WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT FINLAND PREPARES FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2009
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 20, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
DSB F
r ~Y
RET::~~
61
Finland Prepares for Parliamentary Elections
bOCUI1T BRANCH
~~ Secret
..
ma NOT DESTROY
N! 675
20 February 1970
No. 0358/70A
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During the past five months representatives of Finland's eight political parties
have been crisscrossing the nation in an attempt to gain support in the parliamentary
elections scheduled for mid-March. At issue is the record of the two center-left
coalitions that have governed Finland since 1966. The burden of defending their
performance has fallen on the Social Democrats, who, as the largest party in both
coalitions, have twice held the prime ministership. The performance of the other
major coalition partners, the agrarian Center Party and the Communist-dominated
Peoples Democratic League, also is being debated, however. Political polls forecast a
shift away from the parties in power, but the necessity to gain Moscow's acceptance
of any Finnish coalition would seem to rule out any significant change in the
government that will take office after the March elections.
A record three million Finns will have a
chance to express their opinion of four years of
popular front government when they go to the
polls on 15 and 16 March. In the face of the
doubts held by many political observers at home
and in other Western countries that a government
coalition including the Communists could work,
the Finns have succeeded in carrying out a wide
variety of economic and social reforms under the
popular front's auspices and have lived through
perhaps the most stable parliamentary term in
Finland's history.
Considerable prejudice against the Commu-
nists had to be overcome for this achievement to
be realized. At the birth of the republic in 1917,
made possible by the rapid collapse of Russia in
the wake of the October revolution, the Finns
were aware that their independence rested on the
weakness of the Bolsheviks rather than on their
sincere subscription to the principle of self-
determination. This was underlined when civil
war broke out early in 1918 between the bour-
geois "whites," openly backed by imperial
Germany, and the socialist "reds," surreptitiously
backed by Soviet Russia. As the "reds" were
forced back toward the Soviet border, their ra-
dical wing captured leadership of the cause, and
after their defeat, the radicals became the nucleus
of the Finnish Communist Party, founded in Mos-
cow in 1918. For the next quarter of a century
the Finnish Communists, based in the Soviet
Karelo-Finnish region athwart Finland's eastern
border, launched propaganda and infiltrated
agents to subvert the bourgeois republic.
In 1944, following Finland's overwhelming
defeat at the hands of the USSR, the Finnish
Communists, as a "democratic" party, were al-
lowed to re-establish themselves in their home-
land and were invited to take part in the govern-
ment. This honeymoon lasted until 1948, when
the Communist minister of interior advised
Paasikivi, then president, that a Communist take-
over was in the works. With the example of
Czechoslovakia fresh in their minds, the army and
police swiftly nipped the planned coup in the bud
and, following parliamentary elections that year,
the Communists were sent into political exile,
which was to last 18 years.
During the first half of this exile Finland was
governed by a "red-green" coalition of the Social
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Democratic and Agrarian (subsequently Center)
parties. The Social Democrats themselves had
been in political exile during the first decade of
the republic's existence because of their identifi-
cation with the losing "red" cause in the Civil
War. Their willingness to accept the bourgeois
republic, as well as their status as the nation's
largest political party firmly grounded ill the
trade union and cooperative movements, pro-
tected the Social Democrats during Finland's
brief flirtation with some of the elements of
fascism in the early 1930s, and these qualities
finally convinced the parties on the right that
they would be a reliable coalition partner. Even
while the Social Democrats were gaining respecta-
bility on the right, however, they were subjected
to constant Communist efforts to infiltrate and
subvert the labor movement, and were labeled as
"social fascists" or "social traitors." The ire of
the Soviets and the Communists was particularly
aroused by the Social Democrat's energetic sup-
port of the struggle against the USSR between
1939 and 1944. After the Finns were defeated,
the Soviets made sure that the Social Democratic
Party's chairman, who served in the all-party coa-
lition during the war, was tried on charges of
being "responsible for the war" under the terms
of an ex post facto law that was contrary to the
Finnish constitution but was enacted under So-
viet pressure.
In the immediate postwar period, the Social
Democrats were fervently wooed by the Commu-
nists, who formed a Peoples Democratic League
hopefully as a vehicle for their joint efforts. Ex-
cept for a small minority on the far left, the
Social Democrats refused to give way to these
blandishments and instead stubbornly fought th'
Communists' efforts to take over the labor move-
ment. After the Communist setback in 1948, the
Soviets renewed their attacks on the Social Demo-
cratic leadership. By a combination of threats and
bribes, the USSR brought about a split in the
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party and trade union movement, which resulted
in the formation of the splinter Social Democratic
League. With the cooperation of' the Agrarian
(Center) Party led by President Urho Kekkonen,
the Soviets succeeded in exc!uding the Social
Democrats from the government from 1958 .to
1966.
