ANGOLA: IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT MILITARY OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100470001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 7, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

-AMBIL STAT
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 October 1985
ANGOLA: Implications Of Government Military Offensive
Summary
In this year's annual offensive against UNITA insurgents,
Angolan forces--buttressed by a closer Soviet advisory role and
increased use of Soviet-supplied aircraft--demonstrated
significantly improved military performance. UNITA experienced
its first significant military reverse since beginning a push
in 1982 to expand operations and secure more territory beyond
its traditional strongholds in the southeast. In our judgment,
in contrast to last year's failed offensive, more direct and
extensive Soviet advisory involvement in planning and directing
Angolan combat operations, together with extensive use of
tactical air support for the first time, were key factors in
Luanda's gains. Contributing to better performance are
improvements over the past two years in training and
organization of the Angolan armed forces that has allowed for
Anal Contributions were provided by
- r -. - J
Central Africa Branch, of the Office of African and Latin American
This memorandum was requested by Phillip Ringdahl, Director of African
of the Office of Soviet Analysis. The paper was coordinated with
be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, an may
the irectorate of Operations. Questions and comments ar come
d
ALA M 85-10103C
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more effective exploitation of substantial Soviet arms
delivered in late 1983 and throughout 1984. UNITA required
major South African assistance and Pretoria appears to have
intervened at least twice with heavy airstrikes around Mavinga
to prevent deeper penetration of UNITA-held territory.
Luanda has been buoyed by its improved performance and
probably believes that it can do as well in operations next
year. For UNITA--knocked off stride but far from beaten--the
offensive pointed out its relative weakness in a direct
confrontation with a well-equipped conventional army. UNITA
leader Savimbi probably will have to adjust his strategy,
perhaps reverting to more classic guerrilla tactics and try to
intensify the'guerrilla war in central and northern Angola.
For both UNITA and the Angolan government, the importance of
their main foreign backers--the USSR and South Africa--seems
MPLA's Military Offensive This Year
Overview. With the exception of 1983, when UNITA's capture of
Cangam5a threw Luanda into disarray, the MPLA every year since 1977 has
mounted an offensive in the dry season against UNITA without notable
success. In our judgment, the military objectives of this year's
offensive were roughly the same as those last year: to regain lost
territory north and west of Savimbi's stronghold in southeastern Angola
and if possible to capture Jamba, his headquarters. Since beginning the
offensive last July, government forces have captured Cazombo--held by
UNITA since late 1983 and abandoned in mid-September to superior forces--
and nearly took Mavinga--300 kilometers northwest of Jamba--until driven
back by apparently repeated South African airstrikes. In our view, both
Cazombo and Mavinga are important to UNITA: the former because it gave
control of a small portion of the border with Zaire and served as a
support base for northern operations; the latter because it was the first
town of any size to be captured and was the site of the 1982 UNITA party
congress
ll
ON we
as a way station on UNITA's supply line to the north.
Government forces have been driven back from their second effort to
capture Mavinga. Angolan forces were within 20 kilometers of the town in
mid-September when a major South African airstrike on 16 September forced
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a vancina qovernment troops again on 30 September-
Angolan forces apparently are active elsewhere on the periphery of
the UNITA-held territory, but there is scant information on the situation
and neither UNITA nor Pretoria have commented on these secondary
operations. at least one Angolan
brigade was moving toward Lucusse from Luena in mid-September, but an
apparent UNITA ambush may have slowed its operations.
Despite the importance of defending the Mavinga and Cazombo theaters,
there is no indication that UNITA has cut back on guerrila operations
throughout Angola or pulled back significant numbers of troops to help out
during the current offensive.
