HERITAGE FOUNDATION PAPER ON NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802770019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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S-E-C-R-E-T Executive Registry
17 May 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: Heritage Foundation Paper on Nicaragua
1. Responding to your request, the following are my thoughts on Virginia
Polk's paper, "What Next for Nicaragua?" Overall, I believe this paper
accurately and perceptively describes the problem that Nicaragua poses for us
and Central America. Many of the US actions that the paper recommends are
sensible and I agree with them; other proposed actions have an air of naivete
or show an unrealistic appreciation of current political constraints in
Central America, Western Europe, and the US.
2. The sound recommendations that the author makes, fortunately, are by
and large those the US Government is already implementing
-- Suspending US trade with Nicaragua.
-- Supporting the Nicaraguan democratic opposition--its leaders,
institutions, and objectives.
Insisting to the Nicaraguans that any resumption of serious
bilateral talks with the US depends on their honoring Contadora and
other commitments.
Making clear to the Cubans that any improvements in bilateral
relations with them will only be pursued if they reduce their
involvement in Nicaragua.
Working to improve the defensive capabilities of friendly states in
the area.
3. The author proposes one specific action that seems sensible and
overaue to me: bringing home our Ambassador and leaving the Embassy in
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Managua in the hands of a charge d'affaires. I believe her further
recommendation that we break relations altogether is a bad one. Such a move
would make the US look petty, and would open the Administration up to attacks
from critics of both the right and left who would point out that we maintain
full diplomatic relations with the Soviets, South Africans and other
repressive governments around the world
4. The Heritage Foundation paper proposes a variety of further actions
in areas where I believe the US is already doing as much as is wise or
feasible:
Encourage Central American leaders to offer more forthright support
for US policies. I believe the Administration has enjoyed
considerable success in this area and that asking more of the
leaders of El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica or Guatemala would risk
undermining their position at home and making one or more of these
states the ultimate casualty of what is now primarily a Nicaraguan
problem.
Work toward the formation of an OAS peace-keeping force. My feeling
is that this idea is premature. Virtually all OAS members have
indicated their distaste for a US-led military solution to the
Nicaragua problem. I believe pushing this idea at this time would
not only fail but would undermine other more positive and effective
aspects of US policy.
On a related matter, the paper displays a too-limited appreciation
of the fact that the effectiveness of any US measures (and the
ability to garner international support for our actions) turns on
the success of the Contras on the ground. Just as the OAS call for
Somoza to resign came at the end of June 1979--when the entire
country was caught up in the civil war--so will Contra military
progress make any US program and series of diplomatic and political
initiatives more workable.
Marshal European support for trade sanctions. This notion shows a
misunderstanding of current European attitudes. The most we can
hope for (and we are working on this) is that the Europeans will
refrain from increasing their assistance to compensate for the US
embargo that virtually all oppose.
5. Two of the items proposed by the author seem to me to carry great
dangers. The first is the idea of the US recognizing a Nicaraguan government-
in-exile. With the FDN controlling no territory and receiving only uncertain
backing this action could become a legal nightmare and a political
embarrassment of the first order. Second, I believe it would be a mistake to
provide Cobra helicopter gunships to El Salvador and Honduras. Congress would
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not go along with this. Moreover, this weapon system, if provided, would have
the potential for misuse, especially in El Salvador, that would undermine the
Duarte government's current positive momentum with its own population, with
the US Congress, and in the region. The Hondurans for their part have higher
priority needs than the helicopter gunship. The blow pipe surface-to-air
missile would provide a much more cost effective counter to the Nicaraguans'
MI-25 helicopters than would the Cobra.
6. Returning to the positive, I think the real utility of the Heritage
Foundation paper is that it effectively describes the Nicaragua problem and
offers some concrete idea as to what might be done. It provides a forceful
argument for the two aspects of US policy that are absolutely critical: (1)
continuing carefully calibrated and increasing pressure of various kinds on
the Sandinista regime, and (2) increasing and publicizing our willingness to
provide assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors and stand by them as they face the
Nicaraguan threat.
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Subject: Heritage Foundation Paper on Nicaragua
Distribution:
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DDI/ALA:JHelgerson:l I17 May 1985)
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
NIC 02561-85
17 May 1985
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: What Next for Nicaragua
1. I found the Heritage Foundation article thought-provoking, and
offer the following comments on the political measures:
-- 1 believe it would be premature to downgrade diplomatic
representation or even break relations until we have a
stronger and more united democratic opposition. The article
goes on to advocate recognition of a government-in-exile.
