NORTH KOREA: MOVING IN NEW DIRECTIONS OR REWORKING OLD TACTICS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 11, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

.. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
Central Intelligence Agency
11 January 1985
State Dept. review completed
North Korea: Moving in New Directions
or Reworking Old Tactics?
Summary
North Korea in 1983 and 1984 undertook
important diplomatic and economic initiatives that
together suggest real changes may be under way in
P'yongyang's goals and behavior. Against a backdrop
of major domestic problems, including an
unprecedented family succession scheme and an
economy running a distant second to that of South
Korea, Kim Il-song has launched an array of moves
that affect P'yongyang's relations with Seoul,
Beijing, and Moscow as well as its hopes for
contacts with Washington.
The North's fierce independence, its radical
policy swings in the past, and its continued high
military investment are good evidence that
P'yongyang is simply running harder at home and
abroad in pursuit of its longstanding objectives.
But our examination of both recent activity and the
assumptions that we have long used to explain North
Korean behavior suggests that such a judgment may
understate the potential for change in P'yongyang.
Indeed, we may be entering a period of reorientation
in North Korea's priorities when:
This paper was prepared by the Northeast Asia Division and China
Division of the Office of East Asian Analysis and by the Office 25X1
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries may be directed to the
Chief, Northeast Asia Division
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
The North concentrates on succession and its
domestic economic needs, effectively
assigning the goal of reunification a lower
priority than the task of getting its own
house in order.
The North, concerned about the deterioration
of its strategic position vis a vis Seoul,
Beijing, and Moscow, adopts more pragmatic
policies in order to break through to
establish contacts with the United States.
Few North Korea watchers at this stage are
prepared to venture beyond the judgment that
P'yongyang may be entertaining a moderate
realignment of its priorities. Even so, recent
events hold out the prospect that P'yongyang may
indeed be redefining, not just readjusting, its
goals and that the process will give reunification,
and the threat this represents to Northeast Asia's
stability, less prominence. If this is occurring,
it could provide Washington with opportunities to
encourage P'yongyang to reduce tensions on the
peninsula and to test Beijing's willingness to
reinforce more moderate North Korean behavior.
Background
Over the past few years, North Korea has taken steps that
collectively suggest a potential for change in its policy and
behavior:
Offers in 1983 and 1984 to talk with the United States
and South Korea and the recent reinitiation of
bilateral talks with Seoul.
A somewhat cooler public treatment of its normally
close relations with China at a time when Beijing was
brokering P'yongyang's bids for talks with Washington
and Seoul.
Kim I1-song's decision to improve relations with the
Soviet Union, culminating in his trip to Moscow in
mid-1984.
-- New solicitations for expanded economic ties with and
investment from the West.
For North Korea, a number of issues have reached turning
points, some within the past year. We believe that the North's
more activist foreign policy has been shaped by the evolution
of these issues:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
-- North Korea is approaching its first political
transition, a process unique and difficult to predict
because of Kim's familial succession scheme.
-- Economic difficulties, long aggravated by the North's
military buildup, are more pressing, while the South is
increasingly viewed abroad -- and, we believe, in
P'yongyang -- as surging ahead.
-- The North's ability to compete with the South for
international recognition and prestige has continued to
decline.
-- US-South Korean relations have improved, lessening
strains that worked in P'yongyang's favor.
-- China's improved relations with the United States,
Japan, and the West, its quickening pace of economic
liberalization, and an added flexibility in Sino-Soviet
ties all have reshaped North Korea's environment.
This paper examines how P'yon yan has dealt with this
complex mix of trends and events
This approach is designed to suggest some alternative
explanations for recent developments. In the process it also
demonstrates the unique difficulty of the North Korean
intelligence problem, F_ I
e see o puzz a ou motives an
intentions from North Korean media behavior, often relying
heavily on interpreting the chronological record of North
Korean actions, and speculate from there.
recen Chinese
willingness to discuss Korea with US officials has not
dramatically improved our knowledge. It is difficult to sort
out intelligence data in these discussions from Chinese
attempts to mold official US opinion.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
The Dominant View
The judgment that has underpinned our analysis of North
Korean policy and behavior, including P'yongyang's latest
initiative to open talks with the United States and South
Korea, holds that the North's priority is reunification of the
peninsula on its own terms. P'yongyang seeks to advance this
objective by maintaining the military capability to capitalize
on domestic instability in the South or fissures in the US-
South Korean security relationship. P'yongyang has
intermittently sought to create such opportunities -- as with
the October 1983 assassination attempt in Rangoon -- even while
it has pursued diplomatic and other political tacks.
