AFGHANISTAN: FOOD SITUATION REMAINS PRECARIOUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406420001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Central intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 May 1985
Afghanistan: Food Situation Remains Precarious
Summary
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Adequate food supplies probably are available in most
areas of Afghanistan to meet minimum requirements, but the
war-disrupted distribution system, crop failures, and combat
operations have created spot shortages--especially in the
northeast and east--and pushed up prices. Unfavorable
weather and five years of war suggest that the prospects for
maintaining current levels of domestic food production in
1985 in much of the country are deteriorating, and the
population is likely to become increasingly dependent on the
Kabul market and imports from Pakistan.
Domestic Food Production
Although the Afghan Government claimed that food production increased
last year, we believe production of wheat, the country's most important food
grain, was about 10 percent below the level of 1983. Grain crops suffered
moderate damage, mainly in the northern plains regions, because of a shortage
of rainfall.
The disruptions caused by the war are making the outlook for the already
fragile agricultural economy more precarious. Lack of manpower to prepare the
Division,
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of
Global Issues and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia
State Dept. review completed
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soil for planting, poor quality seeds, and unavailable or overly expensive
fertilizer are all contributing to a deterioration of the country's food
producing capability. Food production prospects are particularly uncertain in
Hazarajat Vardak Ghazni, Paktia and other provinces along the eastern
border, Agricultural activity appears
least affected by the war in the northern provinces although information on
food conditions in western Afghanistan is sketchy.
The availability. of water remains the critical ingredient for food
production. Snowfall in the north this winter was less than normal for the
second year in a row, but widespread rains in March, April, and May have
temporarily replenished critically low water supplies. We believe sufficient
water is available to sustain the winter wheat crop until harvest. Prospects
for the summer crops, particularly in the north, are less promising because
the amount of water for irrigation later this year probably will be less than
normal. -
agricultural prospects in
the south for this spring and summer are good because of adequate snowfall.
Insurgent and tribal leaders in the south have been encouraging refugees in
Pakistan to return and help with the planting and harvesting, paticularly in
Qandahar Province and the Helmand Valley. The movement of,Afghan workers from
Pakistan to Afghanistan during the planting and harvesting seasons is an
important source of agricultural labor, particularly in the south. Several
areas that have been deserted because of fighting or air attacks are worked
mainly by these migrants.
Food Prices Continue To Rise
Food prices throughout Afghanistan have climbed rapidly in the past five
years--averaging an increase of more than 25 percent annually--but no faster
than nonfood items, according to spot price surveys taken by the US Embassy
and travelers in the countryside and official government statistics.
Fragmentary reporting indicates prices vary widely from province to province
depending on the degree of self-sufficiency in the area and whether the survey
was taken before or after the harvest. Kabul food price increases generally
have been much more modest than in the rural areas, primarily because the
sizable Soviet food deliveries to the capital ensure a degree of normality in
daily life.
Imports Remain Critical
Afghanistan remains highly dependent on imports to meet the gap between
domestic production and consumption. We estimate that about 400,000 tons of
wheat have been brought into Afghanistan annually since 1981--slightly more
than half from the USSR and the rest from Pakistan.
e Soviet grain is sent to Kabul and t
o other major cities.
A review of Soviet trade statistics and aid agreements indicates the
Soviets have been delivering to Afghanistan about 225,000 tons of wheat
annually for the past few years (see table). Soviet wheat is provided through
sales and grant agreements. Soviet sales were about 30,000 tons annually
prior to the invasion, and have been averaging about 100,000 tons annually the
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past few
years. Data on Soviet wheat sales in 1984 is not yet available.
Table
Estimates of Soviet Wheat Deliveries to Afghanistan
1978
Metric Tons
Salesa Grantsb
30,000 None Reported
30,000 100,000
30,000 140,000
80,000 150,000
125,000 100,000
80,000 N/A
N/A
N/A
aBased on the value of wheat sales to Afghanistan reported in
Soviet trade statistics.