Such a government first has to be formed before it can be
recognized. Thus, the opposition has first to continue to
broaden its support base, both internally and externally, in
order to gain greater credibility as a viable alternative to
the Sandinistas. I don't believe, however, that the armed
opposition needs to seize and hold a significant portion of
Nicaraguan territory as a prelude to recognition. I do agree
that the democratic opposition needs to be given wider US
public exposure, including visits to the White House, to
increase its credibility.
-- I believe that a lot of work has to be done before the OAS
can play a constructive role in condemning Nicaragua and
supporting the democratic opposition. The OAS of 1985 is not
the OAS of 1979. The trend toward democracy has produced new
civilian governments less willing to antagonize their leftist
opposition by openly supporting US policy positions.
-- I agree with the article that any resumption of US-Nicaraguan
talks should be contingent on a Sandinista dialogue with the
democratic opposition, including the armed opposition. It
might be advisable to set forth publicly a number of
conditions that would need to be met before any resumption,
including an end of censorship and allowing prominent
opposition figures such as Cruz, Robelo and Calero to return
to Nicaragua.
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2. There is little reason to believe that the above political
pressures, even coupled with economic sanctions, are going to force the
Sandinistas to "say uncle" and change the nature of their regime to any
great extent. The belief that "moderates" in the Directorate can be
split off from "hardliners" is probably wishful thinking. The idea
behind political and economic pressures, therefore, is to increase
popular dissatisfaction with the regime, undermine its credibility, and
weaken its external support. This in turn should help to strengthen the
popular support, credibility and foreign support of the armed opposition,
which provides the best hope of "changing" the Sandinista regime short of
a US invasion.
3. The article is weak on military options. I don't believe that
CONDECA or the OAS are the answer to the problem. If the armed
opposition is to continue to grow in strength and take advantage of
political and economic measures, the US probably needs to take the
initiative on its own and draw a firmer line on continued Soviet and
Cuban military support for the Sandinistas.
-- It is true that US demarches concerning the introduction of
MIG fighter aircraft have probably prevented their delivery
to Nicaragua. We may need to draw a similar line on the
introduction of any more Soviet weaponry or Cuban military
personnel into Nicaragua. Otherwise, the Soviets and Cubans
can continue to escalate their support indefinitely to
counter any growth in the armed opposition. The recent
identification of a Cuban military unit in Nicaragua could
form the basis for a demarche against the introduction of
any new troops or weaponry. Alternatively, we might want to
wait for firm evidence that the Sandinistas have broken
their own pledge to halt deliveries of new arms and reduce
the Cuban military presence.
-- To enforce any demarche, the US need not impose a naval and
air blockade. Instead, we could announce that if we detect
any violations, we will impose a quarantine on future POL
deliveries. This would be far easier and cheaper to enforce
than a complete blockade, and would bring the Sandinistas to
their knees in a period of several months unless the Soviets
choose to implement a costly airlift of POL from Cuba.
-- SOVA has done a study on Soviet capabilities to implement
such an airlift, and has concluded that while it is feasible
if Soviet aircraft staged from Cuba, it would be extremely
costly and would pose a heavy burden over time on their
capabi-lities elsewhere.
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4. In the long run, then, the best hope of changing the Sandinista
regime is through a coordination of political and economic pressures
designed to weaken Managua's domestic support and strengthen the armed
opposition. But for their policy to succeed, the US has to be prepared
to take firm military actions to ensure that the Sandinistas cannot
respond with-more Soviet BM-21s and MI-24s or with additional Cuban
military personnel. Given the increased reports of growing popular
dissatisfaction with the regime, I am confident that over time, the armed
opposition stands a better than even chance of success of broadening its
popular base inside Nicaragua, establishing better links with the
internal political opposition, and achieving success as a viable
alternative to-.the Sandinistas.
Robert D. Vickers
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SUBJECT: What Next in Nicaragua
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15 May 1985
Executive Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
Director, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, DI'
Chief,. Central America Task Force, DO
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: What Next for Nicaragua?
Give me your thoughts and any ideas you have on this document.
i liam J. Casey
Attachment:
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder,
dtd 2 May 1985, Same Subject as Above
C-387
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No. 429 1 The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 [phone]
May 2, 1985
WHAT NEXT FOR NICARAGUA ?
INTRODUCTION
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua seems paralyzed. Last fall,
Congress suspended U.S.assistance to the anti-Sandinista rebels,
and in January of this year, the Reagan Administration broke off
its bilateral talks with Nicaragua, since nothing had been accom-
plished after months of periodic meetings in Manzanillo, Mexico.
