REMARKS BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON BEFORE THE MID-AMERICA COMMITTEE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS OCTOBER 29, 1985
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14 Nov 8
JOHN H. TAYLOR
ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT NIXON
26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10278
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Executive Registry j
85- 4440
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON !
BEFORE THE MID-AMERICA COMMITTEE,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS -- OCTCBER 29, 1985
The foreign policy issue which dominates
discussion today is the relationship between the two
superpowers and the upcoming summit meeting between
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.
Before discussing that issue, I believe it would be
useful to step back and put East/West relations in
historical perspective.
Thirty-two years ago I took my first trip around
the world. In 70 days, Mrs. Nixon and I visited all
of the countries in Asia with which the United States
had diplomatic relations. Four weeks ago I completed
another trip around the world in which I went to
several of the countries I have visited in 1953. But
I was unable to visit Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Afghanistan, and Iran, all of which I had visited in
1953. On the plus side, however, I spent a week in
the People's Republic of China with which the United
States had no diplomatic relations in 1953.
Thirty-two years ago, every leader of the
countries I visited feared the military power of the
communist Chinese who had just fought the United
States to a standstill in Korea. In most of these
countries, the PRC was supporting communist revolu-
tionaries against the established governments.
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Today, China has good relations with all of its
neighbors in Southeast Asia except for Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos and Afghanistan which have come under
Soviet domination.
There has been another change on the negative
side of the ledger. Thirty-two years ago, the United
States had unquestioned nuclear superiority over the
Soviet Union. Until the mid-70s, that superiority
was the major factor in preventing World War III and
deterring Soviet aggression, particularly in the
Mideast in 1957 and 1973, in Berlin in 1959, and in
the Caribbean in 1961.
Today we no longer have that superiority. This
is not to say that we are a helpless giant. We are
ahead in submarine and air-launch missiles. But the
ti
Soviet Union has acquired decisive superiority in
strategic land-based missiles, the most powerful and
accurate nuclear weapons. With their 300 SS-18s
which carry 3,000 warheads, they can take out all of
the U.S. land-based missile force and have enough
left over to take out our major cities. This amounts
to a first strike capability. This does not mean
that they are going to launch a nuclear war. While
they are dedicated to the goal of expanding communist
domination in the world, they are not fools. They
know that they would suffer enormous retaliation and
a nuclearized Europe and United States is not an
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attractive prize of victory. The danger the United
States and the West face is not nuclear war but
nuclear blackmail. President Reagan's MX program,
his SDI program, and his arms control initiatives
have the purpose of reducing that danger.
Let us now examine another change on the
positive side. Thirty-two years ago, many
non-communists in countries I visited -- teachers,
labor leaders, members of the media -- honestly
wondered whether the communist systems of the PRC and
the Soviet Union might be better models for progress
for newly independent countries than those offered by
the Western democracies.
That is no longer the case. Why? Sixty-five
years ago a starry-eyed American reporter came back
from the Soviet Union and wrote, "I have been over
into the future and it works." Now we have seen that
future and it doesn't work. It doesn't work in
Eastern Europe, it doesn't work in the Third World --
Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, and
Ethopia are economic disaster areas. Most sig-
nificantly, it does not work in the Soviet Union.
That is why Gorbachev's primary goal is to get the
Soviet economy moving again.
The only economic success stories since the end
of World War II are in non-communist nations which
have turned to the market rather than to government
for progress. We have heard a lot about the Japanese
and the German miracles, our two major enemies in
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World War II now are our two major competitors. But
there are other miracles in the making, particularly
on the rimland of Asia. Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand are poised for
economic takeoffs.
The most striking example of change is in the
PRC. When I visited Beijing in 1972, 1976, and 1979,
the Chinese leaders attacked the Soviet Union as
"capitalist roaders" where athletes, actors, and
politicians became millionaires. In 19 79 , Deng
Xi aopi ng began a dramatic program of reform. Until
1979, the effect of the PRC's policy was to give
every Chinese an equal share in poverty. Today, they
are giving some a chance to earn their way out of
poverty. Deng recognizes that his choice is between
equality at the price of poverty or progress at the
price of inequality. As he compares the plight of
his desperately poor country with what Chinese have
accomplished in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, he
has made the choice of choosing progress with some
inequality over rigid equality and no progress.
