WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BELGIUM SEEKS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020046-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: September 11, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Belgium Seeks Constitutional Reviriorn
DSD FILE COPY
RETURN TO 1E-61
Secret
N9 664
11 September 19'0
No. 0387/70A
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BELGIUM SEEKS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
An oft-quoted cabinet minister's
complaint around the turn of the cen-
tury-"The Belgians, they do not exist"-
reflects a political problem that has been
assuming ever greater importance over the
last generation. When the great powers
createa Belgium in 1830, they threw to-
gether two populations with differing cul-
tural backgrounds, the Dutch-speaking
Flemirgs and the French-speaking Wal-
loons. With the awakening of Flemish cul-
tural consciousness, the now more nu-
merous Flemings have been demanding
equal status within the state, a demand
ultimately requiring that the old constitu-
tion be revised. In May and June of this
year, Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens came
closer than any other Belgian prime minis-
ter to achieving this elusive goal. He prob-
ably will continue the quest during the
coming legislative year, though he has not
revealed the tactics he intends to pursue
Tempers flare during Flemish
when parliament reconvenes next month. demonstration in Brussels in 1962.
Although the French- and Dutch-speaking
populations within the boundaries of modern Bel-
gium have coexisted since ancient times, it was
not until the end of the 19th Century that a
Flemish cultural consciousness began to develop
in earnest. In large part its emergence was a reac-
tion to the political, economic, and cultural domi-
nation of the French-speaking population, the
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Walloons, and the Frenchified Flemish upper
class, since the creation of the Belgian .state.
The Flemish struggle for equality was a slow
process during the first half of this century. The
Linguistic Law of 1932 for the first time estab-
lished the use of Dutch in Flanders and French in
Wallonia as the official languages of government
administration. Compulsory education in the sec-
ond national language was also required for the
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NETHERLANDS
un,plli.
WEST-
VLAANDEREN
GIIei l
Flea vsh-sl)enli ingv
S
,
UMBURG
N
1 FEDERAL
speaking
Province boundary
Remuininj; bilinponl
area
French-speaking
NAMUR 'v
or
GERMANY
German-\
speaking ?.1
+-~ LUXEMBOURG
Arlen ?
Luxembourg
first time that year. Dutch was raised to equal
status in the judiciary and military as well in the
late 1930s. The possibility that population shifts
could alter the primary language in any locale was
finally eliminated in 1963, when a series of four
Linguistic Laws drew a definitive boundary across
Belgium.
Demographic and economic changes have
complicated the drive for parity between the two
major communities. Because of a greater birth
rate, Flemings have outnumbered French-
speaking Belgians since the turn of the century,
and now account for about five of every eight
citizens. In contrast to the gradual decline of the
Walloon iron and steel industries, the basis of
Belgium's economic strength in the 19th Century,
Flemish commerce and industry have been pros-
pering and now provide the bulk of the national
economic wealth. For these reasons, the Franco-
phones have increasingly come to regard the
2 -
Special Report -2-
Flemish bid for equality as a drive to dominate,
Flemish
and a militant Francophone movement has
emerged demanding protection for Walloon inter-
ests.
Given the depth of the division between the
two major communities, it is perhaps surprising
that there has been relatively little civil strife.
There have been only a few riots associated with
the problem, and numerous mass demonstrations
did not lead to violence. But the potential for
civic disorder has always been present, and many
moderates believe this potential has increased in
the last decade with the emergence and growth of
militant political parties in both camps.
The struggle to accommodate the conflicting
cultural, economic, and political interests of the
two communities, once the postwar reconstruc-
tion was completed in the 1950s, became the
dominating political issue of the 1960s. This
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accommodation could only be accomplished
through revision of the constitution, a process
requiring the approval of two thirds of the two
houses of parliament. This approval has so far
been impossible to obtain because of the division
of the electorate into three major parties and a
host of minor ones, most of which cut across
ethnic lines. A succession of governments through
the 1960s could not find the required majority in
parliament for any reform package.