Congress now has refused to approve release of $14 million in
military assistance to the armed opposition in Nicaragua or even
to provide humanitarian aid for Nicaraguan refugees.
The U.S. seeks a halt to Nicaraguan destabilization activities
in Central America, an end to the de facto alliance with the
Soviet Union and Cuba, and genuine self-determination for the
people of Nicaragua. These objectives are widely accepted in the
U.S., where even former supporters of the Sandinista regime no
longer dispute that it is fast becoming a communist, totalitarian
state. U.S. goals in the region are also shared by Nicaragua's
Central American neighbors, who are threatened by Nicaragua's
military capability and revolutionary ideology, and the Nicaraguan
resistance in Nicaragua'has called on the government to accept
these same principles.
Nicaragua's military build-up, fed with increasingly sophis-
ticated weaponry from the Soviet bloc and tightening repression
of political and religious freedoms, have occurred while the
Contadora negotiations and bilateral talks with the U.S have been
going on. Consolidation of the Sandinista dictatorship in alliance
with Cuba and-the Soviet Union has proceeded apace even though
the U.S. suspended its assistance*to the opposition. There
should be little doubt that, if left unchecked, the Sandinistas
intend to build another Cuba. With or without U.S. aid for the
Nicaraguan rebel forces, the U.S. must apply firm and steady
pressure on Nicaragua to prevent that outcome.
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt
to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
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As the conduct of the Nicaraguan regime has demonstrated its
determination to become a Soviet-aligned, totalitarian state,
debate in the U.S. has come to focus on the most effective policy
tools to prevent its consolidation. What is required now is a
broader consideration of the full range of political, economic,
and military options open to the U.S. to.pressure the Sandinista
government. Breaking or downgrading diplomatic relations with
the Sandinista government, initiating sanctions of the Nicaraguan
government by the organization of American States, stepping up
military assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors, and reviving a
regional military defense organization are some of the options
that deserve careful evaluation.
Downgrade Diplomatic Representation
It is a curious anomaly that the U.S. government maintains
high-level diplomatic representation in Nicaragua, through its
ambassador, even though the Reagan Administration has consistently
questioned the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government and the
authenticity of the 1984 Nicaraguan "election." The recall of
ambassadors is a time-honored diplomatic signal of disapproval or
disassociation. It was used as recently as 1978, when the Carter
Administration recalled the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua to
signal termination of U.S. backing of Anastasio Somoza.
Sandinista leaders have been quite candid about the purpose
of their November 1984 election, labeled by Commander Bayardo
Arce "a nuisance,"' which was to legitimize their revolution in
world pub-lic opinion and thus deflect pressure against the Marxist
regime. With the solid evidence that the election was neither
free nor fair, the U.S. should not acquiesce in the Sandinistas'
propaganda campaign by carrying on business as usual. At a
minimum, Washington should downgrade its diplomatic representation,
leaving the embassy in the hands of a charge d'affaires. Such a
move would be consistent with the U.S. position that Nicaragua
has steadfastly violated its 1979 pledge to the organization of
American States (OAS) to establish a broad-based, democratic
government.
Break Diplomatic Relations
The rationale for breaking diplomatic relations is essential-
ly the same as for downgrading relations, although it sends a
In La Vanguardia, Barcelona, July 31, 1984. In-a speech by Commander
Bayardo Arce in Managua, where he said: "Action is precisely what consti-
tutes the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat-class ability
to impose its will by utilizing the means at hand and go through bourgeois
formalities. For us, then the elections, viewed from that perspective,
are a nuisance."
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much stronger signal. Breaking relations would allow the U.S. to
provide legal overt assistance to the Nicaraguan armed resistance,
since a chief objection of some critics of the Administration's
policy is the impropriety of arming the opposition to a government
with which the U.S. has normal diplomatic relations. Severing
relations also would prepare the way for recognizing an alterna-
tive, perhaps exile, government.
The two principal objections are that a diplomatic rupture
is too weak a tool to pressure the Sandinista government, and
that by closing the U.S. embassy in Managua, the U.S. deprives
itself of a valuable intelligence'source. However, breaking
relations could be an effective element of a package of diplomatic,
economic, and military measures taken in concert. Further,
diplomatic contact is already so circumvented that breaking
relations would probably not make much difference. According to
a U.S. diplomat, "no Warsaw Pact country restricted access to
government officials as much as Nicaragua does.112
Recognize a Government-in-Exile
The U.S. should consider recognizing a Nicaraguan government-
in-exile. The Sandinista Government of National Reconstruction
in exile attained respectability through a 1979 OAS resolution
withdrawing recognition from the government of Anastasio Somoza
and thus implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the Sandinistas.
