AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406620001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 16, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of & -~2 T? Secret
IIntelli
ence
g
Afghanistan Situation Report
16 July 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
Top Secret
NESA M 85-10148CX
SOVA M 85-10127CX
16 July 1985-'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
25X1
TOP SECRET
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
SUMMER CAMPAIGN IN FULL SWING
Soviet and Afghan regime forces are conducting
military operations in the Panjsher Valley, near
Herat, north of the Salang Pass, and in Paktia
Province, with the insurgents putting up strong
resistance.
DEC.INE IN AIRSTRIKES
Airstrikes against Pakistan have dropped
significantly since the Konar Valley operation
ended in early-June.
IN BRIEF
1 25X1
1 25X1
AFGHANISTAN IN JUNE 3 25X1
Soviet and Afghan forces succeeded in driving out
most resistance groups from the Konar Valley, but
the insurgents increased activity in the Panjsher
Valley, Herat and Helmand Provinces, and along the
vital Sal ang highway.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
16 July 1985
NESA M 85-10148CX
i SOVA M 85-10127CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85T01058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
r
Chaphchar9n
MabiUR.'"= - alltt
WG R NANGAR HAFT:
ff~
a
7~
Gh82111 i/~
PAhTfA
v O
v(Y e
f!'/,r HAZN( j~~~Khowet
0
PAKTiKA
'?Aalat (?J1
~+
I JeyreThn
A_Aeiir-e \1
~~-J~ ~heril0 -
JSheberghan? sn KH
JOWZJAN I 1"
Mayrn\h, ISAr
'FARYAB
Yranj
NIIviRUZ
dsN / ZApc r
i
Qendai ar
QANDAti - I
R
Spin Boldaakje 117
Boundary `representation;is'
not necessarily authoiitativo;
/KONDZ`
~o.
_ Kholm `Ko du
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 . 50 100 150 200 Miles
16 July 1985
NESA M 85-10148CX
SOVA M 85-10127CX
Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
0 Province capital
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85T01058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
the Soviets h-ave-
expanded the Panj.sher Valley offensive--underway since
late June. Moscow has introduced. some 6, 500 new troops
into the Valley. The offensive so far is meeting stiff
resistance, and
large numbers of Afg
han
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
troops stationed. in the Panjsher have deserted or been
killed. The insurgents. have attacked several convoys
and,
regim
e and Soviet casualties are high.
In Herat, a Soviet regiment began a four-dasweep on
10 July. vi ets
sent in reinforcements from the USSR.
the Soviets were also conducting
regimenta -size operations north of the Salang Pass
Gardeyz..
Comment:. The high level of, insurgent activity in the
Panjsher indicates that Jamiat leader Masood's forces
have regained their strength following last fall's
Soviet offensive in the valley. Past offensives have
shown that the Soviets are able to move up the Valley
despite guerrilla resistance. In these operations,
however,'the insurgents generally have managed to get
away before Soviet forces could cut off their escape
routes...
DECLINE IN AIR STRIKES
Air attacks against Pakistani territory have declined
significantly since the Konar Valle o eration ended in
early J un.e,. only one .
bombing incident between early June and mi-d-July
wherea=s attacks had been occurring five to 10 times as
month since last autumn. Overflights of Pakistani
territory also decreased significantly, but
overflights resumed in late
June.
Comment: The decline in ai rstri kes reflects the
completion of military operations: in the Konar'
Valley. The stri kes probably wi 11' resume with
Soviet/Afghan operations near the border or with
increasing insurgent activity. The decline in
25X11
25X1
16 July 1985, 25X1
NESA'. M 85-10148CX
SOYA M 85-101'27CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
airstrikes suggests that ai rstri kes are designed
primarily to disrupt insurgent operations or support
Soviet and Afghan regime ground operations, and only
secondarily to intimidate Pakistan.
25X1
Kabul Radio reported on 11 July that several
civilians were killed by a bomb 'set off by
"counter-revolutionaries" in the marketplace
main Soviet housing complex in Kabul.
of the
Following a three-month investigation, in early
June KHAD officials arrested or dismissed 385 KHAD
officers suspected of sympathizing or cooperating
An official of the International Committee for the
Red Cross says it has decided to send Red Cross
personnel into Afghanistan without asking Kabul's
permission to interview Soviet prisoners held by
the insurgents. The effort will be limited to the
protection of prisoners.
