the Executive Branch. When Secretary Weinberger visits a
country, as he did Egypt in 1984 to discuss the Middle East peace process and
U.S. military aid, or Tunisia where he promotes that nation for standing up to
neighboring Libya and promises continued military support, is he taking away a
role and function of foreign policy from State?
One must conclude that there is no inherent simple separation of interests
or responsibilities between Defense and State when an issue comes to overseas
commitments. Every foreign policy for which the Secretary of State is respon-
sible has a defense aspect, and, every defense policy for which the Secretary
of Defense is responsible, has foreign policy implications--it is next to
impossible to define clearly their unique responsibilities and therein lies
the reason for the frequent competition and the,need for cooperation between
the two.
Within the Department of State there are ample examples of pulls and tugs
of personalities, professionals and politicians, agencies and offices vying
for influence and predominance of their ideas regarding foreign policy. The
bargaining, compromising and negotiating that takes place in the Department
can be as dynamic and intense as that between the cabinet departments and
agencies and, as Rubin concludes in Secrets of State, the variety of
perspectives that the intradepartmental strains a ow are useful to the
overall process of decisionmaking. Some recent examples of discord are
reflected in the comments of Ambassador Galbraith, Ambassador Funderburk and
Secretary Shultz presented in the readings.
B. Issues for Consideration:
1. Should the Department of State have major responsibility for defining,
coordinating, and/or implementing U.S. foreign policy? In what Way, if any,
should it be Subservient to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs?
2. As Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger served not only as the
implementer of the President's foreign policy but also as its architect. Is
his a unique case, given his previous role as Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs? Should the President realistically expect the
Secretary of State to do both?
3. Is it inevitable that there will always be conflict between the
Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs? If so, is the critical issue then who becomes the public spokesman
for U.S. foreign policy?
4. Should the Secretary of State assume the role of "Vicar" in the area
of foreign policy as Secretary Haig believed he should?
5. How can cooperation between the Department of State and Department of
Defense be enhanced to allow for more coherent U.S. foreign policy?
6. How should the Department of State be organized to best carry out its
responsibilities?
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7. Is there a need for political appointees as Ambassadors or should all
Ambassador positions be filled from career diplomats within the State
Department? Why?
C. Required Readings:
Topic 6A: Policymaking in the State Department
1. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Securit Policy Formulation:
Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington,
B. C., 1984, pp. 33-5U.
2. Allison, Graham, and Szanton, Peter, Remaking Foreign Policy: The
Organizational Connection, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 197 pp. 120-140,
3. Rubin, Barry, Secrets of State, New York, Oxford University Press,
1983, pp. 232-249.
Topic 68: Issues Confronting the State Department
1. Hiatt, Fred, "Weinberger Pays Visit to Egypt," The Washington Post,
October 14, 1984, p. A22.
2. Oberdorfer, Don, "Schultz Firmly in Command," The Washington Post,
February 8, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part 11, February 8,-1985,
pp. 8F, 9F.
:. Vinocur, John, "Ambassador Galbraith: Adieu to All That," The New York
Times, February 13, 1985, p. A24.
4. "Schultz Takes Issue With Envoy's Comments," The New York Times,
February 14, 1985, p. 7. (Special to the New York Times). Reprinted in
Current News, Part II, February 14, 1985, p. 4.
5. Graham, Bradley, "Envoy Quits, Faults Policy, The Washington Post,
May 15, 1985, pp. Al, A28.
D. Supplementary Readings:
1. "The Department of State Today," March 1984, United States Department
of State Bureau of Public Affairs Public Information Series. (Separate
student issue)
2. "A Short History of the Department of State, 1781-1981," Bulletin
Reprint. (Separate student issue)
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Topic 7A; The Intelligence Community
Monday
16 December 1985
1330-1630
OR
Topic 78: Intelligence and the Role of the DCI
Tuesday
17 December 1985
0830-1130
LO
A. General:
In this topic, we bring our attention to the intelligence community, the
quality of the intelligence product, and the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence in the national security decisionmaking process.