But-the primary consideration should be effectiveness rather than
historical precedent. Recognition of an alternative government
should not be an option adopted in isolation, but as a prelude to
or part of an overall policy that includes other measures.3 A
transfer of recognition to the armed opposition to the Sandinistas
would become more viable were the rebel forces to succeed in
taking and holding a significant portion of Nicaraguan territory.
Support the Democratic Opposition
With the March 2 announcement by Nicaragua's beleaguered
democratic opposition of its political platform and a call for
dialogue with the Sandinista government,4 the-U.S. is in a better
position to challenge the legitimacy of the Sandinista regime.
The opposition comprises a broad spectrum of Nicaraguans who
cannot be smeared with the "Somozista" label. It has called for
free elections, separation of powers, authentic pluralism, and
"In Nicaragua, the American Embassy Feels the Effects of a Widening Rift,"
The New York Times, February 1, 1985, p. AS.
For a more in-depth study of legal and diplomatic issues.surrounding
recognition of governments-in-exile, see The Heritage Foundation's forth-
coming Backgrounder by Thomas Miller.
Document of the Nicaraguan Resistance on National Dialogue, published in
Diario Las Americas, March 10, 1985, p. 13-A.
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full respect for human rights.5 The opposition's platform rei-
terates the goals proclaimed from Costa Rica in 1979 by the
Nicaraguan government of National Reconstruction, composed of a
broad coalition including Sandinistas and democratic forces, and
it is fully consistent with the Contadora group's 21 objectives.
The U.S. should support the democratic opposition and its
objectives. A key element of this effort should be to give wide
public exposure to the leaders of the democratic opposition and
to the validity of its goals. Its leaders should be welcomed in
the White House and introduced to U.S. policy makers and the
American public. The U.S. also can help the opposition within
Nicaragua, as it. is currently doing through the National Endow-
ment for Democracy's $100,000 grant to Nicaragua's only independent
newspaper, La Prensa. Assistance also should be offered, perhaps
through the Inter-American Foundation, to the small remaining
private sector, free trade unions, and independent political
parties, who are resisting the consolidation of the Sandinista
Marxist regime.
PLAN FOR A POST-SANDINISTA TRANSITION
Part of the rationale for U.S. support to the democratic
opposition to the Sandinista dictatorship should be to help the
U.S. plan for a possible transition in Nicaragua and to avoid the
kind of misjudgments that helped the Sandinis4tas consolidate
power. To ensure this, Washington must maintain close'contact
with. democratic Nicaraguan leaders to keep abreast of changing
circumstances in the country. Should the Sandinista government
be replaced by a democratic, representative government, the U.S.
should be prepared to extend prompt diplomatic recognition of the
new government, encourage its friends and allies to do the same,
and provide economic and technical assistance to help stabilize
the incoming government. The U.S. should be prepared to use its
influence, if necessary, to block any attempt to reimpose an
authoritarian dictatorship.
A Role for the Organization of American States
The OAS, which played a key role in the success of Nicaragua's
1979 revolution by calling on Somoza to step down and by recogniz-
ing the provisional Government of National Reconstruction, has
since kept its distance from Central America's volatile conflicts.
Costa Rican and Honduran protests against Nicaraguan harassment
have been given hearings, as have Nicaraguan counterprotests.
But these issues have been routinely shuffled off for consideration
by the Contadora group, conveniently allowing OAS members to
sidestep the troubling appearance in the hemisphere of a new
Marxist dictatorship with Cuban and Soviet ties.
In fact, all of the chief opposition leaders also opposed Somoza, and
many previously served in the Sandinista government: Arturo Cruz,
Alfonso Robelo, Violetta Chamorro, Eden Pastora, Alfredo Cesar.
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OAS timidity stems in part from a commitment to the OAS
Charter's principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of
other member states and perhaps a self-conscious wariness about
adopting a tough standard of political pluralism. Inside the
OAS, moreover, it probably is assumed that if tougher action is
warranted, then the U.S. ultimately will take it.
Yet the OAS in the past overcame its aversion to involvement
in other countries' internal affairs when it called for the
resignation of Anastasio Somoza. Several member states also
submitted a formal protest in the OAS in September 1981 of the
joint French-Mexican declaration that recognized the Salvadoran
rebels as a legitimate representative political force and demanded
a "restructuring" of the Salvadoran government and army to include
rebel forces.
