INDONESIA'S SOEHARTO: LOSING THE MAGIC?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100960001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 February 1985
Indonesia's Soeharto: Losing the Magic?
Summary
Since September 1984, social unrest coupled
with a spate of terrorist-style bombings and arson
have created a tense atmosphere in Indonesia. Fear
that the country faces a period of turmoil has begun
to fuel concern among much of the populace who
adhere to traditional beliefs in spirits and
mysticism that President Soeharto is losinv his
mandate to rule. The US Embassy
report that rumors are rife on the central island of
Java that 1985 will be decisive for Soeharto's New
Popular anxieties by themselves pose no threat
to the government, but we believe the conjunction of
social turbulence and the speculations of Indonesian
mystics has political significance. Should unrest
and antigovernment opposition persist, doubts about
Soeharto's "mandate of heaven" could become
widespread and erode confidence in his leadership.
This would complicate Soeharto's prospects for
coping with a weak economy and eventually eff 'ng
a succession he finds acceptable
This memorandum was prepared by Southeast 25X1
Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. In ormation
available as of 14 February, 1985 was used in its preparation.
Conments and queries are welcome and ma irected to Chief,
Southeast Asia Division, OEA
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Mysticism's Role
Belief in traditional mysticism, spiritualism, and
parapsychology exert a strong influence among the Indonesian
populace. Not only peasants, but also educated businessmen,
academics, military officers, and high level government
officials--including cabinet members--believe in the mystical.
To varying degrees, mysticism also plays an integral role in
perceptions and decisionmaking among Indonesia's predominantly
nominal Muslims. According to US Embassy reporting, even
Indonesians who disdain such notions acknowledge that these
beliefs have significant sway on man of their countrymen,
particularly the Javanese.
Such beliefs--which predate the comparatively recent arrival
of Islam in about the fifteenth century and Christianity in the
seventeenth century--are regarded as an important component of
the eclectic religious style of most Javanese--Muslim and
Christian alike. Characteristics of the belief system include:
o Belief that ancestral spirits actively influence events
in the temporal world and control the ascendance of a
"chosen one" to reign. Tradition holds that natural
disasters and civil disorder reflect a ruler's loss of
favor with these spirits and thus portend a change in
leadership. Mysticism thus surfaces particularly during
times of social stress.
o Cultural traditions that maintain that society faces
recurrent patterns of severe tests or "transformations,"
accompanied by domestic disorder--one such pattern being
a 20-year cycle. The last such major upheaval followed
the attempted Communist coup in 1965, which set the stage
for Soeharto's coming to power and coytributed to his
self-perception as a national savior.
o Various sacred artifacts--such as ceremonial daggers
(kris) and wayang puppets--which are revered for having
magical properties that empower, or protect the owner.
Similarly, certain locales--such as particular' caves,
graves of monarchs, ancestors, and mystics, and mountain
tops--are considered sites for meditation to acquire
mystical insight and powers. Several such objects and
locations are associated with the monarch's divine
mandate to rule, including one "magical" kris now
1. Prior to 1965, similar upheavals occurred in 1926 when the
Communist Party attempted to instigate an uprising, and in 1945
when Indonesians launched their war of independence against the
Dutch, thus strengthening the notion among believers of a 20-year
cycl a
f
e
o
major uph
ava
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belonging to Soeharto, several caves, and the ancient
sultans' palrces in Solo and Jogjakarta in Central
In addition, Soeharto, although a nominal Muslim, reportedly
spent his late adolescence as apprentice to a prominent local
mystic (dukun), learning techniques of soothsaying and
prophecy. Information regarding Soeharto's decisionmaking
process is limited, although evidence suggests that mystical
considerations do not predominate his generally pragmatic
decisionmaking. We do know that Soeharto routinely consults with
several dukuns, including his longtime personal spiritual adviser
and mystic, Sujoyo Humardhani, according to the US Embassy and
The Regime: Fraying at the Edges? 25X1
Recent social unrest and terrorist-style incidents on the
central island of Java have fueled popular anxiety that Indonesia
is in for a period of turmoil associated with the 20-year cycle
(See inset). Following the 12 September riot in Jakarta, in
which security forces fired on and killed a number of
demonstrators, there was a rash of bomb threats, fires, and
radical Islamic pamphleteering. Coordinated bombing attacks on
several Chinese busine s establishments on 4 October introduced a
new phase of violence.
mid-1985--will erode Soeharto's esteem among the public.
