CHINA: DENG PRESSURES THE ARMY OLD GUARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100830001-4
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 January 1985
China: Deng Pressures the Army Old Guard
Summary
Deng Xiaoping is stepping up the pressure on the People's
Liberation Army to support more fully his economic and
political reforms. Beijing is now demanding that the armed
forces provide extensive material support to China's economic
reforms, renewing pressures on veterans to retire, and
proposing an extensive Army reorganization in 1985 in addition
to carrying on its campaign to reform the party within the
military. We are seeing indications that these efforts, along
with reports that Hu Yaobang will replace Deng as party
Military Commission Chairman. have troubled some senior
military personnel.
Deng's main effort already has begun to pay off: the
aged officers are gradually stepping aside. In our view,
however, Deng, who is driven by the mounting need to secure
the political succession and maintain reform momentum, has
pushed for more than he can hope to achieve in 1985.
Nevertheless, he may believe that advancing such a broad
agenda will give him some latitude for striking acceptable
political bargains with the senior military. As China
approaches what promises to be a climactic party Conference of
Delegates in September 1985, army-party tensions may heighten
but in our view will remain manageable.
A Crucial Session: The High Command Meets
Deng appears to have used a recent convocation of the party Military
Commission to announce a series of major military reforms and personnel
measures. According to official media reports, the Commission held a
This memorandum was prepared by China Division, Office of
East Asian Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, Domestic Policy Branch, OEA
EA M 85-10006
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
"discussion meeting" from 25 October to 2 November to deal with structural
reform in the Army, party rectification, and military participation in the
economic reforms approved at the October party plenum. Deng and other top
officers addressed what appears to have been a large assemblage representing
every important national and regional command.
The most sensitive issue,
was eng s re iremen from the c airmanship of
post.
Other proposed measures
-- Reorganization of China's 11 military regions, reducing the number to
six and sharply contracting the number of staff slots.
-- A substantial reduction of overall military personnel strength, to be
achieved mainly through accelerated retirement of older officers, lower
recruitment, and paring away of many noncombatant activities and
facilities.
-- Appointment of Zheng Weishan, current commander of the Lanzhou Military
Region to succeed Yang Dezhi as Chief of the General Staff. Zheng had
not previously been mentioned among the candidates for Yang's
In published remarks, Deng singled out units above the corps level--
namely, military regions and central command staffs--as needing greater
retirement efforts. To all the old-timers who have thus far refused to make
way for younger replacements, Deng issued a barbed request that "some
enlightened personages" set a good example by stepping aside, leaving implicit
a threat to make outright dismissals if the numbers of volunteers are
insufficiently high. As 1985 ended, 40 officers of the General Staff entered
into highly publicized "voluntary" retirement amid high level promises of more
The official media has also widely publicized Deng's injunction that the
armed forces participate fully in the nation's top priority, economic
development. In recent remarks, Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi echoed Deng's call
and noted that implementation will entail not only shifting military
industrial capacity and military facilities--such as airfields and ports--to
civilian use, but considerable budget slashing and force reduction as well.
Warning Signals
Heretofore, the military has been slow to implement this type of sweeping
change. We have no direct evidence of individual soldier-politicians who
claim to represent a substantial military constituency coming forward with
lists of grievances or alternative agendas.
we discern veiled criticisms of Deng's
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
proposals in the public media and responses to criticism in s+atements by
Deng, Hu, and other top leaders. The ambiguity of the current exchange is
typical of sensitive debates within the leadership.
Our reading between the lines of recent press articles suggests that some
senior soldiers are: miffed at being called to account for their Cultural
Revolution-era behavior; fearful that they will lose their perquisites if
retired; and wary of Hu Yaobang, whom some believe unfit to succeed Deng as
as military overseer. The articles suggest that political problems exist in
the sensitive Beijing Military Region, ever a key security concern for the
party leadership, and one recent newspaper article implied that military men
should be free to handle military affairs without civilian interference.
Recent comments of Hu Yaobang, in an interview with the editor of a major
Hong Kong daily, reinforce the impression of tension between the party and
some senior military. Hu went on at considerable length to emphasize the
Army's tradition of complete loyalty to the party. He even recalled a
personal example from the late 1930s, when he was director of the Red Army's
Organization Department and had the authority, at age 23, to issue orders to
the Army's most illustrious commanders. "They still had to carry out what I
told them...The Army must obey the party organization."
Veterans' Views
In our view, the concerns being signaled in the media are longstanding
and, for the most part, reflect the parochial anxieties of elderly veterans
who worry about their personal livelihoods and perquisites. We believe the
group most troublesome to Deng is the Army's "revolutionary elders," seasoned,
loyal commanders and commissars who go back to the earliest days of the Red
Army. Now mostly over 65, these generals cling to command positions or to
advisory posts within the military regions and central military apparatus.
They appear to believe that the party still owes them for their past
achievements.
Personnel issues appear paramount to the old guard. The veteran soldiers
facing forced retirement see uncertain futures. Those who will remain in
uniform must measure up against new criteria that generally stress education
over experience. Moreover, their behavior during the Cultural Revolution,
when most believed they were simply following orders, has reemerged as an
important issue in the current rectification campaign, and many are being
forced to conduct painful self-criticisms. Some are troubled by the prospect
of a new military commission chairman, Hu, who may not be as sympathetic to
their concerns and traditions as Deng has been.