Stability Through ReJbrm
The first major reform effort in the 1960s
came shortly after passage of the 1963 Linguistic
Laws, themselves an important achievement.
Bickering in parliament finally led the leaders of
the three iargest parties in early 1965 'o discuss
the issues outside of parliament in a series of
"Round Table" meetings. Substantial agreement
was reached on many issues, but the meetings
foundered when the conservative, Brussels-based
Liberals, the smallest of the three parties, with-
drew because of disagreements over the future of
the Brussels region.
In 1966 a new government emerged, a coali-
tion of Social Christians (Catholics) and Liberals,
led by Social Christian leader Pierre Vanden
Boeynants, and a respite from linguistic quarrel-
ing followed in the form of a two-year truce
subscribed to by all major parties. This fragile
agreement broke down, however, in the face of
demonstrations by militant Flemish students at
the prestigious University of Louvain in January
1968. The government resigned the following
month when it was unable to agree on handling
student demands that a beginning be made on
The Belgian Parliament Before and After
the Elections of March, 1968
VALITION
PSC?69
PCB - Belgian Communist Party
PSB - Belgian Socialist Party
PSC - Social Christian Party
PLP ? Liberal Party
Special Report
VNP . Flemish National Party-Volksunie
FDF ? Francophone Democratic Front
F DF -RW - Coalition of Francophone Democratic
Front and Walloon Rally
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relocating the university's French-speaking de-
partments on a site in Wallonia.
The parliamentary election campaign in Feb-
ruary and March was dominated by the linguistic
issue. The small, militant nationalistic parties-the
Flemish Volksunie and its Francophone counter-
parts, the Walloon Rally and the Francophone
Democratic Front-trumpeted regional autonomy
within a new federal state structure; the three
major parties continued to uphold the principle
of seeking reform within the present unitary state
system. The major parties were obviously on the
defensive, however, and it quickly became appar-
ent as the campaign unfolded that their internal
unity was fragile.
To the surprise of few, the election on 28
March 1968 showed a remarkable growth in
strength of the militant national parties. The
Flemish and Walloon militants cornered 15.7 per-
cent of the popular vote, as compared with only
8.9 percent in the 1965 election. More impor-
tantly, these parties increased their seats in the
212-seat Chamber of Representatives from 15 to
32. These gains came at the expense of the major
parties; the Social Christians lost eight seats, the
Socialists five, and the Liberals one.
Although the elections left the major parties
in their traditional positior of strength, their lead-
ers were gloomy. The Social Christians emerged
from the contest with their Flemish and Walloon
wings functioning as separa?i.e entities having only
a tenuous loyalty to their national headquarters.
Regional centrifugalism in the other two parties,
although less strong than in the Social Christian
Party, inhibited incisive leadership. At the same
time, the major party leaders saw the elections as
evidence of an increasing polarization of the elec-
torate which could benefit only the small militant
parties. This fee,ing led to the conclusion that, as
indecisive as the March elections had been, an
effort to win a clearer mandate from the people
in a new election would lead only to further gains
by the minor parties.
Special Report - 4 -
The only chance at this point to achieve
constitutional reform lay in the formation of a
grand coalition of the three major parties, for any
combination of only two big parties would not
command the 142 seats in the Chamber-two-
thirds of the total-required for constitutional
amendments. Even a grand coalition was of
doubtful efficacy, for most observers were skepti-
cal that the leaders could enforce discipline, given
the ugly mood of recriminations prevailing in the
parties. In any event, the grand coalition was
never put to the test, for the Socialist decided
that they were too doctrinally oppos,J to the
Liberals to participate in any coalition with them.
