POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00420R000701360002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Possible Soviet Responses
to the US Strategic
Defense Initiative
Interagency Intelligence Assessment
MEMORANDUM FOR: j 2 7 JUN 198
As you prepare for your NSPG on Tuesday, I thought
you might find this of use for the weekend.
22 June 84
Secret
5-75 101 EDIITINS IOUs
NIC M 83-10017
12 September 1983
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N I C M 83-10017
POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES
TO THE US STRATEGIC
DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Information available as of 12 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Assessment.
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CONTENTS
PREFACE ................................................................................................................... v
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. vii
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 1
Political Pressure ...................................................................................................... 1
Active Measures ...................................................................................................... 2
Potential Soviet Military Approaches .................................................................... 2
Soviet R&D Processes and Timelines .................................................................... 5
Technical Responses ............................................................................................... 6
Land-Based Ballistic Missile Systems ................................................................ 6
Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Systems .................................................................... 8
Cruise Missiles ..................................................................................................... 8
Bombers ................................................................................................................ 9
Conventional ABM Systems ............................................................................... 10
Directed Energy Systems ................................................................................... 10
Space Systems ...................................................................................................... 11
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PREFACE
On 23 March 1983, President Reagan called for a comprehensive and
intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program
to begin to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by
strategic nuclear missiles.
Though the media have given considerable attention to the issue and
have focused attention on exotic space-based beam weapons-the so-called
Star Wars systems-the President did not specifically mention any weapon
concepts or basing:
- Ballistic missile defense systems could be on air, ground, and
submarine platforms as well as on satellites; high-energy lasers,
particle beams, or microwave systems could become elements of a
national ballistic missile defense (BMD) system along with im-
proved conventional-technology systems.
It appears likely that any strategic defense scheme will involve some
combination of systems in a layered defense. A space-based directed
energy weapon may be used to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in their
boost phase; ground-based or space-based lasers or conventional weapons
may be used to destroy buses and reentry vehicles in midcourse; ground-
based beam weapons, missile interceptors, and other weapons may be used
to provide terminal defense.
In attempting to neutralize the development and deployment of a
ballistic missile defense by the United States, the Soviets will be able to se-
lect from a range of technical, diplomatic, military, political propaganda,
and clandestine measures. Since this range is broad, and since the time
scale (20 to 30 years) of the proposed US BMD effort extends well beyond
anyone's ability to make accurate forecasts, we can claim no precision in
evaluating the Soviets' course of action. We have instead focused on
general principles and constraints in the areas of politics, military doctrine,
and Soviet research and development practices that will influence their
response to a US BMD system. Subsequently, we identified a variety of
military and technological options the Soviets could make at various times
in the future. No attempt has been made to perform evaluations as to the
relative advantages of one kind of system or device over another.
Note: This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic
Programs. It was submitted in support of an interagency report in re-
sponse to the President's strategic defense initiative This paper was coordinated at the wotking
level by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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SUMMARY
In the near term, we expect the Soviets to rely principally on a con-
certed political and diplomatic effort first to force the United States to
drop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, to
negotiate them away. There are also certain limited military steps the
Soviets could take initially for the purpose of improving their bargain-
ing position and for preparing them for initial US deployment should it
occur.
Over the long term, if the United States goes ahead with plans to
develop and deploy its defensive system the Soviets will have a different
set of problems. Assuming they know the likely structure and capabili-
ties of US defensive forces, they will look for effective technical
countermeasures.
It appears that there will be a large variety of possible measures the
Soviets can choose from to preserve the viability of their ballistic missile
forces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) can be upgraded with new boosters,
decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures of these
systems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basing schemes
can be devised which make them less vulnerable to US missile warning
and defensive weapon systems. These systems can also be hardened or
modified to reduce their vulnerability to directed energy weapons.
The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularly
manned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improved penetra-
tion aids and stealth technologies, to assume a greater burden of the
strategic offensive strike role and to exploit the weaknesses in US air de-
fense capabilities.
The Soviets can continue development and deployment of their
own ballistic missile defense systems. The Moscow antiballistic missile
system can be expanded and improved, and a more widespread system
deployed, with additional launchers, improved missile detection and
tracking capabilities, and more capable interceptors. The Soviets can
expand their ongoing efforts on directed energy weapons, weapons
which also provide antisatellite capabilities which could be used against
some space-based elements of a US BMD system. In most of the
directed energy weapons technologies, the Soviets are now on a par
with, or lead, the United States. They are likely to pursue these efforts
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regardless of whether the United States sustains its strategic defense
initiative.
We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will undertake a
"crash" program in reaction to US BMD developments, but rather will
seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades the
United States will need to develop and deploy its overall defense, They
will look for solutions that are least disruptive to their way of doing
business and involve the least possible change to their planned pro-
grams. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a fundamental shift in the
strategic environment entailing reliance on strategic defenses by both
sides.
The Soviets could choose to allocate the necessary R&D resources
and could obtain some flexibility for new types of deployment by
adjusting other programs. They are likely to encounter technical and
manufacturing problems in developing and deploying more advanced
systems. If they attempted to deploy new advanced systems not
presently planned, while continuing their overall planned force mod-
ernization, significant additional levels of spending would be required.'
This would place substantial additional pressures on the Soviet economy
and confront the leadership with difficult policy choices.
