CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 3, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
THE DIRECTOR. OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 4 December 1985
NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
NIO/LA
Attached is the Nicaragua briefing
outline that I used yesterday with the
House Foreign Affairs Committee.
I believe that with some modifications
and update, it would be suitable for
use as an overview for the NSC meeting
now scheduled for early January.
Robert D. Vickers
J
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3 December 1985
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA
Introduction
Congressmen, we intend to give you an overview of the current
situation in Nicaragua, following which we will be happy to respond to
specific questions.
Over the past six months or so, the Sandinista regime has come under
growing internal pressure as a result of the unraveling economy, growing
opposition from domestic groups, and increased insurgent activity.
Considering compromise a sign of weakness, the Sandinistas have
adopted a hard line intended to demonstrate their determination
to weather any challenge and to consolidate their power.
In our view, this inflexibility almost certainly will intensify
domestic resistance to the regime and contribute to Managua's
eroding international image.
Unless this results in more forceful actions against the
Sandinistas, however, the outcome may nevertheless be the
eventual consolidation-of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua.
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Internal Problems
We have considerable evidence that the Sandinistas believe their
internal situation will worsen, in large part because of mounting
economic problems.
Managua spends more than 50 percent of its budget on the
military, and the economy is a shambles.
Since 1979, economic activity has fallen at least 25 percent.
Managua is projecting another 3 percent drop in GDP this year
and expects no upturn for years to come.
-- Per capita income has plunged by more than one third, and
inflation may reach 300 percent this year.
? Government efforts to combat inflation by holding down
nonmilitary spending and freezing wages have boosted
unemployment and further eroded purchasing power.
-- Exports have dropped sharply to less than $300 million this year
and are projected to fall by another $50 million in 1986.
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The civic opposition, with the Catholic Church hierarchy in the lead,
stepped up its activities earlier this year.
Cardinal Obando y Bravo, following his elevation in April,
assumed a higher profile. He gave a mass for the exile
community in Miami, began a series of pastoral visits throughout
Nicaragua, and called for negotiations between the regime and
the armed opposition.
In addition, business leaders began to stage meetings in various
cities, and some labor unions called strikes to protest the
deterioration of worker incomes.
Finally, the insurgency continues to be a serious problem for the
Sandinistas, notwithstanding their public statements to the contrary.
-- The FDN, the largest rebel group, has grown to 18,000 combatants.
? Confined largely to the northwest border area a year ago,
the FDN has expanded its operations into 10 of the country's
16 Departments.
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? In recent months, the FDN has been particularly active in
central Nicaragua, astride the Rama-Managua road that serves
as a crucial artery in the transfer of weaponry from the
Soviet Bloc to the Sandinista regime.
On the Atlantic coast, the Indian resistance -- which dates from
the regime's repression and forced relocation of the Miskito
Indian population in 1981-82 -- continues harassment actions
against the Sandinistas.
? The Indian umbrella organization KISAN, with about 1,000
combatants, relies heavily on donations of supplies from the
FDN.
Eden Pastora's forces have dwindled to some 600 men and have
largely been sidelined since the Sandinistas drove them from
their base camps in southern Nicaragua during the summer.
Sandinista Response
Managua has responded to the increased pressures by seeking
additional economic and military assistance from the Soviet Bloc,
cracking down on domestic opponents, and stepping up its
counterinsurgency efforts.
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Only a massive increase in financial support from the Soviet Bloc is
keeping the economy afloat.
Even so, Bloc relief -- about $280 million in 1984 and some $400
million this year -- has not been enough to staunch the economic
decline.
meeting with CEMA members
in Managua, a renewed Sandinista request for full membership
again was rejected. Moreover, the Soviets have told the regime
they cannot fill all of Managua's requests for 1986.
The Sandinistas apparently hope the Bloc will come through with
more cash to protect its investment.
the regime believes it will need $500 million in new funding
next year merely to maintain a subsistence standard of living.
To quell discontent arising from economic deprivation and political
repression, the Sandinistas have further restricted personal freedoms.
The suspension of civil liberties via an expanded state of
emergency in October is the latest in a series of moves giving
the regime stronger mechanisms for suppressing dissent.
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-- The Catholic Church, which Managua views as a potential threat,
has been the principal target.
? The Sandinistas have confiscated a new Church newspaper,
censored its radio broadcasts, occupied its social services
offices, and warned foreign-born priests that they will be
expelled if they criticized the regime.
? In addition, they have banned Church assemblies and tried to
limit attendance at Cardinal Obando y Bravo's sermons.
-- Managua also has struck at other perceived enemies. The
government has:
? Detained and interrogated more than 40 political and
business leaders, Protestant ministers, lay workers,
opposition press officials, and local employees of the US
Embassy.
? Required the independent human rights commission to submit
all letters and reports for censorship.
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? Tightened censorship of the independent newspaper La Prensa
and barred its journalists from government meetings.
? Cancelled the radio program of a small opposition party that
has participated in the National Assembly.
In general, the Sandinistas portray their critics as traitors
and cite "US aggression" as the rationale for their suspension
of civil liberties.
On the military front, Managua has relied heavily on the Soviets and
Cubans for assistance in fighting the war.
some 2,500 to 3,000 Cuban military advisers
and technicians are still in Nicaragua, and some are directly
involved in combat operations.
there are Cuban advisers in
Nicaraguan uniforms fighting in each of the 13 new
counterinsurgency battalions.
? The new Sandinista reserve and militia system is patterned
on the Cuban model, and the Cubans probably advised Managua
to reinstitute the unpopular system of military conscription.
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? Cubans are piloting some of the MI-8 and MI-25 helicopters
that are being used increasingly for combat operations.
? At least 50 Cubans, including several pilots, were killed in
combat last year alone. Some Sandinista and Cuban
casualties are flown to Cuba for medical care and recovery.
Meanwhile, Moscow appears to have stepped up military deliveries
to Nicaragua in recent months.
? Three Nicaraguan ships have visited the Cuban port of Mariel
during the past two months to pick up war materiel recently
delivered from the USSR.
? I some of the ships at Mariel at the
same time as the Soviet arms carriers.
? The Nicaraguan ships subsequently delivered the arms to
El Bluff under tight security conditions.
these deliveries, most of which appears to be
small arms and ammunition for the counterinsurgency effort.
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Outlook
The desire to project a favorable image to the West seems less and
less a constraint on Sandinista actions, as evidenced by President
Ortega's announcement of the expanded state of emergency just prior to
his appearance at the United Nations.
At home, the worsening economic situation, the regime's restrictions
on personal freedoms, and the costs of the war will continue to erode
popular support for the Sandinistas.
Managua appears determined, however, to brook no dissent from
its policies, and we believe the hard line will continue in
force.
-- In particular, the Sandinistas still appear unlikely to heed
calls for a negotiated settlement with the armed opposition.
Summary
In summary, we believe that the Sandinistas are currently willing to
run the risk that their current hardline policy toward their opponents
will eventually succeed despite some short tern loss of Western and other
international support.
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-- The Sandinistas are gambling that with sufficient Soviet Bloc
military and economic aid, they can eventually defeat the armed
opposition while preventing the political opposition from
gaining strength.
-- They are also attempting to show their neighbors that despite
increasing pressures, they will not compromise, and that the
only long-term solution is for these neighbors to accommodate
themselves to a Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
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SUBJECT: Congressional Briefing on the Situation
in Nicaragua
DISTRIBUTION:
Copy No. 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - ER
4 - C/NIC
5 - NIO/LA
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