WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER A YEAR OF TALKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020053-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: October 23, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Secret
NS 660
23 October 1.970
No. 0393/70A
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER A YEAR OF TALKING
One year ago on 20 October, Soviet and Chinese negotiators sat down
in Peking to discuss the Sino-Soviet border dispute. Prior to the beginning of
the talks, relations had reached their lowest point since the two antagonists
had begun to quarrel openly. In the wake of border clashes in March 1969,
skirrri?hing occurred at many locations along the frontier, military prepara-
tions were intensified, propaganda warfare reached a new intensity, and
bilateral trade and diplomatic contacts dwindled. The Soviet leadership may
have been weighing the advisability of stronger military action against China,
and Moscow had embarked on a campaign calculated to convince Peking that
this option was under active review.
I n entering negotiations, each side was seeking to cool the situation for
its own reasons. Peking sought to damp down tension along the border lest it
lead to, or provide a pretext for, a Soviet attack against which it could not
successfully defend. Moscow, ;oncerned that an "open sore" on the exposed
frontier meant prolonged border skirmishing and fearful that such a develop-
ment would weaken its international position, sought to defuse the explosive
border situation and to search for a limited accommodation.
A year of negotiation has failed to produce progress toward a border
accord and has not led to any easing of the fundamental ideological and
political hostility between Moscow and Peking. Nevertheless, both capitals
have partially satisfied their objectives in undertaking the talks. The absence
of fighting along the border has led to a marked reduction of tension in a
situation that had threatened to get out of control. Some steps have been
made toward re-establishing diplomatic contacts, and both sides have sig-
nificantly lowered their voices. Despite these moves toward a tenuous
stabilization, the efforts of both the USSR and China to improve their
military and international positions indicate that relations wil! continue to
be strained. Peking and Moscow seem ready to accept a prolonged stalemate
in the border talks, however, to avoid a slide back toward open conflict.
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Why They Continue to Talk
The factors that induced Moscow to press
for negotiations on the border dispute in the
spring and summer of last year have generally
remained operative despite the lack of movement
toward agreement. The most compelling of these
continues to be Moscow's fear that resumption of
open conflict along the border would produce
either a prolonged drain on Soviet resources or
pressures to escalate the fighting. Although frus-
trated by the impasse in negotiations, Soviet fad-
ers find some satisfaction in the conversion of
exchanges over the border from bullets to words.
The air of relaxation that the talks impart to
Soviet relations with China is particularly valuable
in easing Moscow's international position. Dimin-
ishing tension has made less obvious Moscow's
fear that third parties such as the US would take
advantage of its conflict with China and has
lessened its concern that the conflict might hasten
a possible rapprochement between Peking and
Washington. Continuation of the talks also pre-
cludes accusations from Moscow's socialist allies,
particularly Hanoi, that it is sacrificing the inter-
ests of international Communism to its conflict
with China.
Moscow has been exploiting the talks to
identify trends in Chinese policy and to look for
splits in the leadership. In addition, the talks have
contributed to an atmosphere in which some
obvious shortcomings in Sino-Soviet relations,
such as broken diplomatic contacts, can be
mended.
China's acquiescence in the talks was moti-
vated mainly by anxiety over Soviet military in-
tentions. Although this concern has been some-
what muted over the past year, it still exists.
Peking considers the contact provided by the
talks vital, as it did not in 1964, when it broke off
bilateral border talks with Moscow, and does not
seem prepared to risk the unpredictable outcome
of a break. Furthermore, the Chinese see the talks
as a medium for divining future Soviet intentions.
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The Chinese also wish to escape the onus of
halting or disrupting the talks to avoid creating
grist for the Soviet propaganda mill. In addition,
they see value in appearing "reasonable" to the
rest of the world-particuarly the socialist camp-
while engaging in widespread diplomatic activi-
ties. All this does not mean that Peking is ready
to abandon its quarrel with the USSR or is san-
guine about prospects for the talks. Indeed, the
Chinese have said they expect "irreconcilable dif-
ferences" to prolong the meetings for months,
even years.