If, through some set of circumstances, the Soviets were faced with
actual or impending deployment of a US system and had no effective
military counter to it, we think there are various possibilities for Soviet
actions, ranging from major arms control concessions, to threats of
military action in other areas, to threatened attacks on space-based
components of a US system, to sabotage against US facilities. In some
extreme scenarios, the Soviets could carry out a massive attack against
the US defensive system, although we think that to be highly unlikely,
given the near certainty of thereby initiating general war with the
United States.
' The Soviets have extensive efforts in the advanced technology area applicable to strategic defense, but
we do not know to what extent these are planned for deployment.
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DISCUSSION
Political Pressure
1. The Soviets have already begun, and will con-
tinue, to try to prevent development and eventual
deployment of US defensive systems, which have in
recent years been the nearly exclusive domain of the
Soviet Union, through a variety of political, propagan-
da, diplomatic, and negotiating tactics and active
measures. They will attempt to avoid any major
disruption in their strategic planning by using these
approaches to solve their problems and will work
strenuously to put themselves in the best possible
bargaining position. We can expect the Soviets to:
- Mobilize existing resources for a targeted peace
offensive, aimed at exerting domestic political
pressure in the United States and NATO coun-
tries to forgo advanced ballistic missile defense
(BMD) technologies completely, or at least to
postpone their development indefinitely. Mos-
cow will make use of the peace movement, the
scientific community, and appeals to the defense
and arms control concerns of NATO opinion
leaders. As part of the campaign, the Soviets will
be likely to extol the virtues of the Antiballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty and accuse the United
States of undercutting its provisions.
- Utilize various international forums, especially
those related to arms control interests, such as the
UN disarmament and space committees and the
General Assembly, or the Conference on Disar-
mament in Europe (CDE) which is planned to
begin in January 1984. They could offer publicly
to make strategic arms reductions talks (START)
concessions of interest to the United States in
return for a negotiated ban or limitations on
BMD development. They might judge that the
administration is under growing political pres-
sure to reach a START agreement and would
accept a Soviet offer of this type. But Moscow
would be very reluctant to offer the kind of
offensive forces concessions the United States is
looking for, probably preferring to take its
chances on thwarting US BMD plans by other
means.
- Continue their major arms control campaign to
ban all weapons from space and to attempt to
resume talks with the United States on limiting
antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. Last spring, Gener-
al Secretary Andropov reiterated the 1981 Soviet
proposal for a UN treaty banning all weapons in
space. The treaty would prohibit acts that de-
stroy, damage, disturb, or change the trajectory
of any satellite belonging to a treaty member
who was in compliance with the treaty's ban on
weapons. More recently, Andropov unveiled a
new initiative to prohibit testing and deployment
of space-based weapons, eliminate existing ASAT
systems, and ban development of new ASAT
systems. Embodied in a draft treaty submitted to
the UN and more ambitious than the 1981 effort,
this new Soviet initiative reflects Moscow's con-
cerns over prospective changes in the military
balance in space, especially with regard to BMD.
Soviet initiatives have been somewhat successful
in stimulating worldwide concern about an arms
race in space.
- Demonstrate Soviet will and capability to re-
spond to the US BMD initiative and attempt to
keep pace with the United States in any BMD
race; this could provide them with important
bargaining leverage. One way the Soviets might
do this is to raise the issue of the ABM Treaty.
They have already claimed that we are in the
process of breaking the ABM Treaty with our
efforts.2 The Soviets may demand that we discuss
this issue sooner, rather than later. The Soviets
could also make some overt references to their
ability to deploy conventional ABMs in the near
term. A Soviet conventional ABM "breakout"
would place the United States at a strategic
disadvantage in the near term. The Soviets thus
might calculate that the threat of immediate
ABM breakout could be used to bring the United
2 This is actually not correct: the ABM Treaty only bans the
development of air, sea, space, or mobile land-based ABM systems.
It does not prohibit research on such technologies.
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States to the negotiating table on something
closer to Moscow's terms. While Moscow might
accept a negotiated revision of the ABM Treaty,
they would seek to rule out deployment of
advanced technology BMD for the foreseeable
future in any such agreement. At the least, such
negotiating tactics would buy them some time to
develop their own military response to a US
defensive system.
World War II, and is starting a dangerous new
spiral in the arms race.
- Veiled threats of Soviet response, including state-
ments implying that undefined countermeasures
are already under way.
Potential Soviet Military Approaches
4. The Soviets will position themselves to compete
effectively in a new strategic environment. They will
probably seek to:
2. The Soviets consider active measures 3 an offen-
sive instrument of foreign policy, designed specifically
to influence the policies of other governments in favor
of the USSR. The classic techniques-press place-
ments, disinformation, front organizations, friendship
societies, and so forth-can be used to disrupt relations
between states arrayed against the USSR. The United
States is the primary target. Academicians, journalists,
and other agents of influence have been used to
conduct political influence operations.
3. We believe that the Soviets will employ measures
to cope with the President's BMD initiative that could
include:
- Attempts to cause divisiveness and unrest among
the US allies by arguing that the US initiative is
an attempt to abandon them and that the United
States is reverting to a "Fortress America" policy.
Attempts to force the administration to withdraw
or step down the BMD initiative by trying to
convince the American people that implementa-
tion of the President's proposal would seriously
curtail US social programs.