Babrak Karmal departed Kabul on 10 July for the
Soviet Union for a "general medical checkup,"
according to Kabul radio. Babrak, who reportedly
16 July 1985
NESA M 85-10148CX
2 SOVA M 85-10127CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
V
25X6
25X6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
AFGHANISTAN IN JUNE
Soviet/Afghan forces completed a major spring assault
in the Konar Valley, breaking a lengthy siege of the
Afghan garrison at Barikowt.and forcing the insurgents,
probably only temporarily, out of their Konar
redoubts. The insurgents increased their activities in
the Panjsher Valley, Herat and Helmand Provinces, and
along the vital Sal ang highway, and Soviet and Afghan
troops conducted multi battalion sweeps in the same
regi ons.
The Konar Valley Campaign
The combined.Soviet/Afghan operations in the Konar
Valley, which employed air and ground units from
throughout eastern Afghanistan, ended shortly after a
Soviet convoy broke through to Barikowt on 6 June.
Nearly all of the 10, 000 Soviet and Afghan troops used
in the campaign soon returned to their garrisons.
16 July 1985
NESA Mr 85:-10148CX
SOVA M 85-10,127CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
The Soviets' primary objectives apparentl v
avoid the embarrassment of losing the
strategically important Afghan garrison at
Bari kowt;
disrupt insurgent supply lines;
destroy weapons and provisions caches; and
-- scatter and drive out insurgent forces.
The minor increases of Soviet/Afghan troops and
outposts in the Konar indicates retention of territory
Soviet satisfaction may be short-lived.
s eg battalion-size operations in late June aos4
insurgent attacks intensified.
Insurgents Pick Up the Pace
Resistance efforts picked up noticeably by the middle
of June. They had successes in several regions.
16 July 1985
NESA M 85-10148CX
4 SOVA M 85-10127CX
The Soviets
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
ShInd.and. Sympathizers i n t:h:e Afghan Air Force.
sabotaged. and destroyed. more than 20 Afghan
fi g:hter aircraft,
This loss represents approxitmate.l y 10
percent of fixed-wing combat airc:raft in the.
Afghan Air Force. Despite increased Soviet
concern for airfield security, the insurgents
al so damaged a.i rcraft at Qandahar and Bagram
air bases during the month.
Panjsher.' ValTley. A series of attacks in the
central section of' the. valley resulted in t:he
death of an Afghan, general and, the capture: of
more than 400 Afghan troops, according to
sources of the US Embassy in K ab ui .
Herat.. Insurgent forces controlled muchi of th.e'
city and were continually harassing the garri:son
and airport.
-- Mazar-e Sharif. An explosion damaged` a.
government housing complex which resulted in the
death of at least 40 regime offi ci al s and army
officers, according to a source of the-US
Embass.y in Kabul.
Other Soviet/Afghan Military Operations:
preparation for a major offensive in the Pa.n jshe.r
V a i l ey.
1.6 July 1985
NESA M.8'5=10"148CX'
S OV A M 8 5-11OT,2 TCX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
TOP SECRET
Soviet and Afghan regime forces thwarted insurgent
attempts to penetrate the Kabul security zone on at
least two occasions. The US Embassy in Kabul reports,
however, that the nearly 10-month lull in fighting
around the capital was broken by several insurgent
rocket attacks and bomb blasts.
Outlook
Soviet military operations appear to be aimed mainly at
securing airfields and garrisons from insurgent attacks
and at improving highway security. Fighting is likely
to continue at a high level in the weeks ahead. We
believe that the Soviets wi 11 increasingly call upon
their elite Spetsnaz forces and employ air assaults to
locate and engage insurgent forces. Operations such as
the Konar Valley offensive probably will have little
effect on the insurgents' abi y to maintain their
supply lines.
16 July 1985
NESA M 85-10148CX
6 SOVA M 85-10127CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/08: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000406620001-8