In view of the impasse in the Contadora negotiations, these
precedents are sufficient reason for the OAS to address directly
the issues of Nicaraguan aggression and its denial of political
freedom. This could be done by reconvening the Seventeenth
Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, which was convoked
in September 1978 to examine Central America's political situation
and never formally "adjourned. In fact, should the OAS take
action to censure the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, it
could well use the same language as that contained in the resolu-
tion calling on Somoza to resign.6
The time may be ripe for a U.S. initiative on Central America
in the OA'S. Many OAS members, who were enthusiastic supporters
of the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza, have become less than keen
on the direction and behavior of the Sandinista government.
Venezuela, for example, has suspended its subsidized oil sales to
Nicaragua until payment for past shipments has been made current.
The political distancing from Nicaragua also was reflected in the
failure of Latin American governments to send high-level represen-
tation to the 1985 presidential inauguration ceremonies in Managua.
And as John Silber, President of Boston University and
member of the Kissinger Commission, has noted, many Latin American
leaders express deep concern about Nicaragua in private discus-
sions, even though their public statements are cautious.? U.S.
The OAS resolution of June 23, 1979, reads, in part, "That in the view of
the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
this solution should be arrived at on the basis of the following:
(1) Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime;
(4) The holding of free elections as soon as possible that lead to the
establishment of a truly democratic government...."
John R. Silber, "Plain Talk behind Closed Doors in Central America,"
The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 1985, p. 21.
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leadership and concrete evidence of a consistent, committed U.S.
policy in Central America could reassure them in discussing their
own security concerns.
Central American Diplomacy
While there are strong arguments for an active U.S. role in
challenging the Sandinistas, their impact would be even greater
were the parties most immediately affected by the Nicaraguan
government to speak even more directly about the need for U.S.
involvement. The U.S. should make the case to the leaders of the
Central American democracies (Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Hon-
duras), as well as the internal Nicaraguan democratic opposition,
that their unambiguous public support for a strong U.S. posture
vis-a-vis Nicaragua is crucial to congressional approval of such
a policy.
Western Europe
A crucial element of U.S. diplomatic pressure on Nicaragua
should be to engage U.S. allies in Western Europe in efforts to
assure that the Nicaraguan government fulfills its pledges to
allow political pluralism and respect human rights. Some European
countries originally sympathetic to the Sandinistas have recently
become wary of lending financial and diplomatic support to the
increasingly militant and repressive regime in Managua.
The U.S. should. increase its efforts to explain the basis
for U.S. policy to its allies and to highlight this po?licy's
importance for Western Europe's own security interests. Washington
should marshal the persuasive evidence of'Nicaragua's movement
toward a totalitarian. dictatorship: the European Democratic
Union's detailed report on the sham election in 1984, complaints
of repression of free trade unions submitted to the International
Labor Organization, reports of human rights organizations on
torture by government security agents, and the Sandinista govern-
ment's blatant manipulation of the committee to draft the new
constitution to ensure permanent one-party control of government.
In particular, the U.S. should stress these facts to the Socialist
International, and encourage it to speak out on repression in
Nicaragua.
Also at issue is Western Europe's economic support for
Nicaragua. U.S. economic pressures will fail if offset by loans
and donations from Europe. By the end of 1983, Western Europe
had provided Nicaragua $263.4 million in bilateral loans and
lines of credit. This freed up Nicaraguan resources for invest-
ment in military expansion and allowed the Sandinista government
to pretend that it enjoys the support and solidarity of democratic,
western nations. Moreover, Nicaragua reportedly sells goods
donated to it by Europe at below market prices in neighboring
countries, to the detriment of local producers and exporters.
Should the U.S. apply economic sanctions against Nicaragua, it
must persuade its European allies to cooperate.
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Contadora Negotiations
The peace negotiations initiated by the Contadora countries
(Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia) in 1983 have proceeded
in fits and starts. They recently resumed after a boycott by El
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras protesting the abduction of
a Nicaraguan from the Costa Rican embassy in Managua by Nicaraguan
security forces. The countries are now addressing the difficult
issue of verification and enforcement of whatever provisions the
final treaty contains.
Although the U.S.*is not a member of the Contadora group,
and not directly involved in the talks, it should continue to
support regional efforts to draft and enforce a peace treaty.
The Contadora "Document'of Objectives," signed by the Central
American countries in 1983, calls for self-determination, democra-
tic and pluralistic governments, and respect for human rights.
All Central American countries except Nicaragua have made progress
toward meeting these objectives. The Contadora process is an
appropriate forum for calling Nicaragua to account for violating
the principles it accepted in signing the Document of Objectives.