The signs pointed, therefore, to the creation
of a weak caretaker government, which, while
formally charged with seeking constitutional re-
form, would in fact undertake no major initiatives
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toward this end. Still, the search for a viable
combination of forces proved quite protracted. It
was not until the end of June 1968-after the
longest interregnum in Belgian history-that Gas-
ton Eyskens, a moderate Social Christian, was
able to patch together a coalition with the Social-
ists. With 128 deputies, this coalition enjoyed a
majority, but lacked 14 seats of a two-thirds
majority.
By October, nevertheless, the Eyskens coali-
tion had drawn up a legislative program encom-
passing constitutional revision that was destined
to remain largely unchanged up to the present.
One major provision called for recognition in the
constitution that the country is composed of four
linguistic regions, the Dutch (Flanders), the
French (Wallonia), the bilingual Brussels area, and
the tiny German-language region in eastern Bel-
gium. The first two regions were also to be
granted "cultural autonomy," including such
fields as education, arts and letters, museums and
libraries, radio and television cultural activities for
youth, cultural relations between the communi-
ties, and, with certain restrictions, cultural rela-
tions with foreign countries.
The second major provision of the reform
package called for the creation of Dutch-speaking
and French-speaking linguistic groups in each
house of parliament. These groups were to have
the power to suspend parliamentary action on
any bill if three quarters of either group decided
the bill would be detrimental to the interests of
its community.
Along with constitutional reform, the
Eyskens government also drafted a program to
decentralize decision-making in economic devel-
opment. This program provided for the creation
of Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels sections in the
national Economic Planning Bureau, the creation
of an Economic Council for Brabant (which in-
cludes Brussels) alongside of the existing eco-
nomic councils for Flanders and Wallonia, and the
creation of regional development corporations.
Special Report -5-
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This economic decentralization program was
intended by the government as a concession to
the Walloons, who had long believed something of
this nature was required to combat their region's
economic decay. The government hoped that Wal-
loon members of parliament would support pas-
sage of the constitutional reforms, in which the
Flemings were greatly interested, in exchange for
Flemish support for economic decentralization.
Progress toward enactment of all these meas.
ures was glacial. They were subjected to the
scrutiny of special parliamentary committees for
months, while behind the scenes the power blocks
worked out new concessions and refinements. A
major stumbling block was the status of Brussels.
Historically and geographically a Flemish city,
Brussels in fact is heavily Francophone because of
its national role since 1830. Under the Linguistic
Laws of 1963, bilingual Brussels is defined as
comprising 19 urban central communes, while the
surrounding suburban communes remain legally
Flemish. As more and more Francophones moved
to the suburbs, they brought with them their
French language and culture, creating pressure to
expand the officially bilingual area of the capital
to include these communes. At the same time,
holding the line of the "French island" of Brus-
sels at 19 urban communes became a rallying cry
and a test for Flemings of all political stripes.
A second major problem involved the mech-
anics of passage. The economic decentralization
program could be passed in each house of parlia-
ment by a simple majority, which the coalition in
theory possessed, because such a program did not
require amending the constitution. But Flemish
deputies in both coalition parties refused to enact
the program until the way was clear for action on
the constitutional reform package.
The prospects of achieving a two-thirds ma-
jority on the constitutional reforms seemed as
remote as ever. The Liberals, left out of the
government at the Socialists' insistence and re-
fused even an unofficial role in drafting the
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legislation, threatened to boycott parliamentary
consideration of the package, an action that
would have denied the coalition a quorum. The
militant Flemish and Francophone deputies, on
the other hand, were certain to vote against the
package because each group felt the other had
been granted too many concessions. Finally, coa-
lition deputies from Brussels, particularly the
Brussels Socialists, might break party discipline to
vote against the bills because Brussels' plight was
overlooked.
By Easter 1969, several constitutional re-
form measures were reported out of the special
committees, where a simple majority sufficed.
But, rather than force a showdown on the floor
of either chamber, the government procrastinated
until the approach of the summer recess, thereby
reducing the politicians' appetite for protracted
haggling or their willingness to force the govern-
ment out of office.
