INF: THE PROSPECTS FOR WEST EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT AND THE USSR'S REACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
SECRET
r 1'!
n
?.
A
i ~i Jt4 :.W
1
eau
{y
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS (II) OF
SNIE 11/20-3-82
INF: THE PROSPECTS FOR
WEST EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT
AND THE USSR'S REACTIONS
25X1
Information available as as 25X1
used in the preparation o this Estimate.
J
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
 Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
25X1
FOREWORD
In August 1983 the Intelligence Community issued a Memorandum
to Holders of SNIE 11/20-3-82, INF: The Prospects for West European
Deployment and the USSR's Reactions. The Memorandum was
prompted by growing concern within the Community over possible
Soviet responses to NATO INF deployment. The judgments of that
Memorandum remain valid, but, with deployment now imminent, we
believe that the accelerating pace of events requires an updated
consideration of likely Soviet strategy in the period remaining before
deployment, and a closer look at probable Soviet reaction in the months
thereafter.
I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
 Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
SECRET
Memorandum to Holders (II) of SNIE 11/20-3-82
1. Deployment of new NATO intermediate-
range missiles in Western Europe now appears all
but certain to begin on schedule. We do not believe
the Soviets will succeed in undermining Allied
resolve on initial deployments. The West German
Bundestag almost certainly will support Chancellor
Kohl at the conclusion of its debate on 21 and
22 November.
- It will signify that Soviet blandishments, threats,
and support of Western anti-INF groups have
failed to block the beginning of the NATO
2. For the Soviet Union, the start of intermediate-
range nuclear force (INF) deployments will be a major
political and military setback:
program.
25X1 1
25X1
25X1
- It will help thwart the longstanding Soviet effort
to decouple US and West European defenses
and will introduce a significant new military
threat to Soviet territory.
- It has exposed some political differences be-
tween the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.
They seem to have successfully urged some
softening of Soviet political rhetoric in joint
statements, primarily for the sake of continued
economic relations with the West.
3. Although the initiation of US INF deployments
will demonstrate that NATO remains capable of car-
rying out agreed defense measures, it will not be the
end of the game for Moscow. This Soviet defeat will be
mitigated to some extent by internal divisions in West
European countries-particularly West Germany-
and by differences between the United States and its
allies that have accompanied the long struggle to get
deployment under way. Although the UK and West
German elections this year have resulted in gains for
the pro-INF parties, Moscow will work at exacerbating
tensions within NATO and hope that this will result in
more conciliatory policies toward the USSR by at least
some countries.
Soviet Strategy Between Now and December
4. The Soviets apparently have not yet completed
their predeployment maneuvering. General Secretary
Andropov's 27 October offer had little effect in Eu-
rope, primarily because the proposals presented only
modest change in the Soviet position on missiles, and
because the Soviets earlier had hinted at more sweep-
ing SS-20 reductions. The Soviets probably knew that
the offer would not have a substantial impact, but
made it to give themselves some basis for continuing
their propaganda claim of Soviet "flexibility."
6. We believe that the immediate predeployment
purpose of these overtures-or of any further last-
minute offer-is to increase pressure for postponement
of initial deployments or slippage of the schedule in
1984. Although Moscow's recent proposals still reject
any US deployments, intelligence reporting indicates
that the Soviet Union has become resigned to at least
initial US deployments. Moscow also knows that West-
ern deployments are scheduled to proceed for several
years:
[It-is hlikely, moreover, t at
Moscow believes political opposition will continue in
Western Europe, giving the Soviets additional opportu-
nity to strive to limit INF deployments. The Soviet
tactic, therefore, is to make the political cost of
3
SECRET
CIA-R D P86T00302 R000701060018-2
 Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
SECRET
deployment for the United States and NATO as high
as possible and to strengthen the case for Soviet
countermeasures in the face of alleged US intransi-
gence. "equal reductions" scheme,
however, may foreshadow an eventual face-saving
formula that would allow the Soviets to rationalize
some US deployments and defer the issue of third-
country systems.
