THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507020002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 October 1985
THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND AFGHANISTAN
SUMMARY
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is
unlikely to contribute much more than impotent resolutions in
support of the Afghan resistance. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,
the two OIC members most concerned with Afghanistan, do not
view the OIC as a significant or useful venue for the Afghan
issue. Many of the Islamic states prefer to keep the issue
on the back burner and not to antagonize Moscow. US ability
to influence the OIC is limited because the organization
associates Washington with Tel Aviv. Washington would have
to work through Islamabad, Riyadh, and perhaps Cairo to
influence the OIC on Afghanistan.
This paper was prepared byl (Issues Branch, South Asia
Division, Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis at the request of
Michael Pillsbw y, Department of Defense. Information as of 22 October
1985 was used in preparing this report. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA M 85-10209
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Since the inception of the Islamic Conference in 1971, the organization
has been weak and mostly concerned with preserving a fragile concensus
among its 44 members. Despite the OIC's charter that calls for
"safeguarding the independence and national rights of all Muslim peoples,"
many controversial political topics, such as the role of the Soviets in
Afghanistan or the Iran-Iraq war have tended to reveal conflicting
interests and have resulted in relatively innocuous resolutions. In
contrast, militant resolutions on the status of Jerusalem and the
Palestinians find near unanimous support.
The OIC bureaucracy is small and not well equipped to provide material
aid to Muslim guerrilla groups such as the Afghan Mujahideen. Secretary
General Sharifuddin Pirzada, who was in President Zia's government, is not
a forceful or innovative official and is not likely to advocate an Afghan
policy that is out in front of Islamabad's plans. We do not believe the
OIC's Islamic Development Bank --created to fund projects such as
irrigation or municipal services-- will stretch its charter to aid the
Mujahideen. The organization's Islamic News Agency might serve as a
conduit for publishing more articles on the insurgents, provided that the
Mujahideen establish a information arm.
An unwieldly group such as the OIC compares unfavorably with other
international organizations such as ASEAN. ASEAN is a more geographically
compact and politically cohesive group than the OIC and is better
positioned to take action in the face of external agression directed at one
of its member states..
Afghanistan
The OIC has displayed only limited concern for Afghanistan. In January
1980 the OIC suspended Afghanistan's membership and adopted a resolution
that "strongly condemned Soviet military aggression against the Afghan
people." By May 19 0, the OIC Foreign Ministers Conference had softened
its criticism to express only "deep concern over the perpetuation of Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan, and strongly reiterated the demand
for the immediate, total, and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Afghanistan." The same language has been repeated in OIC
Afghan resolutions since 1980.
In 1984, despite US demarches for a tougher condemnatory resolution and
an impassioned speech attacking the USSR by a prominent Afghan Mujah'ideen
figure, Islamabad offered no new language for the Afghan resolution, with
the exception of a phrase critical of the bombing of Pakistani territory.
The widely-publicized final communique of the Foreign Ministers Conference
of last December called only for "further efforts to safeguard the
independence of Afghanistan as a nonaligned Islamic state." The document
did not mention the Soviet. occupation. The final resolutions do mention
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the Soviets, but these were published months after the meeting and received
Key Players' Roles
Pakistan, which plays the major role in OIC consideration on
Afghanistan, has not pushed for tougher language or other policy actions,
Islamabad, in our view, assesses that Arab
delegations friendly to the USSR would successfully thwart any anti-Soviet
effort. President Zia, faced with political divisions within Pakistan over
the effectiveness of a hard line policy on Afghanistan and increasing
Soviet pressure does not want to get too far out front on an anti-Soviet
Saudi Arabia and Egypt--the most influential Islamic nations in the
OIC-- also seem reluctant to support a stronger Afghan resolution. The
Saudis prefer a low public profile on Afghanistan. Egypt--whose suspension
from the OIC was lifted only last year-- does not want to expend its
limited political capital on Afghanistan.
US Influence
US influence in the OIC is minimal. In last year's final communique,
the US was condemned by name for its "hostile attitude towards the
Palestinians," its continued support of the "Zionist enemy," its anti-Arab
voting in the UN, and its military presence along Arab coasts. US friends
and allies among the O,IC membership remained silent during the debates.
Outlook
The OIC is likely to give little more than lip service to Afghan
affairs unless a key OIC member such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia takes an
active leadership role. Probably the best we can expect from the OIC is'to
continue to allow Afghan insurgent leaders address the annual foreign
ministers meetings. Even with Pakistan and-Saudi leadership other Arab and
African members will drag their heels because of their own priorities.
Even if the Mujahideen arrived on the OIC's doorstep with a unified
delegation, we believe Muslim states with ties to Moscow would resist
granting the Mujahideen formal observer or government-in-exile status.
Other moderate OIC states such as Morocco or Sudan would have qualms about
seating an anti-regime group for fear it would set precedent.
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SUBJECT: The Islamic Conference and Afghanistan
External Distribution:
Mr. Michael Pillsbury, Department of Defense
Mr. Darnell Whitt, Department of Defense
Mr. Steve Sestanovich, NSC Staff
Mr. Charles Dunbar, Department of State
Mr. Ron Lorton, Department of State Mr. Robert Peck, Department of State
Ms. Desiree Millikan, Department of State
Mr. Herbert Hagerty, Department of State
Internal Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - C/DDO/NEC
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - NESA/SO/I
1 - NESA/SO/S
1 - NESA/SO/P
1 - NESA/SO/A
1 - NESA/SO/I,
1 - Typescript File
DDI/NESA/SO
(22 October 1.985)
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