By mid-June, the government increased pres-
sure on the Senate to act on constitutional revi-
sion by demanding that it remain in session
through August if necessary. In the Chamber,
meanwhile, it decided to move ahead on eco-
nomic decentralization. On 19 June, the decen-
tralization bill was passed after Eyskens promised
publicly not to submit the bill to the Senate until
that body had made progress on constitutional
reform. No amount of pressure, however, could
force the Senate to take action, and it too ad-
journed in mid-July.
By the time parliament resumed in the fall,
it was clear to Eyskens that he had reached an
impasse: he could not convince the opposition
parties to give their blessing to proposals on con-
stitutional reform in which they had been refused
any hand in drafting. Although the Socialists had
earlier refused to permit the opposition Liberals
to participate in the drafting process, Eyskens was
able to cajole his coalition partners by early Sep-
tember into accepting a series of extraparlia-
mentary discussions among representatives of five
Special Report -6
parties-the two coalition partners, the opposition
Liberals, and the two important militant parties.
These discussions, close in spirit to the Round
Table talks of 1964-65, would hopefully lead to a
compromise package of constitutional reforms to
which all parties would be committed.
The Committee of 28, popularly dubbed the
Eyskens Committee, began meeting in September.
it consisted of Eyskens, the two ministers for
community relations, and parliamentarians from
the five parties. On 30 October, to no one's
surprise, the three Volksunie representatives
walked out of the committee, arguing that their
party remained opposed to any constitutional
limitation on the rule of the Flemish majority. On
12 November, the remainder of the committee
had completed its final report. It was a statement
of agreement on principles, most of which had
been spelled out before, but it did not point
clearly toward detailed legislation. Most impor-
tantly, it failed to reflect any agreement on the
status of Brussels.
The problem of Brussels was then handed
over to a special commission, with largely the
same membership as the Committee of 28, amid a
rising tide of public debate. Some Belgians argued
that parliament should enact those compromises
already in sight; others believed that parliament
should enact a series of principles, leaving the
details to a later period when agreement might be
easier to reach. But the Volksunie and Liberals
reiterated their threats to deny a parliamentary
quorum on any legislation on the subject unless a
package covering all aspects-a "global" solu-
tion-were submitted. Several Francophone Social
Christian leaders demanded in mid-December that
Eyskens draft such a solution for presentation to
parliament as the price for their continued partici-
pation in the government. Although the special
commission considered several compromise sug-
gestions on the Brussels problem, it broke up
shortly before Christmas after 15 sessions without
reaching agreement.
The cabinet was diverted in January of this
year by other issues, chief of which was a wildcat
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strike in the Limburg coal mines, but Eyskens
continued his patient efforts, first to obtain agree-
ment in the cabinet on a global solution, and then
to obtain a two-thirds quorum in parliament. He
was spurred on by his Francophone colleagues,
who refined their threats to leave the cabinet by
demanding cabinet agreement on a global solution
by 31 January and submission to parliament no
later than 15 February. He missed the January
deadline, but on 15 February announced to a
surprised nation that the cabinet had unani-
mously agreed on a community relations pro-
gram.
The program turned out to be a broad-brush
formula that parliament would have to flesh out.
The keystone was to be Francophone agreement
to only minor changes in the Brussels situation in
exchange for Flemish agreement to ample protec-
tion of minority (Francophone) interests in the
government, including parity in the distribution
of ministerial portfolios and the right of either
linguistic group in parliament to block legislation.
The package would not please the Brussels
Francophones, but the cabinet may have cal-
culated that the opposition Liberals would not
dare to oppose such important legislation, which
the majority of Belgians, supported. The Liberal
leaders had just announced abandonment of their
parliamentary boycott, a decision many assumed
was taken with an eye toward communal elec-
tions upcoming in the fall of 1970.
Parliament did not begin to act until May.
