YUGOSLAVIA: INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86S00588R000300320006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Yugoslavia: Internal
Security Capabilities
Secret
EUR 85-10174L
October 1985
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Intelligence 25X1
Yugoslavia: Internal
Security Capabilities
This paper was prepared by Office of
European Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.n
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, East European Division, EURA,
Secret
EUR 85-10174L
October 1985
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 Yugoslavia: Internal
Security Capabilities 25X1
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Secret
Key Judgments Since Tito's death in 1980, concern about the effectiveness of Yugoslavia's
Information available highly decentralized internal security forces has grown as the country faces
as of 1 September 1985 a prolonged period of economic austerity, public disgruntlement with
was used in this report.
leadership performance, and continuing regional and ethnic tensions. We
believe that federal control is now adequate to manage any localized
disturbances that might result. But we foresee serious command and
coordination problems-including those involved in monitoring potential
Soviet destabilization efforts-should economic problems lead to nation-
wide protests or should a major ethnic or interregional conflict develop.
The trend toward decentralization of the civilian security apparatus in
Yugoslavia stands in sharp contrast to the strong central control apparent
in other Communist countries. Abuse of power by the secret police almost
two decades ago gave impetus to demands for greater regional control over
security, and today most Yugoslav leaders staunchly defend the resulting
decentralization. Like most parts of the country's political structure, power
was deliberately dispersed among the country's six republics and two
autonomous provinces so that no region would be dominated by another.
The state security network today is an array of regional and provincial
organizations only loosely controlled by the federal government. =
The leadership recognizes weaknesses in the security apparatus and is
making efforts to improve coordination among the various federal and
regional security components. Legislation was passed last year returning
some power now held by local officials to federal authorities. But such
measures only begin to address weaknesses that would have serious
consequences if the fabric of post-Tito Yugoslavia began to unravel:
? Because they are highly decentralized, the security services routinely
squander much of their time responding to the political needs of
Yugoslavia's powerful regional leaders. They have been known to try to
protect these leaders by covering up local security problems, as happened
with the outbreak of Albanian nationalist disorders in Kosovo in 1981.
? Effective federal action against security threats requires consensus
among the regions, but longstanding distrust of Belgrade's intentions and
rivalries among the regions makes this difficult.
iii Secret
EUR 85-10174L
October 1985
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The services invest disproportionate time and energy in monitoring, and
sometimes disrupting, the activities of dissidents at home and hostile
emigre groups abroad, a use of resources that distracts from other threats
to the country's security.
? The security forces have1 Eonly a limited ability
to monitor Soviet and other Eastern Bloc intelligence operations in
Yugoslavia-activity that appears to have been on the rise in recent
years.
We think the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), the national institution least
affected by regional divisions, would probably be needed in a major
domestic crisis to buttress the civilian security forces.
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Key Judgments
The Impact of Decentralization
General Strengths
The War on Hostile Emigres 7
Countering Foreign Intelligence Services 8
Efforts To Improve Effectiveness 10
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Figure 1
b
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rk
Balaton
Hun
ary
Romania
\1 DACw11A A-
MONTENEGRO
? 1
\~?` Yugoslav a Serbia proper
Vojvodina
(Autonomous province)
*Tirane
7 Albania
Greece
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Yugoslavia: Internal
Security Capabilities
The Yugoslav party's ouster in July 1966 of hardline
Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic, who was also de
facto head of the national secret police, was a water-
shed event in Tito's 35-year rule. For much of the
preceding 20 years, Rankovic had been a prominent
leader of Serbian-based opposition to political and
economic reform, and he had ruthlessly used the
secret police apparatus as his personal tool to keep
political dissidence and ethnic unrest in check. His
dramatic removal at the hands of party reformers,
with Tito's nod, opened the way for the decentraliza-
tion of the security system as well as the party and
government. F_~
In marked contrast to Rankovic's highly centralized
and tightly knit machinery, the state security network
today is an array of regional and provincial organiza-
tions only loosely controlled by the federal govern-
ment. Stemming from reforms begun in 1966, the
Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (Interior Min-
istry) now supervises Yugoslavia's two nationwide
police organizations-the civilian State Security Ser-
vice (Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti-SDB) and the
People's Militia (Milicija). Both the SDB, committed
to the largely secret war against subversion, and the
Milicija, charged with traditional police functions in
preserving law and order, are formally organized on a
decentralized basis, with authority widely dispersed
among the six republics and two autonomous prov-
inces.)
