WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT POLITICAL CHANGE IN GUATEMALA: ORDER VS. VIOLENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 19, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020031-6
Secret
DIRECTORATE i,`P
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Political Change in Guatemala: Order vs. Violence
DSO copy
Iy`-~J~s~ Secret
N! 685
19 June 1970
No. 0375/70B
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"P'C' R 11"Y
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POLITICAL CHANGE IN GUATEMALA: ORDER vs. VIOLENCE
The inauguration of Carlos Arana as president of GUatciTlala Oil 1 July will mark both a
higl? point in the country's feeble democraric, record and a test of the forces of orderly
process.
Arana will be Guatemala's first freely elected president to receive the office from the
political opposition. Outgoing president Mendez Montenegro will be the first president to
have completed his term since 1951 and only the third in the country's history to have done
so. All legitimate forces have displayed a commitment to set new constitutional political
patterns and to break the country's traditional antidemocratic habits.
Arana's victory, however, represented a demand for greater go~'trnrnental effectiveness
against Communist terrorism; Arana came 'o national prominence by decinn:rting terrorists in
the northeast a few years ago. Communists have long anticipated that popular aversion to the
expected excesses of a right-wing government would provide them their greatest opportunity.
The re-emergence of a rightist terrorist force in the past month provides a grim backdrop to
the coming political change and has already dimmed hopes for peaceful progress.
The electorate, wearied by years of Commu-
nist terrorism and disillusioned by the bland
government of the Revolutionary Party, turned to
the anti-Communist champion, Colonel Arana,
whose promise of peace and order won him a
plurality in the elections on 1 March. Arana's
reputation as an effective lawman rests on his
eradication of guerrillas in the northeast between
1966 and 1968. In that operation he turned
armed rightist civilians against the guerrillas and
their suspected supporters, effectively ending the
strong Communist influence in the area. During
+: a same period, special units of the army and
police also launched an all-out attack on the sub-
versives, employing clandestine groups as assassi-
nation squads. The program of counterterrorism
was highly effective in disrupting the Commu-
nists' networks and bases and in inhibiting sup-
port from their sympathizers. The attendant wave
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of violence, however, also victimized many in-
nocents and evoked an international and domestic:
outcry. Stung by widespread publicity and criti-
cism, President Mendez halted the campaign in
March 1968 and sent Colonel Arana to Nicaragua
as ambassador.
Communist activity during the following
months was mostly organizational, although
sporadic hit-and-run terrorism created a con-
tinuing security problem. Beginni.ig last Decem-
ber, the Commur.1sts stepped up their efforts at
sabotage and assassination in an abortive attempt
to disrupt the elections. During the campaign
period the terrorists, with virtual impunity, at-
tacked and killed more than a dozen security
officials, a candidate for mayor of Guatemala
City, and a highly regarded editor of the coun-
try's largest newspaper. They caused damage
estimated in the millions of dollars in a series of
fire-bombings in the capital. On the eve of the
elections in March, they secured the release of a
guerrilla by kidnaping the foreign minister, and a
week later obtained the release of two others in
exchange for the US labor attache. In these cir-
cumstances, the electorate gave the incumbent
Revolutionary Party a no-confidence vote; it ran
second to the rightist coalition backing Arana.
The popular euphoria that resulted from fol-
lowing democratic processes and experiencing an
unprecedented opposition victory in an honest
election was short-lived. The nation was embar-
rassed and the world was shocked by the Com-
munists' brutal murder of the kidnaped West
German ambassador on 5 April after the govern-
ment refused to ransom him. Even the Guate-
malan public, which might have been inured to
brutality after a decade of terrorism, was stunned
by the event.
Mendez imposed a state of siege. Beyond
press censorship designed mainly to squelch criti-
cism of the government, however, only token
security measures were taken. Clearly Mendez had
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decided that it was not in his interest to tackle
the security problem. The security forces have all
but suspended their normal activities, construing
the administration's release of prisoners and other
measures that undercut their efforts as Mendez'
withdrawal from the battle against insurgency.
Mendez' overriding desire has been and remains
survival in office through his entire term, and he
is a practiced advocate of sitting tight to ride out
the storm. His motive for suspending animation
may also be political, as Arana and his followers
believe, because any successful anti-Communist
activity would ease the insurgency problem for
the new government.
The unwillingness of the Mendez govern-
ment to move against the extreme left goaded the
right again into wreaking its own vengeance. In
late April, the extreme right's response to the
violence of the left and the apathy of the govern-
ment was revealed by the discovery of the first
mutilated victim of a new counterterror organiza-
tion. The new group, calling itself "Ojo por Ojo"
(Eye for an Eye), appears to be made up of some
former members of the army's clandestine assas-
sination squads as well as extremist civilians in
Arana's camp. Ojo por Ojo has been responsible
for as many as a dozen recent murders, whose
victims had been tortured before death.
The rightist revenge for Communist ter-
rorism, directed partly against the leftist intel-
lectual community, has evoked outraged denunci-
ation from university and other liberal circles.
Following the assassination of an economics
professor early this month, the university's
governing council issued a declaration attacking
government security forces for their passivity in
the face of continuing violence. It called on the
army to fulfill its constitutional role and to put
an end to the terrorist acts. Other organizations
associated with the left have issued similar state-
ments condemning threats by Ojo r,or Ojo re-
ceived recently by a number of their members.
The obvious concern in these liberal circles is
that the current wave of rightist terrorism is a
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prelude to the policies of Arana's government.
Arana apparently condones the Ojo organization's
actions as a necessary expedient now but claims
he will implement a strictly legal assault on the
terrorist problem after his inauguration. Although
he probably can rein in most of his extremist
associates, his willingness to do so probably will
depend on the level of Communist activity during
the first days of his administration.
