WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE CHILEAN MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT UNDER ALLENDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 26, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left Under Allende
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N! 661
26 February 1971
No. 0359/71B
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During his first hundred days as president, one of Salvador Allende's chief
accomplishments has been to handle adroitly the disparate political forces in the
governing Popular Unity (UP) coalition. At the same time, he has chosen until
very recently to give a remarkably free hand to the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR), a small, controversial group of extremists outside the UP.
The two dominant-and rival-components of the UP view the MIR quite
differently. The orthodox Communist Party (PCCh) strongly condemns the
revolutionaries as a threat to the party's own methods and influence. The more
extremist Socialist Party (PS), and particularly the hard-line faction that now
dominates it, however, treats the MIR as a favored protege. PS Secretary General
Altamirano and his supporters reportedly see the MIR as a tool to force the pace
of Marxist revolution in Chile and to ensure that the process becomes irrevers-
ible.
Allende has given the MIR an important role in his personal bodyguard and
in the new Chilean internal security mechanism that is being developed with
Cuban "technical help." In January, he pardoned nearly 50 young terrorists-
most of them MIR members-who had been indicted or imprisoned on criminal
charges by the former government. For many weeks Allende's government did
nothing to curb the mounting wave of disruptive agrarian land invasions that
have largely been incited by the MIR. By mid-February, however, Communists
were complaining over MIR actions and government appointments
The MIR was formed in the early 1960s by a
group of disparate radical leftists whose main
bond was impatience with the legalistic and tradi-
tionally political path taken by the Chilean Marx-
ist parties, the Socialists and the Communists.
Little was heard of the MIR for the next several
years. During this time, however, its younger
members were active in several university student
organizations and in developing a revolutionary
program and capability. Some went to Cuba for
training. At the MIR convention in 1967 these
"young impatients" forced the old-guard leader-
ship out and took control. The new leaders,
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mostly from the University of Concepcion, won
control of the student federation that same year.
Other MIR activists had a role in the student
disturbances that increased about that time. They
have been responsible for shifts to the left in even
the most conservative private universities and
secondary schools in Chile.
In addition to their growing organizational
activity among students, peasants, and urban
squatters, MIR cells began a series of robberies in
1968 that showed surprisingly good organization
and preparation. These thefts were intensified in
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1969, netting automobiles, arms, documents, and
substantial amounts of cash. Only a few of the
perpetrators were caught. The MIR claimed that
these were not crimes, but "revolutionary expro-
priations" to support its program of mobilizing
and assisting "the exploited Chilean masses."
Terrorism and violence had been rare in
Chile, and there was a marked official and public
tendency to ignore or to play down increased
MIR activity as youthful escapades, despite evi-
dence that improved subversive techniques were
being used. The Frei government was eager to
preserve an appearance of normality before the
1970 presidential elections. The government was
reluctant to act against the MIR because of fear
of setting off the retaliatory kidnapings that were
occurring in other Latin American countries. The
Chilean security forces were neither accustomed
nor trained to act effectively against terrorist
groups, and they were not urged to do so.
The MIR employed psychological measures
as well. These included sympathetic publicity and
at least implied threats of retribution. F or exam-
ple, Senator Carlos Altamirano, leader of the
Socialist Party's (PS) radical wing and the MIR's
chief promoter and protector, said in mid-1969
that an "offensive" would be mounted against the
government if police searches against the MIR
were not called off. Judges, many of them also
law professors, reportedly hesitated to mete out
stiff sentences to terrorists for fear of retaliation
by students.
The MIR's use of subversive techniques re-
flected not only Cuban training, but other inter-
national contacts. In June 1969, it was discovered
that several young European visitors who were in
contact with the MIR had brought false passports,
weapons, and other specialized supplies into
Chile. Other European contacts included a French
professor, in Chile under an official cultural ex-
change, who was deported after being convicted
of hiding a fugitive MIR leader. Although receiv-
ing outside aid, the MIR appeared to be increas-
ingly nationalistic and self-assured, and it ap-
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parently grew no larger despite the greater fre-
quency and success of its activities.
The arrest of some bank robbers in 1969 and
early 1970 revealed internal divisions within the
group and the alleged existence of breakaway
factions. Some of these disclosures, however, ap-
pear to have been planted to confuse the police.
Several guerrilla training camps discovered in
mid-1969 indicated MIR involvement. About the
same time, several incidents revealing MIR activ-
ity among military units became a matter of con-
cern to some officers.
25X1
By early 1970, the MIR had become an issue
within the Communist-Socialist coalition, known
as the Popular Unity (UP), that was backing
Socialist Salvador Allende in his fourth attempt
to gain the presidency. The Communists, chief
architects of the UP, were optimistic over the
prospects of this popular front strategy against
divided political opposition. They considered the
activities of the maverick MIR a threat to the
"peaceful road" to power. The Communists
blamed the MIR for the successful impact of a
law-and-order electoral campaign waged against
Allende by a conservative candidate. The MIR in
turn reiterated its rejection of elections as mere
"domestication of the masses" rather than the
revolutionizing that was required. The revolu-
tionaries criticized the PCCh as stodgy, sectarian,
and subservient to Moscow and warned that the
rightists would never allow Allende to take office.
