INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R002500040006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 19, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 19 April 1984
NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI
C/NIC
ADDI
FROM: John Horton
NIO/LA
SUBJECT: Interagency Intelligence Assessment
GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY
PROSPECTS
Attached is the Interagency Intelligence
Assessment: GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY
PROSPECTS as requested by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The Principal Drafter was
Officer for Latin America. It was coordinated
on 18 April 1984 and distributed today.
under the auspices of the National Intelligence
of DDI/ALA and was prepared
J
~Oohn Horton
Attachment:
AS STATED
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19 April 1984
GRENADA:
POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence
Officer for Latin America. The Assessment was coordinated at the working
level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the
Department of State. Also participating were the intelligence organizations
of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
Information available as of 18 April 1984 was used in the preparation of this
Assessment.
NI IIA 84-10003
COPY NO.
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19 April 1984
Interagency Intelligence Assessment
GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS
Despite much internal political disarray in Grenada in recent months, we
believe that a coalition of democratic, centrist parties--such as the one
recently formed--most likely will win the election now tentatively scheduled
for later this year. The New Jewel Movement (NJM)--which ruled Grenada under
Maurice Bishop--appears too disorganized and discredited to participate
effectively, and it probably will require several years to rejuvenate itself
as a political party.
Former Prime Minister Eric Gairy has had only limited success in
revitalizing his old party, and is likely to pose a major problem only if the
new democratic alliance fails to coalesce into a united front. A return to
power by Gairy would discredit the multinational in and undermine US
interests in Grenada and in the region as a whole.
Although most available information discusses NJM plans to participate in
the democratic process, we have received reports that the NJM leaders may be
assembling a paramilitary force for the party. However, the probability of
successfully organizing such a force appears to be low as long as US and
Caribbean forces remain in Grenada. The possibility of isolated terrorist
acts by disaffected, unemployed youths, or former members of the People's
Revolutionary Army or Militia, cannot be dismissed.
Public emotions are running high against former government and army
members being held in connection with the death of Bishop and others last
October. The potential for violent public reactions against the detainees is
substantial, particularly if the conduct and outcome of the upcoming trials
displease the population. Moreover. radical rters of the detainees might
try to disrupt the proceedings.
Prospects are poor for developing an indigenous police force by the end
of this year capable of coping effectively with this limited security
threat. The reconstitution of the police force and training of its members
are progressing slowly. A foreign police presence probably will be needed at
least until mid-1985 to maintain law and order, to provide security for the
upcoming trials and the election, and to deter potential dissident and
subversive activity.
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The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force--which numbers less than 450--has
developed into an effective security organ largely as a result of US security
assistance and training. Although leaders of the participating countries have
publicly agreed to keep their contingents in Grenada through the election
period, the financial strains caused by their involvement could lead many to
reduce or terminate their if sufficient funding is not forthcoming
soon from Washington.
Any significant reduction in the US and the Caribbean peacekeeping forces
could well have serious destabilizing political repercussions. Although
credible evidence of a serious threat to stability has yet to materialize,
many Grenadians are deeply concerned that the potential for disruptive
violence will climb sharply if the peacekeeping forces--and especially the
US military contingent--depart.
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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
GRENADA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROSPECTS
1. Although daily life has returned to normal in Grenada, the country is
still recovering from the fall of the leftist regime of Maurice Bishop and the
collapse of its political and economic systems. Reconstruction is progressing
as well as ran ho aynprtpd- ai en the limited resources and expertise
available.
2. The sense of safety and well-being provided by the US military and
the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force has created a stable environment which has
enabled the Grenadians to focus on getting the country back on its feet. The
road to self-sufficiency, however, will be slow and faltering, as
inexperienced officials try to pick up the pieces and tackle enormous
political, economic, legal, and security tasks.
3. Grenada faces several major national events in the coming months --
voter enumeration and an election probably later this year, trials of those
detained in connection with the murders of 19 October 1983, and a commission
of inquiry into the abuses of the Bishop regime as well as that of former
Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The outcomes of these events and their impact on
the security situation i icult to predict, and each undoubtedly will
influence the other.
4. The liberation of Grenada from one-party rule in October 1983 and the
prospect of the first election since 1976 have led to a proliferation of
political contenders. Since January political activity in Grenada has
increased and a variety of political hopefuls -- some old hands and some
newcomers -- are preparing for the election. The current political landscape
consists of four parties grouped around the political center with the leftist
New Jewel Movement (NJM) of the late Prime Minister Bishop on the outer
fringe. No single dynamic, forceful and appealing political leader has
emerged thus far. Politicking has remained at a low level as the contenders
organize their parties, devise campaign strategies, formulate platforms,
select candidates, and jockey for position.