The most striking success story is in
agriculture. With their new incentive system,
Chinese farmers produce enough to feed the one
billion people of the PRC and are exporting food
abroad. Russian peasants still working in communist
communes are unable to produce enough to feed the 250
million people of the Soviet Union and the government
has to import food from abroad.
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One of the more obvious examples of change is in
women's clothes. When I met with Mao and Chou En-lai
in 1972, the young women who translated for us were
dressed in baggy gray Mao suits and had severe short
haircuts. The Chinese communists had taken too
seriously the admonition of Professor Higgins, "Why
can't a woman be like a man?"
When I visited Canton this year, we were served
by beautiful Chinese girls wearing high heels and
multi-colored stylish gowns. My host observed, "You
will note that we have more color in our clothes
today. The same is true of our ideology." This is,
of course, somewhat of an overstatement. It is a
mistake for naive visitors from the United States to
gush that the Chinese have become capitalists. The
Chinese leaders are dedicated communists but they are
also Chinese. They use capitalist tools to achieve
communist goals. For them, as an editorial in Ebony
magazine pointed out in another context, the color of
freedom is not red, white, and blue but green.
Some caveats must be borne in mind: as Chairman
Deng tries to expand his reforms into special
economic zones in urban areas, he has run into
problems which inevitably plague free economies --
corruption, inflation, and shortages. The danger
that faces the PRC today is not in turning back to
doctrinaire Marxism but in going forward too fast.
Deng recognizes this danger and is shrewdly
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developing policies to deal with it.
Whether the policy of reforms will be continued
in the future depends in great part on the leadership
of one of the world's most remarkable leaders, the 81
year old Deng Xiaoping. He is in excellent health
today; he looks better than he did when I saw him in
1982 and 1979. But he is aware of his mortality. He
is preparing younger men to take over when he leaves
the scene. Unlike other strong leaders -- Churchill,
Adenauer, and deGaulle come to mind -- but like
Yoshida of Japan he does not put down his potential
successors. He tries to build them up. The question
is which one will be strong enough to provide the
leadership China will need in the future. History
tells us that collective leadership doesn't work --
not even in a small country like Uruguay. It can't
possibly work in providing leadership for one bill ion
Chinese.
The least likely danger to the reform movement
is the one most talked about -- that the Chinese may
turn back to the Soviet Union in their search for
economic progress. The Soviet model simply doesn't
work. As one Chinese leader put it to me, with
understandable overstatement, unless the Soviets open
up to the West and reform their economy as China is
attempting to do, the Soviet Union in the next
century will "disappear" as a great nation.
With these considerations in mind, it is vitally
important to recognize that more important than our
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military relationship are the economic ties which
China has with the United States, Japan, and Europe.
If we can give them an economic stake in good
relations with the West, they will not turn back to
their big neighbors from the north.
Let us now turn to the Soviet Union. I do not
know Mikhail Gorbachev but I knew those like Suslov
who sponsored and educated him and on this trip I
talked to several who do know him from China,
Pakistan, and England. We Americans, and this is
particularly so in the media, tend to allow style to
blind ourselves to substance. Fb r example, in 1955
when Khrushchev succeeded Stalin I recall the
briefing a Soviet expert gave to the National
Security Council. He predicted that Khrushchev would
not bean effective leader because he was poorly
educated, wore ill-fitting clothes, drank too much
and spoke poor Russian. Foster Dulles disagreed. He
said, "Mr. President, anyone who claws his way to the
top in the communist system is bound to be a strong
man and a dangerous adversary." He proved to be
righ t.
Today, we are deluged with reports about
Gorbachev's style. He has a good education. He is
well-dressed. He has a good sense of humor. He has
excellent eye contact, a firm handshake, and a
melodious voice; his wife wears designer clothes.
This is all very interesting but it does not
indicate that he may prove to be more reasonable.
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On the contrary, he will be more formidable than his
predecessors. That is the opinion of all of the
leaders I met on my recent trip. As one of them put
it: "Gorbachev is a thoroughbred communist; he is a
product of the system; he will try to improve the
system but he will not change it; he will continue to
pursue traditional Soviet foreign policy goals."