Development and deployment of a modified SS-
20 or a new IRBM. Such systems, if significantly
different, would be easier to represent as coun-
termeasures against the US P-11s and GLCMs
and in that way would enhance anticipated
efforts by the Soviets to protect their current SS-
20 force by focusing any subsequent negotiations
on "new" systems.
Countermeasures
7. In the face of imminent deployment, the Soviets
continue to threaten military countermeasures against
Europe and the United States without clearly defining
what the entire set of measures might be. The tone,
however, has become less bombastic as deployment
grows nearer:
- In Izvestiya on 23 September, Chief of the
General Staff Marshal Ogark.ov made clear that
the USSR would respond to US INF deploy-
ments but stated that it would not "blindly
imitate" US programs; rather, it would follow its
"own path" in strengthening military
capabilities.
- Soviet officials have specified that the USSR will
deploy missiles that can reach US targets in 10
minutes, but have appeared to rule out Cuba as
a base for counterdeployments.
- On 24 October the USSR's Ministry of Defense
announced that preparations were under way to
deploy "operational-tactical" missiles in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia. In this context,
we believe the Soviets were referring to SS-
12/22s and possibly SS-23s.
8. We still believe that, in Europe, the Soviets will
initiate, continue, or accelerate military programs,
some of which they will portray as countermeasures.
These probably will include:
- Replacement of FROGs and Scuds in the War-
saw Pact countries with SS-21s and SS-23s. (Ten
Soviet divisions in East Germany have already
converted to SS-21s in a program that began in
1980. We have long expected the deployment of
SS-23s to replace Scuds, but so far none have
been fielded.)
- Resumption of construction of bases in the west-
ern USSR for additional SS-20s, as Defense
Minister Ustinov made clear on 11 November.
- Deployment of long-range GLCMs in the west-
ern USSR, most likely the SSC-X-4, which has
been under development since the early 1970s.
It will probably not become operational in the
military sense until 1985, although limited num-
bers could be fielded in 1984 for political
reasons.
- Accelerated development or deployment of de-
fensive systems against Pershing Its and GLCMs.
Andropov told a US labor leader in August that
the USSR would concentrate on "defensive
countermeasures," an hinted at
deployment over the next five years of defenses
against P-11s. These defensive measures may
consist initially of radar installations in the front-
line Warsaw Pact states (East Germany, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria) and possibly in
the USSR itself.
Eventually, defense improvements may
revolve around the SA-X-12, which the Soviets
could begin deploying as early as 1984.'
- Hardening of a variety of military targets and
possibly an increased stress on mobility.
9. The likely deployment into East Germany and
Czechoslovakia of SS-12/22s will be a clear response to
US deployments and the first time this class of missile
has been deployed outside the USSR. The stationing of
these missiles in these countries will lend credibility to
the Soviet talk of a new "palisade of missiles." With a
range of 925 kilometers, they will be in position to strike
the United Kingdom and France from East Germany
immediately upon the outbreak of conflict. As com-
pared with the SS-20, SS-12/22s do not have multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), are
not as accurate, and will be more vulnerable because of
their proximity to NATO. But the Soviets
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1.
25X1
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
SECRET
could view as a plus the capability to strike deep into
Western Europe without firing from Soviet territory.
Moreover, they could easily be withdrawn from East-
ern Europe as part of any negotiated settlement with
the United States without jeopardizing long-planned,
ongoing deployment of shorter range systems.
10. The Soviets continue to refer to counterdeploy-
ments affecting US territory, although they have made
numerous statements designed to indicate they have
ruled out using Cuba. The US action on Grenada is
likely to have increased somewhat the risk the Soviets
would see in sending nuclear-capable systems to Cuba.
Even before Grenada, the Soviets recognized the
25X1 1
25X1 I
25X1
concerned about the possibility, but we still believe it
unlikely-a 10-percent chance-that the Soviets will
deploy nuclear ballistic missiles to Cuba in response to
INF deployment.2 There is an alternative view that
the likelihood of the deployment of SS-20s to Cuba is
greater than the Estimate concludes. 3
2 For a full discussion of this Soviet option, see paragraphs 23-25
in the 9 August Memorandum to Holders.
' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army, continues to believe that the likelihood SS-20s will be
placed in Cuba is greater than 10 percent. According to this view,
the Soviet leadership, while aware of the potentially great risks
involved in deploying SS-20s to Cuba, is also cognizant of, and
might be tempted by, the significant political (and to a lesser
extent military) gains that would be achieved if the United States
were forced to back down in a second Cuban missile crisis.
Furthermore, the view holds that, given the significantly different
US-Soviet military balance today as compared with 1962, Soviet
leaders might anticipate that another Cuban missile crisis, in
conjunction with renewed Soviet declarations about a desire to
negotiate, would prompt West European leaders to pressure the
United States to withdraw the Pershing II missiles-and would split
US opinion rather than generate a strong consensus in favor of US
military action. The Army concludes, therefore, that there is still a
25-percent chance that SS-20s will be introduced into Cuba.
11. Besides land-based missiles in Cuba, there are
other Soviet options in the Caribbean area. We contin-
ue to believe that:
- There is a good chance-but still somewhat less
than even-that the Soviets will send on periodic
visits to Cuba Bear bombers configured to carry
ALCMs or submarines equipped with sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).'
- The most probable Soviet response involving US
territory will be to deploy SLCM-equipped sub-
marines off the US coast. Although this action
would be characterized as a counter to NATO
13. Moscow's fundamental objective has been to
prevent initial US deployments. Having failed, Mos-
cow will turn its attention to limiting them.
14. Moscow is unlikely to change its basic tactic of
attempting to influence European governments and
public sentiment in order to get the Europeans to put
pressure on the United States to alter its policy.
Moscow will also continue to seek to exploit the missile
issue to maximize strains within NATO in an effort to
deprive future NATO programs of support. The Soviet
Union is already preparing its postdeployment cam-
paign by instructing West European Communists that
the struggle against the new US systems must be
continued after initial deployments. Moscow will con-
tinue to focus its attention on West Germany and
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State, continues to believe that any deployment of
ALCMs or SLCMs to Cuba is as unlikely as the introduction of SS-
20s, because the Soviets would see these systems as equally
provocative, readily detectable, and dependent on launch vehicles
that are more vulnerable to US retaliatory action.
5
SECRET
a
Postdeployment Tactics
 Approved For Release 2009/03/09: CIA-RDP86T00302R000701060018-2
SECRET
could at some point suggest the possibility of improved
intra-German relations or some Soviet gestures in
exchange for West Germany's distancing itself from
the United States. We still believe it unlikely that the
Soviets will attempt to threaten the Kohl government
over West Berlin or intra-German relations, given the
longstanding importance Moscow attaches to strength-
ening its ties to West Germany and to Western
Europe.
15. Moscow's negotiating strategy, however, is not
so clear. The Soviets almost certainly will move shortly
to suspend the INF talks, but we do not know whether
Moscow has already decided how long the suspension
should be or how and in what context eventually to
resume negotiations over INF issues. Eventually,
though, Moscow is likely to seek a formal ceiling on US
deployments to limit a potentially open-ended pro-
gram. But the timing of these efforts will be affected
by several considerations. Prolonging the dispute over
INF could provide the Soviets continuing opportuni-
ties to play upon divisions within NATO. Any agree-
ment coining soon after the beginning of the US
deployments would probably be widely perceived as a
vindication of the US administration's tough tactics.
Moreover, Moscow will weigh carefully the impact of
any moves on the US presidential elections. However,
the Soviets probably will be interested in finding a
mutually acceptable framework to deal with INF
systems sooner rather than later because of their
interest in limiting P-II deployments
I
16. Although the Soviets also have the option of
walking out of the strategic arms reduction talks
(START), we believe they would rather keep this
channel in being to negotiate limits on intercontinental
systems. But they may want a longer than usual winter
recess. They would justify this by pointing out that
they must revise their START position, which has
always been contingent on no US INF deployments.
Eventually, they may move to fold INF issues into
START.
17. A final consideration is Andropov's health. A
prolonged Andropov incapacitation-or even his
death-would not affect the Soviet approach to arms
control in a fundamental way. It could, however,
make it harder for the Politburo to make tough
decisions concerning an agreement with the United
States.
25X1
25X1
6
SECRET