USSR-CHINA: IMPACT OF ARKHIPOV VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
Central In oncc AFncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 January 1985
USSR-China: Impact of Arkhipov Visit
The agreements on scientific, technical and economic cooperation signed
during Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov's visit to China in late December
are the most significant developments in this area since the Soviets withdrew
their advisers in the early 1960's. Beijing, with a view to counterbalancing
its expanding ties with the US, made a point of giving Arkhipov a warm
welcane. Moscow was more circumspect in its public and private handling of
the visit, out of continuing suspicions of Chinese game playing and concerns
about the sensitivities of its Asian allies. Both sides, however, apparently
expect the visit to improve the political ahnos here aril restore sane momentum
to the dialogue on other issues.
t~To progress was made on the intractable issues--Afghanistan, Indochina,
and the Soviet troop deployments near China--that continue to ham.ner a
normalization of political relations, but the visit did produce agreement on a
return visit to the USSR by a Chinese vice premier and the first visit to
Mbscow by a Chinese parliamentary delegation in over two decades.
The agreements reached during Arkipov's visit do not add up to a major
breakthrough, but they may help pave the way for progress on other issues
later this year--for example, an agreement to resume discussions on their
border dispute, suspended since 1978. In the meantime, the next round of
This memorandum was prepared b_yl Ithe Third Wbrld
Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. It has been coordinated with
the office of Fast Asia Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may
be addressed to the Chief, Third Wbrld Activities, SOVA
State Dept. review completed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
political talks between deputy foreign ministers scheduled for Moscow in April
should help us judge the political impact of Arkhipov's visit.
Expanding Economic Contacts
During the visit Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov and his Chinese
hosts signed three well-publicized agreements which should promote a
continuing, gradual expansion of trade and related contacts in the next few
years. Initially proposed by the Soviets more than a year ago, the three
agreements are the most significant development in this area since the early
1960's, when the USSR withdrew its advisers from China.
-- The economic and technical cooperation agreement stipulates that the
two countries will study and exchange production technologies. More
specifically, they will design and build new--or refurbish existing--
industrial enterprises, provide each other with technical services,
and train each other's specialists.
-- The scientific and technological cooperation agreement calls for the
exchange of scientific and technological groups as well as students
and other experts, the exchange of scientific and technological
information, and unspecified joint projects.
A projected joint committee for economic, trade, scientific and
technological cooperation will be concerned with supervising the
implementation of agreements and protocols in those areas. Co-
chaired by deputy premiers from each side, it is to meet once a year
to outline specific projects to be undertaken in accordance with the
first two agreements. Its first meeting is being planned for this
spring, at which time permanent working groups may be established to
supervise specific areas of cooperation.
The two sides also negotiated a supplementary trade protocol for 1985,
increasing the target figure to about $1.8 billion--almost 30 percent more
than they had agreed to in late November, and approximately 65 percent higher
than last year's goal. They also plan to sign a long-term trade agreement
next spring, as the-Soviets have persistently urged. This will put bilateral
trade during 1986-90, the period covered by the next five-year plan on both
sides, on a more solid foundation by providing long-term targets for the
yearly trade negotations.
enlist Soviet help in refurbishing China's factories.
There are also signs of an increased willingness on the Chinese part to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
Arkhipov and China's Economic Reforms
The new economic reforms announced in Beijing last October--designed to
curtail routine party and governmental interference in enterprise management,
reward and punish enterprises based on their profits, and institute a price
system that reflects actual costs--are controversial in Moscow. The
provisions for technological innovation at the plant level, accruisition of
foreign capital and increased joint ventures with US and other Western
businesses are likely to lead to increased dealings with the West, especially
the United States, and thus add to the strains between Moscow and Beijing.
The Chinese reforms have, in fact, already entered into Kremlin deliberations
about how to deal with Beijing--decentralized planning in China will, for
example, make it more difficult for Moscow and Beijing to coordinate their
economic programs--as well as about steps toward Soviet economic reform.
