CARLOS MARIGBELLA'S MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 24, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Carlor Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla
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N2 1042
24 April 1970
No. 0367/70A
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CARLOS MARIGHELLA'S MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA
The recent success of Latin American urban terrorists in such activities as the
kidnaping and ransoming of foreign diplomats, as well as their proven ability to
create at least limited disorder, apparently has prompted the ever-pragmatic Fidel
Castro to accept and give some endorsement to urban terrorism as a revolutionary
strategy. Triconrinental, a magazine published by the Cuba-based Asia, Africa, Latin
America Peoples Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), is currently circulating a
handbook for the revolutionist called theMinimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. It was
written last June by Brazil;an terrorist Carlos Marighella, who was killed by police in
November. (In 1967 Tricontinental published letters and pictures received from Che
Guevara when he was in Bolivia). The manual is clearly designed to foster terrorist
activities in Latin America's growing urban areas. It is too early tc tell whether the
handbook will be regarded as important as or with the esteem accorded the writings
on rural guerrilla activities by Che Guevara and Regis Debray, but its publishers
claim that "it will become one of the principal books of every man who, as a
consequence of the inevitable battle against the bourgeoisie and imperialism, takes
the road of armed rebellion."
Handbooks on revolution in Latin America
have been published before. Che Guevara pub-
lished several articles on rural guerrilla struggles in
the early 1960s, and his Guerra de las Guerrillas
was once considered the basic book on guerrilla
warfare in Latin America. Regis Debray, who is
still languishing in a Bolivian jail for taking part in
Guevara's ill-fated Bolivian adventure in 1967,
later became the primary spokesman for the rural
guerrillas with his Revolution Within the Revolu-
tion, published by the Cubans in May 1967, and
two earlier papers.
Guevara's death in October 1967, however,
forced the Cubans to reappraise the efficacy of a
rural-based guerrilla struggle. Moreover, domestic
considerations, including the national objective of
producing a ten-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970,
compelled the Cubans to reduce their hemi-
sphere-wide revolutionary activities.
This re-evaluation probably led to the con-
clusion that the typical Latin American peasant,
because of his conservative nature, is not a solid
base on which to develop revolutionary awareness
and antigovernment activity without considerable
ideological preparation at least at the present
time. Growing urban populations, especially their
student and labor sectors, and many young
priests, however, are already seedbeds of unrest
and antigovernment activity. It is only natural,
therefore, that the revolution should be advanced
in the urban areas until the rural peasants are
sufficiently indoctrinated to administer the final
coup de grace to the "establishment." The
Cubans can argue, therefore, that their original
emphasis on rural guerrilla activity is correct but
may need original impetus from the urban areas.
This point was made by Marighella.
In addition to this logical extension of rev-
olutionary theory, urban-based guerrilla activity is
not wholly at odds with the Castro-Guevara-
Debray approach. Debray stated that the "cities
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are the graveyards for revolutionaries; city party
backers tend to abandon guerrilla warfare when it
suits their purpose; it is a mistake for guerrilla
movements to become overly dependent on urban
support and leadership." On the other hand, the
mobility and small size of the extra-party military
organization of the urban terrorist groups were
considered useful by Debray. Moreover, he main-
tained that by sharing common experiences in the
guerrilla struggle, the urban recruits would grad-
ually be integrated into the rural environment and
would gain an appreciation of peasant problems
while the peasants themselves were improving
their ideological understanding of revolution.
The author of the Minimanual Carlos
Marighella, is really an excellent authority for a
possible new aspect of Cuban revolutionary strat-
egy. In the first place, the circumstances of his
death (he was ambushed by Sao Paulo police)
have made him something of a revolutionary
martyr. Perhaps, some of the charisma surround-
ing Marighella resulted from accounts of his cap-
ture by Brazilian police in 1964. For instance,
Luis Carrera in January 1969 wrote, "Five agents
of the secret police opened fire on a robust man,
age 56, who was hit
twice in the lungs. Blood
comes out of his mouth,
but he manages to
scream, `You are going
to kill a manly Commu-
nist."' The fact that Mari-
ghella is already dead
and cannot fall victim to
some unglamorous end is
an asset. He was always
viewed by Castro as one
of the most important
revolutionary leaders in
Latin America and,
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despite his demise, his organization is still consid-
ered promising by the Cubans. Formerly a top
leader of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB),
Marighella submitted his resignation in 1966 to
form his own more militant group, which
achieved notoriety through terrorism, robberies,
bombings, airliner highjackings, and the kidnaping
of US Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick last Septem-
ber.