Most Yugoslavs applaud the decentralization and
corresponding easing of police repression since Ranko-
vic's demise, and few would now pay the price in
personal liberties for a return to the kind of security
establishment over which he presided. Nonetheless,
since Tito's death in 1980,
top Yugoslav leaders and security professionals have
become increasingly concerned about the ability of
the country's decentralized security apparatus (see
inset) to confront a major domestic crisis. This paper
will analyze Yugoslavia's internal security system and
assess its capabilities. It also will examine how the
state security network is coping with threats from
foreign intelligence services, particularly those of the
Soviet Union.
Under normal circumstances, the security services
carry out their duties adequately, and during brief
periods of intensive effort'they sometimes turn in
impressive performances. Effectiveness, of course,
varies with the service and with the problem. Most of
the services, however, also exhibit serious weaknesses
that would undermine their ability to cope with a
major interregional conflict or nationwide distur-
bances. F7
General Strengths
On the positive side, the security forces are well
organized and supplied for physical security and
internal stability operations. For instance, larger
People's Militia units possess armored vehicles. Units
of the crack federal antiterrorist commando brigade
are completely airmobile and capable of rapid deploy-
ment to any trouble spot. Since the 1981 Kosovo riots,
Yugoslav press reports have indicated an increase in
riot-control training involving the regional Milicija,
mobilized units of the Military Auxiliary Police,
Territorial Defense, and command elements of the
regular Army. In large-scale stabilization operations,
the regular Army would also be used to back up the
police commando units.
The Yugoslavs have had some notable successes in
coordinated planning. From a security standpoint, the
1984 Winter Olympic Games held in Sarajevo were 25X1
an unqualified success.
the Yugoslavs went to work well in advance of the
games, setting up a federal task force to direct and
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Yugoslav Intelligence and Security Services
The Interior Ministry is responsible for the SDB and
the People's Militia, but the National Defense Minis-
try and Foreign Affairs Ministry also have their own
intelligence units. The Federal Council for the Pro-
tection of Constitutional Order, directly responsible
25X1 to the State Presidency, coordinates all internal
security policy (see figure 1).I
The Interior Ministry, now headed by Dobroslav
Culafic, has the most influence on security at the
federal level:
? The SDB is mandated to detect and suppress all
forms of subversion, espionage, sabotage, political
and religious opposition, and other antiregime ac-
tivity; to conduct operations against foreigners en-
gaging in espionage or other subversive activities;
and to provide protection for ranking officials of the
government and party. In addition, the SDB keeps
the leadership informed about public reactions to
government and party measures. Abroad, the pri-
mary function of the SDB is to penetrate and
monitor hostile emigre organizations and to protect
Yugoslavia's borders from hostile infiltration. The
SDB is now headed by Under Secretary Srdan
Andrejevic. Federal supervision and coordination of
republic SDB organizations has been weak. In
practice, republic leaders control the selection of
republic SDB directors and fully control the activi-
ties of lower level SDB offices within their purview.