Arkhipov's visit is not likely by itself, however, to change what remains
the official hard line in the Soviet media--that the reforms are tantamount to
a flirtation with capitalise, and may undermine the "socialist" system in
China. Arkhipov's remarks about the reforms have not been publicized by the
Soviet media, despite having been given wide play in the Hong Kong press and
Western news reports. Soviet political commentator Fedor Burlatskiy, during a
discussion with U.S officials last November, observed that it was "impossible"
for Soviet specialists to publish on the subject since officials in Moscow
oppose any suggestion that the Chinese model may be applicable to the USSR.
Political Implications
Soviet and Chinese handling of the visit indicates that both sides expect
it to improve the political atmosphere, even though the obstacles to a full
normalization of relations remain. Both sides may be content with having
taken the chill out of their relationship that has been evident since last
spring, while trying to use the results of Arkhipov's visit as new leverage in
Beijing's handling of the visit was particularly forthcoming. A Chinese
official, briefing US diplomats in late December, stated that Arkhipov's visit
had gone smoothly, produced results, and thus had "importance for the
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
normalization of relations." The official claimed that Arkhipov-while
insisting that he was in China to talk economics, not to discuss third country
issues--had promised to relay to senior Soviet leaders the points that Premier
Zhao had made during their brief discussion of the "three obstacles" to better
relations--Afghanistan, Indochina, and the Soviet military deployments along
China's northern perimeter. The official also confirmed that the silence of
the Chinese media regarding the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was intentional, noting that "after all, Arkhipov was in China at
The Chinese media gave extensive coverage to Arkhipov's visit, probably
to demonstrate--for both domestic and foreign audiences--some balance in
China's dealings with the superpowers, and hence to retain some potential
maneuvering roan in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle. The references to Arkhipov
as "comrade" and "old friend" by some of his hosts seemed calculated in
particular to underscore China's socialist credentials and subtly remind
the time."
Washington not to take Beijing for granted.
Apart from a session with Premier Zhao, however, Arkhipov's contacts were
limited to those within the Chinese leadership most prominently identified
with the Soviet aid program of the 1950s. The Chinese media, moreover--by
playing up Arkhipov's visit to the centerpiece of current Chinese economic
reforms, the Shenzhen special economic zone--implicitly signaled Beijing's
interest in expanded ties with the West and the limits of potential Soviet
The Soviets have exercised more restraint than the Chinese in commenting
on Arkhipov's trip. The Soviet media--like the Chinese--did describe the
atmosphere during Arkhipov's visit in warmer terms than they had used last
fall to describe the fifth round of political consultations at the deputy
foreign minister level. A few Soviet news reports also mentioned the party
posts held by Arkhipov's hosts in addition to their governmental positions--a
positive gesture that had been consistently avoided by the Soviet media in
recent years. Overall, however, the Soviet media gave the visit relatively
participation in China's economic modernization drive.
low-key coverage, and a follow-up effort by Soviet propagandists to make
political capital out of the visit was noticeably lacking.
The Soviets probably have a number of reasons to play down the visit's
significance at this time. They are aware that the Chinese are likely to
continue to tilt toward the United States while regarding the USSR as the main
threat to their security. Moreover, because Arkhipov's visit focused
primarily on bilateral economic matters, and not on the basic political
questions at issue between the two countries, it has not produced the sort of
results that would give the Soviets reason to expect major changes in the
triangular relationship anytime soon. Moscow also is likely to be wary of the
outside factors--such as an escalation in Sino-Vietnamese tensions, the Soviet
military buildup in Asia, or Soviet operations in Afghanistan--that could deal
another setback to the Sino-Soviet dialogue.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
visit would only alarm the USSR's two Asian allies.
In sum, the Soviets probably see the visit as having laid the
institutional groundwork for a further expansion of their exchanges with the
Chinese, while leaving the two sides to continue to differ on several
fundamental points. tinder these circumstances, it is not surprising that
Moscow does not want to appear too optimistic about future prospects, lest
this give the Chinese added leverage in their dealings with both Moscow and
Washington in the coming months. The Soviets are also sensitive to both
Mongolian and Vietnamese concerns about any signs of an improvement in Sino-
Soviet relations, and may have felt that more effusive coverage of Arkhipov's
Prospects
We believe high-level contacts will continue to expand during the caning
-- The Chinese have already agreed to a return visit by a vice-premier
this year They reportedly have not decided whether this will be in
connection with, or separate from, the joint economic commission
meeting in Moscow this spring, leaving open the possibility that two
vice-premiers could visit the USSR in 1985.
