ANGOLA: DOS SANTOS UP BEAT BEFORE PARTY CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100590001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 29, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Len ra Intelligence gency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 November 1985
Angola: Dos Santos Up Beat Before Party Congress
Summary
A Party Congress--only the third since the MPLA seized
control in 1975 with Soviet and Cuban backing--is slated for
6-10 December. President dos Santos's position within the
Party appears more secure than at any time since he came to
power in 1979. On the eve of the Congress, the MPLA
leadership, undoubtedly encouraged by its recent military
successes against UNITA, appears even more determined to pursue
a military solution to the insurgency. Although dos Santos is
likely to gain increased personal power at the Congress, we
believe his policy options are narrowed because of the regime's
growing military dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. The
Congress is likely to adopt some reforms to improve party
discipline and to revive the economy, but we expect these
measures will do little to broaden the regime's narrow base of
su
ort
t
pp
or
o arrest the economic decline.
The MPLA's current air of confidence could well be short-
lived in our view. The regime still faces the difficult task
of building on the momentum of the past year, as the
government s improved performance against the insurgents in
This memorandum was requested by Phillip Ringdahl, Director of
African Affaire
c
-
- -
e V1 till
l c.dn and Latin American
Analysis. The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Questions and comments am
Africa Division_ -Iu ? y ue uireczea to the Chief,
ALA M 85-10119
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eastern and southeastern Angola have not hampered UNITA's
guerrilla activities in the north and elsewhere. The MPLA is
unlikely to make visible headway in revamping the nation's
shattered economy and providing basic services to provincial
n
recent years, as UNIIA roe out of its stronghold in southeastern Angola
and eventually spread its operations throughout much of the country. In
our view, the low point for the MPLA occurred in August 1983, when UNITA
regulars overran and temporarily occupied the fortified town of
atmosphere that g omy 25X1
has gripped Lua
d
.. .1. . u V b ;,11Q
conference-- ined the regime some much needed international prestige. 25X1
This air of confidence will stand in marked contrast to the 10
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n
? , our view,
Luanda's successful hosting last September of a ministerial meeting of the 25X1
AlnnmlinnnA un..........~ aL_ r--- -r- .....-.A
Mood in Luanda
In our judgment, the mood in Luanda will be decidedly upbeat when
President and party chief Jose Eduardo dos Santos opens the Second
Ordinary MPLA Party Congress slated for 6-10 December (See Annex A for
the role the Party Congress plays in Angola's one-party state). The
regime is likely heartened by the improved military performance that the
Angolan Army demonstrated--with considerable Soviet and Cuban help--in
this year's offensive against UNITA insurgents Moreover
a
mounted annual offensives every year since 1977 without notable success. 25X1
.. nyun.uu uc i c4 1.
shocked Luanda and its Communist backers and stimulated a major Soviet
military supply delivery and advisory effort. This year, according to
Radio Luanda, the MPLA regained Cazombo to the north of UNITA's southeast
stronghold and nearly captured Mavinga in the southeast in September until
driven back by South African air strikes. Until 1985 the MPLA h
d
Dos Santos' Situation On The Eve Of The Congress
In our judgment, the 43-year-old dos Santos goes into the Party
Congress in a stronger personal position than he has enjoyed at any time
since he became the compromise choice for President followina the death of
appointed a strong group of like-minded, pragmatic gloYyalists to akeyl pa
key party
eu s that have plagued the MPLA since its foundin d h
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and government positions.* We believe the old-guard, mulatto-led faction
has been weakened, but it probably still retains veto power over most
major policy decisions. The once prominent black nationalist group, known
as the Catete faction, appears to us to be largely defunct. We believe
dos Santos's strong backing from Moscow and Havana also has lly
reduced his vulnerability to hardliners in the nnr+?
i
Strengthened on the home front, dos Santos has nevertheless lost
flexibility in his foreign policy. In our view, his regime has become
increasingly dependent on Moscow and Havana since late 1983, when the fall
of Cangamba forced Luanda to request more Communist military assistance.