On the 15th, Eyskens announced that he was
submitting to the Senate the economic decentrali-
zation bill passed by the Chamber the previous
June. At the same time, he was submitting a new
bill defining the geographic scope of the new
regional economic councils, a task left undone the
year before because of disagreement on Brussels.
The new bill would ensure that the six suburban
communes around Brussels would remain under
Flemish jurisdiction.
On 28 May, the Senate passed three of four
critical constitutional amendments, one estab-
Special Report
lishing the linguistic groups in both houses of
parliament, one prescribing parity in ministerial
portfolios, and a minor bill on subministerial cabi-
net posts. The important fourth amendment
failed because of Liberal opposition. This amend-
ment would have specified the size of the major-
ity in either linguistic bloc in parliament that
would be required to block proposed legislation.
The Liberals wanted a two-thirds majority, which
would give them virtual veto power. When the
Liberal proposal was rejected in favor of a simple
majority, the Liberals voted against the entire bill
and threatened to resume their boycott of future
consideration of legislation on constitutional revi-
sion.
Eyskens' fortunes seemed to take a sudden
turn for the better when, on 9 June, the Senate
French-speaking Walloons taunt Flemish demonstrator
in Brussels.
approved the basic amendment creating the Flem-
ish, French, and German unilingual regions, end a
bilingual Brussels area limited to the 19 urban
communes. Not only did the government parties
exhibit a heretofore unknown unity-only five
Socialist senators from Brussels voted against the
amendment-but the solid front of the promised
Liberal opposition failed to materialize. All but
one Flemish Liberal senator voted for the govern-
ment amendment. II the government parties
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could continue to maintain discipline, and if
Flemish Liberals would support them, the re-
mainder of the amendments could pass the Senate
and the entire program could pass the Chamber.
The limiting of Brussels to the 19 urban
communes evoked a quick response from the cap-
ital's Francophone community. On 25 June, a
hastily constituted "Committee of Public
Safety," including leaders frcm several political
parties, conducted a protest demonstration in the
center of the city. Attended by about 12,000
people, the demonstration demanded "liberty"
fo: Brussels and denounced "the iron collar" im-
posed by the political settlement. There was no
violence.
Shipwreck within Sight of Port
Eyskens was to be denied his success in
parliament. On 25 June, when the Senate was
passing the 13th and final amendment having
substantive importance for community relations,
the government fell two deputies short of a
quorum in the Chamber on an amendment con-
ceming the organization of the Brussels metro-
politan government. This lack of a quorum re-
sulted from a boycott of the proceedings by the
20 Volksunie deputies, who felt too many conces-
sions had been made to the Francophones, and by
45 Francophone deputies. These politicians in-
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cluded the Communists, the Walloon militants,
the five Brussels Socialists, and several Franco-
phone Liberals. The fate of the economi.- :cen-
tralization bill in the Senate, which had been
introduced in May and was then nearing a final
vote, was also endangered, for the Social Christian
senators threatened to vote it down in return for
the persisting Socialist defections on constitu-
tional amendments.
The decentralization bill finally passed the
Senate by a narrow margin on 2 July after the
Social Christian threat evaporated in a cloud of
bitter verbiage. The next day the bill went back
to the Chamber for final vote. The government
again failed to raise a quorum in the Chamber for
considering any of the constitutional amend-
ments, and these bills currently are in limbo as a
consequence. The government was able, ho,?-evc,,
to muster enough votes to pass the decentraliza-
tion bill with a last-minute change. Ironically, this
change involved deleting the definition of the
geographical boundaries of Brussels. The defini-
tion will now be accomplished by a royal decree;
the king presumably will decide according to the
advice of the prime minister and what he believes
to be the majority opinion in the nation. This will
likely be to limit Brussels to the 19 urban com-
munes, as the Senate had defined it in May.