The intelligence community is very little understood by almost all of
those who do not work within the national security community and most of those
who do. It is a complex set of organizations, individuals, and responsibili-
ties which, as is the case with the rest of governmental bureaucracy, compete
and cooperate in an effort to provide a product called "intelligence" that can
factor into national security decisions.
The topic of intelligence is deep, often technical and far too complex for
us to learn in detail. However, it is important that we gain an appreciation
for its complexity and improve our understanding of the parts and the process
if we are to be effective in using the product.
"Good inteltigence" is considered by everyone as a critical element that
must be available to our national leaders if we are to ensure accurate and
successful policy and decisions in the national security field. What are the
positive factors that help to make "good intelligence" a reality? What are
the negative factors that detract from making "good intelligence" possible.
There is no shortage of critics who are willing to expose faults and
failures of the intelligence community. Intelligence failures are fair game
for the media and scholars alike. The critics are many, particularly in
hindsight following some major policy failures In the international environ-
ment that affect our national security, e. g., the fall of the Shah in Iran,
the subsequent loss of an important ally, and the substitution of a tyrannical
regime with interests opposed to those of the United States. But can such
policy failures necessarily be construed as intelligence failures?
Many of the criticisms should be viewed with caution. Why? Because often
critics are uninformed or inaccurate in their analysis of an event. Many
critics do not or cannot get access to all the information needed to draw
accurate conclusions. Some others only use the information that fits the argu-
ment they wish to make. On the other hand, there are cases of legitimate
failures in the intelligence system and it is appropriate that we ask the
question, why they occur and how they can be avoided.
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Critics charge, in particular, that the complex and time-consuming
interagency process by which the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are
written and coordinated smothers competing judgments and hides the existence
of gaps in information. The interagency process normally includes representa-
tives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Military Services
Intelligence Staffs, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR).
With respect to the role of the DCI, he has a variety of difficult and
sometimes conflicting responsibilities: to produce "national" intelligence for
the President and the NSC, to coordinate the intelligence activities of the
various government departments, to serve as the President's principal foreign
intelligence adviser, and to manage the CIA. To carry out these responsibili-
ties, he must depend ultimately on the personal support of the President. The
Secretaries of State and Defense have steadfastly opposed centralized manage-
ment of intelligence, and the DCI must be forceful to ensure his position is
upheld. The DCI prepares the national intelligence budget and reviews the
intelligence programs of the various Departments and Agencies. But he does
not actually control any part of the intelligence community budget except for
the CIA. He commands only the analysts in CIA and the collection assets of
the Clandestine Service. Finally, the DCI confronts a potential conflict of
interest between his role as DCI and Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Having said all of the above, it is important to keep the degree of the
problem in perspective. We draw on a useful piece of research and analysis by
Mark Lowenthal to help us do that as he addresses the "Burdensome Concept of
Failure." We would be wise to be cautious of our criticisms of intelligence.
Before we jummpp on the band wagon of fingerpointing towards failures and giving
up on the comibuility's ability to do a good job of providing timely intelli-
gence, we should reappraise our own position and become active in helping the
process. One wonders at times if our expectations for the ingelligence system
may be too high. In any event, it is far better to focus on what we can do to
request from the intelligence community that information which would best help
us to do our job, to not overload the "system" with unnecessary superfluous
requests for intelligence, and to face the reality that even if there is
perfect intelligence, the politics of the situation or larger issues may
preclude its being widely shared or used.
B. Issues for Consideration:
1. What should the President expect from the intelligence community in
terms of information, warning, and predictions? Time and again, first
intelligence reports during a crisis are fragmentary and confusing. The
Korean airline incident in the summer of 1983 appears to be a case in point.
"Should the President and the NSC expect anything different? Does this argue
against any public statements being made by senior officials for the first 24
hours of a crrTsi-s situation? Would this abdicate their responsibilities to
the press?
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2. Now can we improve the quality and timeliness of the products of the
intelligence community? Should organizational changes be made, e.g., through:
--the establishment of a single analytical agency which would bring
together the analysis from CIA, DIA, and INR;
--the delegation of responsibility for producing separate estimates
to CIA and DIA, each using all the intelligence sources but neither
coordinattng with the other?