-- The parliamentary delegation that the Chinese have agreed to send to
the USSR could provide a means of allowing a Politburo member,
wearing his parliamentarian hat, to visit Moscow and hold talks with
senior Soviet leaders.
Soviet concern probably
Neither side, however, has given any sign as yet of a change in its
position on the main issues hampering an improvement in political relations.
Soviet forces deployed along China's northern perimeter.
has been heightened by the visit to China by JCS Chairman General Vessey in
mid-January, and it will be fueled further if Chinese President Li Xiannian
eventually sets a date for his proposed visit to the United States. The
Chinese, for their part, still consider the USSR as the main threat to their
security, and they are unlikely to abandon that assessment as long as Moscow
refuses to address their concerns regarding Afghanistan, Indochina, and the
Nonetheless, many Soviet officials apparently remain convinced that an
expansion of trade and other economic contacts, together with similar "small
steps" on a number of other fronts, will eventually lead to an improvement in
their relations with China. There is, moreover, a good market in the USSR--
especially in the Soviet Far East--for Chinese foodstuffs, textiles and other
consumer goods, while the sluggish world demand over the oast few years for
Soviet exports other than oil probably has made China an even more attractive
market in Soviet eyes. The main problem for the Soviets may be the extent to
which the current reforms in China--specifically, the decentralization of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
years.
economic planning-will make it more difficult for Moscow and Beijing to
coordinate trade and other forms of economic cooperation in the next few
it gets off to a successful start this spring.
It is conceivable that the new joint committee for scientific and
economic cooperation could set a favorable precedent for border discussions if
that they may be prepared to resume such discussions.
In sum, the agreements reached during Arkhipov's visit do not add up to a
major breakthrough, but over the longer term they may eventually help pave the
way for progress on other issues. If the atmosphere does improve sufficiently
to produce some movement on other issues, a resumption of discussions on the
border dispute--suspended since 1978--later this year may be the most likely
development. Senior Chinese leaders hinted last year on several occasions
only a small fraction of China's overall trade.
The Chinese are happy to have Soviet aid in renovating their 1950's-era
industrial plants and increased trade with the USSR, but are almost certain to
continue emphasizing trade with Japan and the West, because the latter
provides Beijing with the advanced technology it needs for modernization.
Even if Sino-Soviet trade were to reach $6 billion by 1990, as a few officials
on both sides have suggested, China's trade with the Soviet Union at that time
probably would be markedly less than that with Japan or the United States, and
The next round of political talks at the deputy
foreign minister level scheduled for April in Moscow will provide an early
test of the political impact of Arkhipov's visit.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
r, ,.,.. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
Economic and Technical Cooperation Between the USSR and China
Moscow and Beijing reportedly have agreed to five general areas of
economic cooperation: coal, metallurgy, energy, communications (railroad
electrification in particular) and machine-building. Some work in these areas
has already begun; the two sides exchanged visits of coal delegations in late
1983, and the Chinese reportedly awarded the Yiminhe open-pit coal mining
proiect in Inner Mongolia to the Soviets last March. The Chinese sent a
second group of coal mining experts to the USSR in April for talks in Moscow
and a tour of Siberian open-Bit mines, and the two sides continued to engage
in such exchanges even after the abrupt postponement of Arkhipov's visit to
China in early May. The list of such exchanges for the May-December period of
last year includes:
-- A two week visit to China in May by a Soviet merchant marine group to
exchange views on maritime transport and port management. The group
arrived in China on 10 May, the same day that Arkhipov had originally
been scheduled to arrive.
-- A two-week visit to Gina in late June-early July by Soviet
specialists in urban management to tour several of China's main
cities and exchange ideas on urban planning.
