CUBA: SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES IN 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000300400002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba:
Soviet Military Deliveries in 1984
NGA Review Completed
Secret
ALA 85-10093D
GI 85-10235D
October 1985
Covv c i
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Directorate of Secret
Cuba:
Soviet Military Deliveries in 1984
Operations.
contributions from
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 85-10093D
GI 85-10235D
October 1985
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Office of Global Issues, with
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Cuba:
Soviet Military Deliveries in 1984F--] 25X1
Key Judgments In 1984 the Soviet Union-as it has every year since 1980-delivered a
Information available large quantity of military goods to Cuba. Shipments of weapons, ammuni-
as of 1 September 1985 tion, and naval vessels-as measured in tonnage-rose sharply as com-
was used in this report.
pared with 1983; this was offset somewhat by a decrease in the tonnage of
military-associated goods. Overall 1984 military deliveries exhibited a 6-
percent increase over the previous year, but are still significantly less than
in 1981 and 1982.
The abrupt increase in Soviet military aid in 1981-more than double the
average annual tonnage of the previous five years-was probably planned
well in advance of 1981, and intended as a general modernization program
for the Cuban armed forces. The overall pattern since 1981 may have been
in response to Havana's concerns over the intentions of the new US
administration. The bulk of the shipments came during the first two years,
suggesting that the schedule may have been accelerated by Moscow to
assuage Castro's fears. Beginning in mid-1984, however, and continuing
into the first six months of 1985, the level of shipments has declined
sharply, suggesting the near completion of the current military delivery
cycle.
Principal features of the 1984 deliveries include:
? An increase for the second year in shipments of combat arms, ammuni-
tion, and naval vessels-46,100 metric tons. This exceeds the previous
recent high of 45,500 tons delivered in 1981, but is still considerably less
than the tonnage delivered during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
? A decrease for the second year in shipments of military-associated goods
(spare parts, trucks, and other support equipment)-8,500 tons as
compared with about 13,000 tons in 1983 and 35,500 tons in 1982.
? Among the most significant items delivered were a frigate, a submarine
and several smaller naval combatants, and over 300 surface-to-air
missiles.
? Other deliveries included a handful of fighter aircraft and about 75
medium tanks and 75 artillery pieces.
In addition to Soviet deliveries, East European countries last year-as they
did in 1983-appear to have shipped approximately 5,000 tons of military-
associated goods. These shipments are not followed as closely as Soviet
deliveries.
iii Secret
ALA 85-10093D
GI 85-10235D
October 1985
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Most of the modern weapons and major equipment now in Cuban
inventories have been delivered since 1980, although substantial deliveries
have been made in each of the past nine years. These deliveries have
enhanced the combat capabilities of each of the three branches of the
Cuban armed forces-air, navy, and ground. Improvements in air defenses
and the Cuban Air Force and Navy are especially significant and raise
substantially the potential cost to the United States of any plan to
neutralize Cuban military capabilities by invasion, airstrike, or blockade.
In dollar value, Cuba ranks fourth among Soviet Third World military
assistance clients. For 1984, arms and military-associated goods have an
estimated value of about $660 million. This compares with a figure of $4.6
billion in Soviet general economic assistance (trade and development aid,
and price subsidies) to Cuba for the same year. While the value of Soviet
military aid has increased greatly since 1975, the value of general
economic assistance has increased relatively more.
The Soviets maintain nearly 20,000 personnel in Cuba. More than half of
these are civilian advisers on political or economic matters. Some 7,000 to
8,000 are military personnel, associated with either the Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba, intelligence collection functions, or the military advisory
group. The latter group, numbering 2,500 to 2,800, is involved in the
planning and assimilation of advanced Soviet arms into the Cuban armed
forces. We assess that it has been relatively constant in size over the past
few years.
We expect that Cuba will continue to modernize all three branches of its
armed forces over the next few years-albeit not at the pace of the past five
years. Economic constraints, already evident in current austerity measures
taken by Cuba, could possibly retard the assimilation of additional
weapons into the Cuban armed forces.
Further expansion in air defenses probably will take place and could
include the delivery of additional surface-to-air missiles of types already in
Cuba-SA-2s, SA-3s, and mobile SA-6s. Other, less likely, weapon
deliveries would be the long-range, high-altitude SA-5 and the MIG-25
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Other force modernization probably will include continued expansion or
improvements in both Cuban naval and ground forces. Additional Foxtrot-
class submarines, or a new type diesel submarine, may be acquired.