3. Can the DCI ensure that the intelligence community judgments are in
fact objective and independent of the policy preferences of the President and
the Department of State and Defense?
4. Often NSC principals make and implement policies based on different
intelligence information supplied by their own intelligence agencies. Should
something be done to consolidate the information early in a crisis? How
should it be coordinated for longer range planning so that it does not get
watered down?
C. Required Readings:
Topic 7A: The Intelligence Community
I.' Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Securit Policy Formulation:
Institutions Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Washington,
D? .. 1984, pp. W- 11U.
2. Flanagan, Stephen J., "Managing the Intelligence Community,"
International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1, Sunnier 1985, pp. 58-95.
Topic 7B: Intelligence and the Role of the DCI
Lowenthal, Mark W., "The Burdensom Concept of Failure," Address before the
USAF Academy, 16 pp.
D. Supplementary Reading:
CIA Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency. (Separate student issue).
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Topic 8A: Vietnam Case Study Preparation
Tuesday
17 December 1985
1330-1630
OR
Topic 88: Vietnam: Case Study In Decisionmaking
Wednesday
18 December 1985
0830-1130
SE
A. General:
The directed reading assignment is designed to prepare you for the Vietnam
case study/student exercise to be held on Wednesday, 18 December, Topic 8B.
The objective of the case study/exercise is to analyze the process by which
the United States decided in 1965 to bomb North Vietnam and to commit combat
troops.
Students will be given individual responsibility for focusing their
readings and research on certain actors in the policymaking process. This
will facilitate discussion during the exercise. Try to analyze the decisions
from the perspective of the actor's ideas, their personalities, and the
organizations they represented. See if this approach can help you understand
their various views. Compare them with others, and come to some judgment as
to why the decisions were taken.
B. Readings: 1, The main readings are taken from The Pentagon Papers. Although these
documents are a rich source of information, they do not provide a complete
picture of the decisionmaking process. From them, nevertheless, you should be
able to gain a sense of the views and roles of the major actors.
The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times. Written by Neil
Shee an, Hen r c Smith, E.W. Kenworthy and ox Butterfield. "The Consensus
to Bomb North Vietnam: August, 1964 - February, 1965," pp. 315-393. "The
Launching of the Ground War: March-July 1965." pp. 394-458. The New York
Times, 1971.
The Senator Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers, Vol. III. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971. Documents 241, pp. 596-598, 651-666.
C. Case .Studer:
This case study will allow the seminar to look into the decisions in 1965
to bomb North Vietnam and to commit US combat troops. How well did the
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process work? How important was the process in determining the policies which
emerged?
This session will be conducted as a discussion period with students ready
and prepared to introduce the views of their designated actor as the
discussion moves through late 1964 and the beginning of 1965. As a student
exercise, the students are expected to put themselves into the position and
mind of the individual/agency they have been tasked to represent. In so
doing, they should be able to convey in the seminar environment not only what
their position on each issue was at the time, but why they adopted that
positon. What were the major influencing factors is the question at hand, and
it should be analyzed and answered in terms of a framework which the student
has found most useful to him/her.
Students in the seminar will be divided into teams with responsibility for
the views of one of the seven major actors in the policymaking process:
(1) President Johnson
(2) Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and other
? Members of the State Department
(3) Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, and other
members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(4) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chairman
(5) the Embassy in Saigon
(6) the Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy
(7) the Intelligence agencies.
For the bombing of the North, the seminar will focus on the choices and
options presented to the President in November 1964 and then on the decision
to begin Operation Rolling Thunder in February 1965. For the commitment of
U.S. combat tPpeps, the seminar will consider the arguments for an increase in
U.S. troops in April 1965 and then on the decision in July to deploy 1UO,000
men.
Through seminar discussion, a comparison of the various views should lead
to a judgment as to why the decisions were taken. In searching for the
answer, the seminar can probe deeply to analyze the characteristics of the
American policymaking process.
