WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT HAITI: NO PRESENT, NO FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020040-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: August 14, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Secret
N2 667
14 Augu.;t 1970
No. 0383/70B
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HAITI: NO PRESENT, NO FUTURE
For the past 13 years President Francois Duvalier has ruled Haiti despotically. He personally handles all
major administrative matters. The country lacks effective institutions; it is devoid of the leadership and trained
personnel that could provide government services and continuity. Duvalier suffered a protracted illness last year
and his Meal th may be gradually weakening. A sudden termination of his brutal dictatorship-either through his
death or overthrow-would produce turmoil.
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On April 24-25 1970, Coast Guard commandant Octave Cayard, who was sup-
posedly loyal to Duvalier, led a futile rebellion following the arrests of several military
and civilian figures for alleged coup plotting. The failure of the mutiny probably will
discourage other military leaders from moving against the regime in the immediate
future. Contingency planning will continue, however, and a rapid deterioration in
Duvalier's mental or physical powers could ilispire a palace coup.
The extent of turmoil that will follow Duvalier's disappearance from the scene will
depend on the ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate power. Available evidence
suggests that when change does come, the succession will be controlled by the individual
leaders of one or more of the security forces-the army, civil militia, and secret police.
They are in the strongest position to act because they are armed and organized, and
because their men in the palace will be among the first to know if something happens to
Duvalier.
No matter who succeeds Duvalier, Haiti's troubles are not likely to be relieved. The
country lacks not only modern government institutions, but also labor, organizations,
professional associations, and a responsible press. In short, society is as lacking in
effective structures as the government itself.
Since Haitian independence in 1804, only
five of the 33 presidents have completed their
terms of office-three of these during the occupa-
tion by US Marines (1915-1934). Violence,
intimidation, and dictatorship have been con-
stants of political life. With few exceptions, those
who have acquired power have felt no responsi-
bility as public servants but have sought to grasp
power permanently while enriching themselves at
public expense. Consequently the pitifully poor
masses have remained illiterate, superstitious, and
apathetic.
The government of Francois Duvalier fits the
pattern. Since his accession to power in 1957, he
has crushed all sources of internal opposition,
including the Communists. He has purged and
divided the army, cowed the Roman Catholic
church, and subjugated all government oganiza-
tions to his personal whim. His fanatic concern
with political security and his indifference to
economic problems hive stifled government
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programs for economic development. As a result,
the standard of living of the Haitian people has
deteriorated steadily. Estimated per capita gross
national product has dwindled to aboit $100.00,
less than 20 percent of the Latin American
average. Exports of the principal agricultural
product (coffee) have declined. The government
has chronic budget deficits and often does not
pay its official debts.
Duvalier began his rule by weakening the
military leadership, which had played a dominant
role in almost every change of government since
independence. He systematically purged all com-
petent officers who might oppose him-including
the mulattoes who initially made up the majority
of the officer corps-and replaced them with his
own creatures. On one occasion, for example, he
sacked a dynamic, well-trained commander in Cap
Haitien who had gained the respect of the people
in his department, in favor of a dissolute non-
entity capable of neither action nor betrayal.
He also undercut military authority by
creating two counterforces, the National Security
Volunteer Corps (VSN) popularly known as the
civil militia, and a loosely structured investigative
unit known as the "Service Duvalier." Until this
year the 5,000-7,000-man militia was maintained
in a parallel but separate status from the regular
armed forces. Recently, however, Duvalier an-
nounced that vacancies within the military ranks
would be filled by militiamen. It is not clear
whether he plans a complete reorganization or
simply a token integration of these forces, but his
actions probably will have little effect on national
security. The militia is not organized, equipped,
or trained for major military operations. It has
never defeated an invading group with its own
resources, but it has assisted the army in patrol
and mop-up operations. Only one militia com-
mander, Zacharie Delva, has demonstrated un-
usual competence as the chief VSN trouble-
shooter for Duvalier.