Antisubmarine warfare forces might be enhanced by delivery of a third
Koni-class frigate and additional MI-14 Haze helicopters. Additional Osa-
11-class guided-missile attack boats and Turya-class torpedo boats will
probably be acquired, and the larger Nanuchka-class patrol boat will
possibly be introduced. Within the ground forces, continued emphasis is
expected on acquisition of mobile point air defense systems-to include two
new weapons, the SA-13 and possibly the SA-8, which Cuban forces are
probably operating in Angola.
Shipments of Soviet arms through Cuba might conceivably be boosted if
the military situation in Angola or Nicaragua should deteriorate further.
Under these circumstances, additional Soviet military assistance to both
countries can be expected. As in the past, some of this aid may be
channeled through Cuba.
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Key Judgments iii
Major Arms Deliveries 1
Transshipment of Arms to Other Nations 8
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban Military Capabilities 8
Factors Affecting New Weapons Deliveries 14
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Boundary representation is
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Cuba:
Soviet Military Deliveries in 1984
This paper sets out the available information on
shipments of major arms and military-associated
equipment from the Soviet Union to Cuba during
1984, identifies and discusses trends in weapons deliv-
eries, and assesses the impact of new equipment on
Cuban military capabilities.'
There are limitations to the completeness of the data
upon which the paper is based:
? Only seaborne deliveries are included. While certain
fragile or high-priority equipment may be shipped
by air (for example, electronics and some spare
parts), we believe that the magnitude of these
shipments is not significant. In any case, all major
weapon systems would normally be sent by sea.
Trends and Patterns in Military Aid
delivery over the 1981-85 time period.
General Patterns in 1984
Overall Soviet seaborne military deliveries to Cuba in
1984 totaled an estimated 54,600 metric tons-an
increase of about 6 percent over the amount shipped
in 1983, but significantly less than the totals for 1981
and 1982 (table 1).' The increased 1984 level of arms
and military-associated equipment was delivered on
46 Soviet-flag voyages, six less than observed in 1983.
Deliveries (as measured in tonnage) tapered off
throughout the year, from about 19,000 tons in the
first quarter, to about 8,000 tons in the last-an
unusual annual pattern. This pattern, taken together
with an exceptionally low level of deliveries for the
first six months of 1985 (see page 3), suggests the near
completion of the current delivery cycle (figure 2).
Given strong Cuban concern about the intentions of
the new US administration in 1981, it is likely that
Havana urged Moscow to accelerate the shipment of
military equipment otherwise scheduled for more even
Major Arms Deliveries
In 1984, Soviet shipments of combat arms and ammu-
nition to Cuba (most of which historically have come
from the Black Sea port of Nikolayev South) amount-
ed to 41,870 tons, which represents an increase of 11
percent over the amount delivered in 1983 (table 1).^
I All tonnages expressed in this paper are metric (I metric ton
equals 2,205 pounds). E::::==
z The appendix contains a discussion of specific aspects of the
methodology used in identifying and determining the magnitude of
' The terms "arms," "weapons," or "military deliveries" as used in
this assessment include weapon systems, ammunition, and naval
vessels; the term "military-associated goods" includes items such as
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Table 1
Soviet Deliveries of Military Goods to Cuba,
1962-84, Selected Years
Identified Military Deliveries a
Military-Associated Deliveries b
Naval Deliveries C
Total
Ship Voyages
Tonnage
Ship Voyages
Tonnage
Ship Voyages
Tonnage
1981
24
45,500
21
18,200
63,700
1982
15
24,540
47
35,470
6
3,730
63,735
1983
20
37,690
32
12,970
2
710
51,370
1984
23
41,870
23
8,510
6
4,220
54,600
Figures through 1981 include all military deliveries originating in
Nikolayev South since it began operations in the mid-1960s, plus
confirmed arms tonnages originating in other Soviet ports, includ-
ing naval craft carried on the decks of merchant ships. Beginning in
1982, the tonnage of all naval craft and vessels delivered is listed
separately.
b Military-associated goods such as trucks, field kitchens, bulldoz-
ers, and so forth that were shipped to Cuba from ports other than
Nikolayev South.
Incorporated in 1982 estimates as a separate category; includes
for the first time ships delivered under tow or their own power as
well as small naval craft such as patrol boats carried by merchant
ships, which were included in prior years' tonnages.