(1) How important to the decisions were the following:
-- the ideas and objectives of American policymakers, i.e., their
assessment of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere; of the potential
costs to those interests if South Vietnam became a Communist state; and of the
potential for Soviet or Chinese actions?
-- the personalities of the major actors? Who dominated the debate? Who
was favored in the president's circle?
-- the or anizational preference and responsibilities of the various parts
of the Execut ve branch?
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(2) In coming to the decision, were all views and options allowed to be
expressed and were they considered?
(3) What was the nature of the military advice given the President and
the Secretary of Defense? How important was this advice in the decisions that
were taken? Would the outcome have been different if the military had played
a different role?
(4) What difference do you think it made in the bombing decision that the
options of neither George Ball nor the JCS were presented in the final paper
for the President?
(5) Who was the most critical actor in the process and why: because of
his position, the nature of his recommendations, his personal relationship
with the President?
(6) In the final analysis, how well did the policymaking process work?
Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts (The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked,
pp. 353-4) conclude:
The U.S. political-bureaucratic system did not fail; it
worked.... American leaders were convinced that they had
to prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism, and until
May 1975 they succeeded....At each critical juncture the
government debate centered on how to contain communism in
Vietnam. Decisionmakers perceTd the immediate costs of
maintaining the commitment, and the President always
refused to pay enough of the costs to make clear or quick
victory possible, but until the end they always paid the
costs of preventing Communist victory....The system
facilitated decisionma`king on means to reach the end of
containment; the end remained virtually unchallenged
within the executive branch....The bureaucratic system
did what it was supposed to: select and implement means
to a given end. The political system did what a
democracy usually does: produce a policy responsive more
to the majority and to the center than to the minority or
the extremes of opinion. And strategic thought, from
that of the limited war theorists to the counterinsurgency
specialists, did what it was supposed to do: support the
general policy of worldwide containment with specific
ideas and programs for containment in Vietnam.
Robert Galluchi (Neither Peace Nor Honor, pp. 133-135) states:
The policymaking process was less open in 1964 and 1965
than it had been in earlier years.... Critical decisions
about the war, including the bombing of the north, were
made at the regular Tuesday lunch meeting of a few top
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actors, operating without agenda, minutes, or staff....the
fact that the process became closed permits us to account
for the persistence of the initial premises about the
nature of the conflict held by principal actors.... Beyond
the initial premises of the policymakers, high level
bureaucratic compromise and interaction were a vital part
-of the process by which the real content of policy was
determined.... The effect of organizations as units
performing' in a way consistent with their traditional
roles and identities also had an impact on policy, as did
the operating procedures and reward structures internal to
the organizations.
(7) In a quasi-revolutionary war, can you imagine or expect the American
political and bureaucratic system to work any way other than to support
incremental intervention?
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Topic 9: DOD, the JCS, Congress and Reorganization
Wednesday
18 December 1985
1330-1630
DR
A. General:
This lesson is designed to allow some reflection on the intricate
relationship that exists within the Department of Defense between profes-
sionals and politicians, particularly regarding their individual goals and the
manner in which their goals are achieved. We also look at the source of
structural changes for the national security apparatus, the Congress, and some
of the more recent discussions and proeosals for changes in the structure to
overcome identified shortfalls in the system."
Deep in our U.S. military tradition is the theme that the "civilian" must
always maintain "control" over the military. Fear of the General on the white
horse charging out to take over the country is the image that is always
conveyed to me by those seriously worried by this prospect. But "control" can
have many different meanings for different people in our free and democratic
system. By analyzing some of the varying concepts for civil-military
relationshies we discover many problems inherent in trying to institutionalize
the "proper relationship.
The criticisms of the system are extensive and range from the obvious
caricature of bloated DOD officials foolishly spending dollars on ineffective
or excessive weapons systems (portrayed as toy tanks, airplanes and ships for
the senior Generals and Admirals), to a more dramatic attack on the "systems"
inability to iiJcecute military operations successfully.