The Agrarians, representing the more pros-
perous segments of' the Finnish rural population,
had been a junior partner in nearly all of the
nation's prewar governments. Only after the other
bourgeois parties had discredited themselves in
Soviet eyes by refusing to heed Urho Kekkonen's
wartime plea for peace with Moscow was the road
clear for the Agrarians to move up to national
leadership. The image of Kekkonen's party was
enhanced by the success of its efforts to resettle
the Finns displaced by the loss of Karelia to the
USSR and to return the economy to normal after
completing payment of heavy postwar repara-
tions.
Kekkonen, as prime minister during most of
the period from 1950 to 1956 and as president
since then, concentrated his efforts in the area of
foreign policy, and gained the reputation, war-
ranted or not, as the only Finn who could deal
with the Russians. By association, this reputation
was extended to Kekkonen's Agrarian (Center)
Party generally, and as a result, the post of for-
eign minister virtually became the party's prop-
erty. The Agrarians were not reluctant to use
their position as guardians of the so-called Paasi-
kivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line-neutrality
friendly to the Soviet Union--to act as a judge of
the reliability of their major competitors for the
non-Communist vote, the Social Democrats and
the conservative National Coalition Party. At the
same time the Agrarians entered into competition
with the Communists for the title of' the party
most useful in facilitating good relations with
Moscow.
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Despite successes in the political wars, the
Agrarian Party leadership, and particularly Presi-
dent Kekkonen, soon realized that the balance
was gradually going against it. The primary reason
for this was the erosion in the party's constitu-
ency as a result of Finland's transformation from
a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial
one. Not only were Finns moving off' their farms
into provincial towns, but there ensued a great
migration from the poorer, traditionally Agrar-
ian-and Communist-north and east to the more
prosperous scuth and southwest, areas of tradi-
tional Social Democratic and conservative pre-
dominance. In an effort to project an image that
would have more appeal for uprooted Agrarian
adherents now in the cities, the party in 1965
changed its name to the Center Party.
A second reason for the shift away from the
Center Party was the success of the Social Demo-
crats and Communists in refurbishing their image.
Persons in the Social Democratic leadership who
were obnoxious to the Soviets either retired or
resigned, and an "opening to the left and to the
east" was espoused. The party not only strove to
bring its one-time members in the splinter Social
Democratic League back into the fold but also
extended feelers to the Communists and radical,
in the Peoples Democratic League. The leaders of
the Social Democratic Party attempted in addi-
tion to present a more positive image in their
relations with the Soviet Union and advocated a
more activist approach in carrying out Finland's
neutral foreign policy.
The Comnnunists responded affirmatively to
the Social Democratic initiatives, thanks to the
rising influence of a new generation of leaders
forming the liberal wing of the pat ty. Aware that
old Communist appeals were increasingly irrele-
vant to the conditions of Finnish society, the
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liberals brought about a shift of emphasis in party
doctrine from violent, revolutionary change to
gradual reforms through parliamentary means.
Cooperation with all "progressive" groups was
sought, and to this end, election alliances were
made with the splinter Social Democratic League
throughout the country. Approaches to the Social
Democratic Party were unavailing because of the
latter's standing policy against forming election
alliances. The Social Democrats displayed greater
willingness, however, to cooperate with the Conn
munists in other areas, especially in the splintered
trade union movement, than at any time since
1948.
The damping down of disputes on the left
half of the political spectrum, combined with an
appearance of respectability and of renewed initi-
ative resulted in a landslide for the Social Demo-
crats. In the 1966 elections they picked up 17
additional seats in Parliament, climbing back from
their 1962 low point, and they increased their
support by 44 percent, or nearly 200,000 votes,
while the vote for all parties increased only
70,000. The only other party to pick up seats in
Parliament was the Social Democratic League,
which did so at the expense of its electoral al-
liance partner, the Communist-dominated Peoples
Democratic League. After the Communists saw
how cleverly their junior partner had turned elec-
toral alliances to its advantage, they vowed that
the number and terms of such future alliances
would be more rigorously controlled to yield
greater benefit to the Communists.