At the same time, the North believes it can serve its most
immediate goal -- namely, ending the US presence in the
South -- through diplomacy, public pressures, and the good
offices of its allies. In this regard, P'yongyang's objectives
are twofold: to open contacts with the United States to end
its diplomatic isolation and to press for the withdrawal of US
military forces from South Korea. North Korea may also hope
that such contacts, over time, will give it access to equipment
and technology, as well as improve its image in the West as a
legitimate alternative to the South.
In arriving at this view we have made basic assumptions
and judgments about (1) the domestic political scene, in
particular the influence of the succession in North Korea; (2)
the pressures generated on P'yongyang by its economic problems;
(3) the longstanding priority accorded to self-reliance in
North Korean diplomacy and security policy; and (4) the
changing roles and interests of the Soviet Union and China.
Should these assumptions be off the mark, we may have to
reassess our judgments about North Korean priorities and
The Succession
The succession is playing a larger role in North Korean
policymaking as Kim I1-song, now 72, moves ahead with his ten-
year campaign to groom his son Kim Chong-il as replacement.
P'yongyang has identified the younger Kim as his father's
only successor. Kim Chong-il has assumed a higher profile in
domestic affairs, especially the direction of the economy. And
we believe he may take over one of his father's two main roles,
i.e., as head of the party or as chief of state when the next
party congress is held, probably sometime in 1986.
have been unable to
e ermine whether the tensions normally generated by such
transitions in other countries are being replayed in North
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
coincides W i t h the North's obvious efforts to reopen a dialogue
with the South, to break new ground in contacts with the US and
to attract outside capital and technology, suggesting that Kim
I1-song wants progress in these areas as he passes leadership to
his son.
Some analysts would go further, maintaining that the
succession is the critical determinant in the timing of Kim's
recent initiatives. If they are correct and we are under-
estimating the impact of the succession, we also may be
underestimating the internal pressures associated with it. We
can only speculate, but it is possible that the North Korean
elite may be generally resisting continuation of the extreme
"cult of personality" that has been developed by Kim I1-song.
Given the history of the post-Stalin transition in the USSR and
the post-Mao transition in China, Kim Il-song may be taking steps
to forestall a wholesale dismantlement of his legacy.
Kim may also see his legacy served by making his son's
passage a little easier. Thus he may sense in this transition
period the need to engineer the kind of actions -- realigning his
position between Moscow and Beijing and breaking out of his
isolation -- that his successor might find more difficult, if not
impossible, to initiate. It is valid to ask -- but impossible to
answer -- whether the military believes that a dialogue with
Seoul might undercut its institutional interest. Indeed, some
members of the power structure may already be attempting to head
off such changes. For example, media threats against North-South
talks following the November 1984 defection of a Soviet embassy
interpreter at Panmunjom could reflect discontent within the
military leadership or maneuvering by other hardline elements.
The succession could also be forcing a crisis mentality
elsewhere. Technocrats, another key constituency, might be
rebelling against the prospect of facing several more decades of
failed economic policies. Kim Chong-il's close association with
media calls for worker incentives and greater attention to
consumerism indicates to us that P'yongyang is already aware of
the need to articulate more popular economic policies.
Despite Kim I1-song's obsession with steering an independent
policy course over the years, P'yongyang has been sensitive to
foreign reactions to the succession scenario. The Chinese have
been more tolerant than the Soviets of this unprecedented family
succession in a communist country; Beijing implicitly recognized
Kim Chong-il's special status during his visit in 1983.