? The People's Militia (Milicija) performs basic law
enforcement duties as well as on-the-spot riot and
terrorism control. At the federal level, it has an
airmobile "brigade" of commandos specially
trained for riot control and other critical opera-
tions. The Milicija cooperates with the SDB against
subversive and dissident threats. Like the SDB, it is
completely decentralized.0
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coordinate special security preparations. Over 16,000 authorities expelled or temporarily relocated foreign-
security personnel were involved in the operation, ers-mostly from the Middle East-whom they re-
including elements of the SDB, the Milicija and police garded as potential security risks.
reservists, special technicians, and local civil defense
organizations. The Yugoslav security forces contacted
and worked closely with
security agencies to monitor the actions of hostile
groups residing in those countries. In some cases, the
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Real and Potential Weaknesses
At the same time, civilian security officers are handi-
capped by weaknesses often stemming from decentral-
ization. Republican and provincial officials, who have
virtual autonomy in defining internal security prob-
lems, naturally resist any concession of their authority
to a centralized secret police. Most security personnel
serve local political bosses intent on protecting their
own interests, even to the point of occasionally sup-
pressing information of activities that could be politi-
The regional security organs, especially in Croatia
and Serbia, also devote inordinate time and energy to
monitoring hostile emigres around the world. This, in
turn, detracts not only from their ability to monitor
major economic crimes but also foreign espionage-
especially from the Soviet Union.
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At the federal level, the commitment to securing
consensus among competing regional interests often
inhibits formulation of a well-coordinated internal
security policy. The devotion to consensus is so strong
that reports submitted to the State Presidency on the
internal security situation must go to great lengths to
provide a balanced presentation of security problems.
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cally embarrassing.
cracy to overlooking smuggling operations.
They have a stake in perpetuating the status quo
through privileges and benefits (such as better pay
and housing) not available to the average citizen, a
particularly coveted advantage in a struggling econo-
my. And, despite these benefits, many of these securi-
ty officers are not immune from corruption and have
been known to take bribes for a variety of favors
ranging from expediting access to the tangled bureau-
Internal contradictions in the Yugoslav political sys-
tem make it difficult for the state security services to
determine assignments and set priorities. As the only
legal party in the country, the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia (LCY) has the power to declare any
form of opposition criminal and a threat to state
security. But, because the LCY's leaders constantly
vie with one another along factional and ethnic lines,
there is often little agreement as to what constitutes a
real threat. There is consensus only on the main
sources of security threats: "internal enemies," in-
cluding regional nationalists; hostile emigre groups;
and foreign subversives-all of whom are said to
conspire to undermine the Yugoslav revolution and
the Titoist system.
Regional authorities often use their near-complete
control over local civilian security forces to advance
their own interests. While explicitly charged with
combating economic and white-collar crime, they
often, steer the
police away from political and economic corruption in
high places and concentrate instead on weakening
local political opponents.
if a threat is found in 25X1
Serbia, one must also be' recorded for the other
regions; if the Soviet Union is mentioned, the United
States must also be cited.
Resistance to recentralization of police power and to
centrally dictated internal security policy, of course,
remains strong for good reason. A long history of
serious abuse of police power-particularly during the
Rankovic era-has created a residual mistrust of
Belgrade among the regions. Regional leaders still
recall that Rankovic used the police to advance the
special interests of his own clique-mostly Serbs and
Montenegrins-at the expense of some Yugoslav eth-
nic groups, especially Albanians, Croats, and Mus-
lims. Yugoslavs also remember that Col. Gen. Ivan
Miskovic, Tito's special security adviser, was deposed
in 1972 after he repeatedly used both the military and
civilian security services to accuse liberals and re-
formers falsely of collusion with emigre terrorists.
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In March 1981, alarmed civilian leaders in Belgrade
ordered the Army and special federal police comman-
dos into action against Albanian nationalist demon-
strators in Serbia's autonomous Province of Kosovo,
where Albanians constitute the overwhelming major-
ity. A high-ranking Yugoslav journalist, reflecting on
the Kosovo riots, said that for three days it appeared
25X1 as though the Army would have to use its heavy
weapons, tanks, and even aircraft.