Results So Far. In our judgment, whatever the next steps, Luanda
comes away from this offensive with its best sustained performance yet
against the insurgents. The Angolan Army has shown that it can penetrate
UNITA-held territory, meet and overcome UNITA conventional forces in a
standup battle, take positions defended by the insurgents, and sustain
higher casualties. Unlike previous offensives where overall direction and
control faltered, this year the operation apparently moved steadily
We believe UNITA--in its choice of tactics this year--may have been
overconfident after three years of steady gains. Savimbi evidently
discounted Soviet readiness to have their advisers become more directly
involved in directing Angolan combat operations and Luanda's ability--with
What Next? There is no information to indicate the government has
called off its offensive despite two rebuffs at Mavinga. We have noted in
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the past that government offensives normally wind down in mid-October when
the rainy season approaches and the weather and terrain give the seasonal
advantage to the insurgents. 25X1
the rains have begun in atom o and are expected soon in the Mavinga 25X1
area. South Africa has recently cut back 25X1
its air buildup in northern Namibia suggesting Pretoria believes the
present danger to UNITA has diminished. 25X1
Luanda may decide to pull back from its present advanced positions to
main garrisons at Luena and Menongue and take credit for a good
performance with the expectation that Savimbi has been knocked off stride
until the next government offensive. Angolan troops have been fighting
for almost two months, casualties and combat losses probably have been
heavy, and weapons and equipment have suffered from wear and tear.
Alternatively, Luanda may try to hold its gains through the rainy
season as a spring board for operations next year. Angolan troops could
dig in at Cazombo and at an advanced position between Cuito Cuanavale and
Mavinga with the expectation they could-bp---,resupplied by air or with
escorted truck convoys.
It is possible, but less likely in our view, that Luanda will
continue the offensive through the rainy season. Even with fresh troops,
Angolan forces would face increasing danger of becoming overextended,
ambushed, or mired in the virtually trackless bush country. Luanda
probably would have the best opportunities in the Cazombo region and
possible could make some gains there. In the Mavinga region, however, we
believe that any move to renew the offensive in the next few months would
be complicated by weather conditions ably would prompt additional
South African counterstrikes.
Behind the Offensive
Despite the failures of past offensives, we believe Luanda has been
preoccupied with achieving a military success over the insurgents that
could be portrayed as a sign that the tide had shifted in its favor. The
alternative of a negotiated power-sharing arrangement with UNITA has long
been publicly refused by the MPLA and is considered in private only by a
small minority, generally when the government has been under extreme
military pressure from UNITA.
the mood in uan a was upbeat because UNITA had failed
to make good on promises to carry its attacks into the capital.
The MPLA government apparently believes that ultimate victory over
the insurgents could take a decade or more. Luanda
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is pursuing a combined military-political strategy that it
hopes will succeed in a protracted conflict. In addition to improving the
military's performance, Luanda seeks to revitalize the party and reform
the government administration to win the "hearts and minds" of the
population. We believe the military's improved performance during this
year's offensive will encourage it to move ahead with some overdue reforms
during a scheduled party congress in mid-December. Luanda's long-term
strategy for dealing with UNITA is supported by Moscow, which has always
opposed Angolan participation in a US-sponsored negotiated solution to the
Soviet and Cuban Role
In our judgment, Angola's improved performance in this year's
offensive is primarily the result of more direct and extensive Soviet
advisory involvment in planning and directing Angola combat operations as
well as extensive use for the first time of tactical air support.
Contributing to better performance are improvements in the past two years
in training and organization of the Angolan armed forces that has allowed
the government to exploit its advantage in weaponry more effectively.
(See Annex for details of military forces in the region.)
The role of Angola's key backers has grown since August 1983, when
UNITA took the town of Cangamba in a major defeat for Luanda that shocked
the MPLA leadership, which requested more Communist military assistance,
and catalyzed Moscow and Havana to provide it. We believe UNITA's
advances challenged Moscow's credibility as an ally and military patron.
Moreover, Angola's lack of military progress probably was viewed in Moscow
as benefiting the position of those Angolans then favorable to the US-
brokered regional negotiations.
Soviet military assistance was immediately forthcoming and peaked in
1984 following delivery of over 100 fighters, fighter-bombers and
helicopters, additional airdefense weapons, and various armored vehicles,
artillery, and other material. Cuba sent about 5,000 more troops, raising
its total military strength to roughly 35,000 men. Soviet aircraft
delivered in 1984 reached the field in significant numbers only in mid-
1985, and in the offensive this year,
Luanda--supported by Cuban and a growing number of, Anoolan uilnts--made
extensive sustained use of tactical air support.