Substantial new Soviet arms and 5,000 additional Cuban trnnns wprp cent o
In exchange for this military assistance, dos Santos has moved closer
to the Soviets. In the process, dos Santos's earlier, more moderate
policies--which included pursuing a negotiated regional settlement leading
to a Cuban withdrawal, attempting to increase economic ties with the West,
and exploring possibile reconciliation with UNITA--appear to have been put
on hold, although Western businessmen indicate L remains as eager as
ever to attract Western investments.
Congress Themes
The Angolan media and dos Santos' speech at a party conference last
January indicate there will be three major themes at the Party Congress:
prosecuting the war, consolidating political power, and improving the
economy. We anticipate dos Santos will use the gathering to reaffirm
publicly Angola's ties to the USSR and Cuba as well as to thank his allies
for their support. We expect US policy toward southern Africa to come
under sharp criticism. Dos Santos will almost surely attack the repeal of
the Clark Amendment
i
, vo
ce suspicion of future Washington's intentions,
and accuse the United States of supporting repression in South Africa.
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Prosecuting the War. The success of this year's government offensive
against f --code named "Operation Party Congress''--will give the
delegates something to cheer about. We expect dos Santos will seek and
easily gain a strengthened MPLA commitment to'the armed struggle against
both UNITA and South Af
i
r
ca, including a more vigorous annual campaign
next year. We also believe the Party Congress will serve as a forum to
reject explicitly any chance of reconciliation with UNITA.
In our judgment, reaffirmation of a military solution to Angolan
insurgency will further tighten Luanda's ties to Moscow and Havana. Dos
Santos may use the occasion to reiterate that Cuban troops will not only
remain in Angola, but that their numbers will increase in direct
proportion to the perceived threat from South Africa. He probably will
reaffirm Angola's commitment to its four point conditions for any Cuban
troop withdrawal:
-- An end to South African violations of Angolan territory;
-- The unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan
terri tory;
-- An end to South African support for UNITA; and,
-- Immediate implementation of UNSCR 435 for Namibian independence,
in expectation th
t
a
this would lead to domination by Marxist-
oriented SWAPO surgents backed by Luanda and the Soviet Union.
We do not expect the MPLA to close the door entirely on resuming
talks aimed at a regional settlement, and the government probably will
continue related behind-the-scenes contacts. The Congress may call for
some confidence-building gesture from Washington--such as diplomatic
recognition--that could motivate Luanda to return to the bargaining
table. Even so, we doubt that Luanda would jeopardize fundamental Soviet
interests--continued Angolan military dependence on the USSR, access to
Angolan militar
fa
ili
y
c
ties, and a pro-Soviet regime in Luanda--bv
dis
la
in
i
p
y
g ser
ous interest in US-sponsored negotiations.
Consolidating Political Power. Dos Santos probably will try to move
more men of his own choosing into national, regional, local level party
positions, while taking care to avoid controversial changes in to leve
art officials that would undermine the uni ty he has forged.
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We believe the President will also push for measures intended to
improve the party's (government's) performance and to broaden its popular
appeal. At a party conference last January, dos Santos was openly
critical of the MPLA's failure--after a decade of holding power--to
establish a stronger grassroots base. Foreign diplomatic reporting
suggests that dos Santos wants to move the MPLA away from its elitist
image by adding members from tribes throughout the country. He
specifically wants to attract Ovimbundus from southern and southeastern
'
Angola where UNITA
s strength lies.
We expect dos Santos to press to correct what he has previously and
openly identified as the most serious shortcomings in the MPLA:
-- The failure of MPLA officials to assert their authority;
-- Ideological and educational shortcomings among party members,
which undermines loyalty to the MPLA by the rank and file;
-- A lack of discipline and determination on the part of many party
members to carry out MPLA policies; and,
-- A lack of liaison and communications between central and
provincial authorities.
The Economy. The Congress, after reviewing the country's five-year
development pan begun in 1980, is ii, ly to ado t economic reforms ke~
d ft d
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9Q a by a team of Hungarian 25X1
economi s a me a stemming economic decline. Although the regime is not
about to abandon the basic tenets of State socialism, the reforms--
will decentralize the economic 25X1
aecisionma ing process, place greater emphasis on the small businesses and
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private farms, and allocate more resources to improve food supplies and 25X1
housing.