The tonnage of naval vessels delivered rose to 4,220
tons from 710 in 1983. The total tonnage of weapons,
ammunition, and naval vessels delivered in 1984-
some 46,100 tons-exceeds the 45,500 tons delivered
in 1981 and is higher than any year since 1962, when
250,000 tons were delivered during the Cuban missile
crisis.
The number of delivery voyages carrying arms and
ammunition increased from 20 in 1983 to 23 in 1984,
all of which departed from Nikolayev; all unloaded at
the Cuban arms receiving port of Mariel. Eighteen
transited directly to Cuba while five made intermedi-
ate port calls where we estimate a portion of the
military cargo was unloaded.
In contrast to 1983 when ground forces appeared to
benefit most from Soviet military deliveries, naval and
air defense forces appear to have been the primary
beneficiaries in 1984 (table 2). Among the major
items of naval equipment observed in 1984 deliveries
were a Koni-class frigate, a Foxtrot-class submarine,
nine Zhuk-class patrol craft, and two Yevgenya-class
minesweepers. Air force and air defense equipment
noted include four MIG-21 and three MIG-23 fight-
ers, as well as over 300 SA-2 and SA-3 missiles.'
Major ground forces equipment observed included 76
medium tanks, 31 armored personnel carriers, and 76
artillery pieces.
5 In addition to these weapons, Cubana Airlines, which frequently
carries military cargoes and personnel, received its first IL-76
heavy transport aircraft in 1984; this aircraft is not included in the
tonnage totals.of this study. A second I L-76 was delivered in early
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Figure 2
Soviet Military Deliveries, by Month, 1981-84
~I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I
Jan
1981
Jan
82
Military-Associated Equipment
While combat arms shipments continued to increase,
deliveries of military-associated goods such as spare
parts, trucks, and other support equipment continued
to decrease. In 1984 an estimated 8,510 tons-one-
third less than in 1983-were delivered on 23 voy-
ages. This contrasts with the peak year of 1982, when
35,470 tons were delivered on 47 voyages. Of the 23
ships carrying materiel in this category in 1984, all
but four departed from Leningrad, and all but two
unloaded in Havana.
Jan
83
Jan
84
vessels to Cuba have declined by 70 percent in terms
of tonnage over the comparable period in 1984. Less
than 10,500 tons of arms have been delivered on nine
ship voyages in the first half of 1985. An estimate is
not yet available for military-associated deliveries.
Significant military equipment received by Cuba to
date includes a Sonya-class minesweeper and two
Stenka-class patrol boats. Other equipment delivered
in 1985 includes air defense radars and several
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T-54/55 tanks.
Delivery Trends in 1985
A preliminary assessment of the shipping data for the
first six months of 1985 indicates that Soviet ship-
ments of major weapons, ammunition, and naval
Shipments From Non-Soviet Sources
As in 1983, a substantial volume of significant mili-
tary and nonmilitary goods were provided by East 25X1
European suppliers. These shipments are not included 25X1
in the tonnage tabulations presented here. Shipments
from Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Roma-
nia, and Bulgaria in 1984 amounted to at least 5,000
Dec
84
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Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapon Systems and Equipment, 1976-84 a
Tank, T-54/55, medium
30
73
31
134
Tank, T-62, medium, 115 mm
50
10
107
45
212
APC, BTR-60, 60P, 660PB
45
26
31
102
Infantry fighting vehicle, BMP
24
6
9
39
Antitank gun, 57-mm,
M-1943, ZIS-2
71
82
153
Air defense artillery, self-
propelled, 23-mm ZSU-23/4
15
7
22
Air defense artillery, 23-mm,
ZU-23
17
17
Air defense artillery, 57-mm,
S-60
36
36
Rocket launcher, 122-mm,
BM-21
40
12
52
Howitzer, self-propelled,
122-mm, M-1974
Howitzer, self-propelled,
152-mm, M-1973
Fighter, MIG-21, Fishbed/
Mongol
3
13
14
2
21
26
35
6
4
124
Fighter, MIG-23, Flogger
12
4
20
3
3
42
Transport, AN-26, Curl
5
15
4
2
4 d
26
Helicopter, MI-8, Hip
22
3
25
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Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba: 25X1
Selected Weapon Systems and Equipment, 1976-84 a (continued)
Missile launcher, SAM, 9 3 6
SA-3, Goa
Missile, SAM, SA-2,
Guideline
Hydrofoil patrol craft,
Turya class
Inshore minesweeper,
Yevgenya class
Landing ship, medium
Polnocny class
a Included are estimates of the most significant items by quantity.