Since 1984, Soviet advisers 'n Angola have been extensively involved
in improving the organization, administration, and training of the Angolan
Army. The Soviets apparently have also taken a more direct role in
planning and directing Angolan combat operations, probably because the
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Angolan troops were slow to assimilate and effectively use the weapons
previously provided by Moscow.
The failure of the Angolans to competently prosecute the offensive in
1984, even though Luanda did not have the full use of Soviet aircraft
delivered earlier in the year, probably led Moscow to conclude that a more
direct Soviet role would be necessary. In Angola's offensive this year,
Moscow apparently relaxed some of the restraints on its advisers--probably
because of impatience with Angolan inability to carry out more complex
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planning for the current offensive probably began soon after the failure
of the 1984 offensive. The fact that the government has managed to
demonstrate improved military performance this year, however, may allow
the Soviets to garner some indirect "East-West" benefits from events in
Angola. For example, government successes could improve Soviet ability to
portray themselves as defenders of a "legitimate" African regime against a
South African government tied to the United States. Sustained government
success could also improve Moscow's credibility as a reliable supporter of
Meanwhile the Cubans, as in previous Angolan operations, probably
sent specialists--such as pilot, tankers, artillerymen, and
communicators--forward to supplement Angolan troops in recent combat
operations. UNITA officials say that no major Cuban ground combat force
has participated in the offensive 25X1
no major Cuban combat force had deployed from the main garrisons they
guard in the region. 25X1
South African Involvement
South Africa, apparently concerned by Luanda's progress in the
current offensive, has increased its direct support to UNITA forces.
Moreover, Pretoria has admitted publicly for the first time that it was
providing materiel, humanitarian, and moral support to UNITA. Senior
South African officials also took pains to emphasize the strength of
Pretoria's ties to UNITA and the importance it assigns to common
objectives in. Angola. Pretoria probably is disappointed with UNITA's
recent performance and decision not to pull back but instead stay and
fight. Individual UNITA soldiers probably have fought hard, however.
In September,) an unusually high
number of South African aircraft at Namibian airbases and indications of
recent use of rough airstips in UNITA-held territory. Pretoria announced
on 16 September that it had launched an anti-SWAPO operation in southern
Angola, a move that undoubtedly was intended to cover additional
assistance to Savimbi and distract the Angolan concentration on the
offensive against UNITA. Although Pretoria and UNITA apparently believed
that Cazombo--too far to the north to be effectively reinforced or
supported--was beyond saving and decided to abandon the town before
capture, the situation at Mavinga probably was viewed as a more serious
threat. In addition to the airstrike, we believe Pretoria also committed
major elements of its 32nd "Buffalo" battalion (black expatriates that
serve as Pretoria's "Foreign Legion") to back up UNITA forces defending
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Outlook
We doubt that either side expects a quick end to the ten-year old
civil war. Indeed, the recent pattern of fighting suggests that for both
the Angolan government and UNITA, the importance of their main foreign
backers--th
S
i
t U
i
e
ov
e
n
on and South Africa--probably will increase.
We believe that Luanda has received a needed morale boost from its
recent military gains. The MPLA probably believes its performance can be
repeated and may even start next year's offensive earlier than usual,
operating from its rear garrisons at Luena and Menongue or present forward
position at Cazombo. In preparation for offensive operations next year,
we believe the Angolan Army will strive for further improvement through
added training and recruitment and will continue to rely heavily on Soviet
and Cuban support. Although Luanda could launch another offensive similar
in objectives to the present effort, there are other targets within the
UNITA-held southeastern quadrant of the country that could attract
government attention. Luanda may try to retake Moxico province, for
example, the region Savimbi captured between late 1982 and late 1983. F
Moscow's View. For Moscow, Angola's improved military performance
probably will be seen as proof of the correctness of it redoubling of
military support to Luanda in 1983 and in 1984. We do not believe,
however, that Moscow will radically change the pattern of its involvement
in Angola over the next years as long as the regime in Luanda is not in
immediate danger of falling and the government anticipates an improving
security situation F_ I
In our view, more direct and extensive Soviet advisory assistance in
planning and administering Angolan combat operations seems likely to
continue. The Soviets no doubt will make good on Luanda's combat losses
in arms and equipment, and possibly even support a modest expansion of
Angolan inventories--particularly aircraft and helicopters that have
proved so useful in the current offensive. Moscow probably will provide
additional airdefense weapons and radars to expand the defenses in
southern Angola and hope to deter South African actions by increasing the
risk to its air
ti
opera
ons.