What Are They Talking About?
It is a measure of the importance that both
Moscow and Peking attach to the talks that
neither has broken an agreement to avoid a full-
blown public presentation of their discussions.
Nevertheless, both have resorted to occasional
press or diplomatic leaks to communicate their
own, frequently distorted, version of the negotia-
tions. These have obviously been designed to put
the other side in a bad light, but there has been
general concurrence on the points preventing
progress.
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Chinese proposals have clearly reflected Pe-
king's primary concern to reduce the Soviet mili-
tary threat. Peking has demanded agreement on
mutual withdrawal of major military units from
the frontier, of armed personnel from disputed
areas, and of Soviet forces from Mongolia as a
precondition to discussing territorial issues. Be-
cause most Soviet forces are deployed close to the
frontier while Peking's troops are not, these pro-
posals mainly work to the detriment of the
USSR. The Soviets have therefore steadfastly re-
sisted them because in addition to diminishing
Moscow's military advantage they would open the
border areas to possible Chinese ".marauding,"
and lend legitimacy to Chinese territorial claims.
Moscow also resists the Chinese demand that
it acknowledge that the tsars "unfairly" forced
Imperial China to yield some 590,000 square
miles of territory in Siberia and Central Asia.
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Disputed Sino-Soviet Borders Areas
[] Areas of "unequal treaties"
o Border incident (1969)
Boundary shown on
Chinese maps ( \V:
Khabarovsk
%~- 4111/1 JJ
i? HeI.hsla-tzu I. rf
,. (Hla Ussurl)
USSR
Boundary shown on
Russian maps
0 10
Miles
? tsourn,
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Both Peking and Moscow have long tacitly rec-
ognized that the present border provides the
probable basis for any future frontier agreement,
but the USSR will not open itself to revanchist
Chinese claims by admission that its boundaries
are based on "unequal treaties. Another sticking
point has been a Chinese proposal that both sides
agree to a nonaggression treaty covering both
conventional and nuclear forces. Moscow sees this
as a backhanded attempt to force an admission
that it has employed military pressure on Peking.
Moscow has sought to turn the tables on Peking
on this issue by making a Soviet agreement on the
nonuse of force dependent on the Chinese signa-
ture of a border accord.
The Soviets have attempted to gloss over the
issue of their military activities and turn the nego-
tiations to a discussion of frontier demarcation.
They have tried to get Peking's agreement on the
identification of uncontested sections of the fron-
tier and have proposed that procedures be estab-
lished to adjudicate tho disputed territories. These
sections include 8,000 square miles of wasteland
in the Pamirs, a 375 - square mile area at the
Man-thou-Ii railhead in northwest Manchuria, and
about 700 contested islands, in the Amur and
Ussuri border rivers. The Soviets have also pro-
posed that both sides agree on a protocol for
regulation of the economic use of frontier areas
by herdsmen and fishermen, and on procedures
for settling future differences.
Although the Soviets appear ready to make
territorial concessions-they have even privately
indicated that they would give up "blood soaked"
Damanskiy/Chen-pao Island, scene of the major
border clashes of March 1969-they are unwilling
to acknowledge the Chinese position that the
boundary in the Far East follows the main chan-
nel in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Although this
principle has a firm basis in international law,
Moscow adamantly resists accepting it mainly be-
cause it would then lose control of the strategic
island-named "Big Ussuri" by the Soviets and
Hei-hsia-tzu by the Chinese-located at the con-
fluence of the Amm and Ussuri rivers opposite
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Khabarovsk, a principal city in the Soviet Far
East. The Soviets contend that Chinese control of
this island would place the boundary "down the
main street of Khabarovsk" and last August
emphatically stated their intention to retain it by
publicizing plans for its development.
Developments on the /'rontier
Although the situation along the frontier is
tense, there appears to be no actual combat. Both
sides have apparently abided by the informal un-
derstanding reached during the Chou-Kosygin
meeting in September 1969 to employ restraint
and to refrain from sending troops into disputed
territory occupied by the othes,. Moscow, for
example, has reluctantly tolerated Chinese oc-
cupation of Damanskiy/Chen-pao Island, ac-
cording to statements by Soviet diplomats.