These important practical concerns, however, preoccupy a decreasing,
although still politically significant, number of veteran soldiers. Natural
attrition is gradually shrinking these ranks. Many--although not as many as
Deng would like--have already cooperated and voluntarily withdrawn from
important assignments.
In addition, some old timers have questioned the ideological foundations
of Deng's program, holding that current policies depart too widely from the
orthodox Communism for which they fought their revolution. Such objections,
whether raised out of true commitment or mere political expedience, have
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
forced Deng's propaganda corps to create convoluted arguments to justify their
programs. We believe that, over time, this concern also will diminish in
importance.
In our view, there is a broad band of middle level officers who stand to
gain by Deng's emphasis on professionalism and expertise, priorities that Hu
will preserve. This generation of officers, which will fill the positions
vacated after years of blockage by the Long March generation, in our judgment
represents an important and growing constituency within the Army for the
current programs and priorities.
The Party's Perspective
Deng's pointed remarks at the Military Commission forum typify crow-
ing complaints of a now impatient party leadership,
n part, however, the problem is of Deng's own
making. He himself arranged for the rehabilitation and appointment of many
old generals who, having lost ten years on the promotion ladder during the
Cultural Revolu-tion, now demand ranks and perquisites as their just due.
Although these veterans formed an important component of Deng's political
base, he now wants them to retire to make way for a rejuvenated officer
corps. Their reluctance to step aside has complicated the entire reform
package and fuels popular uncertainties about the stability of the political
In our view, Deng has maintained his chairmanship of the Military
Commission because he has the standing and influence among the commanders to
serve as the indispensable goad--a critical yet reliable advocate of the
military point of view--pushing for reform of an aged and outdated military
establishment. Since taking the post of Military Commission Chairman in late
1980, Deng has generally been able to win the cooperation of reluctant senior
soldier-policiticians. He apparently recognizes, however, that he must step
down from his military posts while he is still in good health. In both a sym-
bolic and a practical sense, command of the military must be resolved.
Although the evidence is contradictory, we believe that Deng now intends
that Hu should take over the Commission chairmanship this year. It is a
decision that could presumably be ratified at the special party Conference of
Delegates scheduled for September. That meeting is shaping up as a climactic
one, toward which many of Deng's ether reform efforts, including a
rejuvenation of the party Central Committee, are aimed. By moving so rapidly
on so many fronts, Deng risks creating a unified oooocitinn but gives himself
bargaining space to maximize his gains.
With respect to military issues, Deng appears to have already done some
bargaining. While pushing hard on military/economic and personnel issues,
Deng has tried to meet some of the other concerns of the old veterans. The
party rectification campaign has been softened, threatening far fewer people
with dismissal or disciplinary action. According to Hu, many of the career
soldiers guilty of serious misconduct during the Cultural Revolution are not
being prosecuted but are simply being discharged at full salary.
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
Despite widespread recognition of political shortcomings, the military
since August has been praised as an exemplar of rectification. Recent
articles have praised the armed forces' smooth handling of longstanding
problems, even while implying that they should have been resolved years ago.
In reality, we have seen very little hard evidence that the original aims of
rectification have been achieved within the Army, but Beijing nevertheless has
declared a first phase victory and is moving on to phase two.
Outlook
Although not all China's superannuated or incompetent officers will step
aside, we believe that many will yield before the combination of attractive
retirement benefits, lenient rectification treatment, and political
prodding. Moreover, we judge that Deng will be satisfied if he can accomplish
a shake-up in the corps-to-military region layer of command and if Hu can take
over the Commission chairmanship without too great a commotion. In our view,
however, Deng cannot expect to accomplish all that he has undertaken in the
military, and his successors will necessarily have to tie up many loose
ends. The restructuring efforts appear intended to remove obstacles to Hu's
accession, and the degree of success in one may portend smoothness of
transition in the other. Then, it will probably be up to Hu to strike his own
political bargains with those senior soldier-politicians under his command.
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
Deng Pressures the Army Old Guard
EA M 84-10006
Distribution:
National Security Council
1 - Gaston Sigur, OEOB, Room 302
1 - David Laux, OEOB, Room 302
Department of State
1 - Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary, Room 6207
1 - William A. Brown, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary - Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 6206
1 - Hugh Montgomery, INR, Room 6531
1 - Donald Anderson, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs - Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 4318
1 - John J. Taylor, Director, Office of Analysis for East Asia and the
Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Room 8840
1 - Joseph A.B. Winder, Director, EAP/MBS, Room 5206
Department of Defense
1 - General John Vessey, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 - James A. Kelley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Room 4E817, Pentagon
1 - John Sloan, DID for East Asia, Room 2C 238 Pentagon
1 - Ronald Montaperto - JSI-3A, Room 1C 945 Pentagon
Central Intelligence Agency
2 - D/DDI
1 - D/OEA
2 - C/OEA/CH
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM
1 - C/OEA/SE
1 - C/OEA/NA
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/China Reports
1 - OCR/EA
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - NIC/Analytical Group
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - PDB Staff
1 - FBIS China
1 - FBIS/NEAD/CE
1 - C/PES/DDI
1 - OEA/PROD
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
 Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4
Approved For Release 2009/10/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100830001-4