Although H iti spends more proportionately
on defense (approximately 23 percent of the
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budget) than other Latin American countries, its
only effective military units are located in Port-
au-Prince. These include the Presidential Guard of
400 men, the Dessalines Battalion with 800 men,
and the Port-au-Prince police with about 800
men. The capability of these organizations, which
are directly under the command and supervision
of the President, contrasts sharply with that of
the remainder of the army, totaling about 5,000
men, most of whom are untrained and poorly
armed.
The "Service Duvalier," which consists of a
handful of Duvalier's favorites, is not a secret
police organization in the conventional sense.
During the mid-60s, when it was headed by Elois
Maitre and Luc Desir, it did acquire a sinister
reputation, but now its responsibilities consist of
interrogating political prisoners and fulfilling
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occasional investigative tasks for the President.
With Elois Maitre in disfavor at the Palace, the
Service Duvalier is nominally led by Luc Desir,
but it seems to have little if anything to do.
Recently Duvalier created a special staff consist-
ing of four cronies, including his personal phy-
sician and Legislative Deputy Luckner Cam-
bronne, to investigate the abortive coup attempt
of 24-25 April 1970. Cambronne and Finance
Minister Clovis Desinor appear to be the most
powerful civilian Ton Ton Macoutes in the gov-
ernment.
Duvalier supporters march through Port-au-Prince follow-
ing abortive Coast Guard revolt in April.
The Ton Ton Macoutes (Creole for "uncle
boogeymen") are a name for active Duvalier sup-
porters who receive special favors from the Presi-
dent and have been given carte blanche to do as
they wish without fear of interference from or
punishment by civil or military authorities. The
most feared group in H;!iti, they belong to no
organization and include cabinet members as well
as ordinary thugs and taxi drivers. They can bast
be described as a legalized Mafia whose sole mis-
sion is to maintain Duvalier ii' power.
Duvalier has erected a facade of constitu-
tionality around his regime. The legislature and
the judiciary, however, like all other organizations
and groups, are directly subservient to the Presi-
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dent. The Constitution of 1964, which designated
Duvalier "President for Life," contains no
provision for succession. All political parties
except Duvalier's Party of National Unity (PUN)
have been suppressed, and PUN exists in name
only, lacking even a paper organization.
No one within the government has the
strength to challenge Duvalier. Individual mem-
bers of the President's family, however, have
exercised some authority at various times. During
the past year personal rivalries within the Presi-
dent's family have resulted in the fall of in-
dividuals who once wielded power in the Haitian
Government. In December 1968 Duvalier's oldest
and reportedly his favorite daughter, Marie
Denise, returned to Haiti as private secretary to
her father, displacing Madame Yvon St. 'Victor, a
one-time presidential intimate and sister of Luc
Foucard, Duvalier's ex - son-in-law. Marie was
soon joined in Port-au-Prince by her husband,
Max Dominique, who in 1967 had been sentenced
to death for treason by a Military Tribunal and
had gone into exile in Spain. Dominiqu:, a former
member of the Presidential Guard, was officially
reinstated and appointed ambassador to France.
Madame St. Victor, Luc Foucard, and Elois
Maitre, former chief of the Secret Service (rep-
ortedly an enemy of Max Dominique), have lost
the influence they once had.
The standard of living in Haiti, long the
lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has become
still worse under Duvalier. It is said that Haiti's
gross national product is less now than it was at
the time of independence. The economic prob-
lems resulting from declining agricultural produc-
tion and only a limited growth in the small
manufacturing sector are too basic and severe for
any quick solution. Yet Duvalier, instead of
adopting constructive measures, has consistently
ignored the recommendations of international
financial organizations to eliminate corruption
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and implement fiscal and administrative reform.
Despite continuing pressure from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Duvalier has refused to
make a public accounting of the financial opera-
tions of the State Monopoly (Regie du Tabac). Its
revenues, estimated at $10-12 million per year,
are used to support his security apparatus and
regime favorites. Because of his unwillingness to
cooperate with international lending agencies,
Duvalier has been denied the benefits of external
assistance programs large enough to slow the
economic and social deterioration.