According to the US Embassy, rumors are now rife in Central
and East Java that 1985 will be decisive for the Soeharto
regime. A number of sources indicate growing anxiety among
Javanese parliamentarians who subscribe to spiritualism that
recent incidents of rioting, bombings, and arson indicate that
Soeharto has lost his supernatural mandate to govern (in
Indonesian, called the "wahyu"). Spiritualists also predict that
these and other incidents of an unsepecified nature--forecast for 25X1
2. Typical of Soeharto's use of mystical symbols was his choice
of 11 March 1966 for the transfer of power from Sukarno to
himself and the use of the Indonesian acronym (Supersemar) for
the date. In a clear reference to Javanese mythology, Soeharto
sought to draw a parallel between the victory of the bumbling
dwarf, Semar, over his more worldly superiors and Soeharto's own
victory over the more flamboyant Sukarno. 25X1
3. For assessments of recent social unrest and regime political
December 1984, Indonesia: ImD lications of Recen
Tig tening the Screws-- oe ar o s Growing Authoritarianism.
nst, and EA 84-10143 July 1984, Indonesia: 25X1
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Chronology of Major
12 Sept Tanjung Priok riot
Violent confrontation between
Muslims and security forces.
Extensive casualties.
4 Oct Bombings of Chinese-owned
bank and shop in Jakarta
4 Oct Barbing of bank, Pontianak,
West Kalimantan
17 Oct Bathing of Super Mie
Factory, Jakarta
22 Oct Fire at Sarinah Department
Store, southern Jakarta
29 Oct Fire at Chinatown restaurant
and nightclub canplex
29 Oct Fire and explosions at
Marine ammunition depot,
Jakarta
2 Nov Department store and movie
theatre fires, Jogjakarta
5 Nov Threat letters to US and
Australian Fhbassies
5 Nov Telephone threat to shopping,
apartment ccmplex, Jakarta
8 Nov Undetonated barb discovered
at Pertamina headquarters
11 Nov Fire destroys offices at
Kartika Plaza Hotel, Jakarta
13 Nov Fire destroys government
offices, Sarinah building.
14 Nov Barb hoax, American Express
offices, Arthaloka Building
24 Dec Christian Seminary barbed,
Malang, East Java
21 Jan Nine barbs damage Borobudur
Teeple, Central Java
31 Jan Fire destroys Sultan's
Palace, Solo, Central Java
Bank Central Asia owned by key
Soeharto business associate.
Another branch of Bank Central
Asia.
A Chinese-owned business.
Owner has ties to Soeharto's son.
Unknown cause.
Owned by associate of Soeharto's
son. Cause undetermined.
Extensive damage. Probably
accidental--previous fire
occurred in July.
Possible barbing by carpeting
Chinese businessmen.
First threat on US Btbassy
since spring.
Residence of several US Dnbassy
personnel.
Followed a telephone threat.
Origin unknown. Hotel controlled
by group of generals.
Origin unknown. A major Jakarta
department store canplex.
Followed telephone threat. A
praninent Jakarta office building.
Probably reflection of local
religious frictions.
Most prominent and revered
cultural landmark.
A cultural and spiritual
landmark.
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Reinforcing this apprehension is what appears to be a
steadily growing disenchantment among some officials, younger
parliamentarians, and businessmen who perceive that Soeharto has
country.
In addition,
criminal gang active y is again on the rise in some cities and
suggests that authorities may again resort to harsh
countermeasures such as a resumption of the "mysterious killings"
campaign. Although the public by most accounts generally favored
the military's draconian 1983-84 anticrime campaign, under the
present circumstances it could easily interpret a resurgence of
violent crime, and ensuing punishment, as social deterioration--
reflecting the government's inability to maintain control and its
The government has been unable to stop the incidents.
Although serious rioting has not recurred, bombings have resumed
following a lull in late November and most of December. Two
bombs damaged a Christian seminary in Malang, East Java on
Christmas Eve. A grenade attack on 20 January against a Jakarta
police car killed one patrolman and wounded two. On 21 January,
nine coordinated bombs damaged the ancient Buddhist temple of
Borobudur in Central Java--the country's most revered historical
and cultural treasure--in what was clearly intended as a symbolic
attack on the regime. Although the government arrested several
suspects following the October bombings in Jakarta, its failure
to prevent additional incidents will fuel public concern about
the government's ability to maintain control and to prevent for
Is Soeharto's Mandate Waning?