We believe that Moscow's more negative attitude toward the
succession may well have contributed to Kim I1-song's prolonged
failure to visit the Soviet Union. Neither side mentioned the
the greater attention to Kim Chong-i
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
issue publicly when Kim visited Moscow in May 1984, but the
Soviets have since made several gestures that lend the younger
Kim a measure of recognition. Should Kim Chong-il visit Moscow
in 1985 as rumored, it would confer a clear stamp of Soviet
approval.
We cannot quantify the weight of succession politics in the
North's behavior. But it clearly should play an important role
in any assessment of P'yongyang's policies today. If the elder
Kim has serious concerns about his son's staying power, he may
consider Chinese and Soviet support for the succession to be so
important that he would make policy adjustments in exchange for
Beijing's and Moscow's backing. This will be a key analytical
concern as the transfer of power draws nearer.
The Problems with the Economy
We have long held that economic difficulties have a
prominent place in shaping Kim's agenda. We do not have
the analytical tools to measure precisely whether
the North's economy is in worse shape than it was five or ten
years ago. But we do know that economic problems appeared more
pressing as P'yongyang wound down its most recent seven-year
economic plan (1978-84) considerably short of its goals.
Bedeviled by major shortages of coal, electric power, and
transport, factories are being shut down for considerable
periods. Many construction projects are far behind schedule, and
in some cases only a fraction of export commitments are being
honored. And, perhaps most important, these conditions stand in
stark contrast to the health and solid growth prospects of South
Korea's economy.
As part of the preparations for the next economic plan,
which we believe will begin on a delayed basis in 1986, the North
Korean leadership has been soliciting new commitments of economic
support from the Soviet Union and China.
the dominant
view has judged tnat Kim is sticking with his old tactics --
i.e., seeking only critical missing technological and material
inputs for the economy but not fundamentally changing his
autarkic economic policies.
Here too, however, we need to keep an open mind, especially
in light of recent circumstantial evidence that China's economic
reforms have had an impact on the North. We have been struck by
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
the increasing number of high-level economic delegations to
China, of which at least 10 over the past year visited the
showcase zone of Shenzen. P'yongyang's joint-venture law,
promulgated in September 1984 shortly after Premier Kang Song-san
returned from a trip to China, follows the Chinese model closely.
The Chinese also have lobbied foreign visitors to invest in
At a minimum, most analysts would probably be cautious about
giving too much weight to the apparent North Korean interest in
the Chinese reforms.
This view is supported by past swings in the North's
economic policies, such as its buying spree -- and subsequent
plunge into debt with European and Japanese creditors -- in the
early 1970s, when P'yongyang opened its doors to foreign trade.
How far P'yongyang can go today also is a matter of real debate.
One view holds that the North is years, if not decades, away from
the kind of extensive and pragmatic political reforms that have
underpinned Beijing's current modernization program.
But if the North wants to adopt its own version of China's
special economic zones -- essentially, a few enclaves to attract
foreign technology and capital but to quarantine other unwanted
influences -- some analysts would argue innovation is possible
without threatening Kim's system. Another, more open-ended
perspective, would suggest that some forces in the leadership
could be pressing for substantial revision of economic policies.
If this is the case, the outcome of the succession -- that is,
whether it installs a Kim Chong-il wedded to his father's
policies -- might determine their success.
P'yongyang may be ready to overhaul its economic system,
P'yongyang's Perceptions of Security
The more activist North Korean foreign policy, especially
toward the United States and South Korea, ranges from the Rangoon
bombing aimed at assassinating top South Korean leaders in
October 1983 to the nearly simultaneous floating via Beijing of a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
tripartite proposal for talks with the United States and South
Korea, and finally the beginnings of a direct dialogue with the
South. All of these elements have precedents and parallels. The
North, for example, began both tunneling under the Demilitarized
Zone and its rapid military buildup at the same time it entered
the North-South dialogue in the early 1970s. Even today, the
peaceful thrust of the tripartite proposal contrasts with the
continuing reorganization of North Korea's active and reserve
forces, underway since 1981, which increases P'vonavang's ability
to project military power on the ground.
The North has shown considerable tactical flexibility in the
past, and most analysts believe that current ctics do not
reflect any fundamental change.
Kim has consistently sought to circumscribe the influence of 25X1
outside powers and, even at great cost to the economy, to
maximize North Korea's independence and freedom of action.