Marighella was dedicated to the idea of
violent revolution. He may have been recruited by
the Cubans from 1962 to 1964 when they had
diplomatic representation in Brazil. He was re-
sponsible at that time for contacts between the
Brazilian Communist Party and the Cuban
Embassy. On leaving the party lie indicated his
distress at the conservatism and lack of revolu-
tionary dedication of the regular party-a theme
repeatedly stressed by Fidel Castro. Marighella
said, "I am ready to take part in the revolutionary
struggle with the masses but never to play a wait-
ing game in bureaucratic politics pending its con-
sideration....There is a lack of revolutionary
impulse, a revolutionary conscience which is
generated by struggle."
Marigliella rep.;ated his position in Havana in
August 1967 at the Latin American Solidarity
Organization (LASO) conference. He stated that
the Brazilian revolution would be against "tile
common enemy-American imperialism," and
that the way to unify revolutionary movements is
through armed struggle.
In February 1968 lie issued a document out-
lining the objectives and modus operandi of a new
revolutionary organization dedicated to "action
now" through the recruitment and training of
guerrilla fighters and the eventual formation of a
people's liberation army. LASO's political line
was adopted; a complete break with the PCB was
announced; and a loosely structured organization
was advocated.
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In August 1 968, Marighella published
another document in Cuba on tactics and strategy
of guerrilla warfare, wlii,h he dedicated to Che
Guevara. Basic to this strategy is the "existence of
a small nucleus of combatants." The ideological
struggle must be made known to the people in a
vastly bold, confident, and widespread manner,
with a view to ensuring the political and revolu-
tionary support of the masses. Moreover, the
guerrilla forces "must have proper training, which
begins with the careful selection of men, who
should come in particular from the workers' and
peasants' sectors." Eventually the elements of this
stage, it was contended, would lead to a revolu-
tionary army of peasants and workers, joined by
students and intellectuals.
In December 1968, Marighella produced his
"Message to the Brazilians," which was published
in Granma, the official organ of the central com-
mittee of the Cuban Communist Party on 1 Feb-
ruary 1969. In it he spelled out the tasks of his
"revolutionary" government. It was in fact a call
to arms, advocating the elimination of all North
American interests. It called for a prolonged war
to be launched in the blood of students, in the
action of the clergy, and in workers' strikes.
Moreover, it urged guerrillas to capture police and
military personnel to be exchanged for political
prisoners.
Subsequent information indicates that
Marighella was planning attacks against Americans
as early as 1968 in order to make the Brazilian
population aware that there were persons willing
to fight against US imperialism and to provoke
the US Government into intervention in Brazil (a
continuation of Guevara's "many Vietnams"
theory). Kidnaping of important persons, both
Brazilians and Americans, was advocated in 1968
with the objective of demoralizing the govern-
ment and securing the release of important
prisoners.
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In September 1969, Marighella was inter-
viewed by a correspondent from Paris Front. In
answer to a question on the continental aspects of
his revolutionary strategy Marighella replied, "We
must respond to the global plans of North Ameri-
can imperialism with a global plan for Latin
America. We have ties with the Latin American
Solidarity Organization, as do many other revolu-
tionary organizations on the continent, particu-
larly those in neighboring countries that are strug-
gling in the same direction as we are. And of
course, it is our duty toward Cuba to free it from
the imperialism encirclement, or to lighten the
burden on it by fighting everyv.'liere else. The
Cuban revolution is the vanguard of the Latin
American revolution, and that vanguard must
survive."
Marighella's latest document, the Mini-
manual for the Urban Guerrilla, was written in
June 1969, five months before his death. The
direct link between Marigliella's thoughts and the
Guevara-Castro-Debray thesis is provided in the
introduction, which is taken from the resolutions
of the LASO conference: "Tile duty of every
revolutionary is to make revolution." Further-
more, he reiterates his pronouncement that the
function of urban guerrilla warfare is to "de-
moralize and distract the enemy forces, permit-
ting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla
warfare, which is destined to play the decisive
role in the revolutionary war." He adds that
presently the men and women chosen for urban
guerrilla warfare are "workers, peasants that the
city has attracted as a market for manpower and
who return to the countryside indoctrinated and
politically and technically prepared, students,
intellectuals, and priests. This is the material with
which we are building-starting with urban guer-
rilla warfare-the armed alliance of workers and
peasants, with students, intellectuals, and
priests."
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Brazilian Generals Examining Terrorist Damage
The article defines the urban guerrilla as a
man who fights the military dictatorship with
arms, using unconventional methods. "He is a
political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, a
tighter for his country's liberation, and a friend of
the people and freedom." The urban guerrilla is
opposed to and attacks the "government, the big
capitalists, and the foreign imperialists, particu-
larly North Americans." Thus, the urban guerrilla
in order to exist must aim at the "physical liqui-
dation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed
forces and the police" and expropriate govern-
ment resources and those belonging to capitalists.