Numbers are minimum counts and include only items confirmed on
imagery. Totals for some equipment, such as T-62 tanks and BM-
21 multiple rocket launchers, include deliveries both to Cuban
forces and, possibly, to the Soviet brigade there.
c Of 76 medium tanks delivered in 1984, only 24 were identifiable
as to type (T-54/55s). As an approximation, the 1983 distribution
between T-54/55s and T-62s was applied to 1984; hence, of the 76,
31 are assumed to be T-54/55 types, and the remainder assumed to
be the more modern T-62. Of the 76 single-tube field artillery, 46
were identifiable as 122-mm, D-30 howitzers; the remainder were
assumed to be M-46s, which featured prominently in 1983
deliveries.
d Two AN-26 aircraft were delivered in 1984, but were probably
assigned to Cubana Airlines.
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Soviet-Origin Ports
The special port facility south of Nikolayev on the
Black Sea is the shipping point for almost all weap-
ons, weapons support systems, and munitions trans-
ferred from the Soviet Union to the Third World.
This port, dating from the late 1960s, has been
expanded twice over the last 10 years and handles
only military equipment. Since 1980 the Soviets have
shipped an average yearly total of over 400,000
metric tons of military equipment from Nikolayev
South. In the same period, Cuba has received on the
average about 9 percent of that total.
All of the 23 ships carrying arms to Cuba in 1984
departed from Nikolayev South.
Military-associated equipment, by contrast, is usual-
ly delivered in small quantities aboard vessels carry-
ing commercial cargoes. Historically, the port of
Leningrad-the largest in the Soviet Union-handled
most such cargoes bound for Cuba. In 1984, 19 of the
23 shipments of military-associated goods originated
at Leningrad; the four exceptions originated from
Ilichevsk on the Black Sea.
Cuban Receiving Ports
Mariel is the primary Cuban arms receiving port. It is
also the major transshipment port for weapons being
sent overseas from Cuba. Mariel's location about 40
kilometers west of Havana affords a degree of securi-
ty during loading and unloading operations. The
cargo-handling capacity of the port of Mariel has
been expanded greatly since 1983, and construction of
two large warehouses is under way. When complete,
the warehouses will permit easier concealment of
arms being received or shipped from Cuba. All of the
23 Soviet arms shipments originating in Nikolayev
South in 1984 went to Mariel.
Ships bringing military-associated cargoes to Cuba
typically unload at Havana because of the commer-
cial consignments also on board. Of the 23 voyages
carrying such cargoes to Cuba in 1984, 21 went to
Havana. The other two delivered their cargoes at
Mariel and Santiago de Cuba, Cuba's major port on
the eastern end of the island.
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 than in 1983. We believe that shipments may have
included several antiquated T-34 tanks. As with
Ethiopia, practically all weapons and military equip-
ment delivered to Angola come from the Soviet Union
or Eastern Europe on national-flag vessels. We re-
main unable to quantify what proportion of Soviet
military shipments to Cuba have been transferred to
other countries. We believe the amount to be small,
however, and assess that most of the weapons, ammu-
nition, and equipment transferred is old and is being
replaced by new material from the Soviet Union.
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tons-about the same as in 1983. Goods shipped
consisted primarily of military-associated equipment,
such as trucks and other vehicles, spare parts, elec-
tronics and telecommunications gear, medical materi-
al, and clothing. Some military goods were delivered,
however, including explosives, fuses, and detonators.
In addition, a large amount of sporting ammunition
was delivered, some of which was probably used by
the military for target practice and other training
activities.
Transshipment of Arms to Other Nations
Cuba has served in the past as a conduit for arms and
military equipment to other Soviet client states in the
Third World. Prior to the downfall of the Bishop
regime in 1983, Grenada constituted a prominent
example of this activity. Cuba continues to fulfill this
role with respect to Nicaragua and Angola, albeit to a
lesser extent. During 1984,
Cuba was shipping weapons,
ammunition, and military equipment to Nicaragua on
the frequent (four to five per month) ship voyages
between Cuba and Nicaragua as well as on the
civilian and military air flights (up to 30 per month).
