ALGERIA: INTENTIONS TOWARD MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506840001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 August 1985
Algeria: Intentions Toward Morocco
Summary
Available evidence does not indicate that
Algeria constitutes the imminent threat portrayed
recently to US officials by the Moroccan Prime
Minister. Their historically troubled
relationship is at a low level over the Western
Sahara conflict and King Hassan's political union
with Libya. Nevertheless, Algiers, in our
judgment, does not want the situation to
deteriorate to such a point that large-scale
military hostilities are likely. With regard to
the Western Sahara problem, small skirmishes
probably will continue with little warning along
Morocco's defensive berm. Algeria will want to
keep the pressure on King Hassan to force him to
negotiate an arrangement allowing some Saharan
autonomy. The greatest danger is that these
minor clashes might lead to unpremeditated
warfare. We do not believe, however, that
Algiers is actively seeking Hassan's overthrow,
which could produce a more hostile government in
Rabat. Bendjedid's willingness to tighten the
screws on Rabat may also be constrained by
Hassan's "union" with Libya, and the danger that
both its eastern and western borders.
Algiers could suddenly encounter hostilities on
This memorandum was prepared by the LJ/~I
Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis. It was requested by the office of
the Vice President. Information as of 28 August 1985 was used
in its preparation. Questions and comments ld be directed
to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, F 7 25X1
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Moroccan Dissidents: A New Angle?
The most recent incident highlighting the rivalry between
Morocco and Algeria are charges by Rabat, heatedly denied by
Algiers, that the Algerians are attempting to foment political
instability in Morocco. Last week, the government of Morocco put
on trial 17 dissidents whom it claimed were captured in July
after entering the country from Algeria. Rabat also claims the
dissidents were trained by Algerian security officials.
If the alleged Algerian role is true, Algiers indeed may have
decided to put pressure on the regime of King Hassan by stirring
up trouble inside Morocco, Pr than trying to do something on 25X1
the Western Sahara issue.
We cannot confirm the Algerian link to the
dissidents, however, or ascertain the extent, if any, to which
Algeria has given support to other Moroccan dissidents. 25X1
President Bendjedid is under
pressure from his senior Army o icers to take more forceful
action against Morocco. They are concerned about Bendjedid's
refusal to prevent Rabat's completion of an extensive network of
defensive berms in the Western Sahara. The more leftist-leaning
officers are disgruntled with Bendjedid's
courting of the US and the West, particularly because of
continued US and French military support for Morocco. These
officers want to give the Polisario guerrillas more weapons and
have them prosecute the war with Morocco with even greater vigor.
Bendjedid may have decided to sponsor Moroccan dissident activity
as a concession to these officers.
PLO-olanned raid on Israeli defense he
An alternative scenario is that the dissidents were allowed
to reside in Algeria, but that their plans and activities were
not closely monitored by the government. Senior security and
military officials opposed to Bendjedid also may have sponsored
the infiltrations, expecting them to fail, to embarass Bendjedid
by illustrating to foreigners the "contradictions" in the
moderate foreign policy image he has sought to establish. We
believe this may have been the case with last spring's abortive
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Bendjedid's eagerly-awaited state visit to Washington. In our
opinion, Bendjedid is too smart to have approved something doomed
to fail which would have impacted negatively on his trip to the
United States. 25X1
Legacy of Bitterness
Rabat's accusations of Algerian support for dissidents is
the latest theme in the long history of antagonism between
Morocco and Algeria. Underlying the dispute are deep-seated
suspicions based on political, geographic, economic, and
psychological factors. Both have the largest populations and
most abundant resources in the Maghreb, and each views the other
as the principal roadblock to its own regional dominance. In
addition, the political systems of the two countries --
revolutionary socialism in contrast to a feudal monarchy -- are
antithetical. 25X1
The principal source of tension between Algeria and Morocco
in the past decade has been Rabat's claim to the Western Sahara.
