INDIA-SRI LANKA: RAJIV GANDHI AND THE TAMIL INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406330001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Central Intelligence Agency
b5~
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 May 1985
India-Sri Lanka: Rajiv Gandhi and the Tamil Insurgency
Summa
Rajiv Gandhi has softened the tone of India's policy toward
Sri Lanka, in part to stabilize Indian foreign policy while he
focuses on domestic political and economic matters, but also
because Indian officials probably perceive few real options
for solving the Sri Lankan communal conflict. New Delhi
probably hopes that Sri Lankan President Jayewardene will
respond to the new tone of Indian relations by re-engaging the
Tamils in negotiations, but we doubt .
high expectations.
andhi will look to Was ing on to continue
s present course toward the problem, including acknowledging
that India has the key role. New Delhi would be most unlikely
to ask or ex
ect th
p
e United States or any other outside power
D01-0 , .41-71
This paper was prepared by Subcontinent Branch of the
Office of Near Eastern and Sou Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and ma
essed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
I Y u7
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India's Involvement
Because of proximity and ethnic and cultural connections, India has been
deeply involved in Sri Lanka's political development. At Colombo's
invitation Indian military forces went into Sri Lanka in 1971 to assist in
quelling a leftist student attempt to overthrow the government. As the
political fabric between Tamils and Sinhalese frayed in the late 1970's, New
Delhi watched worriedly. The more than 40 million Tamils in the southern'
Indian state of Tamil Nadu pressure New Delhi to remain eneaeed in Sri
Lankan affairs t
t
t t
o pro
ec
heir coethni
-cs.
The Gandhi government pursued a two-prong policy after communal rioting
in summer 1983 left more than 400 Tam' ead and thousands fl
India.
New Delhi at the same time sought to bring the Tamils and ruling
Sinhalese together. During late 1983 and 1984, India repeatedly offered
Colombo its good offices to initiate discussions with Tamil leaders. This
effort culminated with the creation of the All Party Conference, a series of
roundtable discussions with representatives of the major Sri Lankan
communities, which met in Colombo intermittently fnr mare than 10 months
before deadlockin
l
t D
g
as
ecember
.
Since the failure of the talks and the departure of most moderate Sri
Lankan Tamil spokesmen to south India, Colombo has concentrated on building
up its military while the insurgents have sought to drive government forces
from the Jaffna Peninsula. The intensity of the violence in the north has
steadily increased The Tam;le.
_
are
organized in attacks on government facilities.
India's Goals
New Delhi's overall goal, in our view, is to avoid a bloodbath on the
island between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority which would
prompt a massive refugee influx and a political hue and cry in south India.
The Indian government favors a negotiated settlement that would guarantee
limited antonomy for Tamils; it does not support the creation of
Tamil state and has stated this view repeatedly. 7 ate
New Delhi mare that - -11 ...__., . .
-u- ic
politically impotent and would look to India forvsupp
ort.-TheUcreationyofna
separate state along ethnic lines in Sri Lanka also would send the wrong
signals to India's numerous tribal and ethnic currentl
Y pressuring
New Delhi for greater autonomy.
F 7
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India also wants, in our view, to prevent involvement by either
superpower in Indian Ocean affairs and to extend India's image as the prime
player in the region. It wants to prevent potentially destabilizing forces
such as the Libyans, the PLO, or other internati extremist groups from
trying to aid Tamil dissidents. F 7
Rajiv Takes Over
During the first few months after Indira Gandhi was assassinated in late
October 1984, Rajiv paid little attention to Sri Lanka because of the urging
of domestic issues. The visit by Sri Lankan Security Minister-
Athulathmudali to New Delhi in March and the reciprocal visit by Indian
Foreign Secretary Bhandari to Colombo ark the Prime Minister's
first clear involvement.
Bhandari took a new, more detached tone toward Colombo. He appeared to
agree with Jayewardene that violence had to be brought under control before
the opening of new negotiations--a longstanding Sri Lankan position that
Indira's government had opposed. According to diplomatic reporting,
Bhandari was authorized by Rajiv to tell Jayewardene that India would make a
concerted effort to restrict the activities of Tamil insurgents. The
Indians have interdicted several shipments of foreign weapons destined for
the guerrillas, reduced the number of training camps in Tamil Nadu, and
. ,. -
stopped in
t
surgen
boats g
Indian Prospects
Indian public statements, including those of Rajiv, continue to have a
moderate, muted tone, but we see little to suggest that New Delhi believes
Jayewardene will make any bow in the direction of the Tamils soon. The
Indians undoubtedly are aware that Colombo has interpreted Bhandari's visit
as a signal that Sri Lanka can proceed with its strategy for military
victory over the insurgents. If Rajiv and his advisers have concluded--as
we think they have--that in the near term there is little hope for a
political settlement, they also may calculate that New Delhi's interests are
best served by trying to keep a low profile. Bringing the insurgents under
firmer contr
l i
o
s one step toward reducing the impact of the conflict on
volatile south Indian politics;. increasing central government support for
Tamil ref
ugees, which they also have done recently, is another.