- Claims that the United States is upsetting the
strategic balance and planning for a nuclear war-
winning capability, disrupting the peaceful coex-
istence between East and West which has been so
successful in maintaining peace since the end of
8 "Active measures" is a Soviet term referring to activities world-
wide that are intended to promote Soviet foreign policy goals, but
which go beyond traditional diplomatic, propaganda, and military
means. Such measures are intended to influence or subvert the
policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other
countries, undermine confidence in foreign governments and insti-
tutions, and discredit opponents of Soviet policy.
- Increase their efforts to obtain US and Western
technology which may bear on the BMD prob-
lem and step up their intelligence collection
efforts on US plans and intentions.
- Increase their investment in military R&D, stra-
tegic forces, and space programs. This could
force them into explicitly trading near-term mili-
tary capabilities for future capabilities, depend-
ing on the size of the initial effort and the
resources required.
Also, they will possibly:
- Emphasize in their program the early demon-
stration of the potential to match and counter US
BMD, in order to increase their bargaining
leverage.
5. An area which we believe to be of great impor-
tance in conditioning the Soviet response is that of
economics. They will be reluctant to divert scarce
assets to expensive technological efforts in response to
US advanced BMD unless they are convinced that
such efforts are essential to maintaining their security
and political position and that they have identified
potentially viable counters. Such solutions are likely to
be expensive not only in terms of Soviet defense
budgets, but more important, if they involve major
restructuring of their strategic offensive and defensive
forces, in the degree of disruption they would cause
throughout the military forces and command and
control structure. In addition, the Soviets are increas-
ingly less likely to go for big, overall changes to their
posture, because they have more to lose if they invest
in the wrong strategy.
6. Over the longer term, the Soviets could choose to
allocate the resources necessary to sustain research and
development of a large-scale advanced strategic de-
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fense program. They could obtain some flexibility for
new types of deployments by adjusting other pro-
grams. The resources devoted to strategic offensive
and defensive programs make up only 20 to 25 percent
of total military costs. Based on some recent experi-
ence, however, they are likely to encounter technical
and manufacturing problems that are inherent in
developing and deploying more advanced systems. If
they attempted to deploy new advanced systems not
presently planned, while continuing their overall
planned modernization of strategic and general pur-
pose forces, significant additional levels of spending
would be required.' This would place substantial
additional pressures on the Soviet economy and con-
front the leadership with difficult policy choices.
7. The Soviets will try to cope with deployment of
US advanced technology BMD with the least possible
change to their planned programs. Historically, the
Soviets have proceeded at their own pace to develop
any necessary counter to US systems and initiatives
over the long term. They will look for solutions that
are least disruptive to their way of doing business-
those programs that are already under way or are
consistent with present trends in their strategic force
posture. This is not to say that large and expensive new
programs would not be undertaken in response; rather
in choosing among their options, the Soviets will prefer
those which do not represent a radical departure from
established patterns of strategic behavior. It is highly
unlikely that the Soviets will undertake a "crash"
program in reaction to US developments, but instead
will seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts
over the decades the United States will need to
develop and deploy its overall defense.
S.` Moscow will seek to maintain the effectiveness of
its strategic offensive forces as the primary means of
maintaining its strategic position, Measures consistent
with this approach would include proliferation of
warheads and launchers, mobility and covertness for
more of its strategic forces, and development of
passive or defensive countermeasures, such as boost
phase decoys and booster hardening. These measures
would represent a continuation of the current Soviet
military approach.
' The Soviets have extensive efforts in the advanced technology
area applicable to strategic defense, but we do not know to what
extent these are planned for deployment.
9. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a funda-
mental shift in the strategic environment entailing
greatly increased reliance on strategic defenses by both
sides. On the one hand, according to Soviet military
writings, only with a strategy that emphasizes offen-
sive operations could the Soviets achieve their objec-
tives in nuclear war. On the other hand, the Soviets
insist that defensive operations are an essential compo-
nent of a viable nuclear strategy. They see their
offensive and defensive operations as closely coupled;
by maintaining the initiative in offensive strikes, they
can greatly reduce the burden borne by the defensive
forces to attempt to limit damage and guard their war-
fighting capability. We have no reason to expect any
major alterations in Soviet doctrine and strategy in the
1980s and beyond. They will not view strategic force
trends as requiring them to reduce the offensive,
counterforce orientation of their strategy in favor of
some assured level of survivability, as would be im-
plied by a defense-dominated strategy.
10. Even if the Soviets tacitly accept a regime of
defensive emphasis in response to US development
programs, they would be reluctant to depend on
defensive technologies over the long haul to confer the
strategic advantage they seek. Consistent with their
dialectic approach, the Soviets would tend to view a
mutual shift to strategic defenses as a temporary
phenomenon in the ongoing superpower strategic rela-
tionship and not as a permanent solution to strategic
problems. Thus, Soviet military planners would never
stop working the problem of how to overcome US
strategic defenses, and they would probably expect the
United States to behave similarly.
11. Soviet planners would rely heavily on the diver-
sity of their responses to frustrate US defensive sys-
tems. In the offensive forces area, this would probably
mean increased emphasis on cruise missiles and
manned bombers-areas of current major Soviet
developments.
12. The Soviets are likely to attempt to develop
means of neutralizing or significantly degrading US
BMD by exploiting "weak links" in the system. Such
an approach would be consistent with existing Soviet
doctrine and practice. They are likely to look for
options to develop offensive countermeasures to US
BMD-in effect, a strategy of defense suppression.