U.S. support for the Contadora negotiations should depend on
Nicaragua's fulfillment of those principles and on finding reliable
verification and enforcement procedures for any Contadora agree-
ment.8
Resume Bilateral U.S.-Nicaraguan Talks
The Sandinista government seems very anxious to resume
bilateral talks with the U.S. As such, Washington should make
resumption contingent upon Sandinista agreement to begin a dialogue
with its internal political opposition that would include such
matters as political liberties and press freedom. Washington
must link the two sets of talks, because Managua's insistence on
negotiating with the U.S., rather than with its own opposition,
is an integral element of its propaganda campaign, at home and
abroad, to portray the Sandinista government as threatened only
by foreign aggression and to minimize the level of internal
opposition to its policies.
International Peacekeeping Force
As the regime of Anastasio Somoza was caving in to pressure
from the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in mid-1979,
an emergency OAS session on the crisis convened. There, the U.S.
proposed a peacekeeping force to enforce a cease-fire and oversee
a peaceful transition from the Somoza government. The proposal
was withdrawn when it won little support from Latin American
governments committed to the overthrow of Somoza.
For further discussion of the Contadora negotiations, see Virginia Polk,
"The U.S. and the Contadora Effort for Central America," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 372, August 1984.
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The OAS Charter provides for inter-American peacekeeping
forces, and the OAS in fact approved sending such a force to the
Dominican Republic in 1965 to restore order. If Nicaraguan
hostilities between the government and anti-government forces
erupt into full-scale civil war, the U.S should consider pressing
the OAS for peacekeeping action in Nicaragua.
Cuba and the Soviet Union
U.S. policy options in Nicaragua are not necessarily limited
to pressure on Managua. They also include measures to restrain
Soviet and Cuban backing for the Sandinistas. A clear message
that the possibility of direct military intervention has not been
dismissed is essential and in fact was the position of the Kissin-
ger Commission. The threat of force is more credible in the
aftermath of the U.S. operation in Grenada, and it may account
for the fact MiG fighter jets have not been delivered to Nicaragua
despite repeated Nicaraguan attempts to obtain them.
Militarily overextended by its commitments in Africa and
Central America, and pressed by the Soviet Union to export more
sugar, nickel, and tobacco to soft-currency Soviet bloc countries,
Cuba may be susceptible to-U.S. pressure to halt its intervention
in Nicaragua. Fidel Castro, cornered by a stagnant economy and
reduced Soviet financial assistance, has recently launched another
public relations campaign that advertises Cuba's eagerness for a
resumption of bilateral talks with the U.S. Washington should
let Castro know that a bilateral agenda that includes lessening
U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba will be contingent, among
other things, upon a Cuban disengagement from Nicaragua. The
broadcasts of U.S.-based Radio Marti, a news service to Cuba,
could also raise internal Cuban opposition to its foreign adven-
tures.
Reduce Bilateral Trade
In 1984, the U.S. imported $57 million of such Nicaraguan
products as bananas, beef, shellfish, and coffee. U.S. exports
to Nicaragua were $112 million, virtually all of it such agricul-
ture-related products as insecticides, fertilizers, herbicides,
and farm equipment.
Suspending trade with Nicaragua would have a major impact on
its economy, already severely damaged by the Sandinistas' economic
policies. It would boost its neighbors' economies, if Nicaragua's
export quotas were reallocated to Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Guatemala. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
permits such a embargo.9 The President may invoke the Act to
See Overview of Current Provisions of U.S. Trade Law, Subcommittee on
Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
December 4, 1984, p. 110, for discussion of the IEEPA.
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respond to an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to
the. national security, foreign policy or economy of the United
States." The Act requires the President to consult with Congress
whenever possible before declaring an emergency, and to submit to
Congress a report explaining and justifying his actions.
Such reports must be updated every six months while the
emergency lasts. The trade restrictive authority of the Act
states that the President may "by means of instructions, licenses,
or otherwise,... investigate, regulate, prevent, or prohibit"
virtually all aspects of foreign trade, from the transfer of
exchange or credit to the import or export of currency and goods.
The authority granted under the Act was exercised by Presidents
Carter and Reagan toward Iran in retaliation for the taking of
American hostages.
Objections to such action deserve serious consideration.
One is that economic boycotts are ineffective in the long term if
alternative trading partners or financial supporters are available.
This raises the question of Soviet willingness or ability to play
the economic role in Nicaragua it has assumed in the Cuban economy,
which received over $4 billion in Soviet economic aid last year.
The anemia of the Soviet economy and its large financial commitment
to Cuba make it unlikely that it could readily take on the addi-
tional burden of funding a nearly bankrupt Nicaragua.
