AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406580001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of r ~~ TO Secret
Intelligence (~J
~~
Afghanistan Situation Report
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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9 July 1985
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
INSURGENTS INCREASE PRESSURE IN KABUL AND HE RAT
Insurgents recently rocketed Kabul ands
disrupting regime activity in Herat.
Iran is agai n forcing delays of s upply caravans
destined for insurgents in western Afghanistan.
IRAN IMPEDES SUPPLY FLOWS
The Pashtun cultural heritage spurs determined
resistance to the Soviet invaders but, at the same
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THE PASHTUN ETHOS AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE 4 25X1
time, hampers cooperative military efforts.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
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INSURGENTS .INCREASE PRESSURE IN KABUL AN:D HE'RAT'
The US Embassy reports.that.insurgents on 2?July
rocketed several areas. of Kabul while .attacking: the
airport with machinegun fire and rockets ?or mortars.:
In. mid-May, according to US Embassy sources; se.c,ur:ity
i n Herat was so poor. that the proVi nci al? governor moved
about in an APC with an armed escort-. The 12-kilometer
trip from the airport to the city required 90 minutes
and involved passing through successive Soviet, regime,
and insurgent checkpoints.
Comment.: The insurgent attacks on Kabul are the
largest since the Soviets increased security in the
area last November and coinci de with reports that:.
insurgents in the Kabul area are receiving more and
better. arms. Security in Herat has been deteriorating
for months. The attacks will force the Soviets to move
units agai n through the outl yi na areas of both c~ti es
in search of insurgent bands.
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IRAN IMPEDES SUPPLY FLOMS
Iran is agai
n imped
ing the
flow of materiel to
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insur ents i
n weste
rn Af ha
nista
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The guerrillas have
waited
six o nine
months
before o
btaining permission
to ship 25X1
weapons and
southwestern
ammunit
Afghan
ion from
istan no
the triborder area
rth to Herat. Some
in
Hizbi
Islami insurgents informed the Iranians that they would
prefer the danger of transporting supplies across the
western plains of Af hanistan to dealing with Iranian
officials.
Comment: Tehran's continuing reluctance to assist the
mostly Sunni insurgents in western Afghanistan, even by
allowing supply caravans to transit Iranian territory,
will oblige the resistance to rely more heavily on
captured arms and may- cause it to postpone or cancel
some operations while awaiting supplies. Shortages of
arms during major Soviet operations--last summer, for
example--reduced the insurgents' fighting capability.
IN BRIEF
-- A New York Times journalist who recently travelled
extensively in Afghanistan says that the resistance
controls about 95 percent of the countryside and
that he saw no signs of famine or large-scale
attacks. on civilians. The correspondent is
preparing a series of articles on his travels.
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PERSPECTIVE
THE PASHTUN ETHOS AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
by NE SA
Pashtun insurgent groups are central to the Afghan
insurgency. Pashtuns lead most of the major resistance
organizations based in Peshawar, and the groups
affiliated with them dominate the insurgency in the
southern and eastern provinces. The exiles range
politically from the monarchists linked with Gailani to
the extreme Islamic fundamentalists led by Gulbuddin
He kmatyar and Sayyaf. In the northern provinces, the
Pashtun insurgents have often been at odds with the
Tajik-dominated Jamiat-i-Islami. In .Qandahar Province,
Pashtun insurgents from different tribes have
frequently fought each other. Despite their role in
internecine fighting in the insurgency, the Pashtuns
have been mi l i tari l y among the most effective groups
fighting the Soviets. Their most noted commander is
Abdul Haq, who has been responsible for many of the
attacks on the Kabul area.
In our view, cultural factors account for the Pashtuns'
determined resistance to the Soviet invaders and the
Kabul regime and at the same time for the tribesmen's
difficulties in mounting a coherent military effort.
The Pashtun ethos has been a major factor in the
insurgents' internecine fighting and rivalry. Pashtuns
are aggressive, fractious, and martial. They are
linked mainly by a common language (Pashtu) and a code
of conduct ( Pashtunwali ) based on Islam and tradition,
in which vengeance is a key element. Though Pashtuns
comprise much of the insurgency, they also dominate the
military officer ranks of the Kabul regime. Urban
Pashtuns., including many military officers and several
members of the Kabul 1 eadershi p, often have 1 ost thei r
tribal identities.
The Pashtun People
The Pashtuns are the largest and the politically
dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan. According to
academic experts, an estimated 6 million Pashtuns live
in Afghanistan, with the majority in the southern,
eastern, and northeastern parts of the country. Most
are engaged in farming and livestock raising; others
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are merchants, artisans, soldiers, and civil servants;
about a third are normally pastoral nomads, though the
war has severely disrupted their migratory habits and.
?turned many into sedentary refugees. Nearly all are
Sunni. The more than 20 Pashtun tribe-s are di vid.ed
into more than 400 clans; most tribes are grouped into
the Durani and Ghilzai tribal confederations; which
rose in opposition to each other in the 18th century.
Leadership and Hierarchy
Pashtun insurgent leaders are chosen for several
reasons, including their military effectiveness.