Although border forces of both countries
apparently have instructions to act prudently, the
border situation remains highly volatile, and the
makings of a confrontation are at hand should
either side choose to touch it off. Soviet diplo-
mats have recently claimed that Chinese herds-
men and fishermen are using Soviet territory
"without permission."
Normalization of State Relations
Given the failure of Moscow and Peking to
make substantial progress in resolving their politi-
cal differences, the absence of rapid improvement
in other aspects of bilateral state relations has not
been surprising. Chou En-lai apparently gave
grudging agreement when Premier Kosygin said
during their meeting in September 1969 that a
return to more businesslike procedures in diplo-
matic, trade, and other state contacts would
facilitate the easing of tensions. Infusion of
meaning into this principle has been painfully
slow, however, and characterized by mistrust and
vindictiveness.
Moscow's protracted effort to return an am-
bassador to Peking has exemplified the problem.
23 October 1970
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Chou and Kosygin apparently agreed in principle
to restore ambassadorial relations, which were
disrupted in 1966 during the early stages of the
Cultural Revolution. When Moscow named its
man in March of this year, however, Peking pro-
crastinated in accepting
him, evidently suspect-
ing a move to downgrade
the border talks to am-
bassadorial level and re-
senting Soviet selection
of a man identified with
anti-Chinese polemics.
Moscow eventually ob-
tained Peking's agree-
ment by indicating its in-
tention to continue the
talks at the deputy min-
isterial level and select-
ing a different candidate,
Vasily Tolstikov, for-
Vasily Tolstikov, new merly boss of the Lenin-
Soviet Ambassador to China grad party apparatus. Al-
though Tolstikov arrived
in Peking on 10 October, the Chinese have re-
mained silent about reciprocating.
The annual Sino-Soviet river navigation
talks, which began in July, also have run afoul of
the failure to improve the political climate. Nor-
mally, these talks deal with technical matters re-
lating to use of the border rivers for shipping,
such as dredg;ng and navigational aids. Navigation
matters may have become linked with the terri-
torial dispute, particularly ownership of contested
riverine islands. The continuation of the naviga-
tion talks for more than four months without any
indication of progress raises the possibility that,
as in 1967 and 1965, no agreement may be
reached.
Trade negotiations have also dragged, and a
significant increase in economic exchange seems
unlikely as long as political differences remain
unresolved. The failure to conclude a Sino-Soviet
trade agreement last year, along with the dis-
ruptive effect of the border fighting, reduced
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economic exchange to a record low of $57 mil-
lion. This contrasts with 1.959's record high of
over $2 billion. This year, trade discussions be-
tween low-level commercial representatives in
Peking have evidently resulted in a general agree-
ment to increase trade somewhat. The agreement
has not yet been formalized, however, and 1970
trade thus probably will remain well below the
1968 level of $95 million.
The moderating of Sino-Soviet tempers dur-
ing the last year, nevertheless, has produced a few
symbolic developments. For example, the Mos-
cow-Peking "hot line," which was disrupted by
the Chinese at the height of the border tension
last year, has apparently been restored. Children
of Soviet diplomats have returned to Peking for
the firF+ lime since the Cultural Revolution. In
addition, low-level barter trade talks were con-
ducted last summer between local Chinese and
Soviet groups in the Far East. Such steps, how-
ever, have mainly flowed from the dampening
down of tension along the border rather than
from political reconciliation.
The USSR's opening this month of a perma-
nent air route to Hanoi via India suggests that
some bilateral arrangements may never exist as
they did in happier days. Prior to the Cultural
Revolution, Moscow-Hanoi flights went through
Peking, but they were terminated in 1967 when
Soviet passengers were beaten by Red Guards.
Moscow evidently i,, not confident that such
harassment has permanently ended and con-
sequently has opened the alternative route.