So far, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans appear to have leaned
forward to challenge the South Africans. We believe Moscow probably sees
no need to intervene more directly in the conflict and risk a wider war.
In our judgment, however, a threat of major proportion to Angolan
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operations or Soviet and Cuban advisers would be sufficient to prompt
C', t d
vi
C b
e an
u an pilots to take on the South Africans.
Savimbi's Prospects. Although UNITA leader Savimbi may have suffered
a temporary set ac< during the recent offensive, we believe he is far from
beaten. At a minimum, the current fighting has disabused Savimbi of the
idea, expressed frequently earlier this year, that he can achieve a quick
win by increasing military pressure on the government and forcing Luanda
to the bargaining table. In our view, UNITA is facing a protracted
conflict and finds itself more dependent than ever on Pretoria--given
improving government military performance, the more active use of
government superiority in airpower and firepower. difficulties of
supporting extended guerrilla operations.
Savimbi has never had a conventional army and unless there were
fundamental changes in his organization and massive reequipping and
resupply, we believe he probably will be unable to challenge directly
future government offensives in a standup battle which puts a premium on
direct support by South Africa. Savimbi probably will have to adjust his
tactics and strategy, a move which we believe he and his followers are
capable of making and that probably will be urged on him by Pretoria. The
insurgents may have to cut back on semiconventional operations in favor of
more purely guerrilla tactics and conclude that it is better to give
ground than to challenge government forces in fixed battles. Savimbi no
doubt will seek improved antitank and antiaircraft weapons to compensate
for government superiority. Although these weapons could make government
use of its air and ground weapons superiority more tentative, we doubt
that they would be enough to allow Savimbi to conduct effectively a
conventional war
i
aga
nst the government.
We do not believe Savimbi will pull back from operations in northern
Angola or elsewhere in the country. The necessity of challenging
government positions throughout the country, distracting Luanda from
concentrating on his base area, and expanding his area of operation and
recruitment probably will compel Savimbi to keep up the pressure. Savimbi
probably will try to intensify guerrilla attacks throughout central and
northern Angola to keep the government off balance. UNITA may even
increase bombings in the cities, intensify attacks on economic and
administrative targets, and redouble his efforts to knock out Angola's oil
facilities in Cabinda and northern coastal rea s to cut Luanda's only
reliable source of foreign exchange.
South African Actions. We believe Pretoria will again move to
intervene directly in the conflict if Angolan forces in coming offensives
threaten to push deeper into UNITA-held stronghold in.the south and closer
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to the Namibian border. Pretoria struck this year to prevent such a move
and, in our view, the UNITA-held area in Angola's southeast is
sufficiently important to Savimbi and Pretoria that South Africa would not
hesitate to do it again, although the government will seek to avoid white
casualities
d th
l
an
e
oss of its irreplacable aircraft.
Apart from replenishment of UNITA's recent material losses and resort
to special forces operations, there is little that Pretoria can
do--short of direct intervention--to prevent a repeat of Angola's improved
performance in the next if UNITA chose to fight a stand up
battle again
.
South African materiel and logistic assistance to UNITA probably will
increase if only to replace losses incurred during the offensive.
Moreover, we believe that Pretoria will continue special forces operations
in Angola--similar to this year's failed raid in Cabinda--that damage
Luanda logisticall
or ec
i
y
onom
cally and enhance UNITA's reputation.
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Balance of Forces
In our judgment, the balance of forces is in Angola's favor even when
South African forces are included on UNITA's side. The MPLA government
has an armed strength of roughly 100,000 men in the regular army and other
security forces, plus another 50,000 or more auxiliaries. In addition,
there is a roughly 35,000-man Cuban military contingent, including some
27,000 combat trooops, that backs the Angolan armed forces, guards rear
bases, provides essential support services, and frees an equivalent number
of Angolan troops for field operations. There are also some 1,200 Soviet
d
i
d
a
v
sers an
about 500 East European personnel.