According to Western and Afghan academicians, a Pashtun
leader is selected on the basis of his ability to
protect his tribe from external threats and to solve
internal tribal pwoblems. Leadership qualities include
bravery, wisdom, charisma, wealth, fighting ability,
and hospitality--a willingness to receive, feed, and
support others. To have a significant contingent of
fighters, a tribal leader must come from a fairly large
clan, according to an Afghan academi ci an. Leadews are
not normally elected by formal ceremony or vote,
according to an academic expert, but emerge by
demonstrating ability and are accepted by consensus.
Once a person is regarded as a leader, a family
member--usually a son or brother--customarily re places
him when he dies or grows too old to lead. Although
the tribes have a hierarchy, the Pashtuns value
individual freedom, equality, and respect for the-
di gnity of the i ndi vi du al, according to Western
observers.
PashtunNali
The Pashtun code, Pashtunwal i , is respons?i bl a for many
of the divisions in Pashtun society and the.
insurgency. Accenting militarism and honor, the code
has as its most important elements badal, vengeance;
melmastia, the obligation of hospitality and. th.e
protection given each guest; 'and nanavati, the right of
asyl um and the obligation to accept a truce offer. The
principles of honor and revenge have made feuds
continuous processes. in the Pashtun community. To
infringe on someone's honor. is cause for killing the
transgressor, which i'n turn wi1.1 call for another death
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in revenge; blood money is sometimes accepted.
Families are obliged to seek vengeance, even after a
generation or more, and badal has Jed to feuds lasting
several generations. Melmastia is a matter of prestige
and a duty of the i ndi vi dual household. Hospitality
must be extended to known enemies as lavishly as to
friends or strangers. In turn the guest is expected to
behave in a.friendly manner. Nanavati is a special
form of hospitality i 11 ustrated by a Pashtun fol k story
that praises a woman who granted sanctuary to her son's
Loyalties. A Pashtun's commitment to persons and
groups outside the family and clan is uncertain and
.impermanent. According to Western observers, a
Pashtun's first loyalty is to his kin group, which is
the source of 'his livelihood, his social neighborhood,
and his moral code. His loyalty extends to his tribe
and nation only insofar as his family interests .
coincide with the larger groups'. .The importance of an
issue is often measured by how much it involves his
fami 1'y honor or welfare.
Pashtun tri besmen have frequent y agreed to truces with
the Kabul regime and. have also a reed to serve as
regime mi 1 iti a. i n many
instances the tri esmen ave accepted the government's
offers of money and weapons and. soon after redefected
to the resistance. Sometimes the tribesmen have agreed
to negotiate and then ambushed the regime's
negotiators. Such behavior is permitted by the tribal
codes, according to a Western academic expert, because
the regime is not considered a legitimate author it v.
Militancy. .Tradition also encourages P.ashtuns to
parti-ci.pate in the insurgency. Pashtun?s, according to
Western 'observers, admire the posturing warrior, with
bandoleer and rifle, who stand s. erect and moves?
l ithel y. , ?Rea,di Hess to do battle is suggested no.t ?onl y
by the .custo.m. of carryi ng weapons but also by village
construction--the high defense towers:of the fortified
-vi.ll age are common throughout Afghanistan, but
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particularly in Pashtun territory. The heroic spirit,
according to one Western observer, has prompted Pashtun
insurgents to carry tape recorders to ambushes and fire
fights. The recorded sounds of battle accompanied by~
the shouting of fierce insults and slogans are taken
back to camp and played to admiring women and
children. Reliable observers also indicate that
Pashtuns prefer individual weapons to crew-served
weapons because the former permit personal
identification and greater ego gratification.
Rivalry. The Pashtun custom of cousin marriage--a man
weds the daughter of his father's brother--perpetuates
the inward-looking nature of the society, according to
Western observers, and often causes male cousins to
become rivals, vying for i nheri tance from the common,
grandf ather, for wives, and for i of 1 uence withi n the
family. Cousin rivalry has caused many Pashtun family
feuds and is an important factor in tribal politics.
If there are two factions within a tribe, cousins will
usually be in opposite camps. Fundamentalist
resistance leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, for example, is a
first cousin of former President Hafizullah Amin,
according to a Western academi c,i an.
Pushtunistan
The concept of a united Pushtunistan has been a
periodic battle cry of the Pashtuns. Advocates seek
self-determination for the Pashtuns--that is, for those
in Pakistan--and some want relocation of the border
eastward to the Indus escarpment. The Irredentist
approach 'of successive Afghan governments has had
diminishing appeal for Pashtun tribal leaders in
.Pakistan, however, who seem to prefer greater local
autonomy within Pakistan to political union with their
Afghan brothers.
Conclusion
The lack of a united front on Pushtunistan as well as
other subjects underscores the individualistic nature
of the Pashtuns. Of all the ethnic groups in
Afghanistan, the Pashtun insurgents are the least
1 i kel y to cooperate among themselves, 1 et alone with
others, but the most likely to fight indefinitely. _
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