However, the major deliveries of military equipment
to Nicaragua during 1984 continued to arrive on
Bulgarian and Soviet ships.
Cuba was less active in 1984 in delivering Soviet-
origin weapons and military equipment to Angola
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban Military
Capabilities
Overview
The operational inventory of the Cuban armed forces
has exhibited both growth and evolution toward a
more sophisticated combat force since 1975. More-
over, significant additional capabilities have been
acquired with the delivery by the Soviet Union of
equipment new to the Cuban armed forces. According
to our estimates, the Cubans also have contributed to
this upgrading of their capabilities by increasing the
number of active-duty military personnel to about
160,000 (in 1977 the number was about 125,000) and
greatly bolstering their reserve forces. In addition,
there have been substantial improvements in training
and an extensive military base construction program
for all the services.
Patterns and Priorities
Quantities of major weapon systems and equipment
delivered to Cuba beginning in 1976-the year after
Cuba's intervention in Angola-have been substan-
tial. Weapons and equipment received were used to
modernize and enhance the combat capability of all
branches of the Cuban armed forces. The emphasis of
deliveries to the various branches, however, have
varied greatly over time (table 2).
At the outset of the 1975-85 period, priority appears
to have been placed on delivery of ground forces
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equipment, particularly the more modern T-62 medi-
um tank and specialized artillery. Deliveries of ground
forces equipment then slackened and were negligible
until 1980. Significant deliveries of all types of air-
craft began in 1977 and began to taper off only in
1984. Similarly, from 1979 to 1981, strong emphasis
was placed on the Cuban Navy; during that period
two modern diesel submarines; a Koni frigate; and
some 24 missile attack boats, patrol craft, and mine-
sweepers were provided. The year 1981 was unique in
that deliveries appeared to show an equal emphasis on
all Cuban forces across the board. In 1982, air
defense forces, both fighter and surface-to-air missile,
were given priority, while ground and naval forces
deliveries were in a lull.
Most of the modern weapons and major equipment
now in Cuban operational inventories have been deliv-
ered since 1980.6 These have enhanced the combat
capabilities of each of the three major branches of the
Cuban armed forces-air, navy, and ground.
Air and Air Defense Forces
During 1984 the expansion in surface-to-air missile
forces that began in 1981 continued, with the delivery
by the Soviet Union of over 100 SA-2 and 200 SA-3
missiles, and 17 SAM-associated radars. Deliveries of
aircraft to the Cuban Air Force tapered off, with the
acquisition of only four MIG-21s and three MIG-23s.
Improvements since 1980 in Cuban air defenses have
been especially striking (table 3). The number of SA-3
launchers increased from an estimated 24 in 1980 to
39 by 1984. In addition, since 1980 one entirely new
major tactical air defense system normally associated
with the ground forces-the SA-9-was acquired.
Several new SA-2 and SA-3 sites have been con-
structed-with some SA-3s permanently deployed for
the first time in central Cuba-and SAM coverage
has been extended into eastern Cuba with the estab-
lishment there of two SA-2 sites. Several existing
SA-2 sites throughout Cuba have also been converted
to dual-use SA-2/SA-3 sites.
The Cuban inventory of modern jet fighters/trainers
has increased greatly, and we estimate that about 55
percent of the 230 currently operational modern jet
fighters and trainers have been delivered since 1980.
Of the newly delivered aircraft, many possess all-
weather engagement capabilities. Cuba now has 45
MIG-23s; more than half of these are advanced
interceptor models. The remainder are ground attack
and trainer aircraft.
The transport and helicopter arms of the Cuban Air
Force have also profited from Soviet assistance over
the past four years. Since 1980 Cuba has acquired six
to eight AN-24/26 transport aircraft. Older MI-8
medium-lift transport helicopters have continued to
be supplemented or replaced by the newer MI-17
version, and the MI-24 heavy attack helicopter has
been introduced. Because of these deliveries, the
Cuban armed forces now have a contingent of 68
modern helicopters-many designed or armed for a
ground attack role.
