EQUATORIAL GUINEA: PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET AND WESTERN INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 February 1985
Equatorial Guinea: Prospects for Soviet and Western Interests
Summary
We believe President Obiang's political position is secure
for the near term, although his rule rests largely on the
continued presence of a 300-man Moroccan Presidential Guard.
Obiang faces potential tribal, economic, and military unrest
and uncertain relations with Spain--the country's principal
benefactor. Any weakening of Obiang's position or his
overthrow could afford the Soviet Union opportunities to re-
acquire the influence and the presence it lost when Obiang
deposed a pro-Soviet regime in 1979. Obiang's Western-leaning
foreign policy probably has alienated some pro-Soviet officers,
who nay intervene should the opportunity arise. The President
may also face pressure from some pro-Spanish officers who may
be disturbed by the country's slow drift into the French sphere
of influence and by its recent entry into the African franc
cone. Without supplanting Spain, Paris wants to help tie
Equatorial Guinea more firmly to the West and preclude the
State Dept. review completed
This memorandum was prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, the Department of State. It was written bu
American Analysis and by Office of Soviet Analysis.
It has been coordinated wv the Directorate of Operations. Questions and
comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
?i
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J L U K t I
country's potential use by Moscow as an alternate site for air
and naval access the Soviets now enjoy in Angola and Guinea.
Background
At independence from Spain in 1968, the mini-state of Equatorial
Guinea had a seemingly bright future, with a prosperous cocoa-based
economy and a multiparty political system. However, under the brutal
tyranny imposed by its first President, the late Macias Nguema, economic
and political structures disintegrated while relations with Spain
deteriorated sharply; the United States suspended diplomatic relations in
1976. In return for vital security assistance and some technical aid, the
Soviet Union and other Communist states gained a foothold in Equatorial
Guinea in proximity to several important, Western-oriented countries, such
as Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon. Macias' power base was the Mongomo clan
of the Fang tribe that constitutes some 80 percent of the population and
dominates Rio Muni, the mainland portion of Equatorial Guinea. The Bubis,
the indigenous population of the island of Bioko and the site of the
country's cap' constitute about 15 percent of the
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pop
a
In 1979, Macias was overthrown by his nephew, Colonel Teodoro Obiang,
a moderate and a Spanish-educated Army careerist, ending 11 years of
rule. The new President inherited a country in shambles, a dispirited
population, and a civil service and military dominated by Communist-
trained personnel. From the onset, Obiang has depended for protection on
a bodyguard of 300 Moroccan troops. Although Obiang is a Mongomo and his
government is Fang-dominated, he has made some efforts to cultivate better
relations with the minority Bubis and has sought to improve the country's
human rights image. A constitution was approved by plebiscite in 1982
and, a year later, a parliament was installed that was chosen partly by
Obiang and partly by the electorate. Obiang has gradually reoriented
foreign policy tow the West and sought to reduce links with the
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Western Involvement
Since the 1979 coup, Equatorial Guinea has expanded connections with
the West beyond traditional relations with Spain. It has forged
particularly close ties with France while adhering publicly to a
nonaligned foreign policy. Obiang also has cultivated good relations with
moderate African neighbors, especially with French-speaking Gabon.
Equatorial Guinea's relations with Spain have cooled since the
election of a Socialist goverment in Madrid in 1982, particularly because
the Socialists have been critical of past foreign aid expenditures. The
Spanish press has referred to Equatorial Guinea as a "bottomless pit,"
depicting the Obiang regime as corrupt, tribalistic, and inefficient. The
two countries' relations have thus been marked by tension over the level
and disposition of Spanish aid and by Equatorial Guinea's entry this year
into the French-backed African franc zone. The US Embassy reports that
Madrid is unhappy with Equatorial Guinea's growing involvement with
rance, but is reconciled to some loss of influence
The US Embassy reports that Spanish officials indicate Madrid will
continue to play a crucial economic role in Equatorial Guinea, despite the
cooling of relations on the diplomatic front. Spain is Equatorial
Guinea's largest trading partner, providing 73 percent of the country's
imports and taking 33 percent of its exports in 1982, the latest year for
which data are available. Even though Madrid has been critical of aid to
Equatorial Guinea, Spain also remains the single largest economic aid
donor, providing an estimated $14 million a year. Equatorial Guinea owes
an estimated $40 million in debts to Spain, according to Western economic
journals. Since Obiang's coup in 1979, Spain has provided some military
training and assistance, and last vear 40 Spanish military advisors were
stationed in the country.