Since 1963, when the US suspended most
forms of direct aid to Haiti, assistance has been
limited to a few humanitarian projects (prin-
cipally malaria eradication and food distribution
programs), whose funds are channeled through
multilateral or private charitable institutions.
Haiti currently receives $3-4 million annually in
assistance from the US and is drawing disburse-
ments from the $7.2-million loan granted by the
Inter-American Development Bank. Haiti has
given no indication that it would utilize this
financial assistance to alleviate its basic economic
problems, however.
Opposition
After 13 years of absolute rule over a largely
illiterate society, Duvalier appears to have con-
vinced most people in Haiti that they are bene-
fiting from his rule even though by all objective
standards they are not. The few politically
sophisticated Haitians remaining in the country
probably are opposed to Duvalier and his
methods, but they are intimidated and disor-
gani;red. The masses, who have displayed a re-
markable endurance for suffering, will not easily
be shaken out of their apathy.
The opposition to Duvalier includes both
Communist and scattered non-Communist groups,
0 of which have met devastating reprisals after
any overtly hostile move. A number of exile
groups located in the United States, Canada,
Western Europe, the Dominican Republic, the
Bahamas, and Venezuela provide active op-
position of sorts. But the exiles are divided,
poorly armed, and for the most part untrained.
Individual emigre's enjoy almost no following
within Haiti, with the possible exception of
former president Paul Magloire. Magloire is a
Luxurious summer home outside the cs+ ud, as : 1)nt,asted with slums itt Port-au-:'once.
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financial mainstay of the Haitian Coalition, which
has between 200 and 300 members and is head-
quartered in New York. It is the largest of the
exile groups, but its activity has been declining,
and at the moment it appears moribund.
It is doubtful that any of the small exile
organizations could become a serious threat to
Duvalier without decisive help from a foreign
government. Military units from Port-au-Prince so
far have defeated all exile incursions, probably
because the exiles were poorly led and lacked
motivation and adequate support, and because
the average Haitian just is not interested in revolu-
tion. The most recent exile attempts against
Duvalier occurred in June 1969 when ex-Haitian
Army Colonel Rene Leon led ten men in an inept
bombing attack on the National Palace, doing
minimal damage, and in January 1970 when two
small exile forays from the Dominican Republic
fizzled.
Inside the country only the Communists
have demonstrated a capability for sustained,
though feeble, subversive activity. In December
1968 two minuscule parties, the United Haitian
Democratic Party and the Parly of Popular Ac-
cord, merged to form the United Party of Haitian
Communists (PUCH). After the merger there was
a definite increase in terrorist activity, although it
did not represent a threat to Duvalier. Following
some bombing attempts and the seizure of a few
small villages, a number of people who had been
to Communist countries were arrested. The gov-
ernment then picked up more than 100 persons,
including several leaders of the PUCH, for sub-
versive activities. The crackdown left the party in
a shambles, and there has been little militant
activity since mid-1969. Apparently the party is
undergoing a period of retrenchment and con-
solidation.
Although Duvalier's public position has been
consistently hard-line anti-Communist, his actions
have been highly pragmatic. Despite the recent
crackdown on Communist activities, a number of
intellectuals often reputed to be Communist
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oriented have been closely associated with
Duvalier throughout his tenure. The government
will arrest anyone possessing Communist propa-
ganda leaflets, but Communist books and
magazines are sold openly in Port-au-Prince book-
stores. Duvalier also continues to tolerate the
Polish Commercial Mission despite the low level
of trade between the two countries and reports
that the mission has served as a channel for funds
and communications between the PUCH and
Communist parties in Cuba and the Soviet Union.
These two countries provide what little out-
side assistance the Haitian Communists receive. In
the past, both countries have given instruction in
Marxist doctrine and guerrilla warfare to selected
exiles, and Cuba reportedly gave approximately
$70,000 to PUCH through the Polish Mission in
1969.
Radio Havana continues to broadcast in
Creole and French 14 hours a week, but there is
no evidence that the programs-which condemn
Duvalier and the support he is alleged to receive
from the United States-have any significant ef-
fect on the Haitian people. Broadcasts from both
Havana and Moscow play heavily on the theme of
armed revolution as the only solution for Haiti.