One possible outgrowth would be the adoption of a
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strategy of strikes against US defensive systems during
the conventional phase of a conflict with the United
States; space-based components would be particularly
attractive targets. They probably would not rely on
defense suppression alone, but would combine it with
the kinds of steps outlined above to ensure that enough
of their offensive forces could penetrate a degraded
but still operative US BMD system.
13. The Soviets will attempt to develop their own
advanced BMD, using programs they already have
under way, even if the technology is somewhat inferi-
or to US systems. (In some areas, such as most of the
directed energy weapons technologies, the Soviets now
are on a par with, or lead, the United States.) This
would provide them a basis for later improving the
system, while also furthering their political goal of
remaining competitive with US developments. They
are likely to pursue these efforts regardless of whether
the United States sustains its strategic defense initia-
tive. The Soviets are not confident that, over the long
haul, they could match US technology if the United
States makes a high-level sustained effort, and they
would be reluctant to be drawn into a technological
"race" with the United States. They would always fear
a US breakthrough in offensive technologies that could
override Soviet defenses and US achievement of a
much better defensive system.
14. The Soviets will have to compensate for the
threatened loss of their perceived strategic edge
against the United States. The US defense initiative
probably came as a surprise to Soviet planners, and
they are probably not in a position to react quickly
with major changes in their own strategic plans and
programs.
15. While Moscow will continue to look for negoti-
ated solutions to the problems presented by US strate-
gic defenses, the Soviets are not likely to view arms
control as their only, or even their best, hope. They
may be economically pressed to carry out a full range
of military responses, but they are not likely to make
major arms control concessions to the United States
strictly as a means of relief from any such economic
stresses. The Soviets view arms control as but one of
many instruments-political, diplomatic, and mili-
tary--available to them in the pursuit of their strategic
goals. Soviet arms control policy is well integrated into
their overall approach to the United States and the rest
of the world, and they are not likely to acquiesce in
agreements which are fundamentally inconsistent with
their strategic policies and plans.
16. Consider a set of circumstances arising at some
future time in which:
- The United States intended to deploy defenses
that appeared highly effective against ballistic
missiles as well as against cruise missiles and
bombers.
- The Soviets had not achieved a comparable
defensive status.
- The United States had not greatly reduced its
offensive forces.
- The Soviets had not achieved the offensive capa-
bilities necessary to penetrate US defenses.
If this were to occur, which is highly unlikely, Moscow
would be faced with a radical, and highly undesirable,
shift in the balance of power. It is possible the Soviets
would consider options such as the following:
- They could make a concerted last-ditch effort to
stop deployment through arms control. Under
the circumstances, the Soviets would be in a very
unfavorable bargaining position. They would
probably have to offer major concessions in other
negotiating arenas (for example, START or
MBFR).
- The Soviets could threaten to undertake military
actions against US and allied interests in areas
where the Soviets enjoy military or political
advantages.
- The Soviets, citing danger to their supreme inter-
ests, could threaten to attack space-based compo-
nents of the new US defensive system while they
were still in a highly vulnerable stage of deploy-
ment. They would certainly accompany any
threat to attack by intense political action and
propaganda portraying themselves as the defend-
ers of world peace. If t e US satellite system
included nuclear devices
hen it is possible that such a propaganda
campaign would enjoy some success.
- It is also possible, but very unlikely, that they
would threaten to undertake military action or
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sabotage against launch facilities or critical com-
mand, control, and communications elements on
US soil. Since threats to attack US territory would
entail a more serious risk of precipitating a war,
the Soviets would be correspondingly reluctant to
raise the possibility.
17. Finally, if despite all efforts to forestall and
prevent deployment of a US system, the Soviets should
be faced with an imminently operational, viable US
strategic defense, while lacking effective countermeas-
ures and a comparable defense system of their own,
they would need either to accept a prolonged period
of clear strategic inferiority to the United States or to
take dramatic measures to redress the situation. Some
possible measures include:
- Implementing their previous threats of an attack
against the US defensive system. If'this entailed a
massive attack against sites in the United States,
it would carry with it the near certainty of
initiating general war with the United States. We
think it highly unlikely the Soviets would take
such massive action, even under the circum-
stances just outlined.
Attempting, covertly, to destroy important parts
of the US system, using techniques like electronic
warfare or directed energy ASAT weapons. The
ability to conduct such operations covertly is
possible, given the likely complexity of the space
environment in the next century.
- Emplacing nuclear or biological weapons in
Western cities, and announcing that they will be
employed if the USSR is attacked.
- Claiming to have built the ultimate destructive
weapon, a "doomsday" device.
Soviet R&D Processes and Timelines
18. There are several features of Soviet weapons
development practice that will be important in limit-
ing the speed with which they can respond to US
defense initiatives:
- To a greater degree than in the United States,
applied "research" is distinct from weapons "de-
velopment." However, applied research can, and
often does, extend to the fabrication and testing
of design alternatives-that is, well into the "6.3"
stage of US weapons procurement.5
- Fully funded development ("6.4") of a Soviet
weapons system is initiated only when the re-
sponsible design authority is assured that he will
have appropriate technologies on hand which
will allow the military's performance specifica-
tions to be met. While this does not mean that
research on subsystems technologies will not be
undertaken during development, it does mean
that the principal system designer must believe
either that the research is relatively low risk, or
that alternative technologies are available.
- A consequence of conservatism in initiating sys-
tem development is that major technologies tend
to be frozen relatively early in development.