While Spain's influence has waned slightly, France has played a more
active economic role in Equatorial Guinea in recent years. According to
US Embassy reporting from France, Paris' goal is to help prevent a
resurgence of Soviet presence in order to safeguard the moderate,
neighboring states of Cameroon and Gabon, in which France has significant
political and commercial interests. In coming years, we believe French
S E C R E T
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influence will be exercised primarily through Equatorial Guinea's
membership in the African franc zone.*
In our judgment, the Obiang government decided that Malabo needed to
join the franc zone so Equatorial Guinea could reduce its economic and
political isolation and take advantage of the financial benefits that
accrue from membership. The franc zone provides Equatorial Guinea for the
first time with a convertible currency, borrowing access to pooled
currency reserves, and greater monetary stability. The Embassy believes
that Malabo's membership should help stem the flow of smuggled cocoa and
coffee into neighboring Cameroon and Gabon, where these cash crops in the
past have been sold for convertible CFA francs. Moreover, in our view,
Equatorial Guinea's use of the CFA franc should facilitate greater
France prefers a coequal relationship with Spain in Equatorial Guinea
and does not wish to supplant Spanish efforts, according to the US
Embassy. France has few direct trade links with Equatorial Guinea, and it
provides no military aid. We have no information about the level of
economic aid that France may provide Equatorial Guinea. While President
Obiang visited France in 1982, President Mitterrand tely l' ed a
visit to Malabo, according to US Embassy reporting.
Soviet Interests
The USSR became the principal external benefactor of Equatorial
Guinea after Macias became hostile to Spain in the early 1970s and turned
to Communist sources of assistance to reinforce his grip on power.
Between 1968 and 1979, the. Soviets provided a variety of small arms, eight
4Thirteen ex-French territories, in addition to Equatorial Guinea,
are members of the French-backed African franc zone. Other members are
Benin, Burkina, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Africans receive
monetary stability and accept conservative French monetary and, banking
policies in place of national control. Zone arrangements protect France's
privileged trade by setting effective ceilings on imports*by Africans from
i
outs
de the zone and from the EC, and minimum levels for certain imports
from France. African issuing banks must hold their members' pooled
currency reserves and foreign exchange earnings in French francs in a
French treasury account into which receipts are credited and payments
debited. African states ordinarily cannot impose exchange controls or
revalue their currencies without the consent of all parties, and then are
obliged to follow the lead of France in these areas.
C r r R P T
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patrol boats, and 20 armored personnel carriers, ensuring Equatorial
Guinea's dependence on Moscow for equipment, spare parts, and
maintenance. In addition, an estimated 200 Equatorial Guinean soldiers
were trained in the USSR. US diplomatic reporting estimated that the East
Bloc militar advisory resence may have reached 330 by 1977 (see
annex).
The bulk of Soviet economic efforts in the Macias era focused on
developing Equatorial Guinea as a base for fishing activities in West
Africa, according to US' Embassy reporting. A number of press and US
diplomatic sources report that Moscow enjoyed a monopoly of fishing in
Equatorial Guinean waters, providing a limited amount of low grade fish to
the country while it shipped the best part of the catch to the Soviet
Union, and was allowed to set up a floating drydock at the port of Luba as
a repair and support facility for the Soviet West African fishing fleet.
In addition to the Soviet's involvement in fishing, Moscow provided just
over $1 million in economic assistance from 1968 to 1979, and the Soviets
virtually ran the Equatorial Guinean state airline, providing two
transport aircraft, pilots, and mechanics on a cash basis.
For his part, President Obiang has sought to reduce the Soviet
presence and influence in Equatorial Guinea. The US Embassy reports that
the 1973 fishing agreement has not been renewed, Soviet use of Luba has
been terminated since 1980, and Soviet personnel levels were reduced to
about 80 by late 1982.
Ties continued to sour after Obiang
uncovered a coup plot in 1983 involving a number of Soviet-trained
officials. According to the US Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador refused the
plotters' requests for direct assistance, but implied that substantial
support would follow a successful coup. We believe the coup plot
confirmed Obian 's policy,
Moscow subsequently withdrew its
muircary tecnnicians at Equatorial Guinea's request. The Embassy reports
that the Soviets responded by cutting off spare parts for Equatorial
Guinean military equipment. of the equipment is now
nonfunctional. 25X1
The downward trend in Soviet-Equatorial Guinean relations continued
throughout 1984. Trade levels are minimal, according to the US Embassy,
and only two Soviet civilian vehicle repair shops and a Soviet medical
assistance program continue to operate. Equatorial Guinea, however, still
depends on the Soviets to support its state airline, continues to send
students to the USSR--some 40 in 1983--and participates in a number of
cultural and sports exchanges.