Duvalier probably will die in office rather
than step down voluntarily. Although at 63 he is
still an undisputed dictator, he probably has had
two serious heart attacks, the most recent in May
1969. He apparently was incapacitated for several
weeks, but he now seems to be functioning as
effectively as before.
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During May and June 1969 plans reportedly
were made by some military officers to establish a
junta immediately upon Duvalier's death. There is
no certainty as to the extent of plotting and
political maneuvering that took place at t:iat
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Octave Cazard, former commandant of the
Coast Guard and leader of abortive mutiny
in 1970
time, but in April 1970 several people were ar-
rested, including army Quartermaster General
Colonel Kesner Blain. Following Blain's arrest,
Coast Guard commandant Colonel Octave
Cayard, who reportedly had been involved with
Blain in the contingency planning, led about a
third of his men in an attempted coup on 24-25
April. For two days three cutters tried to
bombard the national palace, but did little
damage. The mutiny, which failed to attract army
support, quickly ended, and Cayard fled to the
US naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba.
Since the abortive rebellion, President
Duvalier has moved to prevent further dissension
within the Haitian armed forces. Although none
of the tactical ground units in Port-au-Prince par-
ticipated in the insurrection, Duvalier has evinced
his displeasure with the failure of the police to
ferret out alleged conspirators. Several officers
reportedly have been arrested, and last month the
government created a new position of deputy
chief of police for Colonel Frank Romain, who
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had earned Duvalier's confidence by routing exi'e
invasions in 1964 and 1968.
During the past year Duvalier also renewed
his efforts to Haitianize the Catholic Church. Al-
though the church as an institution is less influ-
ential in Haiti than in most other Latin American
countries and has remained generally aloof from
any active political or social action, about 60
percent of its clergy are of foreign origin. Since
1957 Duvalier has forced the church to conform
to his political objectives. In 1960 he forcibly
expelled the French archbishop of Port-au-Prince
from the country on apparently trumped-up
charges that he had been involved in student
protests against the government; in 1964 he or-
dered the Jesuits to depart. Nevertheless, a ban of
excommunication on Duvalier was lifted in
Aucust 1966 when, for the first time, a native
Haitian was appointed archbishop of Port-au-
Prince. The rapprochement, on Duvalier's terms,
signified an acceptance on the part of the Vatican
that there was no alternative to Duvalier.
I n spite of this normalization of relations,
Duvalier has continued to persecute foreign
clergy. I n September 1969 all members of the
Order of the Holy Ghost, only one of whom was
a native Haitian, were accused of collaborating
with Communists and forced to leave the coun-
try. These priests, who operated the College of St.
Martial, had b3en collaborating with suspect ele-
ments and were active in promoting discussion
and study groups among young Haitians. The
church continues to play an important role in
education by providing instruction to between
one third and one half of the children who attend
school in Haiti. Educational policy guidelines,
however, are established by the government; the
church schools must conform or risk retribution.
Although 75-80 percent of the population is
ostensibly Roman Catholic, voodoo continues to
exert influence in almost all spheres of Haitian
life. Consequently Duvalier has capitalized on the
ignorance and superstition of his subjects for his
own political advantage. He regularly compares
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himself to the ancient leaders of Haiti, as well as
to such noted Americans as George Washington
and Abraham Lincoln, often going so far as to
imply that he is their reincarnation.
As long as Duvalier rules, Haiti will remain a
one-man dictatorship of the most extreme
variety. His passing, however, probably will not
affect the lives of most Haitians. Present indica-
tions are that there will not be a blood bath, as
the struggle for power probably will be restricted
to those who exercise some authority over the
command structure and have access to military
hardware. The army probably will be in the fore-
front of the successor movement, but none of the
key personnel has demonstrated any special lead-
ership capabiliti^.s, and it would be sheer specula-
tion to designate anyone as a probable heir-
apparent. It is conceivable that the military would
be content with an administrative role and turn to
someone outside their ranks to serve as Presi-
dent
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