Our analysis of the events before, during, and after
the riots leads us to emphasize three sobering facts
about Yugoslav internal security capabilities: the
local political authorities could not be trusted to
provide Belgrade with reliable security assessments
or to cooperate with federal policy, the local police
were unreliable or inadequate to deal with the distur-
bances, and the threat of military force was the only
reliable instrument to restore order.
25X1 The Kosovo party chief and two of his highest
security officials were subsequently removed.
Dealing With Nationalists
In our view, the security services do a creditable,
although sometimes overzealous, job in handling one
of their highest priority tasks-curbing outbreaks of
regional nationalism among the country's many an-
tagonistic ethnic groups. Yugoslavia's criminal laws
allow for arrest and prosecution of citizens for verbal
statements that could be interpreted as nationalist.
Several republics regularly report.the jailing of indi-
viduals for singing nationalist songs or making state-
ments that the authorities deem provocative. Such
police action has raised questions about Yugoslavia's
human rights practices, but it has also constrained
ethnic tensions.)
Local police were unprepared for the riots. They were
either overwhelmed by the number of rioters or
unwilling to attempt to assert control. Not only were
the crack federal Milicija commandos dispatched to
subdue the rioters, but also Belgrade had to draw
down regular police units from other republics. For
example, many older and more experienced police-
men were transferred from Belgrade to Kosovo, leav-
ing young, inexperienced officers to patrol Belgrade.
These rookies would probably not have been able to
handle similar disturbances in the capital.F_~
Although the military was not needed to confront the
rioters, they played backup for the police and often
sealed off areas while the police commandos conduct-
ed search and destroy operations. The military,
which is still in Kosovo, has more than tripled its
strength there since 1981. Many Yugoslavs point to
the continued occupation as evidence that the Army
is the only power in Yugoslavia that can guarantee
public order.)
disorders (see inset). Although the authorities are able
to rely on an extensive network of agents and collabo-
rators working against nationalists in Croatia, Vojvo-
dina, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in Kosovo only a heavy
and costly presence of security forces, including mili-
tary units, is deemed sufficient to keep the lid on. Yet
Interior Minister Culafic, speaking publicly before
the Assembly this June, said that during the past year
and a half 16 underground organizations and groups
with 362 members had been uncovered in the prov-
ince. Tensions between Kosovo's Albanian majority
and Serb and Montenegrin minorities, meanwhile, are
deepening as the fast-growing Albanian population
strengthens its hold and the minorities continue to
take flight.)
The greatest challenge the security forces currently
face on the nationalism front is in the southern
province of Kosovo, scene of the 1981 Albanian ethnic
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The War on Hostile Emigres
Tied in with the SDB's efforts to control nationalists
at home is its secret, tireless war against hostile
emigre groups-many of them violence prone-and
critics in exile around the world. The effort and
resources the SDB commits to this ongoing operation
appear to be enormous, and the tactics sometimes
extreme. The regime's concern stems in part from its
continuing desire to settle wartime accounts, its com-
pulsion to intimidate and isolate known exiled oppo-
nents, and its paranoia in the face of any opposition,
no matter how remote or weak. Generally, the SDB of
each republic conducts operations against its co-
nationals in exile. Although all regions are required to
share information and coordinate their actions
through a federal board of directors in Belgrade, they
apparently allow each region to conduct its own
operations against hostile emigres with little interfer-
ence from Belgrade.F__1
The Internal Enemy: A Lexicon
Some of the most common political threats as de-
fined by the Yugoslav security services:
? Nationalism is any manifestation of ethnic or re-
gional chauvinism, ranging from singing forbidden
songs to the commission of overt acts of violence
against the regime. The SDB assumes there are
connections between local nationalists, hostile emi-
gration groups, and meddlesome foreign powers.
? Clericonationalism is seen as a vehicle for combin-
ing antiregime and nationalistic behavior, often
with the active support of foreign interests. The
secret police target leaders and adherents of the
Roman Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox
Church, and the Muslims, as well as smaller
communities.