A further objection to a U.S. economic embargo is'that the
Nicaraguan economy is already collapsing under the weight of mis-
management and massive military expenditures and that a hostile
move to cut off trade would be used as anti-American Nicaraguan
propaganda. Finally, U.S. obligations under the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) would require it to suspend its
bilateral memoranda of understanding with Nicaragua and open up
the possibility that the GATT would rule the action illegal. In
that case, the U.S. could be required to pay compensation to
Nicaragua, and if it refused to do so, Nicaragua, under the GATT
rules, could legally take retaliatory trade sanctions against the
U.S. Far more serious, it would mean the U.S. would be in viola=
tion of an international agreement to which it is committed as a
free-trade nation.
Although an economic embargo has some potential drawbacks as
a long-term policy, it should not be dismissed as a tactical
policy option. Pressure on Nicaragua's rapidly deteriorating
economy could weaken further internal support for the Sandinista
government, which has already eroded substantially among farmers
and peasants. One of the chief benefits of economic denial would
be to curtail sharply Nicaragua's capacity to fund its expanding
military force.
Multilateral Development Organizations
The U.S. has used its voting power in the Inter-American
Development Bank to block financing for development projects in
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Nicaragua; Washington should continue to do so. Managua's request
for a $58.4 million agriculture loan has been the focus of recent
controversy, but two other requests are currently under review,
totalling nearly $70 million. There is no justification for
development loans to a government intent on eliminating private
property and the market system. Through a series of Executive
Orders, the Nicaraguan government is consolidating state control
of the economy. According to Commander Bayardo Arce, "any invest-
ment project in our country belongs to the State. The bourgeoisie
no longer invests--it subsists.110
Central America's regional organizations for economic develop-
ment and integration, the Central American Common Market and the
Central American Bank for Economic Integration, have been paralyzed
since the late 1970s. The breakdown was partly caused by world
economic conditions that interrupted the region's economic pro-
gress and partly by political instability. The question of
whether the U.S. should assist these two institutions has been
under study since the 1984 Kissinger Commission Report proposed
that they be used as a channel to reinvigorate the region's
economies. Also under review is the Commission's proposal to
create a Central American Development Organization, although its
exact nature and function remain unclear. Since Nicaragua cannot
be excluded legally as a beneficiary of the two existing organiza-
tions, U.S. development assistance should continue on a bilateral
basis with the other countries in the region. If any new regional
organization is founded, it should be designed to channel assis-
tance directly to. the private sector and to countries in the
region that respect private property and operate on market princi-
ples.
Military Options
There are a number of options for exerting military pressure
on Nicaragua. While a full-scale U.S. invasion force should
never be definitively rejected, the U.S. could achieve its objec-
tives through less costly and drastic action. Concluded the
Kissinger Commission report, with respect to the use of military
force: "We can expect negotiations to succeed only if those we
seek to persuade have a clear understanding that there are circum-
stances in which the use of force, by the United States or by
others, could become necessary as a last resort."11
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as
the Rio Treaty, provides a legal framework for collective defense
10 La Vanguardia, Barcelona, Spain, July 31, 1984.
11 Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, January
1984, p. 107.
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in the hemisphere. The Treaty was invoked in 1965 for the opera-
tion in the Dominican Republic. Former Foreign Minister Fernando
Volio of Costa Rica cited it as an ultimate recourse in a speech
at the Organization of American States in 1983, made to protest
Nicaraguan armed incursions into Costa Rican territory. The U.S.
and its regional allies would be justified in taking collective
military action against Nicaragua under the terms of the treaty
in the case of a Nicaraguan "armed attack" against any of its
neighbors.12
Regional Defense. Organizations
If Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America move to form a
regional defense organization, the U.S. should offer appropriate
support. There is a precedent for such an arrangement in the
Central American Council for Defense (CONDECA),-set up in 1964 as
a joint defense organization for the region by Guatemala, Honduras,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The Sandinistas' takeover of Nicaragua
caused a regional realignment that undermined CONDECA, since the
other members came to view Nicaragua itself as the chief threat
to their security. Efforts were made to set up a new organization,
leading in 1982 to the Central American Democratic Community,
comprising Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. At
the time, Panama and Belize declined to participate, but recent
political shifts in those countries may reopen the possibility of
an expanded membership.
Matching Nicaragua's Military Capability
The U.S. also must be alert to changes in the regional
balance of military force, and take appropriate steps to ensure
that the defense capability of its friends in the region is ade-
quate, while preventing a dangerous escalation in the sophistica-
tion of military assistance. The U.S. must make clear that it
will enforce its prohibition on the introduction of high-
performance jet fighters in Nicaragua.