Algerian leaders believe their assistance to the Polisario is
necessary both to counter what they see as Moroccan expansionism,
and to demonstrate the country's commitment to foreign groups
fighting wars of national liberation. Although Algeria has won
the political battle thus far in the OAU and nonaligned movement
by gaining widespread diplomatic recognition for the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR), its prospects on the battlefield
-- where the outcome will be really determined -- are grim.
Morocco's commitment of 80,000 men and the construction of the
defensive perimeter during the past two years has proven
effective in defending the territory from attacks by the 3,500
Polisario. Moreover, King Hassan's political union with Libya
has created a potentially new threat on Algeria's eastern
frontier, and Algeria will now have to consider possible hostile
action from Libya if it were to become embroiled with Morocco in
a crisis. 25X1
Algiers has tried different, and often contradictory,
strategies in its struggle to counter these diplomatic and
military setbacks. President Bendjedid earlier this year placed
emphasis on finding a political solution, almost certainly
realizing that the Moroccan berm campaign precludes any semblance
of a military victory by the Polisario. Hassan's rejection of
Algerian peace plans, however, appears to have encouraged Algiers
to adopt a more confrontational policy toward Morocco. For
example, contacts between the two countries have been reduced,
and we are seeing more intensive Algerian efforts among
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nonaligned countries to win wider diplomatic recognition for the 25X1
Polisario (Liberia recently recognized the SDAR 25X1
and some press reports
suggest India may follow suit). 25X1
The Algerian Strategy: More of the Same
In our judgment, however, Algier's continued support for the
Polisario, and its diplomatic wrangling with Rabat, are the
primary elements in Bendjedid's program to harass Hassan for his
"intransigence" on the Western Sahara problem. The Algerians
probably believe that they can make the Western Sahara conflict
so costly that Hassan at some point will agree to some Saharan
autonomy. Algeria may also anticipate that its support of the
Polisario will deter Hassan from a more ambitious scheme to
resurrect the idea of a "greater Morocco," which includes not
only the Western Sahara, but Mauritania and parts of southwest 25X1
Algeria as well.
We believe that the Bendjedid government does not want a
major military conflict with Morocco. Even though Algeria enjoys
an overwhelming military advantage along the frontier, its
leadership almost certainly realizes that the rugged terrain
along the border would limit military action to cross-border
strikes by Algeria that could lead to a protracted war of
attrition. Algiers may also realize that Morocco has a clear
advantage along the southern portion of the border, and could
overrun Tindouf, the only significant Algerian settlement in the
southwest and the political and military headquarters of the
Polisario. Rabat could also launch air strikes against Algeria's
strategic petroleum and natural gas facilities. 25X1
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Alternative Scenarios
A number of developments might compel Algieria to reassess
its position toward Morocco and encourage its leaders to adopt an
even tougher policy. A decision by King Hassan to engage in "hot
pursuit" of Polisario guerrillas into Algeria, or possibly into
northern Mauritania, might lead the Algerians to become more
directly involved in the fighting and to use its Army to harass
the Moroccans along the northern frontier. This could lead to an
unpremediated conflict between the two countries. 25X1
There are other less likely scenarios which, in our opinion,
could result in a more aggressive anti-Hassan posture. Morocco's
purchase of highly sophisticated weapon systems, for example,
might cause Bendjedid to feel more threatened and to consider a
preemptive military strike. The Bendjedid government probably
would respond militarily if it believed that Morocco and Libya
were planning aggression against it, or in retaliation for a
hostile act, such as terrorism. Bendjedid might even consider
the military option if he and his advisors perceived
Moroccan-Libyan involvement in a clandestine operation to subvert
his government. 25X1
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bLuhLT
SUBJECT: Algeria: Intentions Toward Morocco
NESA M#85-10179
DISTRIBUTION
1 - Donald Gregg (Office of Vice President)
2 - Ron Lorton (State)
1 -- David Zweifel (State)
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M ds/6119(28Aug85) 25X1
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North
Atlantic Ocean
canary Islands
GROIN
Lmmur.
Western
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sea
DERIVATIVE CL BY .4
DELL OADR
DERIVED FROM M?Itl^~?
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Morocco