By moving ahead on the dialogue with Seoul, Pyongyang
indeed appears to want to regain some initiative at a time when 25X1
most of the economic and political cards are being dealt Seoul's
way. The fear that great power interest in Korea, unless
carefully orchestrated and controlled, also could move events
beyond P'yongyang's control still seems too strong to downplay in
North Korean behavior. 25X1
So, too, in our view, are other risks to Kim of an expanded
great power involvement in the Korean question. These include
for the North the unpredictable aspects of closer US-China
cooperation that might lead Beijing to move in ways contrary to
North Korean interests. For example, the North Koreans already
have demonstrated their uneasiness with Chinese and Soviet
contacts with Seoul, which they no doubt fear as the first steps
toward a more al recognition of the existence of two Koreas. :~7 These concerns argue that Kim's diplomacy will seek to keep
China's role in the Korean issue restricted to serving as
middleman for North Korean contacts with the US and South
In our judgment, this analytical perspective also helps
explain the North's recent attention to the Soviets. The new
flexibility in Sino-Soviet relations has given Pyongyang
latitude to alter its behavior toward two Communist allies. The
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
North Korean improvement in relations with Moscow helps
P'yongyang demonstrate that it is not dependent on, or fettered
P'yongyang's shifting, indeed contradictory, tone and
initiatives in 1983-84 have led us to conclude that the North
Koreans ting about for new approaches to their dilemma.
One clear theme is the effort to refocus US attention on the
peninsula. The North's behavior, especially over the last
several months, could be viewed as a prompt and direct response
to the recently stated US requirements for the initiation of
North-South contacts before any broader discussions can be
considered. In the year since the North first revealed the
elements of its tripartite proposal, P'yongyang has responded to
specific US objections by indicating it's flexible on the
sequence of the agenda for talks and by suggesting that it
recognizes US troop withdrawals cannot occur overnight.
P'yongyang views its dialogue with Seoul as directly responsive
to US concerns; P'yongyang's letter to Secretary Shultz in early
It seems to us that by 1983 P'yongyang must have concluded
that its efforts to engage the United States were getting
nowhere. And whenever the decision was made to attract US
attention once again -- and it appears to have entered the
North's policy deliberations at approximately the same time as
the Rangoon bombing because it was transmitted almost
simultaneously -- Pyongyang must have realized that US policy
was unlikely to change without the introduction of some new
elements. Thus it indicated willingness to allow another
power -- China -- to be introduced directly into the Korean
diplomatic equation on its behalf.
Soviet Calculations
The Soviet-North Korean relationship continues to be marked
by mutual dislike and suspicion, and Moscow needs few reminders
'
of Kim
s desire to preserve his independence of action.
Moscow probably calculates that it can do little to
influence events on the peninsula, despite the presence of Sovipt
economic and military technician
Moscow's continuing caution in expanding ties with
P'yongyang will circumscribe Kim's ability to maneuver. In our
view, Moscow's caution reflects its doubts about Kim I1-song's
reliability as an ally, its concern about being drawn into a
military conflict with the United States on the peninsula, and
continuing dissatisfaction with P'yongyang's failure to move as
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
far as the Soviets would like from its pro-Beijing stance on
international issues. We believe it has also reflected a Soviet
assessment that a close relationship with P'yongyang is not vital
enough to Moscow's political or security concerns in Asia to
warrant payin a substantial price in military or economic aid.
Most analysts have judged that the Soviets regard their
Korean relationship primarily as a means to limit the influence
of the United States and its Asian allies, to contain China, and
to impede Sino-US cooperation on political and security issues.
The Soviets provide the lion's share of foreign economic
assistance. Moscow, however, apparently remains more concerned
with guaranteeing North Korean repayment of previous assistance
than with providing sufficient aid to acquire political
leverage.
w 1 e the Soviets almost
certainly will continue to aid the North Korean economy, they are 25X1
still holding back on major new project assistance and on
guarantees of increased oil deliveries at preferential prices.
Moscow also has been reluctant to offer the types of
military assistance that might bring them more nn1itira1 1p?ov
in Pyongyang.
