INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM A COMPARISON OF THE US AND SOVIET ECONOMICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030104-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 104
• Publication Date: July 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
A Comparison of the US and Soviet Economies
Confidential
ER IM 72-104
July 1972
Copy N2 114
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
A COMPARISON OF THE US AND SOVIET ECONOMIES
Gross National Product
Overall Economy
The USSR, with a gross national product (GNP) of about $550 billion,
has the world's second largest economy, somewhat more than half that
of the United States. It has consistently grown faster than the US economy,
although Soviet growth slowed after 1960, as follows:
Average Annual
Rate of Growth
(Percent)
USSR
US
1951-60
6.0
3.6
1961-65
5.2
4.1
1966-74
5.6
3.1
1971
3.3
2.7
In absolute terms, however, the gap between the US and Soviet economies
has increased in recent years !Figure 1).
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research.
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Uses of Output
The Soviet government has always given priority to defense needs and
to providing for rapid industrial growth. In their expenditures for defense
and investment, the Soviets have achieved approximate parity with the
United States (Figure 2). By contrast, Soviet consumption is only about
40% of US consumption, or about one-third on a per capita basis. Moreover,
these quantitative comparisons do not measure the very great differences
in the quality and variety of the diet, wearing apparel, and consumer
durables.
Gross National Product, 1970
by End Use
New Fixed
Investment
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Figure 2
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National Policy Expenditures
Important aspects of. Soviet economic policy are illustrated by
comparison of a group of strategic components of GNP that may be termed
national policy expenditures (Figure 3). They include: (1) education,
industrial investment, and civilian research and development, which reflect
the emphasis on economic growth; and (2) foreign aid and defense, which
reflect foreign policy priorities.
Figure 3
National Policy Expenditures, 19TO
I iN r 1L.GIN 1 lKLF
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Taken as a whole, Soviet national policy expenditures (measured in
dollars) are not far below those of the United States. The Soviets have
long regarded increased education as an important element in the economic
growth process. The relatively large Soviet investment in industrial plant
and equipment indicat?s the stren sous effort to catch up with US industry.
But, despite the Soviet concentration on industrial growth, a large
technological gap persists. The USSR spends heavily on advanced education
and on research and development, and impressive results in research are
frequently achieved. Because of the inflexible management system and the
inadequacy of incentives, however, the development and introduction of
innovations are inordinately slow.
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Industry
Industrial Output
During most of the postwar period the USSR achieved a more rapid
increase in industrial production than the United States. By 1970, Soviet
industrial output reached a level almost five times that of 1950 while US
output more than doubled. Soviet industrial growth slowed markedly in
the 1960s -- to about 7% a year compared with 10% in the 1950s - still
well above US growth (Figure 4). The Soviet advantage reflects partly a
more rapid growth of GNP and partly a slower development of services.
Soviet industrial production now stands at almost two-thirds that of the
United States.
Industrial Growtn
1950 1955 1960
01-1 1 1 1 I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I
Figure 4
1965 1970
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A hallmark of Soviet economic development has been the priority
expansion of the producers' goods sector, a policy that has begun to be
relaxed only in the last few years. A comparison of the output of the
two countries' producers' goods industries shows how much progress the
USSR has made (Figure 5). The USSR now outproduces the United States
in such basic products as steel and cement. At the same time, the USSR
remains far behind in production of goods such as electronics and computers
which play a critical role in modern technology. And Soviet large-scale
production of automobiles is just beginning.
Although the volume of Soviet output is large, the USSR, outside its
military-space sector, lags behind the West in the quality of the output
of most heavy industries. Most of its steel, for example, consists of the
simpler, less specialized varieties; thus the Soviets have been unable to
produce the large-diameter pipe needed to develop their distant oil and
gas fields, Machine tool production, which was six times US production
in 1971 in terms of number of units, consists largely of standard types.
The Soviets have had to turn to the West to get a number of crucial
components for their several motor vehicle plants now under construction.
They have not yet begun serial production of third-generation computers
or integrated circuits.
There are exceptions, however. Soviet goods of some kinds have
equaled the best in Western designs. These include hydroelectric generating
equipment, high voltage transmission equipment, electroslag remelting
furnaces, and some kinds of radios and cameras.