This is what we can expect:
He will not engage in any rash new foreign
policy adventures. He has enough on his plate to
digest already.
He will be tough in keeping what he has; he
can't risk losing any part of the Soviet empire he
has inherited.
He will try to romance the Chinese -- without
success -- as long as China has an economic stake in
good relations with the West.
He will try to drive a wedge between Europe and
the United States.
He will try to reduce tensions with the United
Sta to s. Why? Because his primary concern is not
fear of war but the need, to get the Soviet economy
moving again. Because the Soviet economy is only
one-half of the size of ours, he has to spend twice
as much on defense to stay even with the United
States . His opposition to the Star Wars program is
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not primarily because he fears the United States
might gain a military advantage but because of the
enormous burden such a program would impose on the
strapped Soviet economy. He needs the trade and
technology from the West which would come if he could
reduce tensions with the United States.
Getting the Soviet economy moving again is his
first priority, in part because this would benefit
the Soviet people but primarily because without a
stronger economy he cannot have a strong foreign
policy. The Soviet system is no longer a model for
Third World countries where the future of the world
will be determined in the twenty-first century. This
means that while he can still project his military
power in the target areas, he cannot project his
ideas.
Let us turn to President Reagan's priorities.
The primary objective of his foreign policy is to
reduce the danger of war. His critics contend that
if this is the case he should join Gorbachev in
making arms control the major subject for negotiation
at Geneva. The President sincerely wants arms
control but he recognizes that the only purpose of
arms control is to reduce the danger of war and that
it is not the existence of arms but the failure to
resolve political differences which lead to their use
which brings war. Deng Xiaoping made this point
in his interview in Time magazine this week.
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When he was asked about Gorbachev's proposal to cut
nuclear arsenals by 50 percent, he observed that the
United States and the Soviet Union now have enough to
destroy the world ten times and that reducing that by
50 percent would mean that each would have enough
left to destroy the world only five times. He then
observed, "Even if there will be an agreement of a
50 percent reduction, I don't think it will solve the
present problem." President Reagan is on target when
he insists that conflicts which could lead to the use
of arms must be addressed if we want to attack the
central problem of reducing the danger of war.
However, as a political realist he knows that he must
make a credible effort to reach an arms control
agreement with the Soviet Union if he is to retain
support for necessary defense budgets in the United
States and the support of our allies abroad.
How will the two leaders get along when they
meet each other? The answer to that question is easy
-- they will hit it off very well. Ronald Reagan
can't help being a gentleman and Gorbachev is too
smart not to act like one. But it is also
irrelevant.
In the middle ages, a king was about to wage war
on one of his neighbors. One of his advisors urged
that he meet with his neighboring monarch so that
they could get to know each other and understand each
other and then it might not be necessary to go to
war. The king responded, "We understand each other;
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we both want the same thing."
President Reagan and Gorbachev understand each
other; but they don't want the same thing. Gorbachev
wants to defend and extend communism. President
Reagan wants to defend and extend freedom. We have
irreconcilable differences, some of which will never
be settled. But we have one common interest -- to
avoid war over our differences. But even in this
respect we also have a profound difference.
President Reagan seeks peace as an end in itself.
Gorbachev seeks victory without war.
Gorbachev's first priority at Geneva will be to
prove'to his colleagues in the Soviet hierarchy that
he is a strong leader and able to hold his own with
the leader of the Free World. As his second
priority, he wants to come through as a reasonable
leader seeking peace in order to appeal to the peace
activists in Europe and the United States. But if he
has to choose between the two, coming out as a strong
leader will be his first priority.
President Reagan does not need to prove that he
is a strong leader. His primary goal will be to
prove that he is for peace. This is the case for two
reasons; because he sincerely believes in peace and
wants to be remembered in history as one who made a
breakthrough for peace.
What then can we expect at Geneva? Because the
parties are so far apart, it would be unrealistic to
expect that a final major arms control agreement
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could be negotiated. But it is possible that the two
leaders could agree on general principles and goals
for arms control and set up a process which would
make it possible for the two to sign an agreement
before President Reagan completes his term of
office.
