WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE ANGOLAN INSURGENCY: TEN YEARS LATER

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: October 22, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Angolan Insurgency: Ten Years Later
Ea FILE CgPY
Tin TO 1E-51
Secret
N2 627
22 October 1971
No. 0393/71B
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For more than a decade, Portugal has been fighting insurgency ih its
African province of Angola. Although Portuguese forces have succeeded in
restricting the insurgents to sparsely populated and economically unim-
portant areas of Angola, it is apparent that Lisbon cannot win a conventional
military victory unless it deprives the guerrillas of the external support
provided by black African states, especially the neighboring countries of
Zambia and Congo (Kinshasa). This Portugal is not likely to manage. A
substantial military effort against these states probably will not be mounted
because there are alternative economic and political pressures that can be
effectively applied.
Furthermore, Lisbon's limited resources are spread thin by three Afri-
can insurgencies.i.NevertheleSs, Lisbon is firmly committed to maintaining its
presence in Angola andls resigned to a long-term struggle. Its economic stake
there is growinb, and provincial government income ,is paying for an in-
creasing ambunt of the defense burden. For the time being, Portugal believes
that its best bet is to keep the insurgency confined to remote areas of the
province. For th:!ir part, the insurgents show no signof throwing in the
towel, but they have probably reached the limits of their 'present capabilities.
PORTUGUESE
GUINEA
Hence, the present stalemate seems likely to continueindefinitely.
REPUBLIC
REP. DEMOCRATIC
OF
OF THE CONGO
?" Kinshasa
The Angolan Insurgency: *Luanda
Ten Years Later ANGOLA
SOUTHWEST
AFRICA
SO ,TH AFRICA
SECRET
MOZAMBIQUE
552003 I 0
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Popular Movement Jar the
Liberation of Angola
The largest and most effective of the three
nationalist groups opposing the Portuguese is
Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Lib-
eration of Angola (MPLA), formed in 1956 by a
merger of several small nationalist groups. A key
to the organization's effectiveness over the years
has been the ability and high motivation of its
urban-educated leaders who are Marxist oriented.
They have sought, with some success, support
from all segments of the Angolan population?
including whites?by stressing that the movement
is national and multiracial rather then tribally
oriented. The leadership itself has included mulat-
toes although nearly
25X1 all the rank and file have been black Africans.
tr
Neto, a Portuguese-educated physician and
poet, became President in 1962. Since then, the
leadership has undergone many changes brought
about by dissension and various reshuffles in the
hierarchy. Neto has managed to ride out these
changes, and he has fashioned a centralized party,
mulch he has strengthened by selecting leaders
mainly on the basis of proven ability. Neto has
even won the grudging respect of many Portu-
guese officials because of his organizational abili-
ties.
In its early years, the movement operated
solely from bases in Congo (Brazzaville) against
the Cabinda exclave ad in northwestern Angola.
The effort in Cabinda was limited, however, be-
cause it lacked manpower and because it was
unable to obtain sufficient support from the local
inhabitants who remained indifferent to non-
Cabindan insurgents. The organization has main-
tained some men and training camps in Congo
(Br azz av i I le), but insurgent actions against
Cabinda now are very rare and are confined to
border areas. Neto's men also encountered major
obstacles in northwestern Angola. Here, the guer-
rillas not only met with Portuguese military pres-
sures but also harassment by a rival insurgent
group through whose territory they had to travel.
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Although a heavily
armed force infiltrated
the northwest several
years ago, the movement
thus far has been unable
to resupply these units.
Because the effort
to penetrate the north-
west and to seize Ca-
binda became too costly,
Neto shifted his atten-
tion to eastern Angola in
1966. Two years later,
the main base of opera-
tions was moved to Zam-
bia, where permission
had been granted for
sanctuary and for the transit of arms and men.
From initial operations in the Cazombo salient of
Moxico District, the organization was able to
expand throughout that district and into nearby
areas of three adjoining districts: Lunda to the
north; Cuando Cubango to the south; and Bie to
the west.