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The Soviets began to supply 100,000 to 150,000 tons of wheat annually as
grant aid in the late 1970s. Available information does not give us the
quantity of wheat delivered as a grant in 1983 or 1984, but agreements for
general commodity grants in those two years show no overall decline. Recent
reports of plentiful food supplies in Kabul also lead us to believe the
Soviets are maintaining a high level of wheat deliveries. 25X1
We believe imports alleviate shortages in most of those rural areas where
domestic supplies are insufficient, particularly near the border with
Pakistan. Western observers have estimated that 140,000 to 180,000 tons of
wheat are brought in annually from Pakistan through unofficial channels.
Sufficient information is not available to measure the,direction or magnitude
of changes from year to year. The US Embassy in Kabul assumes that a large
share of these supplies is diverted from the refugee camps in Pakistan, but
the Afghans also purchase surplus grain from the
Afghanistan border.
Pakistanis. We have little information on food trade along the Iran-
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The second consecutive poor wheat crop in Pakistan will result in less
surplus grain for export to Afghanistan. The Pakistan government will need to
import 2 million tons of wheat over the next year to meet domestic demand and
replace drawdowns of its own stockpile, but we do not anticipate major
shortages.
Budgetary constraints and pressing needs in Africa are slowing down donor
contributions of food for the refugees. Donor pledges are only about 50
percent of the World Food Program's target level of 400,000 tons for 1985--a
level the Pakistanis believe is inadequate. Pakistan has not been reimbursed
for about 23,000 tons of wheat above the WFP's 400,000 ton quota that it
reportedly delivered to the refugees last year. If wheat donations are
maintained at the programmed level, there will be less food for the camps--and
possibly less for transshipment to Afghanistan and Pakistan may have to draw
from its own stocks to make up for the shortfall.
Outlook
Timely and widespread rains this spring may have averted a major
shortfall in wheat production this year. Prospects for summer crops are less
promising because the amount of water available for irrigation is likely to be
less than normal. Poor crops this summer combined with upward pressures on
food prices resulting from increased transportation costs and general
inflation will exacerbate the food situation in the northeast and east. The
lower grain harvest last year reduced local grain reserves, which were meager
at best, and increased the importance of agricultural output this year. Five
years of economic disruption have depleted farmers' savings and more families
are becoming dependent on remittances from relatives in Pakistan or the Gulf
States for money to buy food Those areas in the
north, around Kabul, and near the border with Pakistan will be able to get
adequate. food supplies albeit at higher prices.
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Food Situation Remains'Precarious
NESA M 85-10108
Distribution:
Internal
Orig - C/SO/P
1-DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI
1 - ED/DCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 .- C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DDO/NE
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/NESA/S0
1 - D/SOVA
1 - SOVA/EPD/FT
1 - C/OGI/SRD
1 - OGI/SR
1 - OGI/SA
1 - NESA/S
D/AA
0/P
1 - NESA/S0/P/Typescript File
DDI/NESA/SO/PI I(23 May 1985)
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Food Situation Remains Precarious
NESA M 85-10108
Distribution:
External
1
- Mr.
Morton Abramowitz (State)
1
- Mr.
Robert A. Peck (State)
1
- Mr.
Peter Burleigh (State)
1
- The Honorable Richard Murphy (State)
1
- Ms. Phyllis Oakley (State)
1
- Mr. Herbert G. Hagerty (State)
1
- Mr.
George S. Harris (State)
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- Mr.
Robert Dean (State)
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Tom Thorne (State)
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Bob Clarke (State)
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- Mr.
W. D. Howells (State)
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- Mr.
Bill Courtney (State)
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Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr. (State)
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Jonathan Olsson (State)
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Elie Krakowsky (DOD)
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Ronald P. Zwart (DOD)
1 - Mr. James Covey (NSC)
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- Mr.
Stephen Rosen (NSC)
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Kenneth E. DeGraffenreid (NSC)
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- Mr.
George Van Eron (NSC)
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