Luanda holds a better than two-to-one advantage in manpower and,
although many of these troops are tied down in defense of fixed positions,?
Soviet and Cuban-flown transport aircraft allow fairly rapid redeployment
and concentration of forces throughout the country. UNITA's troops, in
contrast, move primarily on foot and movement to various regions of the
countr
is
tt
f
y
a ma
er o
weeks or months.
The government's traditional advantage in firepower is even more
pronounced. Substantial Soviet arms deliveries in late 1983 and
throughout 1984 have provided the Angolan Army with the full range of
conventional weapons, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
artillery. UNITA's troops are armed only with small arms and other light
infantry weapons. The substantial growth in Angola's air strength last
year--fully used for the first time in the recent offensive--provides an
additi
l
d
ona
a
vantage for which UNITA has no effective response.
Against the government, the
insurgents-
we
-
rai
regular forces organized in battalions, most of whom are deployed inCu
UNITA-held territory. In addition, there reportedly are 30,000 to 35,000
guerrillas operating in smaller units throughout the country, many of whom
F_ I
are ill-ar
d
d ill
me
an
-equipped.
~^c?NInMtheNpast, ~UNITA has held the advantage in Quality of mannnwpr and
better trained, more dedicated, and tougher than government
ldi
so
ers.
This advantage could be narrowing, however, as government forces improve
their military skills and, as demonstrated in this year's offensive, the
involvement of Soviet advisers in directing the Angolan operations
com
ensat
f
p
es
or previous Angolan shortcomings.
rougn y zu,uuu to 25 0 lightly armed but
ll
t
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South Africa has almost 20,000 troops in northern Namibia, including
Namibian territorial forces and a smaller number of South African regulars
in a small strike forces equipped with tanks and armored personnel
carriers. Pretoria deploys a portion of its air force forward to Namibia
for operations in Angola, but even if its total air strength is counted,
Angola from a purely numerical perspective has the edge, with more
supersonic fighters than South Africa--90 MIG-21s and 24 MIG-23s versus 65
Mirages. Moreover, Pretoria, unlike Angola, cannot easily replace its
aircraft losses. Angola's air strength is also backed by a substantial
air defense system with integrated radars, surface-to-air missiles, and
antiaircraft guns. This system has grown steadily since 1979, as the
Soviets have delivered more weapons to Anoola in response to repeated
- ------
So
th A
u
fri
Despite these apparent weaknesses, South Africa has repeatedly risked
its scarce military resources in Angolan operations. Although Pretoria
has probably grown more wary as Angolan strength has increased over the
years, South Africa has repeatedly shown its willingness to challenge
Angolan forces when necessary. In contrast, the Angolans, Soviets, and
Cubans have through the years been hesitant about using their military
advantages and have seldom directly challenged the South Africans, despite
t
i
fre
ue
t
i
oppor
un
t
es
q
n
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Distribution:
Copy 1-5 -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director African Affairs, NSC
6 -- Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
7 -- Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
8 -- Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
9 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
10 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department
of State
11 -- Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense
e ense Intelligence Agency
13 -- Raymond F. Smith, AF/S, Department of State
14 -- Robert Gelbard, AF/C, Department of State
15 -- Robert H. Baraz, Director INR/Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, Department of State
16 -- Alexander Vershbow, Multilateral Relations, Office
of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
17 -- efense Intelligence Officer for European
and Soviet Political Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency
18 -- Stephen Sestanovich, Director, Political-Military
Affairs, National Security Council
19 -- Raymond F. Smith, AF/S, Department of State for Africa
20 -- NIO for USSR
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21 -- NIC
22 -- DDO/Africa
23 -- PDB Staff
24 -- ILS
25 -- C/DDI/PES
26 -- D/ALA
27 -- ALA Research Director
28 & 29 -- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
.) 31 $ 32 OC*l 33 ~~ D
30 - 33 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB ' / 36"ite
34 - 36 -- ALA/AF
37 - 38 -- ALA/C
49 - 40 -- ALA/C (file)
41 - DDI
42 - 25X1
43 -- SOVA/RIG/TWAD
44 -- NIO for Africa
ALA/AF~
(7 October 1985)
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