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Agostinho Neto
MPLA president
The movement's early progress in eastern
Angola resulted prima) ily from the absence of
Portuguese forces in the area and the slow Portu-
guese reaction to the infiltration. Since 1968,
however, the Portuguese have slowed the advance
with a series of offensives and almost daily
ground patrols. Serious logistical problems have
further frustrated guerrilla expansion. In order to
reach Angola's populous central plateau and
coastal districts, the insurgents must cross hun-
dreds of miles of Portuguese-held terrain. Al-
though Neto's guerrillas can now operate as far as
the eastern fringe of Bie District adjacent to the
populated plateau area, they probably use up
most of their supplies in reaching this point.
Neto's guerrilla operations are now limited
mostly to sporadic ambushes, hit-and-run raids
against Portuguese outposts, mining roads, and
terrorist attacks against Portuguese-controlled
resettlement villages. As a condition for
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maintaining sanctuary privileges in Zambia, the
movement is not allowed to attack the Benguela
railroad, the only strategic target in eastern
Angola. The railroad is a tempting target for
mobile guerrilla bands, but at the same time is a
vital economic lifeline for landlocked Zambia.
Neto's group is the best armed and trained
of Angola's insurgent groups. Its arsenal includes
Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, light and heavy
machine guns, mortars, bazookas, and rocket
launchers. External support has come from a wide
variety of sources and in many forms. The organi-
zation has received the bulk of its arms and finan-
cial support from the Soviet Union. Available
estimates of Soviet financial aid range from
$144,000 to $300,000 per year. Hundreds of its
trainees have gone to the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe, either for military instruction or to
attend trade schools. Assistance from Communist
China has been considerably less and has been
limited mainly to arms supplied through the Or-
ganization of African Unity. Cuba has also trained
some recruits both ln Cuba and at training camps
in Congo (Brazzaville). Since 1965, the African
Liberation Committee of the OAU has given sup-
port to Neto's guerrillas; in 1969-70 the move-
ment received more than $49,000 in materiel and
financial aia through the committee. It has also
received either assistance or training directly from
a number of militant African states, including
Algeria, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), and
Tanzania.
The Revolutionary Government
ofAngola in Exile
Formerly the foremost Angolan insurgent
group, the Revolutionary Government of Angola
in Exile (GRAE) led by Holden Roberto has
slipped to a poor second. The organization's roots
date back to 1958 with the formation of the
Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA), an early na-
tionalist movement. Within two years, Roberto
consolidated his control of the union and in 1962
it merged with another minor group to form the
present organization. Roberto, moderate and
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pro-Western in outlook, has continued to domi-
nate the organization.
From inception, its primary base of support
has been the large Angolan refugee population of
Bakongo tribesmen who live in southwestern
Congo (Kinshasa). Although the organization has
won some support among the agrarian Bakongo
across the border in northwestern Angola, it has
failed to broaden its base because of its thinly
disguised regional and tribal make-up. Moreover,
Roberto's highly personal leadership and his un-
willingness to compromise have produced chronic
friction at the leadership level that resulted in the
defection of several prominent members.
When the rebellion bec2an in 1961, the UPA
had a rudimentary organization of political ac?
tivists already at work in northwestern Angola.
The suddenness and ferocity with which the in-
surgency broke out caught the organization by
surprise, however, and it was only able to provide
limited leader ship to the insurgents. Several hun-
dred Europeans were massacred, and several
thousand fled the northern districts to Luanda
and other major towns. But by the end of the
year, Portuguese military forces had regained con-
trol of all important towns, villages, and roads.
Since 1965, Portuguese counterinsurgency
forces have been able to restrict Roberto's units
to inaccessible mountain
strongholds in the north-
west and to small cross-
border forays along the
north-central Angolan
border. In early 1970,
the organization tried to
regain momentum,
launching its most ambi-
tious offensive in several
years. Portuguese forces
soon countered the guer-
rillas in the north, al-
though other units in
eastern Angola carried
out a few successful at-
tacks.