In themselves apprehensions fueled by mysticism and
antigovernment rumors pose no threat to Soeharto's continued
control. Such increased criticism of the regime--and doubts
about its spiritual credentials--have precedent, tending to recur
midterm between the heightened political anthug*_" associated
with elections. the current
spate of rumors more intense and personally focused on
Soeharto than in the past. Their congruence with the series of
bombings, growing opposition to some of the regime's policies,
and the prospect of continued economic strains in our judgment
could well heighten popular tensions. We cannot say, any better
than any Indonesian, how far the cycle of terrorist incidents and
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I I `
spiritual doubting may go. If no further attacks occur, popular
apprehensions would gradually ease. Should the current social
unrest and terrorist incidents persist, however, along with
worsening economic strains, escalating criticism of the regime
and anxiety about the New Order's loss of spiritual backing could
contribute to a significant erosion of confidence in Soeharto's
leadership ability among both the populace and the elite. Such
an atmosphere could further stimulate fringe groups of
We do not know how Soeharto interprets recent events. Thus
far he has given no indication of steooine down from the
presidency or desienatiny, a succescnr
Nevertheless, a severe escalation in unrest during the
period leading up to the 1987 parliamentary elections could
weaken Soeharto's mandate, thus complicating his prospects for
coping with a weak econom and eventually effecting a succession
he finds acceptable
25X1
A variety of occurrences in the months ahead could in our
view increase concern among the elite about the regime's popular-
-and divine--support arid cause problems for Soeharto:
o Continuation--or an escalation--of bombings and fires or
attacks on prominent facilities, especially th^se
associated with the regime or its Chinese business
partners. Of particular significance would be further
attacks on national cultural landmarks--such as the
Borobudur Temple--which are widely venerated. Even
presumably accidental incidents--such as the fire which
extensively damaged the Sultan's 17th century palace in
Solo and several recent munitions depot explosions--add
to public anxiety.
o The regime's detractors could exploit Jakarta's active
rumor mill to exaggerate public and official concerns
about the regime's support. Recently, for example,
several high level officials received bogus letters
purportedly from a group of Army colonels warning
Soeharto to halt dealings with his Chinese business
partners or face unspecified consequences.
o Escalating criticism by radical Muslim elements--through
mosque speeches, pamphlets, and cassettes--denouncing the
regime's campaign to impose the secular state ideology as
anti-Islamic.
o More open criticism by allies of the regime--including
prominent government, parliamentary, religious, and
business leaders--of Soeharto's policies and ties to
Chinese businessmen.
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2bx-i
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GJ/~ I
o A major natural disaster, such as a prolonged drought,
which could cause substantial shortfalls in rice crops
following favorable harvests in five of the last six
years. Such an occurrence could exacerbate economic
strains and be perceived as an omen of impending
leadership change. Other ominous signs would include
major earthquakes or volcanic eruptions on one of the
central islands--not unusual events in Indonesia, which
hake active volcanoes than any other country.
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Typescript: Indonesia's Soeharto: Losing the Magic?
Original--OEA/SEA/IB
1--OEA/SEA/ITM
1--CH/OEA/SEAD
1--DC/OEA/SEAD
1--PDB (7F30)
1--C/NIC (7E62)
1--NIO/EA (7E62)
5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1--C/PES/DDI (7F24)
1--DDI (7E44)
1--DCI (7D60)
1--DDCI (7D6011)
1--C/DDO/IAD (3D00)
1--C/DDO/EA (5D00)
1--D/OEAA (4F18)
1--Executive Director (7E12)
1--CPAS/ILS (7G215)
1--OEA/NEA (4G43)
1--OEA/CH (4G32)
1 NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
1 /DO/PPS (3D01)
1--OEA/Research Director (4G48)
R LLSG
1-
IA/NIO Economic (7E48)
1--Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
1--John Monjo
1--Lt. General John T. Chain, Jr., USAF
1--Joseph Winder
1--Alphonse LaPorta
1--Charles Morris
1--Alan Kitchens
1--Morton Abramowitz
1--Weaver Gim
1--Paula Causey
1--Corazon Foley
Treasury:
1--Douglas P. Mulholland
1--Bill McFadden
1--Bill Quinn
Commerce:
1--Byron Jackson
1--Roger Severance
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1--Richard Childress
1--Gaston Sigur
1--Richard Armitage
1--James Kelly
1--James R. Martin (ISA)
1--John Finney (ISA)
1--James Smith (JCS)
1--Tim Wright
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