25X1
age 25X1
25X1
If Moscow assigns greater weight to acquiring influence in
North Korea than we now believe to be the case, Kim's options
would obviously increase. Events in 1983, in fact, from
leadership changes in Moscow to the KAL shootdown that set back
Moscow's stock throughout Asia, may have enhanced Moscow's
interest in closer political ties with North Korea. Responding
to apparent North Korean willingness to strike a more balanced
stand between Beijing and Moscow, the Soviets have made a series
of gestures to improve the climate. A birthday present for Kim
Il-song, the red carpet treatment for him during his late May
visit, and new gestures toward heir-anoarent Kim Chong-il
i
-
---_
d t
h i
h l i
h t
h e
f f
g
g
e
r
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
sign a military aareement_
In October
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
In any event, Moscow will still look for some prerequisites
to increased economic and military assistance, including:
-- Firm evidence that the North Korean leadership is putting
more distance between itself and Beijing.
-- A North Korean commitment to involve Moscow in
aspect of talks on the peninsula's future.
-- And, under the best of circumstances, North Korean
agreement to Soviet military use of port facilities and
airfields.
We believe that Moscow wants to participate in any talks on
the peninsula, although to date the North has shown no
inclination to involve the Soviets as direct or indirect
participants. But if Soviet concern about being the diplomatic
odd-man-out is deeper than we suspect, Moscow could make more
generous offerings to head off perceived threats to its role in
the region. A North Korean suggestion that it planned to include
China but not the USSR in talks on the peninsula's future could
precipitate that kind of concern. A sustained North Korean move
supported by China to open up economically to the West, could
also loosen Soviet purse strings.
. And Beijing's Interests
China's primary objective in Korea in our view, is the
promotion of stability on the peninsula and the mitigation of
Soviet influence in Northeast Asia. We believe that the Chinese
want to reduce the potential for hostilities between the North
and South, which could draw them into conflict with the United
States, and that they seek an understanding with the US and Japan
to l
t
i
essen
ens
ons on the peninsula.
The Rangoon episode is only the latest, albeit the most
embarrassing, reminder to Chinese leaders of Kim I1-song's
erratic and often dangerous behavior. In our view, China's
immediate objectives are to convince the North to engage in a
dialogue with the South and, in turn, to engage the United States
in this process. In so doing, China may well be trying to
satisfy North Korean demands by seeking to demonstrate that it
can deliver the US to the table.
We believe that the prospects for change in China's
relations with North Korea are even harder to sort out than those
in the Soviet-North Korean tie. Chinese leaders admit they have
little leverage in Pyongyang. They often assert they must
handle even perfunctory issues circumspectly, despite their
provision of significant amounts of economic and military aid.
Chinese officials have told US diplomats, for instance, that
North Korea did not inform China of its September 1984 flood
relief proposals in advance. Chinese knowledge of critical
aspects of North Korean affairs also appears limited.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
Over the past year, North
Korean and Chinese media have also reflected some signs of
China nevertheless insinuates that it has some influence
over North Korean behavior on highly sensitive issues. China has
brokered North Korean proposals to the United States for
tripartite talks, and Chinese officials have said that they have
privately urged North Korea to be realistic about the South and
the US troop presence in formulating its tactics on these
eat have assiduously courted North Korean economic planners
over the past two years, stressing the positive results of their
open door policy.
Essentially, the dominant view could lead one to conclude
that China is taking advantage of the North's political needs and
economic difficulties to encourage foreign and domestic policies
in P'yongyang similar to those in Beijing. Nonetheless, the
contrast in China's implied claims of leverage and its past
suggestions of more limited access to and influence in P'yongyang
should moderate our confidence in Chinese good offices.
Implications
North Korea's reading of its challenges, and its more
sophisticated and dynamic foreign policy of the past year, could
take it in any of several directions:
-- No change in goals, more of the same tactics, but with
some nuances in behavior toward the United States. This
forecast essentially reflects the majority view and
judges that, overall, North Korea is simply running
harder to stay in the same place. It also assumes that
P'yongyang will put a premium on retaining as much of its
independence as possible as well as the option, should
circumstances permit, of reunifying the peninsula under
its aegis.