As a consequence of all improvements since 1980, the
Cuban air defense system is now substantially more
effective, flexible, and durable. Additional radars and
SAMs have provided better coverage of the island,
and the additional types of SAMs that have been
deployed would make air attacks on the island far
more difficult. The new aircraft possess improved
performance characteristics, and new or expanded
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Table 3
Inventory a of Selected Cuban Air
and Air Defense Force Weapons
and Equipment, 1975, 1980, and 1985
Modern jet fighters/trainers b
MIG-23
0
12
45
MIG-21 c
(95)
138
160
L-39 trainers
0
0
30
Other aircraft b
MI-24 attack helicopters
0
0
12
MI-8/17 helicopters
(3)
30
56
AN-24/26 transports
(2)
24
30
Surface-to-air missile launchers
SA-2 d
102
120
132
SA-3 d
6
24
42
SA-6
0
20
20
a Operational inventory only.
b Through 1980 there were also decreasing numbers of older
aircraft.
primary occupied/operational sites (excludes dispersal sites). Based
upon a recent reassessment.
Note: () denotes substantially greater uncertainty.
airbases with hardened aircraft shelters contribute to
wartime force survivability. Finally, the new com-
mand and control systems improve the overall respon-
siveness of the air defense force.
Cuban offensive air capabilities are also much im-
proved-especially with the squadron of MIG-23
ground attack variants, which can carry six times the
bomb load of the MIG-21. Military transport capabil-
ities also have been enhanced by the delivery of
several aircraft, including the IL-76 heavy-lift trans-
port-assigned to Cubana Airlines. These aircraft,
which are capable of lifting 40 tons from medium-
length runways, can assist in supporting Cuban or
other forces throughout the Caribbean area and much
of Latin America.
Naval Forces
During 1984, one Koni-class missile frigate, one
Foxtrot-class submarine, and nine Zhuk patrol boats
were delivered to Cuba. The Zhuk patrol boats are
assigned to the Cuban Ministry of Interior's Border
Guard rather than the Navy.
Since 1980, Soviet military deliveries have resulted in
a broad modernization of the Cuban Navy and have
given it significant new capabilities (table 4). Deliver-
ies during the last four years account for about one-
third of the Cuban Navy's current inventory of com-
batants. Included are one of three submarines and two
frigates, which have given the Cuban Navy a limited
blue-water capability. Together with four new MI-14
Haze helicopters, these provide an antisubmarine
warfare capability vastly improved over that of the
low-endurance subchasers Cuba possessed during the
early 1970s.
Most naval combatants acquired since 1980 have
been missile boats or minesweepers. The patrol boat
force, which has converted almost entirely from
Komar-class to Osa-class missile boats since 1980,
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Table 4
Inventory a of Selected Cuban Navy
Assets, 1975, 1980, and 1985
Komar
(16)
6
3
Osa-I
5
5
5
Osa-II
1
7
13
P-4/P-6/Komar
conversion
(24)
(19)
13
o
7
12
o
1
3
Polnocny landing ship
0
0
2
tanks-perhaps half of which are the relatively more
modern T-62 type. Among other armored equipment
delivered over the period are about 60 BTR-60 ar-
mored personnel carriers and 140 field artillery
pieces, including 12 BM-21 rocket launchers and a
few self-propelled howitzers. In addition, Cuba's
ground forces acquired nearly 350 antitank guns of 25X1
various calibers and several air defense artillery weap-
now has about three times the missile-carrying capac- ons.
ity of a decade ago. The minesweeping force, nonexis-
tent in 1975, has nearly doubled in size since 1980
and provides a new capability to keep Cuban harbors
and coastal waters clear of mines.
The acquisition of two Polnocny-class landing ships in
1982 enhances the Cuban armed forces' amphibious
capability, enabling it to deliver small, fully armed,
combat units anywhere in the Caribbean.
Ground Forces
Deliveries during 1984 to Cuba's ground forces were
substantial, although down from the previous year.
Shipments included 76 medium tanks, 31 BTR-60
armored personnel carriers, and 76 field artillery
pieces. Other equipment included 17 chemical war-
fare decontamination vehicles.
Major ground forces military deliveries from the
Soviet Union since 1980 have included about 270
The formation in 1980 of the Cuban Territorial
Militia, and its expansion to a current nominal
strength of about 1.2 million, has been a key feature 25X1
of strengthening Cuba's ground forces. The militia-
essentially a lightly armed home guard-operates no
heavy weapons or equipment. Thus its rapid growth
has not been noticeably reflected in observed Soviet
military deliveries.