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c r r D r r
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Based on Embassy reporting, we believe Moscow is unhappy with
Obiang's opening to the West, especially to Paris. From Moscow's
perspective, France's extensive ties with its former colonies in the
region, willingness to intervene military on behalf of its African
clients, and efforts to expand its sphere of influence to non-French areas
of Africa make Paris a more formidable threat than Madrid to the Soviet
position in Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea is not a high priority
for the Soviets, whose major concern is southern Africa and the Horn,
according to the US Embassy in Moscow. However, the Embassy reports that
Moscow does take a general interest in Equatorial Guinea within the
context of trying to displace Western influence and presence, encourage
local pro-Soviet elements, and expand its access to West African fishing
grounds. In our view, Moscow may also see Equatorial Guinea as one of
several potential sites for air and naval access that could support the
small Soviet West African naval patrol and periodic TU-95 naval
reconnaissance flights in the south Atlantic that presently stage out
of Luanda.
Outlook
Although the regime has restored order and lacks an organized
domestic opposition. Obiang still is potentially vulnerable to tribal
unrest, military discontent, and public and military frustration with slow
Tribalism. We agree with the US Embassy that one main threat to
stability is -the persistence of divisive tribal prejudices. Obiang must
balance conflicting pressures from his own Mongomo Fang clan--who wish to
maintain their supremacy--with those of other groups demanding a share of
political power. So far, Obiang has tried to cultivate better relations
with other Fang groups while trying to give the Bubis some voice in
government. His policy may ultimately fuel more Bubi discontent and renew
latent separatist tendencies if the Bubi islanders believe they are given
only token powers,, or it may prompt plotting among Fang groups who sense
th
i
i
r
e
nterests are not being served.
Mi 1 i tary. US Embassy reporting indicates that for the moment Obiang
faces no serious challenge from the military. Obiang is portrayed as
being personally acquainted with virtually every officer, which suggests
to us that he has good information on the depth of his support within the
military. Even so, we believe it is likely that disgruntled pro-Soviet
and pro-Spanish factions exist. We estimate about a third Whigher-
ranking officers are Soviet-trained and some of these may be hostile to
Obiang's gradual Westward shift. We also cannot rule out opposition from
some Spanish-trained officers, who may believe their country s -historic,
S F C. P F T
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25X1
cultural, and linguistic ties with Madrid are threatened by Obiang's
i
&.-- with
r
wa rm
ng
F
nc
The Economy. Although economic problems do not immediately threaten
Obiang's position, we believe the potential for unrest and military
plotting is likely to increase over continued stagnation and corruption.
Rehabilitation of cocoa plantations has been slow. Only 8000 metric tons
of cocoa was produced in 1982, far below the 40,000 tons produced at the
time of independence. According to a senior US Embassy official, the
population is still traumatized by the brutalities of the Macias era and
lacks the drive to work hard. Nigerian expatriates, who historically
worked the cocoa fields but fled during the Macias tyranny, have been
unwilling to return, probably fearing a renewal of persecution. Moreover,
inter-tribal rivalries--which must be taken into account in all domestic
decisions--will also hamper economic reforms, since key Fangs may fear
that changes will challenge their economic prominence. The President's
tendency to remove potential rivals from office, including competent
technocrats, may further forestall needed economic policy reforms.
Moreover, tribal concerns are likely to limit a comprehensive crackdown on
corruption. Malabo must also service what for Equatorial Guinea is
substantial foreign debt, which ranges from $80 million to 5120 million,
accordi
W
ng to
estern economi c publications.
The Moroccan Factor. In our view, the continued presence of the
Moroccan Presidential uard is critical to Obiang's future. King Hassan
dispatched troops following the 1979 coup, a little more than a year after
Rabat provided troops to shore up Zairian President Mobutu following the
1978 exile incursion in Shaba. The Moroccan presence is based on the
personal friendship between Hassan and Obiang as well as Rabat's policy of
providing security forces to various African countries in return for
diplomatic support to its claim to the Western Sahara. US Embassy
reporting indicates Malabo supported the Moroccan position at the 1984 OAU
summit. Should the Moroccan troops be withdrawn if strains develop
between Rabat and Malabo or because of Rabat's continuing economic
problems, we believe Obiang would be more vulnerable to military unrest.
In our view, Equatorial Guinea's gradual shift toward closer
relations with the West will continue so long as Obiang remains in
power. At the same time, we believe Obiang will continue the uneasy
relationship with the Soviets. He is likely to bow to the Soviets from
time to time--for examole in UN voting--to give the appearance of
The Soviets would have new opportunities to exploit if Obiang were
overthrown in the near future by pro-Soviet officers or if a coup were
followed by instability that threatened Western influence and presence.
We believe a more Soviet-influenced Equatorial Guinea would remain highly
S F r R F T
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dependent on the West for financial assistance, however, and for that
reason, Equatorial Guinea's new rulers would probably try to mask their
Barring a change in government in Malabo, we believe the Soviet Union
is likely to continue a wait-and-see policy so long as it is able to
maintain some presence in Equatorial Guinea. To date, the Soviets have
not been willing to counter Equatorial Guinea's improved relations with
the west by offering extensive new military or economic aid, perhaps
calculating that the West will not fulfill Obiang's aid expectations.