Criticized by friend and foe alike, compared
unfavorably with other Belgian politicians past
and present, and frustrated repeatedly in hi. legis-
lative efforts, Eyskeiis has had ample justification
and opportunity to resign.
om-
ing as close to success as he did near the enu of
the last parliamentary session has enhanced the
stature of his Fabian efforts to compromise the
irreconcilable. Chances are that Eyskens hopes to
last out his government's mandate until 1972, and
that he intends to press onward iith constitu.
tional revision.
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Eyskens has not revealed his tactics for the
future, and he apparently has more than one
option open. With parliament due to convene
shortly after the communal elections in October,
he may resume the battle over revision where it
left off in Jul', using as leverage a threat to
precipitate parliamentary elections by resigning.
Because the militant nationalist parties are ex-
pected to do well in the communal elections at
the expense of the large parties, most observers
believe that cumulative and reciprocal damage to
the large parties would be the cater the closer
communal and parliamentary elections are to
each other. The threat of early parliamentary
elections, therefore, might goad the leaders of the
larger parties into greater pliability.
Eyskens could also choose, however, to let
the dust settle for some months, meanwhile
patiently striving for new compromises behind
the scenes. He may well find himself forced into
marking time, for there is no guarantee that his
jury-rigged scaffolding of political support tor the
revision and decentralization plans will not col-
lapse at any time. If his political framework holds
up, he may still opt to divert the nation's atten-
tion for a while to other pressing problems before
returning to revision. Chief among such problems
is the means of financing the country's dud, sys-
tems of public and Catholic schools.
This issue was a major domestic political
problem from the time of Belgian independence
until 1958, when the three major parties arrived
at a 12-year pact under which both systems re-
ceive state financial support. The pact expires this
year, and will most likely simply be renewed. The
pact has not generated much public attention so
far, and Belgian reaction to the religious-based
civil strife in Northern Ireland suggests the Bel-
gian public today has little stomach for such
controversy. Yet pact renewal could conceivably
provoke a new crisis of sorts between strong
Catholics, mostly in the Social Christian Party.
and the anticlericalists in the Socialist and Liberal
parties.
Special Report
If and when Eyskens returns to the battle
over revision, one of the first decisions he will
have to make will be whether to push for a new
compromise over Brussels-the point of conten-
tion which wrecked his plans earlier this year-or
to try anew to enlist Liberal support for his old
plans. These two alternatives need not be mu-
tually exclusive, but either by itself might suffice
to giv; his program the necessary support in par-
liament.
The Brussels question at this point appears
insoluble, and whatever compromise is most
palatable in parliament is likely to be the one
adopted and pursued by the government. In the
past year there has been no dearth of Brussels
plans floated by individuals in and out of pudic
life, and the Belgians' proverbial preference for
compromise should continue to generate other
schemes.
The quest to line up Liberal support for
revision and decentralization depends largely on
the extent of the party's unity. If it emerges from
the communal elections with its current tenuous
degree of unity, coalition strategists may con-
clude that the government bills can hope to pick
up support in parliament from dissident Liberal
elements, even though this strategy did not give
the government victory last spring. In the unlikely
event the Liberal image is improved by the elec-
tions, and its unity strengthened, Social Christians
would have to face again the task of trying to
convince their Socialist partners to admit the Lib-
erals into a tripartite coalition or, at least, work
with the Liberals in another Round Table con-
ference.
Some Belgian political commentators, des-
pairing of any solution at this time., bViieve that
constitutional revision is a task for future genera-
tions. If it should prove elusive in the near future,
the government and parties will have to continue
making such ad hoc adjustments in the country's
political, economic, and social structure as they
have been doing over the past few years. The
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gradual trend toward federalism will therefore tions and services. Deplorable as this is to many
continue, regardless of what happens in parlia- thoughtful Belgians, they profess to see no other
ment. The trend has already resulted in burden- way to accommodate the mutually antagonistic
some and wasteful duplication of public institu- Flemish and Franco communities
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