Thus, a major new system deployed in a given
year will incorporate the technologies of the
Soviet state of the art eight to 12 or more years
earlier.
During system development, the Soviets adhere
to an elaborate schema which, in fact, is formally
codified in Soviet law. While this works well in
bringing order to development projects, it is an
additional major factor in making it unlikely that
they will undertake "crash" programs.6
The Soviets are persistent in the pursuit of
program goals. We know of several programs
that the Soviets have continued after major
setbacks.
' The primary effect of acquiring technology from the West is to
circumvent or accelerate "research" rather than "development."
That is, acquired technology may allow the Soviets to initiate
development sooner, but it does not have a great effect on develop-
ment times per se. At most, it can be an alternative to subsystem
research during system development. But even in this case, the
designers will have available alternative, if less advanced, technol-
ogies to fall back on if Western techniques cannot be obtained.
6 Under Khrushchev, a number of ambitious programs were
undertaken in which research and development were run concur-
rently. Examples are the SL-X-15 moon rocket, very large wing-in-
ground-effect vehicles, and the A-class submarine. All of these
programs have encountered major problems (some catastrophic),
and even when a system was finally deployed the overall develop-
ment time amounted to almost 20 years. These unhappy experiences
undoubtedly reinforce the Soviets' reluctance to try to short-circuit
the orderly process which has served them, in the main, very well.
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19. We have found that one result of the Soviets'
development practices is that they need considerable
time to introduce technological changes throughout a
force. The necessary time is, of course, dependent on
the degree to which the changes represent new tech-
nologies or only different applications of old ones.
Whether modifications to existing systems or com-
pletely new designs are involved is also a crucial
factor. In general:
- Minor modifications to existing systems take
about five years to enter a force.
- Major modifications take eight to 12 years.
- New systems based on existing or only moderate-
ly advanced technology take around 15 years
from initial requirements to deployment.
- Systems based on new or significantly advanced
technology, which requires substantial research
before design inception, can take 15 to 20 or
more years.
- Systems which the Soviets term "new in princi-
ple" require lengthy research programs preced-
ing weapon system development and can take
upward of 20 years to produce a fieldable
system.
20. In the last two cases, the factor of technology
transfer can be particularly important, since it enables
the Soviets to piggyback on much more efficient
Western research and initiate a design project consid-
erably sooner than if they had to depend on their own
rather sluggish research establishment.
ing. For these reasons, we believe it very likely that
they will try to retain ICBM and SLBM systems in at
least the near term and midterm by employing tech-
nological fixes that will enhance the missiles' surviv-
ability in the face of US defensive systems. Due to
their strong and experienced design teams, it is proba-
ble that they will be able to implement modifications
to existing missiles quite soon (five to 10 years),
followed by more effective systems further in the
future.
22. In the near term,' the Soviets could seek to
increase the survivability of their ICBMs or the num-
ber of weapons surviving by:
Deploying larger numbers of boosters, decoys,
and penetration aids.
Continuing or quickening the present trend to
solid-propellant missiles, which tend to be struc-
turally less vulnerable to continuous-wave (CW)
laser damage 8 and have higher acceleration than
liquid-propellant ICBMs,
- Further fractionating (increasing the number of
reentry vehicles) systems currently deployed or
in development.
Technical Responses
Land-based Ballistic Missile Systems
21. The Soviets have invested enormous monetary
and human resources in creating the ballistic missile
component of their strategic attack forces. They now
possess four major design bureaus that develop these
types of weapons and have several new and improved
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and subma-
rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in develop-
ment. In addition, their military has structured their
strategic war plans around ballistic missiles, and prizes
the military advantages inherent in ballistic systems-
the ability to strike decisive blows quickly and accu-
rately over great distances, with a minimum of warn-
In the remainder of the paper, we define the "near term" to be
the period to 1995, the "midterm" to be 1995-2005, and the "far
term" to be after 2005. These definitions are meant for orientation
and are obviously not to be taken literally.
8 Note that many measures that would help against lasers would
have little or no effect against particle beam weapons.
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23. In the midterm (1995-2005), the Soviets could
undertake more radical measures to harden present
types of missiles. Toward the end of the period, they
could begin to deploy new missiles which have been
designed to reduce the effectiveness of US defensive
measures as the Soviets understood them in the middle
to late 1980s:
- New guidance systems that would allow continu-
ously rolling airframes could probably be devel-
oped, tested, and installed in existing missiles
toward the beginning of the period. Continuous
roll is estimated to be two to three times as
effective as oscillatory role in increasing CW
laser burnthrough times.
- Also in the first half of this period, current
missile types could be modified with an ablative
coating to further protect against CW laser at-
tack. Studies indicate that for missiles of the SS-
17, -18, and -19 classes a continuously rolling
airframe with a thin ablative coating will in-
crease burnthrough times by a factor of about 15
over the present systems.
- It is possible that some degree of X-ray harden-
ing could be incorporated with an ablative coat-
ing on the postboost vehicle (PBV ,thus reducing
vulnerability as well
as other lasers.
- Other laser hardening measures, such as a smoke-
screen, could be installed.
- First-generation boost-phase decoys could be
deployed.
- Measures to reduce or alter the infrared (IR)
signatures of booster plumes would also be
possible.
- New PBVs that dispense RVs earlier than at
present could be put on existing missiles.