We cannot rule out a gradual shift back toward Moscow. Obiang is
likely to come under mounting internal pressure from Soviet trained
officers if his moderate policies fail to promote economic recovery and if
the West fails to provide the quantity of economic assistance Equatorial
Guinea requires. Although Equatorial Guinea received $140 million in
pledges at a 1982 donors conference, Western countries are reluctant to
invest in or provide significant aid to Malabo, given the country's
inability to absorb aid and its potential instability. A considerable
burden of responsibility for Equatorial Guinea's well being will remain on
Spain, because we believe France does not wish to supplant Madrid in the
near term as the principal prop of the Obiang regime.
c c r D G T
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Annex
Other Communist Involvement in Equatorial Guinea
Predominant Soviet involvement in Equatorial Guinea is supplemented
by the Chinese, the Cubans, and North Koreans. US Embassy reporting
indicates that China clearly is Moscow's leading Communist rival in the
country, and is more popular than the Cubans and the North Koreans.
China. The US Embassy reports that the Chinese, who maintain a low
profi eT are well regarded by the Obiang government and the local
population. Beijing had good relations with the former Macias regime, but
did not commit enough resources to compete effectively with Moscow in the
military and economic areas. Approximately 20 Chinese technicians
currently are working on road and energy projects and we believe China's
role in Equatorial Guinea's development will remain modest. China's own
economic needs outweigh its ability to substantially increase financial
aid to Malabo. We note that no new economic agreements were announced
d
i
ur
ng Mang s visit to China last year
North Korea. Obianq continues to cultivate good relations with North
Korea, desp 1 Pyongyang s strong support of Macias and several recent
instances of North Korean interference in Malabo's internal affairs,
including smuggling and attempts to bribe local officials. Equatorial
Guinea's ties with North Korea developed in the late 1960s, with Pyongyang
providing an unknown number of military advisors and possibly some arms.
According to open sources, North Korean advisors unsuccessfully tried to
11
-
The US Embassy reports that Obiang hopes to stimulate rivalries
between the resident North Korean Embassy and accredited South Korean
diplomats based in Cameroon, believing this will result in more assistance
to Equatorial Guinea. Last year, according to Embassy reporting,
Pyongyang promised $10 million in material and economic assistance,
including the completion of a aarliamentarv hiiilrlinn etar+-,i -.,. +i,., +L.
IQ y pro
Macias forces during Obiang s coup.
Cuba. Although relations with Havana and Malabo are good, mainly
because of a common Hispanic background, Cuba's influence has diminished
since Obiang took power. The US Embassy reports that Obiang has allowed
military and economic agreements with Havana to lapse, resulting in a
decline of Cuban presence. Cuba currently provides no military aid or
advisors, and its economic assistance is limited to four doctors who work
c r o r -r
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in a local hOSDital plus a few scholarships for Equatorial Guinean
c r. r D r r
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Lobe( / Bioko
r:-/ (Fernando Po)
*YAOUNDE
Cameroon
llhado ,..>
Principe
Sao Tome
and
Principe
*SAO TOME
llha de
Sao Tome
LIBREVILLE *
Evinayong
Equatorial Bata
Guinea ,
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SUBJECT: EQUATORIAL GUINEA: Prospects for Soviet and Western Interests
Distribution:
Original -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State, Department of State
1 -- Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Frank G. Wisner, Africa Bureau, Department of State
4 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR,
Department of State
4 -- Edward J. Perkins, Director, West African Affairs, Department of
State
1 -- Deborah O'Dell, Equatorial Guinea Desk Officer, Department of
State
1 -- Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, USN, Political Military Affairs
1 -- Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Secur~ity Affairs, Department of Defense
1 -- Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa,
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 -- Karen Puschel, INR/SEE, Department of State
1 -- Alexander Vershbow, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of
Euopean Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Ambassador Jack Matlock, Senior Staff Member, NSC/USSR Eastern-
1 -- Steven Sestanovich, National Security Council
1 -- DDI
1--ADDI
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1 -- PDB Staff
1--ILS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
2 -- ALA/PS
1 -- ALA Research Director
3 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
2 -- ALA/AF/W3
4 -- ALA/Af/W
2 -- D/SOVA
1 -- C/SOYA/PA
1 -- C/SOYA/TF
1 -- C/SOYA/SF
1 -- C/SOVA/EA
S E C R E T
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25X1
1 -- C/SOVA/DI
1 -- C/SOYA/SE
1 -- C/SOVA/TW
1 -- C/SOVA/TW/A
1 -- C/SOYA/TW/T
1 -- C/SOVA/TW/M
1 -- SOVA/TW/M/
1 -- SOVA/TW/M/Chrono
1 -- SOVA/TWA/Chrono
ALAAF/I I(22 February 1985)
S E C R E T
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