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Figure 5
Output of Producers'Goods, 1971
USSR as a Percent of US
Aluminum
Cement
Electric
Generators
Electronics
^omputers
Crude Oil
Natural Gas
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Primary Energy
Consumption
Percent
Reserves, 1971
USSR as a Percent of US
Figure 6
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Primary Energy
Both the United States and the USSR are well supplied with the
primary sources of energy - coal, oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric power
(Figure 6). Production continues to rise in both ccuntries in response to
escalating demands, but more rapidly in the USSR. Newly discovered
resources (especially in the USSR) and increased imports (particularly for
the United States) have prevented major shortages thus far. This trend is
likely to persist.
The pattern of energy consumption differs greatly in the two countries.
About 44% of Soviet energy comes from coal compared with 19% in the
United States, and the Soviet shares of oil and gas are correspondingly much
smaller. However, the Soviet consumption pattern is shifting rapidly from
coal to oil and gas, following the path of the United States, Western Europe,
and Japan.
Both countries are self-sufficient in coal although the USSR produced
somewhat more in 1971. Soviet industry is, however, increasingly forced
to exploit low-grade deposits far removed from major consumption centers.
The United States and the USSR are the world's leading crude oil producers.
Each country has about 5% of total proved world reserves, but potential
reserves are much more abundant in the USSR. Although US production
of natural gas was more than three times Soviet output in 1971, as in
the case of oil, potential reserves are much larger in the USSR. Nuclear
power will continue to play only a minor role in the overall energy balance
of both countries for the next several years.
Metals and Minerals
A significant factor in the growth of the Soviet economy has been
the country's extensive deposits of generally high-quality ores and metals.
Many of these deposits, however, are found in the country's northern and
eastern regions where exploration and deve.'lopmeri,al expenditures as well
as transportation costs to major consumption areas are extremely high. Until
recently the USSR has postponed these expenses by exploiting reserves
located in more accessible areas, but these deposits are being depleted and
consequently reliance is increasing on development of the more distant
sources.
In 1970, Soviet production of platinum-group metals, manganese,
nickel, and iron ore far exceeded US output. As for chrome ore and
industrial diamonds, the USSR produced significant proportions of total
world output while the United States produced neither of these items. US
production of copper and phosphates exceeded that of the USSR in 1970,
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Figure 7
Output of Metals and Minerals, 1970
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but primarily as a result of lower Soviet demand, since the USSR is well
endowed in both of these resources (Figure 7).
Currently the United States imports large amounts of Soviet chrome
ore and platinum-group metals. Copper, diamonds, mangai-ese, and nickel
may join this list over time as US demand outstrips domestic supply or
alternative sources for imports become less attractive.
As in a number of other industrial areas, the Soviets are looking to
the West for the technology and equipment to develop the country's mineral
resources. They have done this in the past largely by means of medium-term
and long-term credits. Currently, the Soviets are seeking Western aid in
developing their raw materials sector through joint ventures involving
self-liquidating credit - that is, credit to be repaid out of the product of
the joint venture.
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Value of Output of Selected Agricultural Products; 1971
Net Agricultural
Production
-Value of production of crops and livestock for human use In average 957.59 dollars.
The dollar value of the USSR's output reflects the geometric mean of a. !ernativa
comparisons of US and USSR production computed In 1068 ruble pricer and
1957-59 dollar prices.
--Based on production In million metric tons.
??? Based on carcass weight, bone In, of beef, veal, mutton?lamb, goat, pork, poultry
and edible offals, excluding lard.
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CONE IDENTIAL
Agriculture
Of all sectors of the US and Soviet economies, agriculture offers the
greatest contrast in teims of organization and efficiency. Successive Soviet
leaderships have had recurring difficulties in assuring an adequate food
supply for a growing population. While the USSR has been expanding sown
acreage in an effort to increase production, the United States has been
reducing the area under cultivation and struggling with farm surpluses.