Needless to say, contacts betwee,i the Soviet
and Chinese Communist parties are nonexistent
and show no sign of being re-established. Ideo-
logical differences-as demonstrated by Peking's
major attack on Moscow's marking of Lenin's
centennial last April, and Moscow's bristling re-
joinder a month later-continue to contribute to
the aggravation of relations. Although both sides
have suppressed direct ideological polemics during
the past several months, it seems likely that they
will resurface periodically.
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POLEMICS FOR ONLY 8,000 YEARS?
Mao has often been quoted as saying
that Sino-Soviet ideological polemics would
last "for ten thousand years-even after Com-
munism has been achieved."
during the osy-
gin - Chou En-lai meeting in September 1969,
"the Soviets proposed a reduction to nine
thousand years. Subsequently, the Romanians
suggested five thousand. Mao finally compro-
mised on eight thousand."
USSR Continues to Amass Military
Forces Opposite China
Moscow continues to view its military
strength along the border as an essential element
of its policy toward China and has continued its
military build-up at a deliberate pace while the
talks in Peking are under way.
The Soviets last November publicly acknowl-
edged the creation of a Central Asian Military
District (MD) designed to consolidate control of
forces opposite Sinkiang that formerly were sub-
ordinate to the Turkestan MD. Considerable So-
viet military activity has also taken place in Mon-
golia during the past year. Marshal Grechko's visit
to Ulaanbaator this past September was the first
by a Soviet defense minister since 1966 and
demonstrates the importance Moscow attaches to
its military position in Mongolia. In the Trans-
Baikal and Far East MDs, the Soviets have appar-
ently continued to expand and fill out their
forces during the past year.
25X1 Since 1965, Soviet forces along the border
are estimated to have more than tripled.
but it is highly unlikely that all
are corn at ready. These forces and their support
units total about 325,000 men and are backed up
with heavy concentrations of artillery
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The Soviet build-up has been gradual and
deliberate, suggesting that at the time the deci-
sions were being made the Soviet planners per-
ceived no immediate danger from the Chinese.
Rather, they appeared to be building a force
intended to counter any future Chinese threat
and to fill political needs. There has been no
evidence indicating an appreciable change in the
rate of deployment in the past year, suggesting
that Moscow has not attached additional urgency
to the border build-up as a result of the 1969
border fighting.
The Soviet forces now deployed along the
border have the capability to repel any attack the
Chinese could launch for the next few years. Most
of the divisions along the border, however, are
understrength. They are not, therefore, prepared
to conduct large-scale offensive operations with-
out substantial reinforcement from the European
USSR. At present, however, they probably are
capable of conducting division-sized raids across
the Chinese border. If the existing divisions along
the border and the nondivisional support struc-
ture were filled out, the Soviets would have the
capability to conduct major offensive operations
into China, seizing large areas on the northern
periphery of the country, including Manchuria,
Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Even should the
Soviets establish such a capability, however, it
would not necessarily mean they would employ
it. Traditional Soviet practice has been to main-
tain forces clearly in excess of security n eds.
In addition to its military rationale, the So-
viet build-up against China has important political
motivations. The overwhelming force deters Chi-
nese "adventurism" along the border and assures
the Soviet leadership that it is negotiating with
Peking from a position of strength. These
forces-as shown last year-can be used to intimi-
date Peking. Cortinuation of the build-up height-
ens Chinese apprehensions over Soviet intentions
and makes Peking somewhat more susceptible to
diplomatic pressure. The Soviet leadership also
probably views the force as a possible element of
leverage in any post-Mao leadership struggle.
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Chineae War Preparations:
Symbolic and Real
The Chinese obviously view the Soviet
build-up with some apprehension. An important
aspect of China's strategy against the Soviets has
been its own "war preparations" campaign. Some
aspects of the campaign serve to bolster national
unity while others, such as efforts to increase
industrial and agricultural production and to dis-
perse population and industry, promote long-
standing policies. A principal goal, however, has
been to deter the Soviets by stressing that China
is prepared to fight no matter what the odds.