Arana i's. the Insurgents
Arana takes seriously his mandate to elimi-
nate the insurgency problem, and his enemies as
well as his supporters expect a full-scale anti-
Communist campaign after he takes office. His
more rabid backers and his opponents assume
that Arana will pursue the same program against
the Communists that he used earlier, that is, more
widespread employment of Ojo-style tactics.
Arana repeatedly has forsworn illegal meth-
ods and has assured the public that he has a plan
of action within the law, although he declines to
reveal it. In his contacts with US officials, the
president-elect has discussed the need for better
training for the security forces, better police
laboratories and technical equipment, more per-
sonnel, better maintenance of arms, nd improved
communications and coordination of intelligence.
He is contemplating the establishment of an "elite
police corps," a small, trained outfit whose work
would focus exclusively in the terrorist field. His
advisers have spoken of using military tribunals to
try accused subversives in order to bypass legally
the established judicial system, which is weak and
corrupt.
Arana feels under great pressure to produce
immediate results, but transforming the present
security forces and judicial system into com-
petent, efficient organizations is at best a long-
range process. His major assets on 1 July when he
begins his presidency are the good will of the
armed forces and their desire to cooperate with
him. Their past performance, however, has
demonstrated their limited abilities. Moreover,
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continual personnel shifts and enforced inaction
during the preinaugural period have thrown the
security organizations, particularly the police,
into administrative chaos.
It seems unlikely, Arana's statements not-
withstanding, that he or his advisers have as yet
constructed a legal plan for quick results. Arana's
directness and his evident earnestness may lead
hint to make an immediate appeal for public
support for, and patience with, his administra-
tion. Since entering politics last year, Arana has
observed and commented on Guatemala's serious
deficiencies in the social sphere. He promises to
fight ignorance, poverty, and disease, so as to
remove the causes of violent political dissidence.
He probably hopes to play on these themes to
gain acceptance and cooperation among those
sectors of the public that are apprehensive and
fearful that his may be a tyrannical regime.
Counterguerrilla Activity in Guatemala City
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The moderation and social concern dis-
played by Arana as candidate and as president-
elect have not erased his image as "the butcher of
Zacapa" held by many, and the Ojo's activities
have added to the fear among the leftist opposi-
tion. Even the vice president elect, one of Arana's
closest advisers, has expressed concern over the
rightist terrorism and the characterization in the
international press of the new leadership as
"assassins."
The presentiment that the Arana administra-
tion is a threat prevails in the intellectual com-
munity, the opposition political parties, the press,
and labor organizations, as well as among Arana's
obvious targets, the guerrillas and terrorists. Their
foreboding will lead them to interpret Arana's
actions and policies in the worst light, and if he
proves thin-skinned, the gap between the opposi-
tion and the government will grow.
Communist terrorism since the murder of
the West German ambassador in April has con-
tinued at a relatively low level. The Ojo murders
have claimed no victims among the hard-core ter-
rorists and therefore have probably only a mar-
ginal relationship to the Communist pull-back.
The Communists may have an arranged or im-
plicit "deal" with the Mendez government to hold
off terrorism in exchange for the virtual retire-
ment of the security forces for the rest of his
term.
It is clear that the insurgents hope to prove
that the vaunted anti-Communist Arana can con-
trol them no better than past presidents. It seems
likely that they will attempt to challenge him in
the first days of his presidency and that they will
attempt a terrorist act aimed at gaining wide
publicity, such as the kidnaping or assassination
of a prominent Guatemalan or a foreign diplomat.
Unless the Arana administration can achieve an
unprecedented breakthrough against the clan-
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I f the Communists launch a terrorist
campaign early in July, Arana is likely to find the
legal weapons at his disposal as ineffective as they
have been in the past. In office, as now, he may
find it difficult to resist reverting to methods he
has seen work well in the past. In any event, the
strength of his resolve to resist it should become
apparent soon after he takes office.
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destine terrorist organizations, this kind of hit-
and-run action will be almost impossible to stop.
The Communists are believed to have the assets
for a fairly prolonged period of terrorist activity
in Guatemala City.
The bulk of leftist terrorism is perpetrated
by the fanatical Rebel Armed Forces (FAR),
which is made mainly of young, rabid leftists
who consider violence the only method of un-
doing Guatemala's feudalistic socioeconomic
structure. They are said to believe that their per-
sistent provocation of the security forces will lead
to a bitterly harsh repressive period, which in turn
will so alienate the general public that active
popular support for the revolutionaries will result.
The appearance of Ojo and the public outrage and
revulsion that its activities have provoked are
probably seen by the FAR as encouraging de-
velopments.
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Less devoted to violence but hardly averse to
it, the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) has
been under pressure for some weeks to avenge the
recent deaths of two party members. The PGT,
reportedly with some cooperation from the FAR,
has been concentrating on US targets,
plans to assassinate
US Embassy officials have failed only because of
increased security iimaasures in effect at the
Mission. The Communists identify US representa-
tives with the Guatemalan security forces and
with the "repressive" government policies because
of US military training of and aid to the security
forces.
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The brutal cycle of score-settling between
the left and right now in progress presents a grim
outlook for Guatemala and for the US Mission
there. Continuing Communist surveillance of US
officials makes plain the terrorists' determination
to put pressure on the government partly by
attacking the Americans. Arana and his ministers
will be under the constant threat of assassination.
f he democratic process begun by the con-
stitutional transfer of power will come under
heavy strains, and the prospect is for difficult
days ahead for the new government and for the
steadily polarizing society.
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