-- A two-week visit to the USSR in mid-July by a Chinese group of agro-
economists to tour Soviet research institutes and farms, and to hold
talks with various Soviet officials.
-- A delegation of senior officials from the PRC Ministry of Water
Resources and Electric Power visited the Soviet Union in August for
talks with their counterparts in Moscow, a tour of several research
institutes, and excursions to several of the USSR's main
hydroelectric power stations.
-- A deputy minister of the PRC Ministry of Geology and Mineral Reserves
led a delegation to the Turkmen SSR, where his group visited several
research institutes and were given a tour of the Shatlyk gas fields
in September.
-- Chinese railroad officials were in Moscow in October to attend a
seminar on the electrification of freight lines and learn more about
Soviet expertise in locomotive production. The PRC Minister of
Railways also was in Moscow at that time for talks with the Soviet
Rail Minister on how the two sides could improve passenger and
freight service between their capitals. The two men reached an
agreement on measures to improve the passenger service, and
presumably intend to continue working on freight service.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
Scientific and Technological Exchanges
The two sides reached an agreement in early 1983, following round two in
their current series of political consultations at the deputy foreign minister
level, to resume student exchanges. They agreed last fall to increase the
number of annual exchanges from 10 to 70.
The Soviet side, at the October 1983 round of talks, also proposed 22
exchange programs in cultural and scientific fields, and the two sides
subsequently signed a protocol on improving meteorological links. in November
1984, a Soviet official told a US diplomat that the USSR and China would host
eight artists and five scientific and technological delegations from the other
side in 1984. The latter presumably included:
-- The Soviet group that attended an international meeting of
meteorologists held in Hangzhou last March to study climatic
conditions.
-- The Soviet group that attended an international seminar on
demographic questions held in Beijing in late March.
-- The Chinese delegation, headed by deputy minister of Geology and
Mineral Reserves, that attended the 27th International Conference on
Geology, held in Moscow in August.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
SUBJECT: USSR-China: Impact of Arkhipov Visit
Internal Distribution
Orig - DDI
Senior Review Panel
OCPAS/IMD/CB
Vice Chairman, NIC
NIO/USSR
NIO/EA
PDR Staff
DDO/SE
DDO/EAD
C/DDO/FF
C/DDO/SE
C/DD0/SE
C!/'DO/EA
D/OEA
C/O /CH
C/OEA/NA
C/OEA/CH/DEF
C/OEA/CH/FOR
D/SOVA
C/Sc /PA
C/SOVA/TF
C/SOYA/SF
C/SOVA/EA
C/SOVA/OI
C/SOYA/SE
C/SOYA/TW
C/SOVA/TW/A
C/SOVA/TW/T
C/SOVA/TW/M
SOVA/ZW/A[::::~
SOYA/IW/A/Typescript file
DDI/BONA/TWA/
(22 Jan 85)
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1058R000507240001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
SUBJECT: USSR-China: Impact of Arkhipov Visit
External Distribution
Director, National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Senior Staff Member, USSR-Eastern Europe
Roam 368, Old FOB
Donald Gregg, Assistant to the
Vice President for National Security Affairs
White House
Gaston Sigur
Senior Staff Member, Asia
Room 302, Old EOB
State Department
Jeremy Azrael
Member, Policy Planning Council (S/P)
Room 7315
Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217
Donald M. Anderson, Director
Office of Chinese Affairs
Bureau of Fast Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4318
Director
Office of Regional Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacfic Affairs
Room 4310
Hugh Montgomery
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Roam 6531
John J. Taylor, Director
Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, INR
Roam 8840
r~..?>~~? - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8 ?___
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8
SUBJECT: USSR-China: Impact of Arkhipov Visit
External Distribution (Continued)
State Department
Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
William Sherman
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4310
Harriet Isom
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 4310
Linda Wetzel
Policy Assistant for USSR-EE Affairs
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO/Regional Policy
Room 1D469, Pentagon
CIA Rep NMIC
DIA/SS0 (JSO-1)
Rm 2D 801-A, Pentagon
Department of Defense
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/22 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000507240001-8