24. New missiles appearing in the 15- to 20-year
time frame might incorporate the following features:
- High-acceleration boosters that burn out below
100 kilometers, thus eliminating boost-phase vul-
nerability to X-ray and neutral particle beam
weapons.10
- Airframes designed to minimize vulnerability to
spot heating from CW lasers and impulsive loads
from pulsed lasers.
- Multiple high-acceleration PBVs to minimize RV
dispensing times and proliferate PBV targets.
- Maneuvering RVs to reduce accuracy degrada-
tion caused by early, rapid RV dispensing.
- PBVs designed to dispense many decoys per RV.
25. In the far term, from 2005 onward, the Soviets
will be able not only to refine responsive measures
taken earlier, but also will have had time to perform
research and development on radically new concepts
and to deploy those which prove out:
- Highly fractionated, hardened, high-acceleration
ICBMs could be developed as evolutionary fol-
low-ons to first-generation responses of the late
1990s.
- Further development of boost-phase decoys and
signature reduction/ alteration techniques could
make early characterization of an attack and
weapon targeting very difficult.
- New means of launching RVs, such as railguns
and other electromagnetic devices, could elimi-
nate boosters entirely.
- Nuclear rockets could be used in boosters capable
of depressed (height less than 100 km) trajectory,
perhaps very fast (greater than circular velocity)
attacks.
- Missiles could be put in high Earth or solar orbit
to be deorbited on enemy targets.
10 The beams from both X-ray lasers and neutral particle beam
weapons are seriously degraded by passage through the atmosphere.
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Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Systems
26. Many of the measures to make the Soviet land-
based ICBM force less vulnerable to defensive systems
would be applicable as well to the strategic SLBM
Ablative coatings of the airframes and continuously
rolling airframes would be possible by the end of the
century, as would initial measures to reduce or mask
visible, infrared, and radar signatures of boosters,
PBVs, and RVs. By the end of the midterm, new
SLBMs designed specifically against currently pro-
posed US defensive systems could be in test or the
early stages of deployment. These, like the ICBMs of
that time, could incorporate airframes designed to
mimimize vulnerability to CW and pulsed laser ef-
fects, high-acceleration boosters, and multiple PBVs
that could rapidly dispense RVs and decoys. Advanced
signature reduction techniques for boosters and RVs
could also become available at this time.
27. SLBMs do possess peculiarities that both restrict
possibilities for some responsive measures that are
available to ICBMs and, conversely, offer some unique
opportunities:
By the early years of the next century, the Soviets
could design, develop, and deploy depressed
trajectory SLBMs that would not exit the Earth's
atmosphere and would have very short times of
flight, if launched from 3,000 to 4,000 km from
their targets. The fact that such systems never
leave the atmosphere would stress the capabilities
of the defensive systems even more severely: X-
ray and neutral particle beam weapons would be
of little use against them. Moreover, such SLBMs
would, by necessity for their own survival in
flight, employ hardening measures which would
also be effective against CW lasers. In addition to
attacking time-urgent counterforce and counter-
value targets, these weapons would be very
useful for attacking ground-based components of
the US BMD system, particularly command,
control, and communications elements and inter-
ceptor missile launch sites.
- Boost-phase decoys would be more difficult to
develop and might not be worth the space they
would take on a submarine. (But decoys could be
launched from cooperative surface vessels.)
- A submarine-mounted electromagnetic RV
launcher is probably not a practical prospect
for the next quarter of a century. Thus, subma-
rine-based ballistic systems will continue to
depend on rocket engines (perhaps nuclear in
the far term) for accelerating their payload.
28. If the United States develops a ballistic missile
defense, an obvious way for the Soviets to try to defeat
it is to place greater emphasis on nonballistic strategic
offensive systems. One of these is long-range cruise
missiles, which remain in the atmosphere and are
susceptible to further reduction of their IR, visible,
and radar signatures, which are already small. In
addition to attacking the target sets formerly allotted
to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles could be potent
defense suppression weapons. Using combinations of
speed, stealth, and launch points near the United
States, they could attack ground-based elements of the
US BMD system, clearing the way for a subsequent
ballistic missile attack.
29. A major disadvantage of cruise missiles is, of
course, that if they can be detected, they can be
brought under attack by fairly conventional air de-
fense systems. This, however, might not be seen as a
completely negative point by the Soviets, since the
enormous expense needed to provide the United States
with an effective air defense system would mean that
these resources would not be available for other
programs. In the longer term, visible and IR space-
based lasers of the sort that might be incorporated in
the endoatmospheric boost-phase segment of a United
States BMD system would also be effective weapons
against cruise missiles, again assuming they could be
located. In the near term, submerged-launched ver-
sions of two Soviet long-range cruise missiles now
under test, if deployed on submarines off the coast of
the United States, could provide an initial circumven-
tion of a BMD system.
30. Also by the mid-1990s, initial steps to apply
stealth technology to cruise missiles could be taken by
the Soviets. In all probability, these would take the
form of modifications to missiles already in design or
test. The Soviets also may choose to develop subsonic
intercontinental cruise missiles. Their slow speed
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would be offset by the Soviets' ability to launch them
surreptitiously from the USSR and, in the midterm, by
the use of stealth technology.
31. By the end of the midterm (2005), the Soviets
probably could develop and start to deploy supersonic
and hypersonic cruise missiles that would use stealth
technology and speed to penetrate air defense systems.
Submarine-launched cruise missiles with speeds in the
range of Mach 3-5 could arrive at their targets in the
same time period as ICBMs launched from the USSR.