? Anarcholiberalism generally characterizes liberals,
reformers, and westward-leaning dissidents who
advocate a more open political system in Yugosla-
via. Officially so-labeled, ex-Yugoslav Vice Presi-
dent Milovan Djilas was expelled from the party
and imprisoned in the 1950s. Several ideological
currents run through this group, but the regime sees
them as similarly anti-Communist and strongly
influenced by "Western" intelligence services.
"Bourgeois rightist" has recently been used synony-
mously with "anarcholiberal."
? Unitarism, on the other hand, represents opposition
to the policy of decentralization and advocacy of a
more authoritarian and centralized government.
This characterization also includes nationalists,
particularly "great Serb hegemonists, " who would
seek to dominate the other Yugoslav nationalities
from a central government in Belgrade. F__]
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that initiative-backfired, turning into an internation-
al embarrassment for the regime. We believe that
henceforth the regime will look for less public ways to
put pressure on its critics, probably using the secret
police to harass them.
Belgrade newspaper, Student, gives its version olice
procedure in identifying a suspected dissident
Monitoring Regime Critics
Another large part of the SDB's effort involves moni-
toring the political attitudes of Yugoslav citizens,
notably regime critics.
Countering Foreign Intelligence Services
The Yugoslav internal security services, while boast-
ing some successes, have a long way to go in counter-
intelligence. Security officials recognize that Yugosla-
via is a major target of foreign, and especially Soviet,
intelligence, but they lack the resources and authority
within regional security structures to cope systemati-
cally with major foreign espionage or penetration
efforts. F -1
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Last year the police began to concentrate on the most
highly visible regime critics and dissidents. The crack-
down began in April 1984 when veteran regime critic
Milovan Djilas and 27 other dissidents were tempo-
rarily arrested in Belgrade, but it stalled because of
opposition from moderate elements in the party.
and the Interior Ministry in October 1984 directed a
new offensive against "westward-leaning," antiparty
dissidents in the media and the intellectual communi-
ties. But the trial of the "Belgrade Six"-a result of
the State Presidency
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Soviet Meddling: "The Cominformist Affair"
Yugoslavia's sensitivity to Soviet-backed subversion,
and its potential impact on bilateral relations, was
graphically illustrated 11 years ago following the
arrest and trial in Yugoslavia of 32 pro-Moscow
cominformists. One of the largest indictments of anti-
regime opponents in recent decades, the pro-Soviet
group allegedly held a secret congress in the city of
Bar, Montenegro, in 1974 of a "Communist Party of
Yugoslavia" bent on overthrowing the Tito govern-
ment and installing an orthodox Soviet-style regime.
the Yugoslavs believe the Soviets are using every
means available to gain influence, most frequently
targeting their counterparts in the Foreign Ministry,
the Yugoslav diplomatic corps, the Federal Executive
Council, and both Yugoslav citizens and hostile emi-
gres. the SDB
believes that the diversion of Western technology is a
top priority of Soviet and Warsaw Pact services.
The members of the group were sentenced to prison
terms of from one to 14 years.
a total of 82 cominformists, making up
four different groups, were sentenced before the end
of the decade
Belgrade's handling of the affair suggests it wanted to
put Moscow on notice while containing damage to
bilateral relations. Tito publicly acknowledged a
foreign connection, but stopped short of pointing the
finger at Moscow. Moscow, for its part, publicly
distanced itself from the group and warned that the
incident should not be exploited to damage ties.
The cominformist affair, nonetheless, brought a halt
to a warming trend in bilateral ties begun in the early
1970s.
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1980, Belgrade had been concerned about attempts by
cominformists to smuggle in propaganda from Soviet
Bloc countries, notably Bulgaria, to stir up ethnic
strife.
Yugoslavia's internal situation (see inset).