5. Popular involvement and interest in the election has been slow to
develop in part because the population is still recovering from the emotional
trauma of the October 1983 events. Following the demise of the Bishop regime,
most Grenadians felt an aversion toward politics. This feeling translated
into apathy and apprehension over the prospect of elections. Moreover, people
seemed to lack confidence in their ability to choose competent and trustworthy
leaders.
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6. Although the fluidity of the current political situation has added to
their confusion, most Grenadians share a revulsion for the leftist, pro-Cuban
New Jewel Movement (NJM). Many also view Gairy, who returned to Grenada in
January, as eccentric and as a threat to political stability.
7. The New Jewel Movement: Discredited and disorganized following the
demise of the People's Revolutionary Government, Bishop's death, and the
multinational intervention, the New Jewel Movement has no significant popular
support. Former members of the leftist government and its diplomats overseas
have tried to rejuvenate the party by perpetuating the memory of the popular
Bishop and establishing the Maurice Bishop and October 19 Martyr's
Foundation. Their efforts so far, however, have been less than successful.
The leader S-17 e received promises of some Cuban material assistance.
8. The party probably still enjoys some residual support among
disaffected youths, but it does not appear to represent a serious political
force. The NJM recognizes that the current political atmosphere is not
conducive to a major effort to revive the party. Time is needed to heal the
wounds from last October and for the party (under the guise of the Maurice
Bishop Memorial Foundation) to develop sufficient support to compete
successfully in elections. According to several sources, party leaders have
indicated that it will be several years before they will be ready to
effectively participate in elections. Over the longer term, however, the
party could become a threat to internal security and stability if the
moderates cannot provide effective leadership.
9. Gairy's Party: Since his return to Grenada, Gairy has been trying to
muster support for the revitalization of his old party, the Grenada United
Labor Party. His efforts so far have been unsuccessful and he apparently is
frustrated and disappointed by the poor reception he has received. Gairy has
announced that he will not run in the election, but will work behind-the-
scenes in the campaign. Most Grenadians believe that his ultimate goal is to
return to power and that the Grenada United Labor Party is his vehicle.
10. Gairy traditionally could count on the support of some 20 to 30
percent of the population, particularly among the older generation and in
rural areas. However, he is viewed with deep-seated animosity by most of the
younger generation, which make up the majority of the population. Moreover,
former supporters have been reluctant to associate with him, and he reportedly
is having difficulty recruiting candidates.
11. Gairy's party is likely to pose a major problem only if the new,
democratic alliance fails to coalesce into a united front. Fear of an
eventual resurgence of the NJM could aid Gairy's cause by driving anti-NJM
voters into his camp. Conversely, many observers fear that if a viable
alternative to Gairy's party is lacking, voter turnout will be low,
particularly among youth, leading to a Gairy victory.
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12. Because of the deep-seated dislike of Gairy and the likelihood of
his instituting repressive measures, his victory could provoke social unrest
and possibly even political violence. Moreover, a return to power by Gairy
would discredit the multinational intervention and undermine US interests in
Grenada and in the region as a whole.
13. The Democratic Center: Three political parties make up the
democratic center. The Grenada National Party, led by 66-year-old Herbert
Blaize, has been involved in domestic politics since the 1950s. Traditionally
backed by businessmen and an older constituency, the National Party has a
narrow support base. As the head of government in the 1960s before Grenadian
independence, Blaize is an experienced politician who has a reputation for
honesty. However, he lacks charisma and his frail health could be a
detriment.
14. The National Democratic Party was formed in January by 35-year-old
George Brizan, an educator and administrator in the civil service. Brizan has
support in the civil service, the business sector, and among many youths whom
he has taught. Although Brizan is well-liked and respected, he is
inexperienced politically, and some Grenadian political observers have
described him as weak. Brizan hopes to capitalize on his popularity among the
youth in the St. Georges area, by combining with the support base of the
National Party.
15. The Grenada Democratic Movement is a former exile organization which
was based in Trinidad and the Unite States during the Bishop regime. It is
headed by Francis Alexis, a professor and lawyer. The Democratic Movement and
its young, well-educated leaders are largely unknown in Grenada and have not
made much of an impact on the political scene. The party suffers from a
credibility problem because many Grenadians resent what they perceive as the
organization's opportunistic return to the island for elections, and the fact
that its members did not suffer under the Bishop government as others did.