We cannot expect that the Soviets will cease
being communists but the Geneva summit will provide
an opportunity to make the point that both the Soviet
Union and the United States have an interest in not
being drawn into war by Third World conflicts. The
Soviets face a choice -- to seek a better relation-
ship with the United States or to probe in Third
World areas where we have a vital interest. They
can't talk peace in Geneva and engage in and support
war in Asia, Africa, and Central America.
There will be agreements on consular, cultural
and commercial issues which while not addressing our
fundamental differences can provide contacts which
could marginally improve the atmosphere for more
constructive negotiations about those differences.
Does this mean because there will not be a major
arms control agreement that the Geneva summit will be
a failure? On the contrary, the meeting in Geneva
will be a success. It will be an unquestioned
success from a public relations standpoint. From a
substantive standpoint, we can expect at least one
major achievement -- the agreement of the two leaders
to meet again.
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As Henry Grunwald has pointed out, the tension
between the United States and the Soviet Union is not
a problem for which there is a solution but a
permanent condition which can be alleviated but not
cured. Regular summit meetings between the leaders
of the two superpowers are essential if we are to
manage those differences over the long period of time
in which we will continue to have them.
The greatest danger of war we face today is not
that one nation would launch a nuclear strike against
the other. The greatest danger of war is mis-
calculation. When the two leaders meet they may not
like each other and they may not trust each other but
at least the very fact that they know each other will
mean that they will reduce the possibility that one
might misjudge the other and underestimate the
other's will to resist in the event that actions are
taken which threaten its vital interests.
In the run up to Geneva, it is vitally important
to keep that meeting in perspective. Because
Gorbachev is only 57 years of age and could possibly
live long enough to meet with as many as five
American Presidents, the point has been made that he
is not in a hurry. If he can't make a deal he likes
with President Reagan, he will wait for his
successor. Others breathlessly intone that this is
President Reagan's only chance to assure his place
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in history as a peacemaker. Not true. This is
President Reagan's first meeting with the Russians
but not his last. It is far more important for him
to lay a solid foundation now for a better agreement
later than to make a bad agreement now in order not
to disappoint excessive public expectations. The
greatest service he could provide is to leave a
process for his successors for negotiating over our
differences in the future and not fighting over
them.
Looking ahead, I do not believe that there will
be a nuclear war. On the other hand, I do not see a
world without conflict. The greatest advantage the
United States has in this continuing conflict is not
the power of our arms which can prevent defeat but
the power of our ideas which can assure victory.
That is why it is so important for the economy of the
United States to be strong, free, and productive.
The business executives
nation and particularly
when they operate their
and productive manner.
if we are to afford the
will be necessary for a
in this audience serve the
the nation's foreign policy
businesses in an efficient
We must have a strong economy
defense expenditures which
long period of time. We need
a strong economy if we are to finance the indis-
pensable aid programs for our friends and allies
abroad which are essential if we are to have an
effective foreign policy. Most important of all, we
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need a strong productive economy as a powerful
example to others around the world of how freedom
works.
We are engaged in a long struggle. We are on
the right side. But history is strewn with the
wreckage of superior civilizations of the past who
were overrun by barbarians. British strategist, Sir
Robert Thompson has written, "National strength
equals people plus applied resources times will." We
have the people. We have the resources. The
question is do we have the will to continue to
provide leadership for the Free World? It is
understandable that many Americans tire of this role.
We are just recovering from the trauma of defeat in
Vietnam. As we celebrated the fourtieth anniversary
of the United Nations this past week, we were
constantly reminded that a great majority of the new
nations who have joined that organization since it
was founded 40 years ago consistently vote against
the United States, even though we provide generous
foreign aid to most of them.
Despite these understandable frustrations, the
United States must continue to play the role as the
major leader in the Free World. We must do so
because without the United States the rest of the
world would be helpless before totalitarian
aggression. We must do so not just for others but
for ourselves. Whether we like it or not, we must
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recognize the fact that we live in one world. The
United States cannot long exist as an island of
freedom in a world dominated by totalitarians.
There is another reason which cannot be
described in material terms. General deGaulle once
said, "France is never her true self unless she was
engaged in a great enterprise." This is true of
nations, it is true of individuals, it is true of
every man and woman in this room. To serve the cause
of peace and freedom in the world is a great
enterprise. Leadership in the Free World is not a
burden to be borne grimly but a challenge worthy of a
great people.
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