WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT NIGERIA UNDER GENERAL GOWON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Nigeria Under General Gowon
On cepi
Raum TO 1E-61
Secret
N2 668
1 October 1971
No. 0390/71A
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Special Report
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era Unt.er
General Gowon
The Nigerian civil war, which
ended in January 1970, settled the
question of whether Africa's most
populous country would be broken up
by secession. The federal victory did
not, however, resolve a number of
more fundamental problems that lay
dormant during the civil war but are
now surfacing again. Tribalism, region-
alism, and other sources of friction
undermine Nigeria's hard-won unity.
Nigeria's e,..:onomy has benefited from
an oil boffin that has made the coun-
try the nirrth-ranking producer in the
world. The government has made im-
portant gains in its drive to increase
both its take from oil and its control
over production. In foreign affairs, the
government is clearly more assertive
than its predecessors in its efforts to
carve out a leading role for Nigeria on
the African continent.
Genera i Gowon's government is
popular, but criticism of inaction in
domestic affairs has increased. Little
has been done to reshape Nigeria's
institutions or to prepare the country
for a return to civilian rule, now
scheduled for 1976. There has been
slow adjustment on the local level to
the new 12-state structure, which has
diluted the power of the major tribes.
In the background is the usual pleth-
ora of scheming politicians who have
so far avoided a confrontation with
the military government.
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A-
;.
General Gowon and his constituents
Gowan and His Leadership
The 36-year-old head of the federal military
government has gathered experience and confi-
dence since taking over the government in 1966.
Gowon's major strength lies in his neutral and
conciliatory image. As a minority tribesman and a
Christian, he is not identified with any of the
three major tribes: the Yorubas in the west, the
Muslim Hausa-Fulanis in the north, or the lbos in
the east. Since taking over, Gowon has developed
an important constituency among the minority
tribesmen, who hold real power in the federal
government through their control of senior posi-
tions in the army. Gowon appears to have wid-
ened this constituency in the past year. Some-
thing of a hero at the end of the war, he has
garnered additional popular acceptance through
speeches and widely publicized trips throughout
Nigeria. Among Gowon's main advisers are a num-
ber of key civil servants, who are particularly
important in economic matters.
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Gowon is probably unsure about the best
way to achieve his objectives. He sees himself as a
mediator who operates by consensus, and he has
on occasion been shouted down by his associates.
A modest man who lives simply and reads the
Bible daily, Gowon has the reputation of being
relatively free from the corruption endemic in the
Nigerian political system.
The most recurring domestic criticism of
Gowon's leadership is that he is not making the
hard and unpopular decisions that are necessary
but is seeking to divert attention from pressing
problems. Certainly, there has been drift in gov-
ernment leadership. Gowon designates no deputy
while he is out of the country and all decisions
have to await his return. This situation, added to
the normally cumbersome workings of the Ni-
gerian bureaucracy, means that things move
slowly, when they move at all.
The Army
The 280,000-man army has been called
Nigeria's thirteenth state. Any challenge to
Gowon would have to come from within it, or
from politicians who have links with army offi-
cers. There are rumors of coup plotting at ir-
regtflar intervals, but the division commanders are
personally loyal to Gowon; in addition, the large
size of the army and its dispersal throughout the
country would make it difficult to mount a suc-
cessful coup.
There are no immediate plans for demobili-
zation of the large force (it was 12,000 before the
war) which costs the government more than $1
million a day. The army is very much under-
employed, but there have been only a few clashes
with civilians. Most of these appear to have been
spontaneous incidents.
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Reconciliation Policy
At the war's end, Lagos announced a con-
ciliatory policy toward the Biafran secessionists,
including the absorption of "misguided" army
and police personnel and the reinstatement of
civil servants. This policy has led to an impressive
degree of reintegration and a near return to nor-
malcy in the lbo East-Central State. Several
thousand former Biafran policemen have been
reabsorbed, as have lbo enlisted men and non-
commissioned officers who wished to return to
the army. A federal military tribunal that was set
up to screen officers completed its work months
ago, but thus far no army officers have been
reabsorbed. Secessionist officers from Mid-West
State?not originally a part of Biafra?are regarded
as "traitors" and are still in prison, while I bos
from the East, officially considered "misled,"
have been allowed to return to civilian life. The
highest ranking secessionist officer still in the
country, Col. Effiong, has been allowed to return
to his farm. Secessionist leader Ojukwu remains in
Ivory Coast, where he has been prohibited from
engaging in any overt political activity.
Over 3,000 civil servants of East-Central
State origin have been reintegrated into the gov-
ernment. Some 50,000 lbos have returned to
northern Nigeria, where more than 350,000 lived
before the war. For the most part, they have
returned as wage earners rather than as entre-
preneurs. The I bos have been warmly welcomed
back to the north, where they are very slowly
regaining their property. The northerners appar-
ently prefer them to the assertive Yorubas, who
in many cases took the I bos' place after the
exodus. The I bos have not been so fortunate in
Rivers and Southeastern states where minority
tribesmen, freed from lbo domination by the
outcome of the war, are determined to keep the
lbos out. In Rivers State, the lbos have been
unable to regain their valuable property in Port
Harcourt, a predominantly lbo city before the
war.