While Alexis's participation in a political coalition apparently is desired by
leaders of other centrist parties, some other members of the Democratic
Movement are considered too controversial.
16. Former political detainee Winston Whyte is planning to form another
political party but does not appear to have significant support beyond his
stronghold in the town of Sauters. Moreover, Whyte is suspect among some
moderate Grenadians because he was a Minister in the Gairy government and by
more conservative elements because of his tips with the New Jewel Movement
before falling out of favor in 1979.
Coalition Politics
17. After months of stalemated discussions, the three democratic parties
agreed in early April to form an alliance for the forthcoming election. The
new coalition, called the "Team for National Togetherness," reportedly will
allow each party to retain its identity and structure, but will campaign on a
platform of national unity. The alliance will be led by Herbert Blaize and
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will be open to any political contender with a demonstrated commitment to
democracy and human rights. The formation of the new body apparently was the
result of mutual accommodation and an underlying conviction held by the party
leaders that some type of alliance was needed to defeat Gairy's party in the
elections.
18. A workable alliance would allow the parties to broaden their support
bases and pool their political and organizational skills. In addition, a
well-organized and effective campaign presenting a united democratic front
would have a good chance of winning the election. However, many details still
have to be worked out and a straightforward and comprehensive educational
campaign will have to be launched in the coming months to ensure success. The
basis for the formation of the alliance and the agreements reached on power-
sharing could have significant implications for the strength of the democratic
coalition and, if it is successful, for the new government.
THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY
19. A major concern among the Grenadian population is that hard-core
elements of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and the People's
Revolutionary Militia (PRM) will resort to terrorism when the US military
forces depart. The estimated 2,000 former members of the PRA and PRM are
currently disorganized and demoralized, but could become a source of mischief
and instability if they are not soon integrated into society through gainful
employment. Some PRA arms probably remain on the island and could fall into
the hands of trained soldiers from the previous leftist regime. The
possibility of isolated terrorist acts by disaffected, unemployed youths,
cannot be dismissed.
20. The New Jewel Movement: Although most available information
discusses NJM plans to participate in the democratic process, we have received
reports which indicate that the NJM leaders are
assembling a military force for the party. The
force reportedly will consist of armed soldiers mostly drawn from the PRA
and Grenadian students who received military training in Cuba.
Cuba has agreed to provide training and equipment
for the force, which has been characterized as a security/bodyguard unit with
some guerrilla warfare capabilities. One party leader reportedly said that
the force may be necessary to counter plans that Eric Gairy may have to seek
revenge against the NJM and its supporters. The force also is intended to
serve as a combat wing of the party to be used in an eventual uprising led by
the NJM.
21. Although it is possible that the NJM leaders are considering the
formation of a paramilitary wing, other reporting on the party's strategy and
activities indicates that over the near term the party leaders do not want to
jeopardize their right to eventually participate in Grenadian politics by
engaging in such activities. Moreover, the probability of successfully
organizing such a military force appears to be low as long as US and Caribbean
forces remain. Other major obstacles include the strong popular opposition to
the PRA and the current disillusionment among former rank and file members of
the NJM and the PRA.
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22. The likelihood of NJM-sponsored subversion could increase if Gairy
were to return to power. Many young Grenadians and former NJM supporters
vehemently oppose Gairy primarily because they fear that if he regains control
in the government that he will try to eliminate any dissidents. The
possibility of political violence and widespread unrest would increase. On
the other hand, a Gairy return to power would be advantageous to the leftist
NJM because they could then play on people's fears and,try to portray
themselves as saviours as they did in the late 1970s.
23. If a responsive moderate democratic government is elected, however,
the prospects for subversive activity by the NJM are less likely. Any efforts
to destabilize a strong popular government would be counterproductive and
would be met with open opposition. In this case, party leaders probably will
bide their time and seek opportunities to foment unrest or cultivate
legitimate opposition to the new government.
24. Internal security could also be threatened by the presence of
detainees at Richmond Hill prison now being held in connection with the death
of Bishop and others on 19 October 1983. Popular sentiment against the
detainees is high. The general population vehemently opposes the radicals,
holding them responsible for plunging Grenada into a political and military
crisis. Grenadians want the detainees convicted through due process, and the
investigations, case preparation, and physical security required for the
trials are likely to absorb most of Grenada's legal and security resources for
the rest of the year.