When Allende's chances of election improved in
mid-1970, however, the MIR was persuaded to
curtail its more flamboyant activities
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Organization
Besides its small size and tight discipline, one
of the MIR's most valuable assets is the compart-
mentation that has protected its security. The
MIR apparently relies on a core of about 600
militants, whose emphasis on mobilizing, training,
and organizing others has built up a much larger
body of supporters. Many of these supporters are
members of peasant or slum organizations manip-
ulated by the MIR. In mid-1970 it was estimated
that the MIR controlled about 20,000 squatters
in slums in and around Santiago. About the same
time, the group began a major effort to organize
dissatisfied peasants and Indians in southern
Chile.
Most of the 600 MIR members are presently
or were recently university students from privi-
leged economic, social, and political backgrounds.
Their dedication to urgent revolutionary change is
combined with a knowledge of the vulnerabilities
and complexities of Chilean politics and psychol-
ogy, good contacts in influential circles, and an
ability frequently to utilize this knowledge to
their advantage. Despite differences over tactics,
the original group that took control of the MIR in
1967 is still largely in command. The secretary
general is Miguel Enriquez, son of the former
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rector of Concepcion University (who was forced
out by the MIR) and nephew of two former
influential Radical Party legislators. Other known
leaders include Enriquez' brother Edgardo and his
brother-in-law as well as Andres Pascall, who is
Allende's nephew, the son of a Socialist deputy,
and the son-in-law of the leftist rector of Catholic
University. Others are children of well-known
members of the Christian Democratic (PDC) and
National (PN) parties. Miguel Enriquez' chief rival
for leadership apparently is Luciano Cruz
Aguayo, half-brother of an officer who was re-
tired from the army in 1970 for involvement with
the MIR.
Another leader is Jorge Fuentes, until re-
cently president of the University of Concepcion
student federation. When Fuentes returned from
a meeting in Havana of the Castro-supported
Latin American student Organization (OCLAE) in
January 1970, he announced the formation of a
Chilean Committee of Support for the Bolivian
National Liberation Army guerrilla group. Both
Altamirano and Allende were named directors of
the committee. The MIR is believed to have col-
laborated with it as well as with other Socialist-
sponsored groups while retaining its own identity.
The didactic func-
tion-i.e., training guer-
rillas and organizing the
poor to make them
aware of their problems
as well as inciting them
to violent action-ap-
pears to be a major part
of the MIR program. In
both Santiago and Con-
cepcion the homeless
squatters it organized in-
vaded land an-1 set up
shantytowns. the MIR
members remained with
the settlers, providing
health and medical serv-
ices, setting up schools,
planning and building
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Miguel Enriquez
MIR Secretary General
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shelters, planting gardens, and otherwise helping
the occupants to organize and look after them-
selves. Ideological instruction was probably an-
other offering. Under the Frei government the
MIR also organized militia that patrolled the per-
imeters of the settlements to keep out the regular
police, thus providing a refuge for MIR fugitives.
Other MIR cadres remained active among
students and peasants in the period before the
presidential election. Efforts among urban work-
ers appear to have been less successful than the
other MIR organizational activities. In 1969 a
group of worker-members broke with the MIR to
form their own revolutionary group, claiming that
they were made to feel inferior by the better
educated leaders. Workers probably resented the
MIR criticism that Chilean organized labor was
materialistic and had been lulled by the PCCh and
moderate Socialists into "bourgeois" attitudes.
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of
the MIR leaders' frequent and public claims of
total dedication to the overthrow of the tradi-
tional Chilean institutions by revolutionary ac-
tion. They preferred the re-election of conserva-
tive former president Jorge Alessandri in Septem-
ber 1970 on the grounds that this would be the
most effective path to arouse the poor and in-
crease their interest in revolutionary action. M I R
leaders continue to mistrust the conformity and
orthodox methods of the PCCh as slow and in-
effectual. They realize, too, that the PCCh con-
siders the MIR its most dangerous rival on the left
and would like to eliminate it.
What leaders such as Enriquez see as the
outcome of the long revolutionary war they claim
is necessary to educate the masses to an awareness
of their own best interests is not clear. The voice
and the publicity provided the MIR for several
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years by the Chilean news media have benefited
the MIR but have not clarified its ends. The
message remains negative and iconoclastic, even
under a Marxist government. The arrogation to
themselves of protection as well as incitement to
revolution may be the limit of the MIR leaders'
reach.
