AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406560001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of (0- 0 Top Secret
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
State Dept. review completed
2 July 1985
Top Secret
NESA M 85-10139CX
VAM 85-10123CX
2 July 1985
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
COOPERATION AMONG SHIITE INSURGENTS
Rival groups of Shiites have agreed to end their
disputes, but their fragile truce is unlikely to
F_ I
aid the resistance effort.
KHALQI NAMED CHIEF OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. Shahnawaz Tanai recently was named Chief of
the General Staff of the Afghan armed forces, probably
to improve morale among Khalgi officers.
Some spot. shortages of food have occurred in the
eastern provinces, but widespread shortages in the
FOOD SHORTAGES IN THE EAST
immediate future are unlikely.
IN BRIEF
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USSR, but the change represe 25X1
support for the Afghan insurgents or Pakistan.
China has moderated its rhetoric on the Afghanistan
issue in recent months to improve relations with the
no softening of Chinese
t
PERSPECTIVE
CHINA-USSR: THE AFGHANISTAN OBSTACLE TO BETTER RELATIONS 04
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near. Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Ouestions or comments on the issues raised in the publication
should be directed to
2 July 1985
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2 July 1985
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COOPERAThON.AMONG,SHIITE.?INSURGENTS
Ten rival groups of Afghan Shiites in the Hazarehjat
have agre'ed':to 'en.d, their..disputes, promote an Iran.i.;an- }
style -.,r,evol uti o,n;- and .oust the Soviets and the Kabul
regime,. according to-press jreports. ..The ~tru?ce was.
reportedly.engineered by Iran and binds all the.mai,n
Shiite-groups in the Hazarehjat except the Shura-
Ingila?b-.i-Itifaq-i-Islami, which has been supported by:
Comment: Tehran's press for unity among the Shiite
groups began in earnest in March, probably from fear-of
growi-n,g~Su,nni influence, since the Peshawar resistance
leaders--a11 Sunnis--were moving at that time,:to form a
new alliance. The truce probably will prove fragile.
because .of competing local interests. Even if i.t
hol..ds,, it is unlikely to affect the overall effort to
ex'pe1*the.Soviets and oust the Kabul regime. Eight of
the 10-- S:h i -i to groups involved are local and radical and
have had little impact on the fighting. The two,lar.ger
groups, Nasr and the Sepah-i Pasdaran, which follow
Khomeini,, have, concentrated almost exclusively on -ga.i.n
ing c.ontrol, of the Hazarehjat. They have long had t.h;e,
upper hand against Shura, which was driven o.ut. of most
of the Hazarehjat in 1984 and has been generally
inact.i?ve. Iranian efforts, to -aid the Afghan insurgency
have consisted primarily of support to groups loyal to.
local landowners rather than by Iran.
Khomeini;
KHALQI NAMED CHIEF OF STAFF
Major General Shahnawaz Tanai recently has been pro-
moted from commander of the Afghan Army's I (Central)
Corps ?to.-,C,h,ief of the General Staff of the Armed
Force:s-., ; He will oversee the operations of the army and
o.f, 17; di?n.ectorate?s within the :Ministry of -.National:'
Defense, A .,young,,,m,i li -
tary officer with a reputation tor being highly
political, Tanai has been a member of the PDPA Central
Committee si;nc:e Jul, 1.983. He was the. only,Khalgi;;
ofhe,r,than D_efens,e ?.Ministe.r .?Nazar Mohammad. and ;Interior
Minister,G.ulabzoi; raised to. major general, thi:s,.Apri1
i n a ro?und..of~ ,prom.ot.i ons . that,;-1 arg;el y f avore,d ,the
Parchamis. Tanai commanded the :8th Division, h,ead-,
quartered near Kabul, prior to taking over I Corps in
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late 1982.
Comment: Tanai's appointment may be part of the
Soviets' continuing effort to placate Khal qi s, ,who
dominate the officer ranks of the Afghan military.
Given the pervasive Soviet role in the war and th.e
chronic low morale in the Afghan forces,'it is unlikely'
that this or other Afghan personnel moves will greatly
FOOD SHORTAGES IN THE EAST
Shortages of wheat, rice, onions, potatoes, kerosene,
and cooking oil are occurring in the eastern provinces
of Afghanistan Insur-
gents in Baglan and Lowgar Provinces are not permitting
the shipment of grain out of the provinces. The short-
ages have resulted from the deterioration of irrigation
systems and the disruption of distribution systems.