-- A grim variation on this view asserts that North Korea is
preparing actively to create and exploit opportunities
for mischief in 1986-88. Seoul considers this period
particularly enticing, given the North's penchant for
troublemaking, because South Korea's prestige is riding
on the success of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988
Summer Olympics. Some officials in Seoul also hark back
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
to the early 1970s, the last time the North pursued
negotiations and used them to mask a secret military
buildup. Today, the North is implementing forward
deployment of military forces as it sits down to the
table. Moreover, the Chun government has identified the
mid-1980s as its time of political transition and
liberalization. Under the current constitution, it must
guide the changeover to a new president or face the
prospect that President Chun will extend his power
indefinitely -- both scenarios with elements of
instability that the North could want to exploit.
As the discussion in this paper of our basic assumptions
suggests, our "school" interpretation may understate the chance
for change in P'yongyang's policies. The signs of ferment now
evident in North Korea may represent the first limited signals of
greater political and economic realism. Are we, for example,
seeing the beginning of a period when:
-- The North concentrates on economic problems and
succession and accepts a "two Koreas" format for the
peninsula -- as currently does the South -- and
effectively relegates the idea of reunification to second
place behind the need to get its own house in order?
-- P'yongyang senses that it must find a new middle ground
between the United States and China or risk having its
political goals put on ice through the 1990s? The
stronger US-South Korean relationship and the changes in
US-Chinese ties since 1983 have offered virtually no
opportunities for P'yongyang so far. With a favorable
international spotlight turning on Seoul, economic
disparities between North and South becoming more
obvious, and the succession drawing nearer,
Kim Il-song has further reason to look for diplomatic
movement now, rather than later in the decade.
While we are not now prepared to answer the questions above
affirmatively, we do believe that the North Korean leadership is
more keenly aware of domestic problems and more concerned about
international isolation than in the past. And, with these
concerns as a backdrop, the effort by the North in its dialogue
with the South and in seeking contacts with the US, in our view,
are initiatives likely to retain some momentum, even in the face
of diplomatic setbacks. Moreover, we do not dismiss the
possibility that, as circumstances force the leadership to put
more emphasis on economic development and contacts with the West,
P'yongyang will be led gradually into positions that run counter
to the single-minded focus on Korean reunification that has
characterized Kim I1-song's rule. That process could give
reunification -- and the worrisome threat this represents to
Northeast Asian stability -- less prominence in North Korea's
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
If this is the case, it could provide increased
opportunities for the United States to encourage the North to
reduce tensions further on the peninsula. The potential for
change in North Korean behavior also could offer greater latitude
for Washington to test Beijing's willingness to take explicit
steps to reinforce more moderate North Korean behavior.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5
SUBJECT: North Korea: Moving in New Directions or Reworking Old
1 - Mr. Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
1 - General Vessey, Chairman, JCS
1 - Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, State/EAP
1 - Mr. Richard Burt, State/EUR
1 - Mr. Richard Armitage, DOD/ISA
1 - Mr. William Sherman, State/EAP
1 - Mr. Jim Kelley, DOD/ISA
1 - Mr. Peter Rodman, Chairman, Policy Planning Staff,
State
1 - Scott Butcher, State/PM (Rm 7470)
1 - Mr. Gaston Sigur, NSC
1 - Ms. Harriet Isom, State/EAP/K
1 - Mr. Donald Anderson, State/EAP/C
1 - Mr. Thomas Simons, State/EUR/Sov
1 - Mr. John J. Taylor, State/INR/EAP
1 - NIO/EA (7E62)
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NEA Division
1 - OEA/China Division
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - OEA/Research Director
1 - SOVA/TWAD/Asia Branch
1 - D/SOVA
1 - DDCI
1 - DDI (7E44)
1 - Executive Director (7E12)
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff (7F30)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G50)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
4 - OCR/ISG (1H19)
1 - FBIS/AG
1 - DDO/C/EA
1 - DDO/EA
1 - DD0/EA
DDI/OEA/NEA
11 January 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/01 : CIA-RDP85T01058R000100820001-5