Some of the well-publicized quasi-military meas-
ures-such as extensive construction of air-raid
shelters and trenches, stockpiling of strategic
materials and food, and emphasis on regional
self-sufficiency-seem aimed at underscoring for
Moscow's benefit the fact that Peking plans an
in-depth defense of its territory. At the same
time, the "war preparations" theme furthers Pe-
king's propaganda line that Moscow is the po-
tential aggressor in the dispute. As Peking has
become more relaxed about the Soviet threat,
however, it has given less emphasis in its propa-
ganda to the continuing campaign.
Peking has also made improvements in its
military position designed to underscore the
seriousness of the "war preparations" drive as
well as to improve its defensive position.
some troops
have been moved north, and the abolition of the
Inner Mongolian Military Region indicates that
Peking is attempting to improve command and
for a large-scale move against Soviet-held, dis-
puted territory.
Peking Attempts to Break out of
Its International Isolation
Peking probably judges that it can counter
the Soviets at present through an active, tradi-
tional diplomacy more effectively than through
polemical exchanges and a hermit-like attitude
toward the rest of the world- as was the case
when the 1969 border clashes took place. The
general thrust of Peking's strategy since the Pe-
king talks began, therefore, has been to reduce its
vulnerability to Moscow's military and diplomatic
pressures through positive diplomatic action.
A major aspect of this has been China's
successful efforts to expand and improve its inter-
national contacts, most clearly illustrated by the
return of 28 ambassadors to posts vacated during
the Culturai Revolution. In particular, China's ties
with France, Romania, Yugoslavia, North Viet-
nam, and North Korea have blossomed during the
past year. Peking has also broadened its efforts to
develop new friends, such as Canada, Italy, Peru,
and Chile, and has made its international presence
felt by a variety of friendly gestures to a hetero-
geneous group of states. The Chinese have also
revealed a strong interest in taking their "rightful
place in the UN," which would allow them a
prestigious forum for presentation of their case
against Moscow as well as the West. Most drama-
tically, they resumed contacts in Warsaw with the
US in January of this year. The talks have been
suspended since the US intervention in Cambodia,
but Peking has made clear its intention to resume
them. They are probably no longer quite so im-
portant to China in the Sino-Soviet context,
however.
The Chinese undoubtedly realize that Mos-
cow is aware of their military improvements. In
June, for example, a Moscow broadcast labeled as
"indeed significant" reports that units formerly
trained "to deal with the Chiang gang have been
transferred to the Sino-Soviet border area." The
Chinese, however, probably believe that Mos-
cow--despite its propaganda-will interpret these
actions as defensive rather than as preparations
The Chinese return to the international
arena is designed, in the first instance, to counter
Soviet attempts to perpetuate and if possible to
increase the self-imposed diplomatic isolation into
which China drifted during the Cuitural Revolu-
tion. This relative isolation in itself made China
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vulnerable to Soviet pressures, and its termination
was obviously to Peking's advantage. But in addi-
tion, more extensive and closer contacts abroad
have probably allowed Peking to gain greater in-
sight into Soviet intentions by assessing the views
of third parties, while at the same time they have
given China a wider forum in which to present its
own case. To achieve this end, Peking has gone to
some lengths to appear "reasonable"-primarily
by maintaining a general polemical standdown on
Sino-Soviet bilateral issues since the Chou-
Kosygin meeting.
MOSCOW ON CHINESE
REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS
Moscow Seeks to Keep Peking Bottled Up
Moscow has, in turn, continued to press to
"contain" China internationally despite the easing
of bilateral tension. Just as Peking suspects, this
policy is aimed at increasing Chinese vulnerability
to Soviet political and military pressure. It en-
compasses continued emphasis on "socialist
unity" to isolate China ideologically, efforts to
increase Soviet influence in Asia at Chinese ex-
pense, and attempts to foster Peking's continued
exclusion from the international community.
Moscow's efforts to press for closer "social-
ist unity" have taken a particularly anti-Chinese
cast in Eastern Europe, where the USSR has
vigorously pushed its interpretation of the War-
saw Pact as applicable against China. It has
pointedly claimed that treaties renegotiated last
year with Czechoslovakia and Romania, as well as
earlier ones with Hungary and Bulgaria, commit
each contracting party to come to the other's aid
in the event of attack by "any state." The Soviets
have also indoctrinated East European leaders
with their interpretation of the "China problem"
through consultations, and by visits to Mongolia
and the Soviet Far East.