Ground force developments since 1980 have empha-
sized improvements in mobility and firepower and
have displayed an intention to present an attacker
with potentially costly defense in depth. More of the
active-duty divisional units are more mechanized than
they previously were, and therefore more suited for a
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Table 5
Inventory a of Selected Cuban
Ground Forces Weapons and Equipment,
1975, 1980, and 1985
T-62
0
50
(200)
T-54/55
(300)
630
780
Other armored vehicles
BTR-60 armored personnel
carrier
(80)
340
410
M-1974 SP 122-mm howitzer
0
6
18
B-21 122-mm multiple rocket
launcher
(0)
40
72
ZSU-23/4 SP air defense
artillery
0
28
40
fluid battlefield. Increases in firepower have been
achieved by means of a large number of antitank
weapons, larger caliber tanks, and mobile air defense
equipment (table 5). While these measures do not
approach the requirements of the type of high-intensi-
ty warfare that could be expected in Europe, they
represent a substantial improvement over Cuba's
ground combat capabilities of just five years ago.
Cost and Benefits to the Soviet Union
of Military Aid to Cuba
General
We estimate that the value of all weapons and
military-associated goods provided to Cuba by the
Soviet Union in 1984 is on the order of $660 million
(figure 9).' This places Cuba in fourth rank (behind
Iraq, Syria, and Libya) in dollar value of military
assistance delivered by the Soviet Union to Third
World client states in 1984. This military assistance is
in addition to an estimated $4.6 billion of general
economic assistance-trade and development aid and
price subsidies-also provided by the Soviet Union to
Cuba in 1984. While the value of Soviet military aid
provided Cuba in 1984 is substantially greater than in
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Figure 9
Soviet Military and Economic Aid,
1975-84
0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
1975, the value of general economic assistance has
increased relatively more over that same time period.
Soviet Military Training and Assistance
The Soviets maintain a presence in Cuba of nearly
20,000 personnel. More than half of these are civilian
advisers on political or economic matters. Some 7,000
to 8,000 of the 20,000 are military personnel, associ-
ated either with the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba,
signals intelligence or communications functions, or
the military advisory group. The latter group-
numbering 2,500 to 2,800 personnel-is thought to be
involved in the planning and assimilation of advanced
Soviet arms and equipment into the Cuban armed
forces. The size of the group has been relatively
constant over the past few years.
The Benefit to the Soviet Union
The USSR does not charge Cuba for the military aid
it supplies. From Moscow's standpoint, the cost of
supplying that aid is probably more than offset by a
variety of military and political benefits. These in-
clude Cuban assistance in penetrating the Western
Hemisphere and influencing the Third World, the use
of Cuba as a surrogate force, and the utilization of
Cuban territory as a base for signal and other intelli-
gence collection against the United States. Perhaps
the greatest benefit, however, is the leverage Cuban
military modernization may exert on US military
planning. By forcing US contingency planners to
allocate resources for maintaining the security of the
Caribbean Basin, the Soviet Union evidently hopes to
dilute US military power in other geographic areas of
greater importance to Moscow-primarily the Eur-
Economic
aid
asian continent.
Military
aid
early 1980s
We expect Cuba to continue to modernize its armed
forces over the next few years. We project improve-
ments in all three branches of the Cuban armed
forces, albeit probably not at the pace exhibited in the
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Trends in Military Modernization
The trend toward expanding surface-to-air missile
defenses in the central and eastern parts of the island
will require additional SA-2 and SA-3 systems. Cuba
will also probably receive additional SA-6 mobile 25X1
SAMs. Improvements in command and control will be
accompanied by deliveries of more radar and commu-
nications equipment.
nother-a eit less 1 e y-weapon
delivery is the long-range, high-altitude SA-5. This
system has been delivered to only one other Soviet
client state-Syria. Its deployment to Cubs
coverage to southern Florida and the Keys.
The number of fighters and trainers in the Cuban
inventory is expected to remain relatively stable over
the next few years as the Cubans assimilate the
aircraft received since 1980. However, replacement of
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older MIG-21s with either all-weather versions, or
with MIG-23 interceptors, will probably continue at
the current relatively slow pace. Expansion of airfield
and hardened shelter capacity would probably be
required in any case before any significant further
growth in the fighter force occurs. A possible acquisi-
tion over the next few years might be the MIG-25
high-altitude interceptor or reconnaissance aircraft.
ground attack aircraft-currently flown by Cuban
pilots in Angola-might be introduced on the island.