In some respects, US and Soviet agriculture arP similar. Both countries
have very large expanses of farmland relative to their populations. Despite
the USSR's much larger total area, the amount of arable land in the two
countries is roughly equal, as only 11% of the USSR's huge land mass is
suitable for farming Most of the farmland of both countries lies in the
north temperate zone. The USSR, however, is less favorably situated because
of its more northerly location and because much of its grain acreage is
marginal from the standpoint of rainfall. The USSR has no cropland
corresponding to the most productive farm regions of the United States:
the combination of fertile soil, adequate moisture, and long growing seasons
found in the US corn belt is lacking in the USSR where low temperature
and o""ermoist lands prevail in the north and aridity characterizes the south.
Institutional differences are vast. The collectivization of agriculture in
the USSR has resulted in the division of farm organization into two
sectors - the socialized sector which consists of state and collective farms
and accounts for two-thirds of agricultural production, and the private sector
consisting of small private garden plots accounting for one-third of total
farm output.
Soviet agricultural output was about 70% of the US level in 1960.
Since that time the dollar value of Soviet output has increased by about
35% and now stands at slightly less than 80% of US production (Figure 8).
However, Soviet farm output is still dominated by breadgrains and
potatoes - the USSR produces about twice as much wheat as the United
States but only 7% as much corn - while output of higher quality foods,
particularly meat and fruits, lags far behind that of the United States and
is patently inadequate to satisfy the growing demands of the Soviet
consumer.
Although Soviet farm' output has increased and diets have improved
somewhat, the additions to agricultural production in recent years resulting
from the large= flows of new plant, equipment, and soil additives have been
below expectations. Thus the USSR has recently imported large quantities
of meat and grain from the West and has scheduled further imports of
bread grains and feed grains for 1972.
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The USSR employs a farm labor force more than eight times the size
of that in the United States on two-thirds more cultivated Innd (Figure 9).
But in the USSR, one farm worker feeds seven while in the United States
he feeds 46. The USSR maintains almost one-third of its labor force in
agriculture, by far the largest share among industrialized nations; the United
States employs only 5% of its labor force in agriculture.
Despite heavy capital investment - 18% of total investment in the
USSR versus 4% in the United States - the withdrawal of manpower from
Soviet farms is relatively slow, and mechanization of the agricultural sector
lags far behind the US level. Deliveries of equipment to agriculture are large
but erratic and have not always coincided with needs. Thus, although
inventories have increased substantially since the 1950s, Soviet farms still
Figure 9
Factors of Production in Agriculture, 1970
New Fixed
Investment
'Acreage sown to annual and perennial crops.
"End of year Inventories.
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have ^niy about 40% as many tractors and trucks as US farms and
three-fourths as many combines (Figure 10). Moreover, efficient utilization
of Soviet mechanized equipment is hampered by the poor state of repair
work.
A major cause of inefficiency in Soviet agriculture is the collective
farm system. Soviet farmers and their families work their private plots
intensively and are not given adequate incentives to produce efficiently on
the collective land.
Figure 10
Inventories of Agricultural Equipment, 1971
USSR as a Percent of US
Tractors
Trucks 38
Grain Combines 74
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In 1970 the average Soviet citizen consumed about one-third of the
goods and services consumed by his US counterpart, but this comparison
fails to reflect fully the inferior quality and assortment of styling of Soviet
clothes and durables, the chronic shortages, and the long queues at retail
stores (Figure 11).
Per Capita Consumption, 1970
Health
Personal Services
Durable Goods
Soft Goods
Food
Figure 11
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Except for sewing machines, Soviet consumers enjoy only a fraction
of the durables owned by their US counterparts (Figure 12). Automobiles
are only now beginning to be produced for the public at the Toliatti plant
built by Fiat. Currently the waiting period for a new car runs from 4 to
6 years. Shorter, but nonetheless extensive, delays exist for the best-quality
refrigerators and furniture. Many durables - automatic washers, dryers, and
freezers - are not manufactured or sold in the USSR. On the other hand,
both color and black-and-white television sets, radio-phonographs, transistor
radios, and tape recorders are available oft the sales floor. The poor quality
of the color in Soviet television sets, their high price, and the few hours
of color programming per week have turned Soviet consumers away from
this product.