B. Issues for Considerations:
1. In giving military advice to the President, should the Joint Chiefs
of Staff consider domestic and international politics as well as the economic
situation--of the nation and the world? Should they consider the budget
deficit, the international debt of the third world countries, local opposition
such as that to M-X basing schemes, fears of reaction to nuclear weapon
deployments overseas and development of nerve gas weapons for examples?
2. Is it wrong for military men to speak out against such things as the
War Powers Act or troop reductions in Korea? Or to request shifts in regional
military priorities to match regional shifts in economic importance such as
that occurring today between the Atlantic and Pacific areas?
3. Of what value is the debate over JCS reform? Will structural changes
really make a difference to the Chairman's position as adviser and single
spoke:;nan for the military? To the parochialism among military services?
4. Is it possible to have reform within the national security decision-
making apparatus that will be institutionalized and accepted by all parties
without Congress mandating the reform through legislation?
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4. Is it possible to have reform within the national security decision-
making apparatus that will be institutionalized and accepted by all parties
without Congress mandating the reform through legislation?
5. There has been an explosion in ideas and measures that could or might
be implemented to change the system" to make it more effective. Look closely
at some of the recommendations for change. Who are the individuals making the
proposals? What positions do or did they hold in the government? What is it
about their ideas that are intrinsically sound?
6. Some say that strengthening JCS or replacing it with a "General
Staff" will lead to a Prussian-like General Staff "Monster." Is such a fear a
"red herring," or does the argument have merit?
C. Required Reading:
1. Betts, Richard K., Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,, 1911, pp. 31-510
2: Dudney, Robert S., "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?," U.S. News and
World-Report, February 27, 1984, pp. 35-39.
3. Middleton, Drew, "Movement Builds to Reorganize Joint Chiefs," Air
Force Times, April 29, 1985, p. 55.
4. Keller, Bill, "Overhaul is Urged for Top Military," The New York
Times, January 22, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part January 22,
1985 pp. 1, 4.
5. Gerstenzang, James, "Major Pentagon Reforms Urged in Study," The Los
Angeles Times,x February 26, 1985, p. 6. Reprinted in Current News, Part I,
February 1985, p. 9.
6. Schlesinger, James. R., "Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs," The Wall
Street Journal, February 8', 1985, p. 32. Reprinted in Current ewl ws, Part 1,
February 8, 1985, p. 5.
7. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "Streamlining U.S. Military Command Set-up," The
Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1985, p. 28. Reprinted in Current News, Part7-
II, June 29, 1985, p. 3-F.
8. Anderson, Gary W., "The Military Reformers Prussian Model," The
Washington Post, May 21, 1984, p. 19. Reprinted in Current News, Part I, May
, p. 1.
9. Halloran, Richard, "Study Assails Move to Strengthen Joint Chiefs,"
The New York Times, September 23, 1984, p. 38. Reprinted in Current News,
Part T, ~Epterner 24, 1984, pp. 1, 2.
10. Bell, Thomas D., Jr., "The Joint Chiefs Should Remain Joint," The New
York Times, March 22, 1985, p. 31. Reprinted in Current News, Part I,
March 985,, p. 7.
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11. Keller, Bill, "Pentagon Leaders Defend Its System," The New York
Times, April 8, 1985, p. 1. Reprinted in Current News, Part April , 1985,
pp. T-2.
12. Lehman, John, "Don't Subject Pentagon to Trendy Whims," The Miami
Herald, July 29, 1985, p. 11. Reprinted in Current News, Part II August 9,
T983-,p. -5-F.
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Topic 10: Providing Military Advice and the Role
of the JCS in National Security Decisionmaking
Thursday
19 December 1985
0830-1130
LD
A. General:
Today we will have an opportunity to view the decisionmaking process
through the experience of an individual who has held positions as the Chief of
his military service and as the highest level military officer in the United
States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General David C. Jones, USAF
(Ret.) brings a perspective to this issue that is unique, serious, long
contemplated and actively proposed. Since his retirement he has been a major
stimulus for change to the current JCS organization.