They would be difficult to detect because of their size,
small IR signature, and small radar cross section. Using
terminal guidance, these systems could have accura-
cies below 10 meters. Such missiles could perform
many of the missions now assigned to ballistic missiles.
32. In the far term, the Soviets will be able to apply
many advanced technologies to cruise missile design, if
they now elect to begin work on them. Examples
would be:
- Cruise missiles with an intercontinental subsonic
cruise phase and supersonic or hypersonic termi-
nal attack phase.
- Cruise missiles with very long (several days)
preattack loiter times.
- Multimode cruise missiles capable of operating,
for example, in submerged, aerodynamic, and
ballistic regimes.
- Nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missiles.
US studies during the late 1950s and early 1960s
demonstrated the feasibility of nuclear ramjet
propulsion for a low-altitude, supersonic cruise
missile, and open literature of the late 1950s
demonstrated USSR understanding of the propul-
sion principles involved. Such a missile would be
large by modern US standards (about 1.5 meters
in diameter), but would have a greater payload
capability, range, and ability to deploy advanced
defensive electronics than present small cruise
missiles.
33. After a relatively long lull in which the Soviets
produced no new bomber for intercontinental mis-
sions, they have begun testing a new aircraft, the
Blackjack, which is clearly intended to be capable of
intercontinental attack. It is expected that this bomber
and its future variants will remain operational well
into the next century. In addition, a new variant of the
Bear bomber capable of carrying strategic cruise
missiles to intercontinental ranges is now being de-
ployed. Like cruise missiles, bombers are largely im-
mune to space-based X-ray lasers and particle-beam
weapons, but are susceptible to conventional air de-
fenses and space-based lasers that operate in the visible
and IR regions of the spectrum.
34. In the near term (to 1995):
- We expect the Soviets to deploy the Blackjack
and to perfect its use as a carrier of cruise
missiles and gravity bombs to intercontinental
ranges. Various penetration aids, principally
electronic warfare equipment, will be installed
and upgraded. It is possible that the Soviets could
adapt a large aircraft, perhaps the IL-86, to serve
as a cruise missile carrier in addition to the new
Bear variant.
35. In the midterm (1995-2005):
- Defense suppression weapons such as the US
short-range attack missile could also be available
for use on the Blackjack and possible stealth
bomber in the early part of the midterm.
- The principal development expected is the appli-
cation of stealth technology to manned aircraft.
This may include a manned bomber.
- Some degree of hardening against ground- and
space-based laser weapons could be incorporated
on aircraft.
- Hypersonic aircraft are possible. These could
incorporate stealth technology, considerable
hardening against laser weapons, and extensive
countermeasures against conventional antiair-
craft systems.
- Nuclear propulsion for aircraft could be avail-
able. This would give greatly extended ranges
without the need for refueling and might make
indirect, high-speed, low-altitude approaches to a
target practical.
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Conventional ABM Systems
37. The Soviets have an extensive program of R&D
on conventional ABM systems that dates back to the
1950s. The program they are currently pursuing in-
cludes development of components which are suitable
for use in an extensive deployment to protect key
military, industrial, and urban population centers.
These components include a large, quasi-transportable
engagement radar, an endoatmospheric interceptor,
and a missile guidance radar. Additionally, they are
improving the Moscow ABM system by making it a
two-layered system, increasing the number of inter-
ceptors to 100, and building a large, phased-array
engagement radar. In addition, large, phased-array
radars to upgrade their ballistic missile detection and
tracking capabilities are under construction. Given
their already extensive research and upgrade pro-
grains, we do not believe that the Soviets' initial
response to a US BMD effort would involve any major
alterations to their own conventional BMD deploy-
ment. At most, the Soviets might position themselves
to be better able to break out with a conventional
BMD deployment through acceleration of the poten-
tial timelines for construction and deployment. If the
ABM Treaty were to be abrogated by either side, we
believe the Soviets would undertake rapidly paced
ABM deployments to strengthen their defense at
Moscow and cover key targets in the USSR, and to
extend protection to key targets east of the Urals. Such
widespread defenses could be in place by the late
1980s or early 1990s.
38. In the midterm, the Soviets could choose to
develop a more capable exoatmospheric interceptor,
perhaps with a homing capability, multiple warheads,
and a sensor capable of discriminating RVs from chaff
and decoys. Also, for endoatmospheric or low-altitude
engagement the Soviets could develop the capability to
discriminate RVs from precision decoys. Supporting
systems, such as more powerful computers and a
reliable wideband communications system, would be
needed and could be developed and deployed by the
end of the century.
39. In the long term, the Soviets could pursue a
variety of improvements to conventional ABM sys-
tems, such as multiple-warhead interceptors, dual
mode exoatmospheric/endoatmospheric interceptors,
mobile launchers, and so on. Some of these develop-
ments would probably eventually occur even without
a US R&D program. These include general improve-
ments in the capabilities of interceptors and radars. A
US R&D program might cause the Soviets to acceler-
ate the pace of these developments, but need not alter
their fundamental nature.