Introduction of this older aircraft would provide little
Depending on the Cuban assessment of the mine
threat to their coasts and harbors, additional mine-
sweepers may also be acquired.
We expect the Cuban ground forces to upgrade their
firepower and mobility at a slow but steady pace, by
continuing to integrate additional increments of types
of weapons-including tanks, APCs, and self-
propelled howitzers and air defense weapons-intro-
duced over the past several years. This judgment is
based on the extensive construction at ground forces
units over the past several years, and on evidently
incomplete unit complements of new equipment.
additional capabilities, however.
Cuba will probably receive more short-range AN-26
or similar transport aircraft as well as MI-8/17
transport and MI-24 attack helicopters
only two IL-76 transports are
expected for Cubana Airlines, a change in Cuban
heavy-lift requirements-especially for logistic
support of Nicaragua-could result in the delivery of
one or more additional IL-76s.
We assess that the Cuban Navy will continue to
expand over the next several years. This judgment is
based on the significantly increased capacities reflect-
ed in ship berthing and servicing facilities and bar-
racks now in advanced stages of construction at
various naval bases, as well as on observations of
recent Cuban and joint Soviet-Cuban ASW exercise
activity.
A significant expansion in Cuban submarine and
ASW forces appears probable. Although the Cubans
now possess only three Foxtrot submarines, there is
adequate berthing capacity at the new submarine base
near Cienfuegos to accommodate at least three or four
more. Given the Cuban emphasis of the past few years
on developing an ASW capability, a third Koni-class
frigate may be acquired, as may additional MI-14
Haze ASW helicopters and new-model Turya-class
hydrofoil patrol boats with sonar systems.
The Cubans could well continue to upgrade their
coastal defense force by acquiring several more
Osa-II-class-and possibly a few of the higher endur-
ance Nanuchka-class-guided-missile patrol boats.
If additional active-duty divisions are created from
existing reserve divisions, more T-62 tanks and ar-
mored personnel carriers may be delivered. In any
case, continued emphasis is expected on acquisition of
mobile point air defense weapons, such as the SA-9
SAM and ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft artillery units.
Cuban forces in Angola probably are operating two
additional low-altitude systems-the SA-8 and
Unless the role of Cuba's Territorial Militia evolves
greatly from its current "home guard" function to
that of a more heavily equipped (and expensive)
reserve force, the magnitude of military deliveries for
it is expected to be insignificant.
Factors Affecting New Weapons Deliveries
There are several factors that may affect the type and
magnitude of military deliveries over the next few
years. These include the military situation in Nicara-
gua, and economic and political constraints faced by
both Cuba and the Soviet Union.
If the military situation faced by the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua or the dos Santos regime in
Angola deteriorates further, additional Soviet mili-
tary assistance to both countries could be expected.
Depending upon the character of the combat, that aid
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could include additional helicopters, air defense weap-
ons, and armored vehicles. Low-performance combat
aircraft might also be introduced. As in the past, some
of this aid may be channeled through Cuba.
According to various press reports, Cuban economic
planners were put on notice by the Soviet Union
during the course of the 1984 cycle of Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) meetings that
increased levels of economic aid would not be forth-
coming, and that Cuba must make greater efforts to
make efficient use of that aid, which the USSR is
providing. Subsequently, there have been reports of
limited austerity measures for the Cuban armed
forces. In the absence of other factors (for example, a
deteriorating situation in Angola or Nicaragua or new
tensions with the United States), it seems likely that
continued austerity for the armed forces would ad-
versely affect the capacity to assimilate additional
equipment. At an extreme, this may slow delivery of
additional arms and constrain the delivery to Cuba of
new types of weapons. Given the sharp reduction
exhibited to date in 1985 arms deliveries, this process
may already be under way.
Deliveries of new types of weapons to Cuba are also
dependent on Soviet assessments of the acceptability
to the United States of such weapons in Cuban hands
and the readiness of the United States to respond to
provocative armaments. With the introduction into
Cuba over the past several years of additional SAMs
and more capable ground attack aircraft, submarines,
and frigates, Moscow appears committed to strength-
ening Cuba's capability to defend against an air
attack or possible naval blockade. It presumably
understands that the delivery or permanent deploy-
ment to Cuba of clearly offensive weapons would
cause a serious crisis. The Soviets would also probably
be willing to expand Cuba's regional intervention
capability (such as through additional IL-76 aircraft),
but would move cautiously so as to gauge US reac-
tions.
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