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We believe that the ability of the PIPLA to implement economic reforms
will be hampered by the continuing civil war, which has disrupted every
nonoil sector. Angola's social and economic development has taken a
distant second place to Luanda's need to sustain the anti-guerrilla
campaign. For most Angolans, the quality of life has deteriorated
markedly since independence in 1975 (See Annex B for a more detailed
'
trea Lment of the country
s economic problems.
UNITA Disruption?
In our opinion a successful Congress--held without interruption--will
boost dos S '
t
l
i
an
oss r
a
mc that his leadership has stemed the UNITA tide.
order to regain prestige, improve its morale, and score propaganda
points. We doubt that UNITA has the capability to stage attacks within
Luanda, however, although it is possible that South Africa will attempt a
special forces raid for which UNITA could claim credit.
Outlook
Dos Santos and the MPLA are going into the Party Congress claiming
they have slowed if not halted UNITA momentum, and Luanda s challenge will
be to make these claims credible. We believe that at least for the next
12 months, the regime is probably. secure whether it can maintain its
present, perceived advantage or not.
Despite the government's improved military performance on the
battlefield, it still confronts a serious situation:
-- UNITA remains a formidable foe capable of carrying out guerrilla
warfare throughout most of the country. The Army s victories did
little more than underscore UNITA's well-known weaknesses in
materiel and inability to fight regular troops in conventional
warfare; and,
-- Reforms of the party and economy likely will have only marginal
impact and do little to win popular support. UNITA retains the
ability to disrupt economic enterprises and transportation which
already has reduced the domestic economy to subsistence level. We
do not expect there will be relief from such major difficulties as
food shortages, disrupted transport, electric power, interruptions,
and below-ca
acit
m
f
p
y
anu
acturing.
Although dos Santos is likely gain increased personal power at the
Congress, we believe his growing military dependence on the Soviets and
Cubans will leave him little in the way of policy options. The regime,
therefore, is not likely to pursue new initiatives in the coming year,
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such as regional settlement, that would be at odds with what the Soviets
see as their fundamental interacts
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Annex A
The Popular Movement for the i ib" eration
of Angola
MPLA membership stood at approximately 20,000, out of the,
coup ry s e ted nnntiln+;,,., .,r?P
iaeology is Marxism-Leninism and it*hasj party's Official transformed itself from a pre-
independence guerrilla movement into a "vanguard" party that the ruling
elite hopes to use to transform An
ola i
g
nto a Communist state.
In theory, the supreme organ f o
the party is the Congress, which is
supposed to meet every five years. In fact, actual power is concentrated
in the 14-member Politburo, which is elected by the 100-member Central
Committee (75 full members and 25 associate). The Central Committee meets
every six months, while the Politburo--which oversees the party
secretariat that is responsible day-to-day implementation of policy--
meets more frequently. ~ , 7
There have been only two previous party congresses since the MPLA
took control in Lunada when Angola became independent in 1975. The 1977
First Ordinary Congress and the 1980 Extraordinary Congress achieved
little and were overshadowed by the UNITA insurgency, organizational
difficulties, Angola's econ
leadership uncertainties. ~micn"nhlems, party factionalism, and
Leaders
Jose Eduardo dos Santos--President of Angola, Commander in Chief
of the Arme orces, and President of the MPLA since September
1979- ..43 years old. ..Claims to be a nationalist first and
Marxist-Leninist second...has formed broad leadership coalition
behind war effort.