The M.inin: anual provides detailed guidance
for slliping, ambushes, hijacking of aircraft,
executions, riots, sabotage, assassinations, strikes,
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and work interruptions as well as the occupation
of factories and schools, and cites a variety of
preferred targets including banks, local businesses,
and US-owned companies. Terrorism, Marighella
says, "is an action the urban guerrilla Must ex-
ecute with the greatest cold-bloodedness, calm-
ness, and decision."
Of particular interest, especially at the pres-
ent time, is Marighella's discussion of execution
and kidnaping as weapons of the urban terrorist.
As examples of execution, the manual cited the
killing of a North American spy (the assassination
of a US Army captain in Brazil): of an agent of
the dictatorship (opposition political figures in
Guatemala); of a police torturer (tile Murder 01'
the chief' of the Montevideo police quick reaction
unit on 13 April 1970 by the Uruguayan
Tupanlaros); of a fascist personality involved in
crimes and persecutions against patriots: and of'a
stool pigeon, informer, police agent or police
prOVOcatetlr. In 111a11y eases, according to the
article, these executions should be carried out by
a solitary sniper operating in absolute secrecy.
Kidnaping is described as "Capturillg and
holding in a secret place a poli -e agent, a North
American spy, a political personality, or a notori-
oas and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary
nlovenlcnt." According to the Minimu,u,al, kid-
naping is used to force tlle exchange or the libera-
tion of' imprisoned revolutionary comrades. or to
force the suspension of torture in the jail cells of
the military dictatorship. The kidnapings of' US
Ambassador Elbrick and the Japanese consul
general in Sao Paulo were used for these purposes.
The communique issued by the terrorists follow-
ing the Japanese consul's abductioll, for example,
stated that the act was committed "to obtain the
freedom and ensure the physical integrity of sonic
political detainees who are in the prisons of Sao
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Paulo .... We would not have taken this attitude if
there was no extreme necessity to save the lives of
some comrades whose physical condition has be-
come alarming."
The kidnaping of noted nonpolitical persons
is also advocated inasmuch as the ensuing public-
ity can generate propaganda for the guerrilla
cause. The kidnaping of North Americans resident
in Brazil or visiting there is also considered useful
since it publicizes the involvement of US imperi-
alism in the country.
The kidnapings of political personalities thus
far-the US ambassador to Brazil, the Japanese
consul general in Brazil, the Paraguayan consul in
Argentina, the US air attache in the Dominican
Republic, and the US Embassy labor attache and
the West German ambassador in Guatemala, have
apparently been carried out by what Marighella
described as a "firing group." This group consists
of no more than four or five persons and con-
stitutes the basic urban guerrilla organizational
unit. It plans and executes urban guerrilla actions,
obtains and guards arms, and studies and corrects
its own tactics.
According to Marighella, "No firing group
can remain inactive waiting for orders from
above. Its obligation is to act." Moreover, any
single urban guerrilla who wants to establish a
"firing group" can do so. This organizational
structure leads to free initiative and security. Two
"firing groups," separated and sealed off from
other firing groups, make up a "firing team."
Marighella concludes his article with a
lengthy treatise on guerrilla security and the seven
"deadly sins" of the urban guerrilla: inexperience,
boastfulness, vanity, exaggeration of numbers,
precipitate action, poor tactics, and poor plan-
ning.
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By maintaining good security, by sustaining
pressure or, the police and armed forces, and by
propagandizing governmental failures, Marighella
says the urban guerrillas will not only preserve
themselves but will also win the support of the
people. As this support grows, the rural guerrilla
war will develop rapidly and a solid infrastructure
will be created. This group will be composed of
peasants, who know the land; of students, who,
although politically crude and coarse, have a
special talent for revolutionary violence and have
plenty of free time on their hands to spend on
revolution; of intellectuals, who spread the rev-
olutionary call and influence the people; of
churchmen, who have the ability to communicate
with the people; and of women, who have demon-
strated unmatched fighting spirit and tenacity. In
1969, these processes were under way and there
were reports that Marighella was preparing to un-
dertake rural guerrilla activity in conjunction with
the urban effort already in progress.
Fidel Castro in Animated Conversation with the
Brazilian Revolutionaries at the Havana Airport
The Minimanual appears to represent a logi-
cal extension of the Guevara, Castro, and Debray
revolutionary thesis. The already-widespread
publicity of the various kidnapings and terrorist
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activities as well as the publication of the article one who "takes the road of armed struggle."
in Trfcontinental may result in its wide reader- Marighella, at least, maintains that to be a
ship. It is conceivable, therefore, that the docu- "terrorist is a quality that ennobles any honorable
ment may become a principal statement for any- man."
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