Figure 12
Stocks of Consumer Durables, 1970
Refrigerators
Washing Machines
Radios
Television Sets
Automobiles
Vacuum Cleaners
Sewing Machines
513547 4-72
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Housing conditions in the USSR are one of the major causes of popular
discontent. The Soviets have built urban housing at a very rapid rate during
the last decade, but, because of the large growth of urban population, the
number of square meters of space per person increased from only 6 in
1960 to about 7.5 in 1970. Housing space per capita for the total population
in the USSR, however, is still only one-third that Li the United States.
A substantial percentage of the urban apartments involve the sharing of
bathrooms and kitchens, and a considerable number of communal dwelling
units exist. However, increasingly larger percentages of urban families are
obtaining apartments with their own bath and kitchen facilities.
Soviet consumers receive enough to eat in terms of daily calories, but
their diet is heavily weighted with starches and deficient in meat, vegetables,
and fruit (Figure 13). Although per capita consumption of meat has
increased 14% since 1965, the average Soviet citizen still eats only one-third
as much meat as that consumed by his US counterpart (Figure 14).
However, the Brezhnev regime is clearly committed to expanded meat
production to alleviate the worst short^;ges.
Figure 13
Average Diets, 1971
Meat and Fish
Vegetables,
Milk and
Milk Products
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Figure 14
Per Capita Meat C: onsUmlp -)n
in Selected Countries, 1970
Poland
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
West Germany
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The Soviet population is 18% larger than the US population, but the
total labor force of the USSR exceeds that of the United States by 45%,
a ratio which has not appreciably changed since 1955 (Figure 15). A basic
factor accounting for the larger share of employed persons in the USSR
is the greater use of women workers. In 1970, one worker in two in the
USSR was a woman, while in the United States the ratio was one out
of three.
Figure 15
Total Labor Force
The sharpest difference in structure between the US and the Soviet
labor force is in agriculture, where Soviet employment now reach..s a level
eight times that of the US in 1970 (Figure 16). By contrast, only one-third
of the US labor force is employed in services, while less than one-fifth
work there in the USSR. However, the Soviet service sector is growing
rapidly as a proportion of the nonagricultural labor force - from 24% in
1960 to 28% in 1970.
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Commerce (that is, retail trade, banking, insurance, and real estate),
like services, is only now emerging from an embryonic stage in the Soviet
Union. These activities employ one-fourth of the US labor force and only
7% of the Soviet force. The United States has slightly fewer men under
arms than the USSR - 3.2 million in the United States compared with
3.3 million in the USSR in 1970. In both countries, about one-fourth of
the work force is employed in industry, while construction takes 4% to
6% of the labor force and transportation-communications 6% to 8%.
Figure 16
Distribution of Total Employment by Sector, 1970
Construction
Commerce
Services
Military
Transportation
and
Communications
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Productivity
Soviet growth in the past has been fueled by large and increasing
outlays on investment (Figure 17). In 1970 the share of GNP allocated
to capital formation exceeded 31% compared with 17% in the United States.
Figure 17
Total Investment*
As a Percent of GNP
In spite of this high rate of investment, labor productivity in the two
countries has grown at about the same rate since 1950 (Figure 18). Labor
productivity in Soviet industry was about 40% of US levels both in *j955
and in 1970. The marked Soviet advantage over the United States in the
rate of growth of industrial output reflects a more rapid increase in
employment, not in productivity. Similarly, growth in agricultural
productivity has barely matched US performance, and agricultural labor is
only about 10% as productive in the USSR as in the United States in spite
of a do::?de of much larger investments in Soviet agriculture.
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Figure 18
Labor Productivity *
1960
'Computed using net Industrial and agricultural output and the average
annual number of workers employed In each sector.
The consistently poor performance in. productivity stems from the
many managerial problems of a centralized and bureaucratic socialism.
Rewards and pressures are directed toward increasing output, while the
introduction of new technology involves risks of failure. In addition, the
armed forces preempt the larger share of research and development (R&D)
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funds and get the best scientific talent (Figure 19). Civilian R&D receives
only about 25% of total R&D outlays in the USSR against 40% in the
United States. Moreover, three-fourths of the funds allocated to all R&D
in the USSR go for basic and applied research rather than to translating
research into the development of new processes and products. In contrast,
the United States spends three-fifths of its total allocation to R&D on
developing new processes and products.