If MIR's ultimate aims are in doubt, how-
ever, the efficacy of its methods thus far is not. A
combination of well-planned, effective subversive
activity and an informed psychological offensive
has transformed it from an indulgently tolerated
band of radicals to a disciplined force with politi-
cal influence. The MIR's infiltration of the armed
services was aimed at vulnerable points at various
levels to obtain useful information as well as
supplies. The real extent of the infiltration is not
known. The discovery of a few instances of it,
however, was a factor that caused officers who
opposed Allende to question whether they could
act successfully to keep him from the presidency.
Many of the officers doubted that they could rely
on their troops to support such an attempt. Some
high-ranking officers also expressed fear of setting
off a civil war, a specter frequently raised in MIR
propaganda.
The MIR's exploits and publicity fed the
group's zeal and boldness and attracted support
for its activities. Some influential Chileans
excused MIR's acts as the deeds of Robin Hoods
and brushed off as a passing phenomenon the
increased evidence of the M I R's use of violence
and subversion. The MIR has fed this image by
organizing literacy programs in prisons and pro-
viding genuine assistance to the poor among
whom it agitates.
The logistics aid provided by Altamirano and
other PS officials has proven vital to the MIR,
although it probably has strings attached. The aid
facilitates the MIR's priorities. These include free-
dom to take direct action in response to oppor-
tunity, constant mobility, dispersion of forces,
retreat from unfavorable combat, and the mainte-
nance of the initiative.
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During the lull in terrorist activities before
the election last September, the MIR did not let
organizational preparedness sli .
The remains of training camps, believed to
have been established by the MIR for other revo-
lutionary groups, have been discovered in various
areas of Chile over the past two years. They show
careful preparation and use of paramilitary meth-
ods. Some of the camps were apparently cooper-
ative efforts; they included representatives of
revolutionary groups from Brazil, Bolivia, Uru-
guay, and other countries. The extent and nature
of MIR ties with these groups before Allende
took office is unknown but is now likely to
increase.
When the UP won the presidential election,
the particular appeal of the MIR seemed super-
fluous, and the PCCh renewed its determination
to get rid of this annoying group. The MIR
showed no interest in joining the coalition/
It was not long, however, before it became
apparent that the MIR was acquiring a role under
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sonal bodyguard is a
President Allende, par-
ticularly in the field of
internal security, and
that it intended to use
its influence to ensure
the maintenance of revo-
lutionary momentum by
the government. Miguel
Enriquez announced re-
cently that the MIR
struggle will not be over
until it considers the
capitalistic system dead
in Chile.
Allende's reliance
on the MIR for his per-
Allende's confidence in the MIR stems largely
from its successful penetration of the plot that
resulted in the death of Army Commander
Schneider and whose failure strengthened
Allende's hold on a constitutional claim to the
presidency. Capitalizing on Allende's obsessive
fear of plotting against him, the MIR has parlayed
its charges of continued antigovernment plotting
by "lean and hungry rightists" into a psycholog-
ical weapon threatening a wide range of Allende
opponents, including former President Frei.
In its efforts to goad the new government,
the MIR has vowed to maintain its
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"politico-military structure" intact so long as its
leaders consider it necessary. Using its frequent
journalistic mouthpiece and supporter, the pro-
Castro magazine Punto Final, the MIR has made
clear its postelection position as revolutionary
gadfly and watchdog. It rejected in advance the
validity of any concessions by the UP. Like the
PS, the MIR opposed as a compromise the PDC
support for Allende in the October congressional
run-off to confirm his election. Neither Allende
nor the PS joined the UP criticism of the rowdy
take-over in October 1970 of memorial ceremon-
ies for Che Guevara by the MIR and its squatters'
organization.
Soon after taking office Allende took posi-
tive steps to help the MIR. He dissolved the riot
control unit as the organization had demanded
and pardoned MIR leaders accused or imprisoned
on criminal and security charges by the previous
government. In early December he provided the
tacit support that gave the MIR a victory over the
PCCh in a violent student election confrontation
in November 1970 at the University of Concep-
cion.
The MIR is now playing a major role in
inciting widespread rural land invasions and has
set up a revolutionary peasant group that is de-
manding a more drastic agrarian reform law. A
PDC leader recently termed Allende's present use
of the MIR a politically brilliant move. He said
that the President is using its activities as the
cutting edge to maintain revolutionary drive while
the government sticks to legalistic processes.
French Revolutionary ideologue Regis Debray
praised the MIR as the structural nucleus in the
process of revolutionizing Chile when he arrived
in Santiago following his release from Bolivia
where he was serving a jail sentence for being
involved in the ill-fated Che Guevara "guerrilla
war."
Allende's political astuteness is one of his
most effective assets in a government of contend-
ing factions. He may have seen the MIR as a
weapon to avoid the PCCh's domination of the
administration and his favorable treatment of it as
a way to gain approval from extremists in his own
Socialist Party. Now, however, Communist and
Radical Party leaders of the UP are very con-
cerned over the continuing appointments of MIR
members and other extremists to key government
posts.
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