AFGHANISTAN-US: THE ALLIANCE AT THE UN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review
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Central Intelligence Agency
24 October 1985
Afghanistan-US: The Alliance at the UN
Summary
The arrival of an Afghan resistance
delegation at the UN General Assembly this week
represents the first significant effort by the new
insurgent alliance--Ittihad Islami--to focus
international attention on the Afghan issue. The
delegation hopes broader international attention
will enable it to challenge the official Kabul
representatives and set a precedent for resistance
alliance representation at other international
forums. Pakistan is concerned about the impact of
a highly visible resistance delegation on its ties
with Moscow and will seek to limit the group's
public exposure. If the delegation can operate
effectively at the UN in spite of Pakistani
restrictions, it will mark an important step in
improving the political cohesion of the Afghan
resistance, enhance resistance representation at
other international organizations, and help allay
Pakistan's concerns about its own equities,
including the Geneva negotiations on
Afghanistan.
This paper was prepared byl (Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA,
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Delegation Strengths and Weaknesses
The resistance delegation represents the first sustained
effort by the insurgents to lobby at the UN since November 1980,
when an insurgent delegation split between supporters of ex-King
Zahir and guerrilla leaders was denied entrance to the General
Assembly. This year's delegation includes the spectrum of
opinion in the resistance alliance, making it more likely that UN
representatives will consider the delegation authoritative. Led
by fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the group includes a
representative of each of the main groups in the Afghan
resistance alliance. Because Gulbuddin is known for his anti-
Western as well as anti-Communist views, the delegation is less
likely to be viewed as a tool of the United States.
The insurgents' record of more than five years of increasing
military pressure on the Soviets, in our view, gives them
enhanced status with a number of UN delegations as a legitimate
liberation movement. We believe the insurgents' credibility has
been strengthened by their strong showing this summer against
Soviet offensives in the Konar and Panjsher Valleys and in the
recently concluded Paktia Province fighting.
The delegation members lack experience in political dealings
outside the Islamic world, however, and the group is likely to be
strained by its political and ethnic diversity. Political
divisions between the moderates and the most radical of the
fundamentalists could cause problems at the UN. Open squabbling
could arise over such issues as distribution of Western aid, the
extent of US influence on resistance policies, policy statements
favoring Saudi or-Iranian positions on any number of issues,
anti-Israel rhetoric, loyalty to the resistance cause, and the
course of resistance alliance policy.
Pakistani Concerns
Pakistani officials--fearing that a highly vocal resistance
delegation could embarrass Islamabad and cause problems with
other delegations--have stressed that they wish to prevent public
contact between the delegation and US officials in New York. In
our view, Pakistan's concern stems from a desire not to anger the
Soviets and possibly jeopardize the Geneva talks as well as from
a wish to maintain widespread support for the UN resolution on
Afghanistan. Pakistani officials also want to maintain their
control over the resistance alliance and fear that direct contact
with US officials could erode Pakistani influence over the
insurgent groups.
Outlook
The performance of the resistance delegation at the UN will
be important in the success or failure of future efforts by the
Afghans to attract international attention to their cause. A
successful performance at the UN would, in our view, go a long
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way towards convincing Arab and other Islamic countries that the
insurgents ought to be represented more regularly at other
international organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic
Conference. Moreover, an effective resistance effort in New York
probably would ease Pakistani concerns about future efforts and
might encourage Islamabad to be more forthcoming in supporting
insurgent attempts. A more visible international presence by the
insurgents--especially if it resulted in serious challenges to
the Kabul regime's credentials in various international
organizations--would raise the political cost to Moscow of
maintaining its occupation of Afghanistan.
An effective resistance performance at the UN also might
boost insurgent unity efforts and encourage resistance leaders to
look for additional ways to establish an international
presence. The newly established resistance alliance would, we
believe, benefit significantly if the representatives in New York
demonstrate that they can work together with a minimum of
friction. Gulbuddin and other resistance leaders, who have
declared that a military victory is the only way tb oust the
Soviets, may see benefits deriving from a more active insurgent
role internationally.
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan-US: The Alliance at the UN
DDI/NESA/SO/AJ I(24 October 1985)
Mr. Steve Sestanovich, NSC Staff
Mr. Charles Dunbar, Department of State
Mr. Ron Lorton, Department of State
Mr. Robert Peck, Department of State
Ms. Desiree Millikan, Department of State
Mr. Darnell Whitt, Department of Defense
Mr. Michael Pillsbury, Department of Defense
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - NESA/SO/A
1 - NESA/SO/P
1 - NESA/SO/S
1 - NESA/SO/A,
1 - Typescript File
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