Figure 19
Expenditures for Research
and Development and Space
70 1960
Cumulative Expc.iditures
1960-70
Billion US $
n/1*TT'TTITITPT1T A V
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USSR
US
1965
1970
1971
1971
GNP (billion 1970 US $)
227.3
298.8
397.8
530.6
548.6
1,000.4a
Population, mid-year (million persons)
196.1
214.3
230.9
242.8
245.1
207.0
Pei capita GNP (1970 US $)
1,160
1,390
1,720
2,190
2,240
4,830?
Industrial production index (1960 = 100)
66.6
100.0
139.2
192.6
203.1
160.911
Net agricultural production index (1960 = 100)
84.3
100.0
118.9
146.0
143.8
123.3
Broad grains (million'metric tons)
63.6
59.0
62.0
91.0
91.0
45.9
Feed grains (million metric tons)
42.8
34.0
37.0
58.0
58.0
186.2
Potatoes (mWion metric tons)
71.8
.844
88.7
96.8
92.3
14.4
Meatb (million metric tons)
5.8
8.1
9.2
11.4
12.2
23.1
Total labor force (including the armed
forces), adjusted annual average
(million persons)
Non-agricultural, adjusted annual average
(million persons)
75.6
86.7
89.1
75.7
Agricultural, adjusted annual average
(million persons)
42.3
37.5
36.9
4.5
Total investment Index (1960 = 100)
54.2
100.0
135.6
195.3
208.7
146.7?
Per capita consumption index (1960 = 100)
84.6
100.0
113.0
141.1
148.6
135.9
Crude oil (million metric tons) '
71
. 148
243
353
377
470
Natural gas (billion cubic meters)
9
45
128
198
212
637
Electric power (billion kilowatt-hours)
170
292,
507
740
800
1,827
Petroleum products (million metric tons)
61
114
174.
252
266
610
Coal (million metric ions)
390
490
545
578
592
507
Primary energy production (million metric
tons of coal equivalent)
"
'
435
663
942
1,237
1,291
2,140
Crude stcel
(million
metric tons)
45.3
65.3
91.0
115.9
120.9
109.1
Cement (million metric tons)
22.5
45.5
72.4
95.2
100.3
72.12
Aluminum (thousand metric tons)
430
630
1,000
1,720
1,760
3,561
Refined copper (thousand metric tons)
377
490
772
1,100
1,190
1,745
Chromite (million metric tons)
0.3
0.5
1.2
1.4
1.4
Ncgl.
Manganese ore (million metric tons)
4.7
5.9
7.6
6.8
6.8
0
Iron ore (million metric tons)
71.9
105.9
153.4
195.5
203.0
83.6
Nickel, relined (thousand metric tons) .
46
72
100
140
151
14
Bauxite (thousand metric tons)
2,700
3,110
4,860
5,000
5,000
2,032
Phosphate rockd(rriillion metric tons)
N.A.
5.8
11.5
18.0
19.5
34.55
Automobiles (thousand units)
107.8
138.8
201.2
344.2
529.0
8,585
Trucks, including buses (thousand units)
337.5
384.8
415.1
571.9
613.7
2,053
Electric generators (thousand kilowatts)
4,526
7,915
14,390
10,578
13,354
36,548
Machine tools, metalcutting (thousand units)
117.1
155.9
186.1
202.3
206.0
32.8
Instruments (million rubleb, 1967 prices)
268
820
1,440
3,102
3,310
N.A.
Computers, digital (units)
60
280
470.
800
1,000
20,000
Refrigerators (thousand units).
151
529
'1,675
4,140
4,557:
5,6910
Washing' machines (thousand units)
87
895
3,430
5,243
4,052
4,608?
Radios (thousand units)
3,549
4,165
5,160
7,815
8,794
20,600
Television sets (thousand units)
495
1,726
3,655
6,682
5,814
11,200
Vacuum cleaners (thousand units)
131
501
800
1,509
1,720
7,9730
Sewing machines (thousand units)
'
.1,611.
3,096
800
1,400
1,409
N.A.
Gold production.(thou.!
ad troy ounces)
2,970
3,500
5,000
6,600
.6,960
1,580
CONFIDENTIAL. 27,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030104-2