Moscow wants to impress on the East Euro-
peans that geographic, strategic, and political
realities dictate their support for the USSR in thn
event of a Sino-Soviet conflict. In addition, Mos-
cow is seeking to put its East European allies on
notice that even now excessive flirtation with
Peking is not acceptable.
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The Peking leaders are responsible for
imposing their adventuristic tactics on some
detachments of the Communist and national
liberation movement in Asia and Africa, thus
dooming them to defeat and rout. On believ-
ing advisers from Peking, tens of thousands of
courageous fighters have to pay with their
lives and the revolutionary movement in some
countries was pushed far back. Such is the
result of the adventuristic intrigues and provo-
cations of the Peking "ultra-revolutionaries,"
Pravda, 18 May 1970
I n Asia, Moscow has sought to intensify fear
of China through assiduous efforts to portray
Peking as aggressive and adventuristic. Asian Com-
munists have been warned that Peking will sub-
ordinate their interests to its own goal of "Chi-
nese hegemony over Asia." A steady stream of
Asian visitors has been greeted in Moscow, and
the Soviets have made diplomatic and commercial
demarches in states such as Thailand, Singapore,
and the Philippines, where Soviet influence has
heretofore been minimal.
Moscow's handling of events in Indochina
following Sihanouk's ouster dramatically demon-
strated the intensity of Soviet concern over Chi-
nese influence in that area. I he Kremlin has per-
sistently indicated that it will not endorse Si-
hanouk's provisional government as long as the
Prince is under Peking's domination. Although
this position has put Moscow out of step with
Hanoi on an important issue, the Soviets calculate
that as long as they give Hanoi the military and
economic assistance it wants, they will retain
their influence there. In any event, Moscow is still
counting on North Vietnam to counter Peking in
Indochina over the long run.
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Moscow's efforts to isolate Peking took a
new turn this fall when the USSR privately
threatened to oppose Belgium's candidacy for a
Security Council seat if it presented a resolution
at the UN that might have fostered China's entry.
Heretofore the Soviets have not employed
strong-arm tactics on the issue of Chinese repre-
sentation.
Moscow's relations with the West have also
been subtly but significantly affected by its con-
tinuing difficulties with China. Although specula-
tion is often overdrawn that last year's border
fighting spurred Moscow to seek diplomatic agree-
ments with the West in order to "obtain a free
hand against China," the USSR is working to
avoid a simultaneous heightening of tension on
both its eastern and western flanks. Such policies
as pursuit of a Soviet - West German accord, ad-
vocacy of a European security conference, and
exploration of a strategic arms agreement have a
long history and logic of their own. Their coinci-
dence with Moscow's desire to devote additional
resources to its China problem, however, is cer-
tainly a point in their favor. In addition, Moscow
relishes the jitters created in Peking by the specter
of an East-West detente.
Nevertheless, Moscow's unwillingness to
make concessions indicates that it is not going to
sacrifice important interests, or, as in the Middle
East, to curb efforts to expand its influence,
simply to secure agreement with the West. Fi-
nally, Moscow realizes that the relationship be-
tween its policies toward China and toward the
West is a two-edged one. Moscow is acutely sensi-
tive to any suggestions that the West is attempting
to take advantage of Sovi,:t concern with China to
improve its pc,sition vis-a-vis the USSR. Thus,
Moscow has sought to temper its dispute with
Peking in part to ensure thi,t it does not have to
yield to the West on signific;int positions.
The View From Peking
The deep suspicion and preoccupation over.
long-range Soviet military and diplomatic inten-
Special Report
PEKING VIEWS THE SOVIET
MILITARY BUILD-UP
Social-imperialism greedily eyes Chinese
territory. It has not for a single day relaxed its
preparations to attack China. It claims that it
poses no threat to China. Why then does it
mass troops in areas clos,:to Chinese borders?