Unfortunately, the U.S. may have drawn the line at too high
a threshold, given the nature of the conflict and terrain in
Central America. Nicaraguan acquisition of Soviet-made MI-24
Hind helicopter gunships passed almost unnoticed in the shadow of
the suspected delivery of MiG jet fighters to Nicaragua in November
Article 3 of the Rio Treaty reads: "The high contracting parties agree
that an armed attack by any state against an American State shall be
considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently,
each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting
the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
On the request of the State or States directly attacked, and until a
decision of the organ of consultation of the Inter-American system, each
one of the contracting parties may determine the immediate measure which
it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation."
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1984. These aircraft are the world's most heavily armed, sophis-
ticated, and fastest helicopters. For the kind of military.
operations suitable to Central American terrain, they are probably
as effective as the aircraft that was not delivered.13 The U.S.
should move quickly to supply El Salvador and Honduras with Huey
AH-1S Cobra helicopter gunships to counter Nicaragua's advantage.
DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
The use of direct military force against Nicaragua would be
advisable only if there were an important change in the region's
status quo. A major military offensive by the Sandinista govern-
ment against its own population, the introduction of high-
performance jet aircraft or other advanced weapons systems into
Nicaragua, or a Nicaraguan cross-border attack on any of its
neighbors are the kinds of situations that might trigger a direct
U.S. military response. U.S. military operations that should be
considered are full-scale intervention with U.S. forces, a block-
ade, the selective destruction of military targets in Nicaragua,
and the introduction of a small number of special U.S. and Latin
American forces to aid the anti-Sandinista rebels. The successful
action in Grenada can serve as a model.
There are important reasons for holding these options in
reserve. Intervention with U.S. forces would be an extremely
costly undertaking and would certainly entail the loss of American
lives. U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo in 1965 involved over
23,000 combat troops to'restore order in a single city where they
faced virtually no opposition. It is also possible that direct
military intervention in Nicaragua would require a prolonged
military occupation and a counterinsurgency campaign. To be
effective, a U.S. naval blockade preventing the shipment of arms
to Nicaragua would have to be in effect for an indefinite period,
and as in the case of an invasion, would limit the U.S. response
capability to crises elsewhere. The selective destruction of
military targets, such as airfields or Soviet military materiel
would achieve U.S. security objectives at a much lower cost, but
it would be likely to provoke strong U.S. domestic and interna-
tional opposition if Nicaragua proclaimed its right of self-
defense and national sovereignty.14
Finally, the political repercussions of military options
must be anticipated. Unless the need for such action can be
conveyed convincingly to the American public, it will not enjoy
the level of public support crucial to the successful outcome of
such an operation. Adoption of any of these options also would
13 John F. Guilmartin, Jr., "Nicaragua is Armed for Trouble," The Wall Street
Journal, March 11, 1985.
14 David Ronfeldt, Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean
Basin (Rand Corporation, 1983).
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require at least the tacit acceptance of neighboring Central
American countries, if future U.S.-Latin American relations are
not to be jeopardized, and joint action by the U.S. and its-
Central American allies should be undertaken if possible.
U.S. policy to date has rested chiefly on military assistance
to the Nicaraguan anti-government rebels as the most viable
option for forcing the Nicaraguan government to move away from
its alignment with the Soviet bloc and return to the original
democratic ideals of the 1979 revolution. Further military
assistance'to the opposition forces has been defeated temporarily.
by Congress. Although it may be renewed in the future, the U.S.
in any event must explore the feasibility and effectiveness of
other policy options to halt the consolidation of a Soviet-aligned,
Marxist government in Central America.
The successful U.S. operation in Grenada in 1983 and the
progress made in El Salvador on both the military and political
fronts, largely due to the combination of strong U.S. backing and
pressure, demonstrate that a well-designed, consistent U.S.
policy can be effective in simultaneously protecting U.S. security
interests and promoting democracy and the rule of law in the
Caribbean Basin area. An important element of those achievements
has been the demonstration of U.S. determination and its willing-
ness to use force when necessary to protect its interests and
defend the right of other nations to genuine self-determination.
In Nicaragua, there is growing rebellion against the Sandinistas'
Marxist dictatorship, and in the international community, a
belated recognition of the nature of the Sandinista regime and
the dangers it poses to Western security. U.S. policy toward
Nicaragua should build on these circumstances to thwart Soviet-
and Cuban-backed efforts to impose a Marxist totalitarian govern-
ment on the unwilling people of Nicaragua.
Virginia Polk
Policy Analyst
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