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Holden Roberto
GRA E leader
22 October 1971
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Angola: General Area of Insurgent Activity
/10
CONGO
DR AZ ZAVILLE
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
dii
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20
2,1
MPLA activity Efl UNITA activity
LII GRAE activity ELI Area of highest
population density
190 200 Milps
100 200 1(11ornelol,
LUANDA ti/
L
Henrique
Main* '\ du Carvalho
SOUTH-WESI\AFRICA
(International Taiisijory)
10
20
55201 0 10-71 CIA
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Roberto's group has made little headway
along its second front in the east. In late 1966,
some insurgents began entering the southern end
of Lunda District north of the Benguela railroad,
largely to demonstrate that it was more than a
limited tribal-based movement. It has continued
sporadic operations in the east, but the main
effort remains in the northwest.
One factor in the organization's decline was
Roberto's loss of the political support he once
received from the OAU. Initially, recognition by
the OAU as the Angolan government-in-exile gave
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by restrictions placed on their activities by the
Congo (Kinshasa) Covernment. Out of favor with
most of the African and Communist states that
provide the bulk of assistance to the insurgent
movements, the organization has usually fielded
poorly trained and inadequately armed guerrillas.
President Mobutu has been Roberto's major bene-
factor, providing financial and materiel aid, oc-
casional training, and bases in Congolese territory.
Since early 1969, however, Mobutu has followed
a policy of restraining insurgent operational ac-
tivity, while quietly renewing working relations
with Portuguese authorities in /- ngola. Late last
STRENGTH ESTIMATES (1971)
PORTUGAL MPLA
Total: ),000
Army V
Navy
Air Force
Regular Police
Security Police
59,000
2,700
3,500
12,000
1,100
11 Does not include local militia
GRAE UNITA
Total: 7,000 Total: 5,000 Total: 1,000
Field Strength: Field Strength: Field Strength:
North 500 North 2,500 East 200
East 3,500 East 500
21 Approximately 30 percent recruited locally
the organization a distinct advantage in obtaining
African-wide support. More recently, the prefer-
ence of the militant African states for Neto's
group and growing doubts about the military ef-
fectiveness of Roberto's men have resulted in a
diversion of OAU assistance. At the 1971 OAU
summit conference, the African heads of state
withdrew recognition of Roberto's organization
as a government, thereby reducing it to the same
status as all other African liberation movements.
Roberto's guerrillas continue to be handi-
capped by a shortage of modern small arms and
Special Report
year, he abruptly cut in half the group's monthly
subsidy of $20,000, despite protests from
Roberto. Lacking an alternative to Kinshasa's lim-
ited support, Roberto has had to make do with
what little he receives.
National Union fbr the Total
Independence of Angola
The smallest and weakest of the three groups
is the National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi.
Savimbi broke with Holden Roberto in 1964 and
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formed his own group two years later. Because of
tribal ties and Savimbi's personal contacts along
the Benguela railroad, the organization was ini-
tially successful in winning cooperation from east-
ern and central Angolan tribes who were cool to
the other two insurgent groups.
Savimbi and his followers have managed to
survive under conditions that should have finished
them long ago. Since 1967, this group has experi-
enced a sharp decline because of clashes with
Neto's men and defections to Roberto. It was
expelled from Zambia after attacks against the
Benguela railroad and has received no meaningful
outside support. Yet, Savimbi has kept his small
group alive, operating with virtually no assets.
Moreover, he has set up operational headquarters
inside Angola, a feat no other Angolan liberation
leader has been able to manage.
Although not a serious military threat, the
organization retains some capability for mounting
limited operations in east-central Angola. Savimbi
is also free to sabotage the Benguela railroad now
th-.4t he is no longer beholden to the Zambians. As
ecently as July 1971, the Portuguese claimed his
Portuguese Airlift Troops to Combat Zone
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group was responsible for a sabotage incident on
the railroad.