Directed Energy Systems
40. The Soviet Union has had a large, military-
sponsored, high-energy laser weapon program since
the 1960s. One of the primary motivations for this
effort is probably the development of ballistic missile
defense weapons. Our best evidence in this area
concerns a major program to develop the technology
necessary for a ground-based laser weapon for termi-
nal ballistic missile defense. Soviet research also has
included a project to develop a space-based laser
weapon, probably for ASAP applications initially, but
we believe that the more difficult BMD mission is also
of interest to them. The result of these longstanding
and well-funded programs is that the Soviets are now
on a par with, or lead, the United States in most of the
directed energy weapons technologies,
that in the late 1960s the Soviets were giving serious
thought to both explosive and nonexplosive nuclear
power sources for lasers of an unknown type. In any
event, Soviet scientists are certainly capable of carry-
ing on this kind of work and will undoubtedly do so
now that there are reports of successful US tests and
public discussion of nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers as
potential BMD weapons.
42. The Soviets are known to be aware of the
potential of radiofrequency (RF) weapons, which
would damage the electronics of target systems with
intense fluxes of microwaves. They are world leaders
in the development of certain types of high-power
microwave generators applicable to RF weapons, and
also exhibit great talent and creativity in constructing
pulsed power systems that could drive such weapons.
The utility of RF devices in the present context, except
perhaps as antisatellite or air defense weapons, is
unclear to us, and we are correspondingly uncertain of
the likelihood that the Soviets will choose to develop
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them for BMD. If they should do so, they are in a
strong position to match or exceed any advances made
in the United States or elsewhere.
43. There is good evidence of Soviet military-spon-
sored R&D projects on particle beam weapons (PBW),
although work here is in an earlier stage and on a
much smaller scale than that in lasers. Soviet particle
beam weapon research might eventually have some
ASAT or BMD applications, but the achievement of a
prototype system for such uses would be at least 10 to
15 years in the future. DIA believes that a space-based
PBW system, intended to disrupt the electronics of
ballistic missiles and requiring significantly less power,
could probably be developed and deployed in the
1990s.
44. Soviet directed energy programs already have
important internal Soviet advocates, and support for
them will be enhanced by aggressive US pursuit of
directed energy weapons. We can expect the Soviets to
continue or expand their laser BMD efforts, in part as
a hedge against technical and strategic uncertainties.
Continued or expanded Soviet effort on directed
energy BMD weapons would provide them with the
option of developing a counterpart Soviet defense to
match any future US development and preserve the
strategic balance, or to serve as leverage in arms
control negotiations to limit or curb such weapons.
45. Besides forming a component of a BMD system,
Soviet directed energy weapons could also be used to
negate or destroy space-based elements of a US BMD
system, since most laser weapons designed for BMD
functions are even better ASAT weapons. High-energy
lasers in orbit conceivably could have eventual appli-
cation in an air defense role and be used for attacking
unhardened targets on Earth.
46. We believe there is a high probability that a
Soviet prototype high-energy laser ASAT weapon will
be tested in low orbit by the early 1990s. A space-
based laser of the 1-megawatt class could be tested in
the late 1980s at the earliest, but prototype testing is
more likely to occur in the early 1990s. If testing
proves successful, an initial operational low-altitude
system consisting of a few satellite weapons, each
having an ASAT range in the hundreds of kilometers,
could be available by the mid-1990s.
47. There is a moderate-to-high likelihood that the
development of low-orbit space-based lasers, coupled
with a heavy-lift launch capability, will result in
testing of laser ASAT weapons in geosynchronous orbit
by the late 1990s, although CIA ascribes a low proba-
bility to operational deployment by the year 2000.
DIA believes that, while deployment of a geosynchro-
nous space-based laser would probably take place after
deployment of a low-altitude system, there is a moder-
ate chance of deployment of a geosynchronous space-
based laser by the mid-1990s. Space-based weapons
for ballistic missile defense will require greater tech-
nological advances than those needed for an ASAT
mission. Thus, the Soviets are unlikely to have a
prototype space-based laser BMD system until at least
the mid-1990s, or an operational system until after he
year 2000. There is also some possibility that
could be
Erea or operational use by the end of the midterm.
48. In the long term, the Soviets will have had time
to perfect shorter wavelength devices such as the free-
electron and excimer lasers. These have several advan-
tages over weapons operating in the infrared, includ-
ing better coupling of the laser radiation to the target,
and ability to produce a more intense flux on the
target for a given diameter of output optics. In
addition, most of these can be designed to operate with
nuclear power sources, thus obviating the need to
carry great amounts of fuel into orbit. Also in the far
term, Soviet work on particle beam weapons could
produce a workable space-based weapon for BMD or
ASAT use.
Space Systems
49. The Soviet space program is unlikely to change
markedly in response to the US BMD initiative. The
program is well funded with a number of short-range
and midrange goals that are not likely to change.
However, the Soviet R&D effort could shift more
toward developing components for ballistic missile
defense and antisatellite use if the United States
emphasizes space-based BMD, probably at the expense
of the manned-space and communications satellite
programs which have recently accounted for larger
shares of Soviet space costs.
50. At present, we estimate that 17 new military
and civil space systems will be tested, and most of
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these will be deployed, in the next 10 years. These new
programs will result in improvements across the board
in existing capabilities; in addition, the new space
transportation system (shuttle) and an associated Saturn-
V-class heavy lift launch vehicle will add a new dimen-
sion to the manned and unmanned Soviet programs.
These new vehicles will be available in the late 1980s
and will allow the Soviets for the first time to put
payloads of 130,000 to 180,000 kilograms into low
Earth orbit. The Soviet space program will have an
increasing manned component: their shuttle, space
tug, and space stations will be used to conduct technol-
ogy-oriented research and development in space, in-
cluding ASAT and perhaps BMD system development.
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