Luci o Lara--a founder of the PIPLA i n 1956...i s the art s
Secretary General and Secretary the Politburo and Central Committeer..a r
gdoitrinair Ma
pis a Marxist- of
Leninist and leader of a pro-Soviet hardlliinefaction.rxi t
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Politburo Members
Full Members: Jose Eduardo dos Santos
Col. Joao Luis veto (Xietu)*
Col. Pedro Maria Tonha (Pedale)
Lt. Col. Antonio dos Santos Franca (N'Dalu)
Col. Joao Rodrigues Lopes (Ludy)
Lucio Lara (Tchikweka)
Pascoal Luvualu
It. Col. Evaristo Domingos (Kimba)
Lt. Col. Juliao Mateus Paulo (Dino Matros)
Lt. Col. Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues (Kito)
Lt. Col. Francisco Magalhaes Paiva (N'Vunda)
Lt. Col. Henrique Carvalho Santos (Onambwe)
Kundi Paiama
Roberto de Almeida (Jofre Rocha)
*Names in parentheses are names given to individuals during the pre-
independence liberation struggle. T many leaders are referred to by
these and not their real names-
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Annex B
Angola's Declinin Economy
We believe the cost of battling the UNITA insurgency offsets most the economic benefits of the continuing oil boom in Angola. Oil
production, which accounts for 90 percent of Angolan exports, has r of
doubled since 1982 and is projected by industry experts to double 19 90, reachin some roughly
a ecoo 9 550,000 barrels per day. v e ector r in
mY, however, is suffering from the impact offighting~between the
MPLA government and UNITA insurgents. We estimate that Luanda
the bulk of its foreign exchange windfall from oil exports to
currency used
Y payments to the USSR, Cuba, and other Communist militarye hard
suppliers and to maintain the second largest standing army in black
Africa. Substantial new arms deliveries this
requirements to service existing military year, together with
foreign exchange reserves. Y
debt, will continue to drain
As a result, *
in our
from economic hardships can be
udgment, little relief
h j
expected throu
'An, I
g
Public statements by MPLA leaders indicate growi ng concern abo
dismal performance of the economy's nonoil sectors were a major theme
bout the
t
.
a
a art Lconoi
y conferecemc
Two
commissions created at the Conference nwere ctedtopresent reports
eld la t Januar . problems u on ways to improve economic performance at the P
^
r
ary
e rece
tAlthough
t
J vvyc,,
n
commet b
nsy dos Santos to Western busines
indicate his interest in strengthening the private sector of
little change in Angola's centrally planned economy
economy,
Angola has called on Western firms-- thesmen
c
on a variety of called
economic ~ likely to occur.
projects, suchtasuroadyreoil
construction, and a
el -for r help
ri
ai
p
g
r
s hot
cultural
, assistance.
with France last Januar Luanda signed an agreement
the
the Lome Convention in Aprilh1985restore coffee production.
from the European Community. in hnr~,
E 7 of obtaining credits and joined
Prospects for increased ~lestern investment outside of oil production
are poor because of continued civil war and the aversion of
investors to Angola's socialist economic sy
despite th ; lzving an ec
are dim,
of significant increases in oil production.
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SUBJECT: Angola: Dos Santos Up Beat Before Party Congress
Original--Phillip Ringdahl, Director African Affairs, NSC
1-- Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1-- Stephen Sestanovich, Director, Political-Military Affairs,
National Security Council
1-- Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1-- Frank Wisner, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1-- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
1-- Raymond F. Smith, AF/S, Department of State
1-- Robert Gelbard, AF/C, Department of State
1-- Alexander Vershbow, Multilateral Relations,
Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
4-- Anthomy Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State
1-- Robert H. Baraz, Director INR/Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, Department of State
1-- Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Department of Defense
1-- Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Internatinal Security Affairs, Department of Defense
1-- William Struck, Defense Intelligence Officer,
for Africa Defense Intelligence Agency
1-- Wynfred Joshua, Defense Intelligence Officer
for European and Soviet Political Affairs,
Defense Intelligence Agency
1-- DDI
1-- NIO for Africa
1-- NIO for USSR
1-- NIC
1-- D DO/Af
1-- DDO/AF
1-- PDB Staff
1-- I LS
1-- C/DDI/PES
1-- D/ALA
1-- ALA Research Director
2-- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean)
4-- OCPAS/IMD/CB
4-- ALA/AF
ALA/A
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4-- ALA/C
4-- ALA/C
(29 November 1985)