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On the whole, things are moving along well
in lboland. The state has one qf the better func-
tioning governments. Food shottages have ended,
agricultural recovery is encouraging, and key
businesses are being reactivated. The federal gov-
ernment has been generous in its aid to the East-
Central State, allocating $35 million for rehabili-
tation, in addition to direct payments of $90
million to the state treasury. There are, however,
still large numbers of unemployed and a shortage
of capital.
There has been little political activity in I bo-
land. lbo tribesmen have been preoccupied with
rehabilitation, and little dissatisfaction?or even
interest?in the state administration is evident.
The most popular figure among the I bos is the
commissioner for economic development and
reconstruction, Sam lkoku, a well-known leftist
An embrace for Sir Louis Mbanefo former Chief Justice oil'
Eastern Nigeria immediately after the collapse of seces-
sion, January 1970. Center is Lt.Col. Philip Effiong who
formally renounced secession.
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States and Tribal Groups of Nigeria
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?12
DAHOMEY
?
? Sokoto
\NORTH WESTERN
NORTH
CENTRAL
? Kaduna
NIGER
IC
CHAD
? Kano
KANO ?
Ma iduguri
1U 0
KWARA
WESTERN
lbadan?
0
Q.OS
LAGOS
Bight of Benin
? State capital
UAW Selected tribe
?'Benin City
MID- t'
WESTERN
5.0 I00 170
STATUTE MILES
4
RIVERS
?
r.1 Port
BENUE PLATEAU;
/1
SOUT
EASTER
\ s' Calabar
r
Bight of Biafra
EQUATORIAL
GUINEA
NORTH EASTERN
CAMEROON
CHAD
0.?
FORMER REGIONS
Kaduna.
Northern
Western
?Ibadan
-. jGenio
Lagos
M
Easter
551921 9-71
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who spent the last years of the prewar civilian
regime in Nkrumah's Ghana. lkoku is adept at the
game of tribal politics and, as the principal
spokesman for lbo interests, appears to be ready-
ing himself to go after a wider political con-
stituency.
The North
The carving up of the old Northern Region
into six states, which occurred in 1968, has
broken the power of the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy
over the minor tribes. It has also set in motion a
chain of events that will ultimately shift most
power from these traditional leaders to the state
governments. The emirs and chiefs retain enor-
mous influence, but they have been stripped of all
important powers e>Ccept local taxation and con-
trol over primary school education. They are al-
lowed to keep 80 percent of the taxes they
collect. In addition, federal funds for develop-
ment are being channeled into new organs of
government, which are taking over many of the
aristocracy's old functions.
The momentum with which these changes
are taking place varies greatly from state to state,
but is slow everywhere. Some powerful emirs in
the far north have been able to circumvent re-
forms, and there has not been much real change
so far in local government personnel. A struggle
appears to be developing between young, edu-
cated civil servants and those clustered around the
traditional rulers. Because many of the reformers
are themselves part of the feudal social structure,
there is always the possibility of backsliding.
Although the pace of change is uncertain,
the old solid north is gone. Each of the state
capitals now faces toward Lagos, rather than
Kaduna, the old regional capital. The few com-
mon services the states share will probably be
terminated in a year. Nevertheless, a psychologi-
cal consciousness of "north" as opposed to
"south" probably still exists and will tend to
haunt Nigeria for some time to come. Northerners
recognize the fact that they are far behind south-
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erners in education and economic development,
and they are quick to complain if they think they
are being discriminated against. A group of north-
erners, in fact, has bitterly criticized the four-year
plan for being "socialist," "southern," and not
sufficiently cognizant of "northern sensitivities."
The Economic Picture
Nigeria's economic prospects are good, but
the country faces a number of problems typical
to Africa: inflation, unemployment, endemic cor-
ruption, and a serious shortage of managerial,
skills. Price inflation?severe since the end of the
war?appears to be subsiding somewhat as a result
of an increased supply of goods from liberalized
imports and the current harvest. Another infla-
tionary spiral may occur, however, if cost-of-
living salary and wage increases now being con-
sidered by the government are granted. The
foreign exchange situation is improving.
Booming oil production continues to be the
brightest spot: production is running at 1.5 mil-
lion barrels per day. The government has made
important gains in its drive to increase both its
take from oil and its control over production.
New financial terms, negotiated with the oil com-
panies last spring, combined with anticipated out-
put of about 1.7 million barrels per day by the
end of the year, could push government revenues
as high as $900 million this year compared with
$300 million last year. If military expenditure?
now accounting for over a third of federal spend-
ing?does not increase too much, there should be
a small surplus for development needs.
The military government has announced an
ambitious four-year economic development pro-
gram that includes planned investments of almost
$4.5 billion. It has set up a national oil company
that will play a major role in future exploration,
production, and marketing. Nigeria recently
joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries and can be expected to exact price
increases similar to those granted to other mem-
ber countries; it has also demanded majority
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participation in all new oil ventures. In a further
nationalistic thrust, the government has reserved
certain businesses exclusively for Nigerians.