Soviet Bloc Activities. Yugoslav officials are particu-
larly concerned about Soviet efforts to influence
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The biggest Eastern Bloc spy operation since the
cominformist purges of the mid-1970s surfaced in
October 1984. A Yugoslav military court convicted
nine people, including at least five Bulgarians, for
spying on military installations. Also last October,
three Bulgarians were reportedly sentenced for espio-
nage against a Yugoslav nuclear reactor and research
facility.
Yugoslavia's open borders make it difficult to screen
the thousands of people who enter and leave the
country each week. Foreigner watch lists and similar
bulletins keep border control officials alert to the
movements of known individuals, but the volume of
tourist traffic from Eastern Bloc countries alone
makes effective surveillance nearly impossible.2F--]
the State Presidency
has begun to move more decisively by preparing for
the possibility of a serious domestic crisis.
1984 has enhanced the legal jurisdiction of the
federal-level security apparatus over its regional coun-
terparts, and federal authorities also have begun to
play a more assertive role in improving cooperation
and coordination among civilian security agencies.
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25X1 ' In 1982 nearly 711,000 Eastern Bloc tourists visited Yugoslavia
and of these almost 300,000 were Soviet citizens.
necessary to restore order.
The leadership's efforts to enhance federal control so
far have had only marginal success, and the conflict
between federal and regional security interests contin-
ues unresolved. Abuses of police power are less likely
in the future, as measures to maintain oversight and
discipline are tightened. But we believe a major
domestic crisis would probably strain local security
forces to the breaking point, making eleventh-hour
federal intervention-perhaps even martial law-
New Federal Controls
The federal government in March 1984 passed legis-
lation that returns to it some of the authority in
regional security matters that it lost over the last 18
years. Belgrade enacted the following major revisions
to its 1974 Law on State Security:
? The federal Interior Ministry, including its secret
police, was empowered to conduct inquiries and
investigations without consulting local officials.
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? The federal interior minister was given explicit
responsibility for coordinating the work and meth-
ods used by federal and local police.
? The minister was authorized to issue "binding pro-
cedural instructions" to ensure uniform enforcement
of federal laws.
The new law is intended to allow the federal security
forces to make firsthand security assessments in po-
tentially troublesome regions. Advocates of the legis-
lation, primarily former Interior Minister Dolanc,
argue that sole reliance on information from local
security organs would be disastrous, as apparently
was the case before the Kosovo riots in 1981.1
We have yet to see the new powers put to a test, and
the law, in any case, still protects regional autonomy.
It includes oversight provisions to hold the police
accountable to regional legislatures for their activi-
ties. It also provides that the collective State Presiden-
cy must agree beforehand that "special security con-
ditions" warrant federal investigations within regional
jurisdictions. Direction for such special police actions
is likely to originate in the Federal Council for the
Protection of Constitutional Order, the Presidency's
primary agent in implementing internal security
decisions.
In a genuine crisis, we think the federal SDB would
be tempted to operate directly at the council's behest
and possibly even to launch an independent crack-
down on regime opponents within certain republics or
provinces, without clearing every action with the
Presidency.
Even in these circumstances, though, a number of
factors would operate to keep the SDB within its
authority. The system at the federal level is organized
to preserve discipline: the interior minister and key
generals in military security serve at the pleasure of
the State Presidency and the Parliament, which con-
trols budgets; the Council for the Protection of Con-
stitutional Order under 'the State Presidency directs
all internal security policy; and a parliamentary over-
sight committee holds the security forces responsible
for their actions and can demand access to their files.
In the lower SDB ranks,
discipline and control are maintained through
screening for political reliability, professional train-
ing, and indoctrination. Most important, membership
in the Communist Party and loyalty to the regime are
basic requirements for selection and continued
employment.
Military Intervention
The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) is widely recog-
nized as the national institution most resistant-
though not immune-to ethnic and regional divisions
and as the ultimate defender of the Yugoslav state.
Large-scale, disturbances' would, in our view, require
federal police and YPA assistance. If the disturbances
spread throughout the country, limited federal police
assets would quickly attenuate and regular YPA units
would have to be called in to impose stability.