25. We believe the defense will try to prolong the process by raising
legal technicalities and will seek to gain maximum propaganda value by
discrediting the Advisory Council. With public emotions running high, the
potential for violent public reactions against the detainees is substantial,
particularly if the conduct or outcome of the trials displease the
population. Moreover, radical supporters of the detainees might try to
disrupt the proceedings. While the formation of a group of political
supporters to defend the radicals' interests appears unlikely, the possibility
of residual support for the radicals among some Marxist-indoctrinated youths
and the reported ability of the detainees to maintain ties with the outside
through visitors, raise important security concerns.
26. Regardless of the outcome, the trials will have a significant effect
on the election and on Grenada's long-term security situation. A competent
security force will be viewed by many as essential to maintain public order,
prevent anv disruptive incidents, and guarantee just proceedings during the
trials.
27. We judge the potential for subversive activity by Gairy and his
supporters, should they fail to win the election, as minimal. Most political
observers agree that while Gairy may continue to use his skills and
connections to manipulate and discredit his political opponents, he probably
would not resort to violence as the way back to power.
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28. Although the views and intentions of some 150 to 200 Grenadian
students remaining in Cuba, USSR, and East Germany are not yet known, their
eventual return to Grenada could have implications for security. There is no
evidence of destabilizing activities by the approximately 40 students who have
so far returned, but these youths represent a potential base of support for
the NJM.
29. Grenada currently lacks a viable, indigenous police force and is
totally dependent on the US and Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces (CPF) for its
security needs. The 350-man Grenadian police force lacks the discipline or
the training to maintain law and order, much less to control a possible
resurgence of radical elements. There is also a lack of competent senior and
mid-level management as well as potential candidates for the top leadership
positions in the new Grenadian police force. Moreover, many of the members
who served the Bishop and Gairy governments are highly politicized and
corrupt. The process of removing these disruptive elements will further delay
the formation of an effective law enforcement apparatus.
30. Reorganization and training of the police are progressing slowly.
The Barbadian Commissioner of Police and a British adviser are involved in
training 30 police recruits in Barbados. Plans also are underway to
accelerate training for the rest of the force and for additional recruits.
Foreign police and security advisers in Grenada do not believe they will be
able to assess Grenada's security requirements accurately until several groups
of these trainees are integrated into the police force and assume their duties
later this year.
31. Once trained, the police force will need to develop confidence
through on-the-job experience and to establish credibility with the
populace. A sense of loyalty and pride in the force is necessary for the
morale of its members and to protect it from political influence. The US
Embassy and other foreign security advisers in Grenada believe that a fully
trained indigenous police force will not be ready to assume complete
responsibility for internal security until mid-1985. In the meantime, a
foreign police presence is needed to maintain law and order, provide security
during the unrnmina trials and the election, and to deter dissident
activity.
The Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces
32. The CPF has become an effective security organ whose performance and
capabilities have improved significantly since last November largely as a
result of US security assistance and training. The force now numbers less
than 450, including two companies--or about 300 members--from Jamaica and
another 150 personnel from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, and St. Kitts. The contingent from the Jamaican Defense Force is
competent and professional and generally better regarded than contingents from
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the other Caribbean islands. The CPF plays the prominent security role on the
island, while US military personnel--numbering some 250--maintain a lower
profile. Most Grenadians, however, still look to the US military as the main
guarantor of stability.
33. Jamaica will probably maintain its peacekeeping contingent in
Grenada at current levels, at least for the near term. The political benefits
derived by Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga as a result of his contribution to
the CPF so far have outweighed the economic costs involved in supporting this
force in Grenada. However, Jamaica may decide to withdraw some or all of its
CPF contingent if large-scale public disorders arise at home. The Jamaican
Defense Force, even at full strength, would be hard-pressed to contain massive
demonstrations or riots and widespread criminal activity if the opposition
party decides to use political violence to push the government into calling
early elections. Although the opposition has refrained from using this tactic
so far, they may be planning to do so in the next few months.
34. Although all the participants have a vested interest in ensuring the
continuation of democratic rule after the election, domestic financial and
security needs are likely to bring growing pressure on a number of countries
to pull out. The leaders of the CPF countries have publicly agreed to keep
their contingents in Grenada, along with US military forces, through the
election period. The financial strains caused by their involvement, however,
could lead them to reduce or terminate their commitment if sufficient funding
from Washington is not forthcoming.
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