Portugal Fights Back
Determined to remain in Angola, Lisbon has
reacted vigorously to the insurgent challenge. Por-
tuguese regular armed forces have increased from
about 11,000 when the rebellion began to over
65,000 in early 1971. The army forms the back-
bone of the counterinsurgency forces and is
augmented by some militia and paramilitary or-
gan izatio ns. The Provincial Volunteer Civil
Defense Organization is the largest militia group,
numbering around 35,000, of whom some 6,000
are armed. It provides armed protection for vil-
lages and towns, and performs other routine civil
defense functions that free conventional forces
for military operations. In addition, there are
approximately 4,000 irregular black troops that
operate under army or security police aegis.
In northern Angola where the largest num-
ber of combat battalions are located, the Portu-
guese seern to have the insurgency well in hand.
Large-scale sweep-and-destroy operations have
gradually pushed the insurgents back into inacces-
sible mourtain redoubts in the northwest. Along
the north-central Angolan border, insurgent
harassment has usually been restricted to shallow
penetrations that are soon pushed back across the
border into Congo (Kinshasa).
In eastern Angola, the character of the war is
markedly different. Both Portuguese troops and
insurgents mc ve with relative freedom through
the vast and open terrain. As a result, government
forces place heavy emphasis on almost daily
patrols aimed at disrupting guerrilla infiltration
and supply routes. To increase mobility, a small
Portuguese helicopter fleet assists ground forces
in carrying out quick long-range strikes and sweep
operations that require placement of troops in
blocking positions. Although this military strat-
egy has not eliminated the instirgent threat, Por-
tuguese military authorities claim, with some
validity, that they have kept the guerrillas on the
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move in eastern Angola and out of the more
important central plateau area.
In conjunction with the military drive, the
Portuguese are also waging a determined psycho-
logical action program designed to demoralize the
insurgents and cut them off from the population.
The major focus of this effort is the establishment
of village clusters where the population of an
insurgent area can be resettled. Most of these
villages, called "aldeamentos," are provided with
their own defense militia and are situated near
roads to permit rapid assistance by Portuguese
forces if attacked. The number of aldeamentos is
not known, but they are believed to have denied
insurgents easy access to much of the population
of eastern Angola.
The Portuguese have taken other nonmili-
tary measures to strengthen their hand. In order
to foster allegiance to Portugal, an extensive pro-
gram of development and social reform has boen
introduced, including the construction of schools
and clinics in remote areas. According to the
Portuguese, since 1961 the number of children in
primary school has grown from 105,000 to
around 520,000. A few pilot projects have been
started in Bie and Moxico districts to improve the
quality and yield of agricultural commodities
grown by native producers. Military units also
help build medical and educational facilities for
the local population. All of these programs have
been partially successful. All suffer from a gener.91
lack of resources.
The Angolan economy is growing, partly in
spite of the war, partly because of it. Economic
activity has expanded to the point where provin-
cial government income is relieving the metropole
of an increasing share of the burden of defense
expenditures. While combating insurgency con-
tributes to i:iflationary pressures and takes an
increasing share of the Angolan provincial budget,
important sectors of the economy have continued
to grow. Agriculture, manufactui ing, and minerals
extraction?especially the rich offshore oil wells
at Cabinda?have increased oul put in the last few
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r.5./
oditticepr;
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itak A. l.L A
MPLA Guerrlia With Communist Literature
years. Basic projects, principally roads but also
water supply and electrification, are being
speeded up because of the war and will have a
IGng-term impact.
Regional Implications
The insurgents' use of Zambia and Congo
(Kinshasa) for sanctuary, supply, and staging is a
key factor affecting Portuguese relations with
these two neighboring countries. Lisbon has been
unable to end their support of the guerrillas, but
it has been able to induce both states, through
various political and economic pressures, to place
some restraints on the insurgents.
Portuguese relations with Zambia are more
difficult than with the Congo, in part because of
President Kaunda's strong personal commitment
to the liberation of white-ruled southerr. Africa.