The YPA, however, is not experienced in internal
stability operations. Most Yugoslav soldiers are un-
trained in riot-control techniques and know little
about urban combat. They also would probably be
more susceptible to provocation and overreaction than
trained civilian police. Exercises combining federal
and regional police with military units have been
infrequent and rarely have extended beyond regional
7--1 1
The YPA has come to play an increasingly important
political role during Yugoslavia's era of decentraliza-
tion, but we doubt the military aspires to play a
predominant role in the country. Military leaders
have gained political influence in recent years, largely
because of their growing representation in the party
organization and their frequent assignment to top
security and defense posts. Prominent military lead-
ers, while displeased with some trends in their coun-
try, take pains to point out that their legitimate
political mission is to prod civilian politicians and not
to promote any alternative program of their own.
Most appear to appreciate that a complete military
takeover-invariably thrown up as a worst case sce-
nario for contemporary Yugoslavia-would end un-
rest only at a heavy political cost both at home and
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In the absence of a major national crisis, which we do
not foresee in the near future, the Yugoslav leader-
ship's remarkable capacity to broker workable, albeit
minimal, solutions-essentially "muddling-
through"-will probably continue to help the authori-
ties deal with security problems. Yugoslavs, moreover,
will continue to draw some comfort from their record
of surmounting several crises in the postwar period-
including the break with Stalin in 1948, the Rankovic
purge in the mid-1960s, the Croatian "rebellion" in
25X1 1971 and the Kosovo riots in 1981-despite the lack
of strong federal institutions.F--]
Despite that record, however, we believe the decen-
tralized security services are not well prepared for a
new crisis requiring interregional cooperation. In con-
trast with Tito's day, the decentralization process is
now far more entrenched, and the system actively
works against the emergence of a strong national
leader in Tito's mold. The Yugoslav political culture
has become more Westernized in recent years and, as
the recent Belgrade Six trial revealed, many of the
government's traditional national security arguments
25X1 have lost their force with a more critical press and
among a more astute urban population.
A new national crisis also cannot be ruled out. A
major downturn in the economy, though not now
expected, is still possible over the next few years;
political protests and sharply increased labor prob-
lems, along with growing pressure to end IMF-
mandated austerity, could rapidly draw down federal
government resources. Tensions between Serbs and
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, meanwhile, remain po-
tentially explosive. Concerted action by the security
services has kept control since 1981, and it may be
able to do so for some time to come. But the
underlying ethnic conflict appears as resistant as ever
to a peaceful solution.)
Politically influenced threat assessments will continue
to hamper preemptive and reaction capabilities. The
federal Interior Ministry, aside from the small gain
made under the 1984 Law on State Security, does not
appear likely to recover much control or leverage over
its regional counterparts. Significant expansion of
federal security assets is unlikely because of budget-
ary restrictions. The regions, extremely defensive of
their autonomy, will probably continue to deny Bel-
grade any greater access to local security assets. In
fact, regional bosses are likely to use the local secret
police to resist federal policy directives, and even to
intimidate local supporters of such directives.F_
Because contingency plans are unrehearsed, Belgrade
in a real crisis might have to solve major command
and control problems on a trial-and-error basis. Ex-
tended political inaction coupled with poorly coordi-
nated crisis control measures might even lead some
zealous security officials to take the law into their own
hands. The danger of this happening would be highest
if hostile ethnic groups found themselves on opposite
sides of the barricades.)
Based on our reading of political will among Yugoslav
leaders, prospects also appear dim for significantly
improved capability to monitor and counter Eastern
Bloc operations inside Yugoslavia. We think the
Soviets and their allies, meanwhile, are likely to
continue efforts to infiltrate the government and to
cultivate a clandestine network of agents inside Yugo-
slavia. This would leave Yugoslavia vulnerable to the
actions of Eastern Bloc provocateurs in the event of
growing domestic unrest.
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Secret
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