Although changes to the system have occurred in the past through
amendments to the basic National Security Act of 1947, it is still felt by
many that the system is deficient. Even some who strongly supported a
position of no change are beginning to alter their point of view. The
Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, seems to be in favor of limited JCS reform
which acknowledges that some problems do exist within the current system and
there is a possibility that reform to the system may be able to solve them.
The congressional surge of interest continues to heat up as of the writing
of this syllabus. Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC), has separated himself from Reagan Administration
policy and jotnad with Senator.Sam Nunn, senior democrat on the SASC, to push
aggressively for' change to the current system.
All this having been said, it is difficult to appraise the chances for
meaningful reform this legislative year. Although many seem to be in favor of
reform and the possibility of a more receptive response by the new Chairman of
the JCS, Admiral Crowe, is strong, the recent past has shown that the
legislative process is not up to bold initiatives in the area of JCS/DOD
reform. Last year, the debate for reform became smothered in larger issues
such as the budget and, to date, Congress has been able to only pass
legislation containing minor, token changes to the current system.
B. Issues for Consideration:
1. The issues listed under Topic 9 continue to apply to this topic. You
might at this time try to summarize in your own mind what the major reform
proposals are, hhat meaning they bring to the system, and why you favor or
disfavor them.
2. What odds do you place on the possibility of major reform measures
being approved by Congress? Why?
3. The JCS are having a difficult time finding consensus on new
retirement proposals. Why? Is this to be expected? Is this an issue that
the JCS should try to resolve? What difference would an all-powerful Chairman
add to the debate?
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4. Should the JCS be abolished? If so, what would replace it?
C. Required Readings:
1. Jones, David C., "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,"
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 138-149.
2. Mohr, Charles, "The More it Changes, the More it Stays the Same," The
New York Times, February 6, 1985, p. 20. Reprinted in Current News, Part 1T
February 85, p. 3-F
3. Burgess, Tom, "Navy Secretary Supports Limited JCS Reform," Air Force
Times, August 5, 1985, p. 44. Reprinted in Current News, Part II, August 1,
T955, pp. 8F, 9F.
4. Budahn, P.J., "JCS Deadlocked on Retirement," Air Force Times,
Septer_ber 2, 1985, p. 4.
D. Supplementary Reading:
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization:
The Need for Change, Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, October 15, 1985).
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Topic 11: Contemporary Perspective on National Security Issues
Friday
20 December 1985
1000-1130
L
A. General:
This lecture and Q&A will be our final session and will seek to do a
couple of things. It will first give a contemporary perspective on national
security issues as suggested in the topic title. Second, it will provide
another opportunity to view a practitioner up close and further investigate
that unique attribute of personality in the decisionmaking process.
Alexander Haig has held a number of positions at the highest level of
government and has had an opportunity to observe first-hand the workings of
the Nixon Administration and the powerful position held by Henry Kissinger
plus the beginnings of the Reagan Administration with its turbulence and
adjustments. Excerpts from the book Caveat give a flair for the turmoil of
those times.
Finally, our last reading returns us to the main theme of our Course and
that of Unit IV by way of bringing to a conclusion our consideration of how
national security policy is formulated within the Executive Branch and why and
how the American policymaking process works.
This ends the first semester of your year at the National War College and
we are hopeful that what you have learned will stay with you as a strong
background for your upcoming studies of the major regions of the world and
foreign policy.and national/military strategy development during the second
semester. More importantly we hope your insight into the American
policymaking process will stay with you and help you throughout the remainder
of your government service.
May the holiday season be especially joyful to each of you and your
families. Be sure to join together at the NWC Christmas traditional
immediately following this session to celebrate.
B. Required Reading:
a. Dixon, James H. and Associates, National Security Policy Formulation:
Institutions, Processes, and Issues, National Defense University, Was ington,
D-777.794, pp. 147-163.
b. Haig, Alexander, "CAVEAT: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy," Time
Special Section, April 2, 1984, pp. 40-62.
c. Gilman, Stuart C., Philosophical Challenges and Historical Ironies,"
The Bureaucrat, Spring 1985, pp. 5-9. Reprinted in Current News, Special
Edition; June 12, 1985, pp. 5-9.
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