Why has it dispatched large numbers of troops
into another country which neighbors on
China? Why does it frenziedly undertake mili-
tary deployments to direct its spearhead
against China? It is clear that social-imperial-
ism, like US imperialism, says that it poses no
threat to China only to weaken our vigilance,
to fool the people of its own country and the
world.
Joint Peking editorial narking
43rd anniversary of the
People's Liberation Army
I August 1970
tions that China demonstrated earlier this year
remain as strong as ever and color Peking's cur-
rent diplomatic activities ',vorld-wide. The Chi-
nese, however, probably consider that the reduc-
tion of tensions in the immediate border region
will a:low them to avoid any concessions in the
Peking talks.
Nevcrtlreless, Peking probably judges that
the Soviets are focusVg their efforts on finding an
opportunity to comps! a humiliating Chinese re-
treat on the frontier ques~ion, and that military
pressure will continue to be a major tactic. For
this reason, it probably expects the Soviets to
continue filling out and improving their forces
along the border. Peking apparently does not rate
very high the IikP!:'.1nod of either an early Soviet
"surgical strike" against Chinese advanced-,neap.
ons facilities or a genera: and full-scale invasion of
China, but clearly it Fas not ruled out these
possibilities entirely. Indeed, in assessing Soviet
intentions, it seems likely that the Chinese do nct
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feel they can be certain just what Moscow will do.
Chinese statements, both public and private, have
frequient'y alluded to Soviet "perfidy" and un-
trustwort'iiness. Moreover, Peking may well con-
sider that the Soviets could at any time respond
with a harsh local reprisal to normal Chinese
patrolling in the border area, and that such a clash
could quickly escalate, either through miscalcula-
tion or as a result of deliberate Soviet aggressive-
ness, into a major confrontation. An attempt to
forestall such a possibility was a major Chinese
objective in the Chou-Kosygin agreement last
year, and it remains an important Chinese motive
in keeping the dialogue going in Peking.
The Chinese probably also anticipate con-
tinued Soviet diplomatic pressures aimed at isolat-
ing and weakening them as a complement tc, the
Soviet military "threat." They clearly view cur-
rent Soviet diplomatic activities as indicative of
such an approach. Moscow's recent public ges?
tures toward China suggesting a conciliatory atti-
tude to bilateral problems have been interpreted
by the Chinese as an attempt to lessen Chinese
vigilance against possible future "surprise attack"
and to justify such an action internationally by
branding Peking as hostile and intransigent. By
the same token, Chinese charges that Moscow's
recent diplomatic moves in the Middle East and
with regard to Germany were designed to free
Soviet hands "for moves against China" were
probably at least partially believed at home.
Above all, Peking seems convinced that Moscow is
working hard all around the world to paint China
in the darkest possible colors to ensure that, iso-
lated diplomatically, it will be vulnerable to con-
tinued and perhaps increased Soviet pressures.
If the Soviets should step up the pressure,
China will probably react as it did last year,
conceding only what is necessary to deflect the
immediate threat without prejudicing its over-all
claims. Peking's increased confidence in its ability
to control tensions along the border and its im-
proving international position will probably be
major factors supporting continued resistance to
Soviet demands.
The Soviet leadership probably t=,kes some
satisfaction from the reduction of Sino-Soviet
tensions that h03 occurred during the past year.
Moscow probably hopes that Peking's own moves
toward domestic and international moderation
will incline the Chinese to stabilize relations fur-
ther. It is doubtful, however, that Moscow has a
great deal of confidence that this will be the case
with the "unpredictable" Chinese.
Moscow realizes, however, that it has little
positive leverage that could impel Peking toward
an agreement on the border or improvement of
other aspects of state relations. Although the
USSR might consider a more belligerent line in-
volving increased military pressure attractive in
view of its success in getting Peking to the nego-
tiating table, the Kremlin appears to have con-
cluded that sabre-rattling is only likely to stiffen
Peking's resolve while impeding Soviet efforts to
project a favorable international image of its con-
duct in the dispute. A more bellicose posture
might also lead to collapse of the talks themselves
or produce a resumption of fighting along the
border, in which case the USSR would be right
where it was over a year ago.