Comment: By preventing the shipment of grain from
areas they control, the insurgents probably hope to
ensure adequate food supplies and thus keep their
civilian supporters from migrating. Irrigation and
transportation problems and manpower shortages have
periodically produced spot shortages of food in -
Afghanistan. While spot shortages will probably con-
tinue to appear, widespread food shortages in the
immediate future are unlikely.
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US'Embassy.sources report that insurgents in the
Ghazni and -Paghma'n areas have begun to cooperate'
closely and that the Paghman groups have obtained
new supplies of weaponry and large numbers of
reinforcements.
2 July 1985
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PERSPECTIVE
CHINA-USSR: THE AFGHANISTAN OBSTACLE TO BETTER RELATIONS
China has moderated its rhetoric on the Afghanistan
issue over the past few months as part of its:, efforts
to improve relations with the Soviet Union. In. our
view, the tempering is largely tactical and represents
no softening of Chinese support for the Afghan insur-
gents or Pakistan. Indeed, Beijing. would like nothing
better than to see the Soviets remain bogged down
indefinitely in Afghanistan. China also remains very
sensitive to Soviet attempts to gain leverage over
Pakistan to halt the flow of arms to the resistance and
to accept the legitimacy of the regime in Kabul. As a
consequence, we believe China will continue to keep its
own official relations with Kabul to a minimum and
continue to supply and train Afghan insurgents.
Afghanistan As an Obstacle
Afghanistan has slipped over the past few years
ostensibly the most to the least important
blocking normalization o
vie relations, judging from Chinese
treatment of these issues.
In part this reflects a decline in Chinese
concern since 1981 that the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan poses a direct security threat to China.
It also reflects the corresponding increase in Chinese
concern about the Soviet military presence in Vietnam
and especially at Cam Ranh Bay.
The Chinese have played down all three obstacles since
last December in an effort to restore some momentum to
stalled Sino-Soviet relations. They were very
restrained in their response to the Vietnamese offen-
sive against the Cambodian resistance camps and silent
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on the fifth anniversary of the So.vi:et: i:nvas;ion?.,of ;:.~;.
Afghanistan because they were.courting `:th,e-:;.visi;ting:.
Soviet F i r s t Deputy. Premi er Arkhi pov :at ,the -time.
Chinese and Soviet medi a cl ashed brief ly.., i-n ;,Febru.ar-y.,-,.
and early March over the Soviet publ i.cati,,on of t an
Afghan protest note accusing China of a.il di,:ng ?:th;e,Af,ghan?
insurgents. But since the accession ?of the n,ew-.Soviet.,
party chief Gorbachev in March, the Chinese have held
down the number of high-level commentaries on
Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union has downplayed:. it?s a,_,s,?
c r i t i c i s m of C h i n a . The Chinese press, however, con=
ti nues to produce a steady stream of -.low-l eve;l:-Yar;titcl;es
on Afghanistan that mention brutality-by Sovieit;:_-
troops.
Beijing, meanwhile, continues to :ref use-to. have .a.ny-
official contact with Kabul. l est . it lend som,er.l,egi1ti-,1 ;
macy to the Kabul regime and the Soviet, mi1i,ta-ry. .,;
presence .in Afghanistan. According,to the Ghi?-n:e,se~-MF-A---
-
First Secretary, the Chinese rebuffed ;two recent;
attempts by Kabul to establish. contact. ,:..-0m -.17.Janua?r,y--
the Chinese charge in Kabul refused to accept ,.a 1'et:t:er:,-
from the Afghan ruling party to the Chinese :C?ommun ::st:.-,
Party. Simi larly, . the Chinese rejected a--note from-th:e
Afghan Foreign Ministry on 31 January: p.ro.testi-4g :i
Chinese aid to the insurgents. We believe .the C.hi-nese;.,
may have feared that the Soviets and their Afghan
allies would misrepresent such contacts as a softening
of China's support for the insurgents and Pakistan.
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Outlook
The Chinese are likely to continue to temper their
press commentary on Afghanistan, at least as long as
they are still hopeful of improving relations with
Moscow, while maintaining their backing for the Afghan
insurgents and Pakistan. The Chinese will use aid to
the insurgents to reassure Pakistan as well as the
United States that their overtures to Moscow do not.
foreshadow any dramatic reversal of China's geostrate-
gic alignment with the West. Pakistani cooperation is
crucial to sustaining the insurgency, which serves
Chinese interest in keeping the Soviets bogged down and
reminding the world of Soviet aggression. Moreover,
Chinese leaders still regard Pakistan both as an impor-
tant buffer against Soviet expansion southward and as a
counterweight to India on the subcontinent.
2 July 1985
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