Because of Zambia's geographic vulnerability to
economic retaliation, however, Kaunda tries to
keep a restraining hand on the insurgents in his
country. Kaunda has been forced to prohibit
guerrilla attacks against the Portuguese rail system
because Lusaka is dependent on both Angola and
Mozambique for rail and port facilities. This
dependence has often strained relations between
the two countries, and since 1966 there have been
sporadic and occasionally serious incidents along
the Angolan-Zambian border. Attempts to reach
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?
agreement on border integrity have been ham-
pered by mutual suspicions and recriminations.
Relations have been complicated by occasional
Portuguese incursions into Zambian territory,
either in pursuit of insurgents or in reprisal for
guerrilla raids. On several occasions, the Portu-
guese have temporarily closed their railroads in
25X1 retaliation for guerrilla strikes from Zambia. \
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Although Congo (Kinshasa) has provided
sanctuary for Roberto's headquarters and opera-
tional bases, actual logistical support has been
limiteci due to President Mobutu's conflicting
motives. Because Mobutu values his reputation as
a sponsor of Angolan nationalism, he publicly
welcomes Roberto's group. He genuinely wants
the organization to maintain some effectiveness,
because he relies on it to check subversive in-
fluences by the Marxist-oriented followers of
Neto?a potential channel for Communist sub-
version among Angolan refugees in the Congo. On
the other hand, Mobutu is anxious to avoid Portu-
guese reprisals for guerrilla strikes mounted from
Congolese territory. He particularly fears that
heightened operations by Roberto would provoke
the Portuguese authorities to delay or halt copper
shipments on the rail line from Katanga to
Benguela. He has placed strict limitations on the
group's operations,\
/ As part of
his policy of quiet collaboration with the Portu-
guese, Mobutu has allowed Portuguese diplomats
to return to Kinshasa.
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Beset by the black African states, the Portu-
guese have had to look south for moral and politi-
cal support. While they have carefully tried to
avoid identification with the racial policies of
white-ruled South Africa and Rhodesia, which
conflict with their own professed multiracial at-
titudes, the Portuguese have found one common
bond with white-ruled southern Africa. The three
countries view themselves as forming the last
bastion against Communist subversion. South
Africa also has a special interest in keeping
Angola under Lisbon's control as a buffer zone
against any insurgent infiltration into rieighbori,1
south-West Africa. 25X1
Assistance from South Africa and Rhodesia
has been limited thus far.\
Neither South Africa nor
Rhodesia is likely to become more involved in
helping thc Portuguese as long as Lisbon appears
able to hold its own. Moreover, the Portuguese
would rather go it alone so long as the insurgents
do not represent a serious challenge.
The Future: More of the Same
The insurgency shows every indication of
remaining at a stalemate for a long time to come.
Neither the Portuguese nor the insurgents appears
capable in the foreseeable filthre of gaining a
decisive military advantage over the other. The
Portuguese are unlikel,; trl initiate an all-out drive
to deprive the insurgents of their external support
and foreign sanctuaries. Portugal's human and
economic resources are limited and are already
spread thin by insurgencies in its other territories
of Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. More-
over, Lisbon sees no real need to press for total
victory so long as the insurgents can be contained
in the north and confined to the remote and
economically unimportant regions of eastern
Angola.
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Portugal can be expected to contain, but not
eliminate, any foreseeable military threat from
the guerrillas. It can probably continue to sustain
the tolerably low casualty rate in Angola (accord-
ing to available estimates, fewer than ten soldiers
a month in 1971). Moreover, the growing An-
golan economy is now beginning to relieve the
metropole of an increasing share of tie war's
financial burden.
Special Report - 9 -
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44,
For their part, the insurgents' strategy is to
avoid serious confrontations and simply hang on.
Despite their inability to mount concerted actions
or to unite in a common front, the liberation
movements show no signs of giving up the strug-
gle. Rather, the insurgents hope to keep the pres-
sure on until Portugal, through economic neces-
sity, international pressure, or "historical inevita-
bility," is forced to give up its African prov-
inces.
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