On the other side of the coin, Moscow '.s
obviously iiot willing to make the major retreat
needed to entice Peking to sign a frontier accord.
Periodic hints that the USSR is readying some
"new proposal" in the talks and occasional cooing
by Kremlin leaders seem mainly designed to give
the Peking Talks the appearance of substance and
project an international image of Soviet restraint
and flexibility. Indeed, it is possic;e that concilia-
tory gestures such as the dispatch of Ambassador
Tolstikov to Peking without reciprocal Chinese
action has already irritated Kremlin hard-liners.
Moscow thus appears ready to continue the
talks for the foreseeable future, while working to
restore a Ih-,;.tcd degree of bilateral contact. The
replacement this past summer of chief negotiator
Kuznetsov with the much-less-valued Deputy
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LONG-WINDED AND PATIENT ADVERSARIES
Chief Chinese negotiator.
Chiao Kuan-hue
Chief Soviet negotiator,
Leonid Ilichev
Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev seems to have
signaled Moscow's adoption of such a course. This
will probably incline Moscow to shrug off minor
pin pricks and slights from Peking, while sharply
responding to major polemical attacks such as the
Chinese assault this past September on the West
German - Soviet treaty.
A policy of restraint and "coexistence" ac-
cords with the long-term Soviet hope that a post-
Mao China may produce a situation more to the
liking of the USSR. Moscow may dream that,
after Mao, China could disintegrate into squab-
bling regions or become preoccupied with internal
power struggles. More realistically, the Soviets
may hope that a post-Mao leadership will pursue a
more tempered policy toward the USSR and
avoid some of the excesses inspired by Mao's
personal animosity toward Moscow. An essential
element of such a long-term approach, however,
will be cot ',inued reliance on military strength.
Peking's development of advanced strategic
weapons will increasingly influence Moscow's out-
Special Report
look. The few public and private Soviet co:n-
ments on China's weapons program have tended
to belittle Chinese progress on the grounds that
China cannot threaten the USSR for many years.
The USSR appears to be calculating that its own
nuclear deterrent and, if its employment is neces-
sary, its pre-emptive capability, are adequate de-
fenses against a Chinese nuclear attack. Soviet
policy makers have probably concluded, however,
that Peking's acquisition of nuclear weapons will
make China even less susceptible to Soviet pres-
sure. Indeed, this concern seems to lie behind the
oft-voiced Soviet interpretation that Peking is
stonewalling in the talks in order to buy time to
push ahead in its advanced weapons program. In
any event, the Kremlin may be increasingly vexed
by pressure from Soviet hawks that it "do some-
thing" about Peking's bomb. The Soviets will also
have to wrestle with its impli rations for broader
Soviet policy in Asia as well as relations with
China.
Peking and Moscow now seem intent on
continuing the vague and unformalized accom-
modation that has emerged along the frontier
during the past year as a result of the talks. This
arrangement has reduced the concern of both
over escalation while requiring neither to concede
anything of its position on a frontier settlement.
The border situation, however, remains subject to
accidental confrontation, and either side can in-
crease tension along the frontier if domestic or
international politics so requires.
Neither side has given an inch on ideological
differences, and Moscow shows no signs of ad-
justing to Peking's great-power aspirations. Move-
ments toward "normalization of state relations"
have thus largely been atmospheric gestures with
little political content. Meanwhile, Moscow's con-
tinuing military build-up can only enhance
Peking's suspicions of Soviet intentions, while
Peking's progress toward a credible nuclear
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stepped-up Soviet effort to discredit the Chinese ative.
abroad. Thus, after a year of talking, the pros-
striking force increases the Kremlin's concern. pects for imminent military confrontation
Moreover, Peking's resurgent diplomatic activity between Moscow and Peking have been reduced,
and international gains may become a more but the basic factors producing continued and
significant concern to Moscow and trigger a perhaps heightened contention remain oper-
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