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Rajiv's restrained policy on Sri Lanka, in our view, reflects his
cautious and conciliatory style of leadership. As a new leader he also has
more pressing problems in front
f hi
o
m. He probably senses that little
would be gained from
ti
ac
ve personal involvement at this point.
Potential "Monkey Wrenches" for New Delhi
Some potential developments could lead to or force a major change in
Indian policy toward Sri Lanka:
-- Rajiv himself appears to have become an important voice for
moderation. If he dies or is removed from office, it is unclear
whether his successor would be equally committed to his policy.
-- Similarly, Jayewardene's removal from office would create
uncertainties, although few of his potential successors appear
any more conciliatory toward the Tamils or more likely to try to
force the chauvinistic Sinhalese majority to accept a negotiated
settlement.
A massive influx of refugees into Tamil Nadu would strain south
Indian resources and place new domestic political demands on New
Delhi.
If a third country provided large amounts of sophisticated military
support to the Jayewardene government, Rajiv would come under
domestic pressure to increase Indian aid to the insurgents.
The final and perhaps most important factor that could drastically
affect New Delhi's ability to manage policy toward Sri Lanka is the
status of the nearly half million Tamil estate workers, most of whom
retain close political and family ties to south India. Although
they have remained largely uninvolved in the communal conflict, if
they become drawn into the crisis, New Delhi would be pressured both
by opposition
arties
d th
p
an
e government of Tamil Nadu to intervene
li
.
to protec thei
ve
r
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Implications for the United States
We believe New Delhi wants the United States to defer to India's lead in
resolving the conflict, to treat the insurgency as a regional issue, and to
continue to urge Colombo to accept the need for a negotiated solution.
Should the Sri Lankan communal conflict deteriorate to the point where New
Delhi becomes convinced of. the need to intervene militarily to restore
order, the Indians will look to Washington for political support or, at the
least, for diplomatic acquiescence. New Delhi would characterize Indian 25X1
military intervention as aimed solely at restoring public order, not as an
expression of Indian expansionism within the region. The Indians will
assume that Jayewardene would turn to the United States for military
t
suppor
, but they will urge Washington to turn down such requests.
In our assessment, New Delhi would not call for or even welcome a
greater role for the United States in resolving the Sri Lankan communal
conflict. We believe Gandhi's overarching concern is to preserve and extend
India's role as the primary regional leader in South Asian affairs.
Preventing foreign--particularly superpower--involvement in regional issues
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SRI LANKA: Population by Ethnic Group and Religion, 1981
Ethnic Group
Religion
Sinhalese
Ceylon Tamil
Indian Tamil
Ceylon Moor
Other
10,986,000 74 Buddhist 10,293,000 69.3
1,872,000 12.6 'Hindu 2,296,000 15.5
825,000 5.6 Muslim 1,135,000 7.6
1,057,000 7.1 Catholic 1,010,000 6.8
111,000 0.7 Other -
Christian 102,000 0.7
Other 15,000 0.1
14,851,000 100 Total 14,851,000 100
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SUBJECT: India-Sri Lanka: Rajiv Gandhi and the Tamil Insurgency
Internal Distribution:
1-DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/EA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
1 DD/NESA
1 - D/SOVA
1 - C/SOVA/RIG
1 - C/PPS
1-D/OGI
1 - C/ISID
1 - C/S0/D/NESA
1 - C/S0/S/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - PDB Staff
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2 - NESA/S0/S Branch
DDI/NESA/S0/S 17 May 85)
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SUBJECT: India-Sri Lanka: Rajiv Gandhi and the Tamil Insurgency
External Distribution:
Peter Burleigh, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, South Asia Division,
Department of State, Room 4636A, Washington, DC 20520
Major General Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Room 4D765, Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301
Captain Edward Louis Christensen, USN, Chief, South Asian Regional Plans
and Policy Branch, Department of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon,
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Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
Room 381, Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Philip S. Kaplan, Staff Director for Policy Planning Council
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Colonel Kenneth E. McKim, Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Near East and South Asia Region, Department of
Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Christopher Ross, Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, Department of State, Room 5254A, Washington, DC 20520
Dr. John D. Stempel, Special Assistant, Near East Asia,
Department of State, Room 5246A, Washington, DC 20301
Peter Tomsen, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Director, INS,
Department of State, Room 5251, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Geoffrey T. H. Kemp
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
National Security Council, Room 351, Old Executive Office Building,
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Dr. Dov S. Zakheim
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Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense,
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