The military government had some trouble
at the beginning of the year with labor unrest and
student protests. For a while it looked as if the
students and unions might make common cause, a
prospect that rattled the government. The situa-
tion is now calm, although there could be further
strikes and demonstrations later this year by
groups disgruntled with proposed wage and salary
increases.
The Return to Civilian Rule
Last year on the tenth anniversary of Ni-
gerian independence, Gowon announced a nine-
point program for a return to civilian rule in
1976. The program extended the ban on politics
and called for several time-consuming procedures,
including a new constitution and a census. The
thorny issue of adding new states to the present
12-state structure?which some tribes want and
others oppose?was put off until 1974.
One year after Gowon's announcement, vir-
tually no progress has been made in carrying out
the program. The prospect of five more years of
military rule has generated little open opposil;on.
There has been press criticism and some grum-
bling from former politicians, most of whom have
been skulking on the safer stage of state rather
than national politics. Although political parties
are banned, several ex-politicians have been
quietly building their local bases. For the most
part, they have been using the informal organiza-
tions or network of contacts that existed before
the war.
Behind-the-scenes political activity is highest
in Western State, home of the Yorubas, who are
inveterate political maneuverers. The most public
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politicking surfaces in the newspapers of the
state's former political parties; when the Action
Group's daily takes a position, it is assumed that
Chief Awolowo, leader of the Yoruba, is speak-
ing. Awolowo, who was the highest ranking
civilian in the government until his resignation
last June, has been quiet over the past few
months but no one believes he has given up his
political ambitions. The 62-year-old Awolowo,
however, has so many enemies that his chances of
winning the leadership of an eventual civilian gov-
ernment seem remote. His Action Group, based
largely on the personal followings of various lead-
ers among Yo, iba subgroups, is probably the best
organized of the former political parties and has
managed to establish some influence within the
L'vil service.
In northern Nigeria, a number of old-line
politicos have been meeting to discuss matters of
common interest. Small, informal groups have
also coalesced around minority interest groups
like the various tribal separatist movements. On
the whole, however, the politicians are biding
their time and avoiding a frontal attack on mili-
tary rule.
Foreign Affairs
General Gowon has been carving out a more
activist role for Nigeria in African affairs. In a
series of successful state visits to African coun-
tries, he has pressed for regional economic ties
and or the reconciliation of differences. Nigeria
has resumed relations with two of the African
countries that supported Biafra during the war?
Tanzania and Zambia?and re-established contacts
with the other Biafran supporters?Gabon and
Ivory Coast. Nigeria's influence has also been felt
within the councils of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), where thc country clearly intends
to play a leading roe.
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At the same time, Nigeria has adopted a
more militant African nationalist line, drawing
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General Gowon with President Haniani Diori of Niger
closer to those African countries considered in
the "progressive" camp. Gowon is one of the
leading opponents of Black African dialogue with
white-ruled South Africa. At an OAU summit
meeting last June, he went a step further and
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called for the "liberation of at least one colonial
territory within three years." Gowon's rhetoric,
probably designed to increase Nigeria's stature as
a leader in the struggle against Africa's white
redoubt, fits well with the idea that Nigeria, as
Africa's most populous country, must be "a ban-
ner of hope and an instrument of achieving self-
respect for the black man"?a recurrent theme in
propaganda out of Lagos.
Nigeria has so far not given much backing to
the African liberation movements, but it can be
expected to step up its material and propaganda
support. There are indications that plans are
under way to furnish material assistance to the
Portuguese Guinean insurgents, who are currently
using Guinea as a base, and to the Angolan libera-
tion movement.
The Soviet Union, which improved its image
during the war through its support of the federal
government, has not been able to consolidate its
position. Nigerian military leaders have never
been enthusiastic about expanding ties with the
Communists, and recent links uncovered between
left-wing trade un;on officials and the Soviet
Embassy may make them even more cautious.
The USSR has extended a $6.7-million credit for
geological prospecting, and an extensive Soviet
geological survey has begun in the north. Despite
pressure from the USSR to get the army and air
force to procure Soviet equipment, n9 new major
items have been received. In keeping -with its
policy of balancing East and West, Nigeria this
year recognized Peking, but the federal leaders'
natural affinities remain with the West.
There is a residual sensitivity in Nigel ian-US
relations resulting from the belief that the US
gave moral, if not material, support to the Biafran
secessionists, but Gowon wants good relations
with the US. US companies have some $500
million invested in Nigeria and larger commit-
ments are planned. Expatriate and foreign
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business interests must expect, however, to
encounter some prickliness from Nigerians be-
cause of a growing feeling on their part that a
certain number of businesses should be reserved
for Nigerians and that the number of expatriates
should be reduced.
Nigeria's pursuit of an assertive and national-
istic foreign policy will of course depend irr large
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part on a relatively quiet domestic front. It is
highly unlikely that the present military gov-
ernment can resolve Nigeria's peacetime problems
within the timetable it has set for itself. Nigerian
tolerance is high, however, and the military gov-
ernment will probably be able to say in power at
least for the next year or two.
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