THE PAASIO GOVERNMENT, 1966-1968
President Kekkonen, concerned about the
power position of his Center Party, called on the
Social Democrats, as the largest party and the
only true victors in the 1966 election, to form the
broadest possible coalition, including the Conmiu-
nists. The way for such an idea, unthinkable only
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Parliamentary Seats
by Election Districts, 1970
Lapland
9
1JG0 1970
L. _.1 loss
Vaasa
19
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urku-Pori
(north)
13
I JU h)
UV
Central
Finland
11
13
Hhme
(south)
20;5`
Helsinki
22
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Oulu
18
Kuopio
11
Mikkeli
10
North
Karelia
8
Kymi
15
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a short time earlier, had been carefully prepared
by the President in the years immediately pre-
ceding the election. In a series of addresses he
deplored the divisions in the nation resulting from
he 1918 Civil War and the isolation of the Social
Democrats and Communists, representing halt' the
electorate, from the center of power. Some ob-
servers of the Finnish political scene believed that
Kekkonen was, through an act of consummate
statesmanship, attempting to make amends for
the rancor his own actions had created during the
postwar period, but most believed that Finland's
master politician had merely seen the handwriting
on the wall earlier than had his contemporaries.
In any case Social Democratic Party chair-
man Rafael Paasio agreed to become prime min-
ister, and after more than two months of rugged
negotiating, put together a coalition including the
Social Democrats, Center, Peoples Democrats
(two of whom were Communists), and the splin-
ter Social Democratic Leas:,,. The Center Party
occupied the Foreign and Defense ministries. It
agreed to give up the Interior Ministry to the
Social Democrats, moreover, only if the police
and border guard were subordinated to the minis-
ter of defense acting as "assistant" to the minister
of interior. The Social Democrats reached into
their ranks of technicians outside Parliament to
staff the key ministries of Finance and Education,
in which areas they intended to carry out wide-
ranging reforms. As for the Communists, only
ministries of secondary importance were offered,
and each of these positions was backstopped by a
Social Democratic or Center appointee to moni-
tor Communist activity.
For much of its first year in office the Paasio
government devoted its energies to adjusting to
the new political line-up. It soon became apparent
that Paasio himself was no leader, despite his
years of service in the party and Pa.!ianlent. He
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was unable to
establish good working relations with either Presi-
dent Kekkonen or the Soviets. Alarmed at the
frittering away of the party's opportunity to
prove itself, younger Social Democrats pushed
through a resolution that no man could serve
simultaneously as party chairman and prime
minister. Paasio, uncomfortable as prime minister,
opted for retaining his party post and resigned
from the government in early 1968 fo;lowing the
election of President Kekkonen to a third six-year
term.
THE KOIVISTO GOVERNMENT, 1968-1970
To replace Paasio the Social Democrats
named Mauno Koivisto, a political unknown from
the cooperative and workers' saving bank move-
ment, who had been drafted in 1966 into the post
of minister of finance. Koivisto, with the advan-
tages of a working-class background, a lack of
identification with any group in the party, rela-
tive youth, and good looks, proved to be a skillful
minister, carrying out a budget reform and a
successful devaluation in late 196''. lie also dis-
played a refreshing candor in his relations with
the public, was fluent in both Swedish and Rus-
sian, and seemed to be acceptable to Kekkonen
and the Soviets. All these qualities created a cer-
tain euphoria in the party, and lie was soon being
touted as presidential timber in 1974. In an effort
to cut Koivisto down to size, the Center Party
demanded that, in addition to presidential hope-
ful Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, the new
cabinet include a third presidential hopeful, the
former prime minister and chairman of the Center
Party, Johannes Virolainen, as minister of educa-
tion. By so doing the Center Party hoped to take
over an area where the Social Democrats had
earned considerable credit by introducing a com-
prehensive school reform, closing the sharp divi-
sion between the academic, technical, and voca-
tional courses of study in the secondary schools,
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Composition of Parliament and Government Coalition, 1968-1970
Center Party 50 (5)" N9 -T CCA. . 55 (6)' Social Democratic Party
and making university admission available to a
larger share of the school-age population. Besides
the shifts brought about through jockeying be-
tween the Social Democratic and Center parties,
the Koivisto cabinet was expanded to accommo-
date the Swedish Peoples Party, which left the
opposition because it believed that the interests
of Finland's Swedish-speaking minority would be
better se.ved if its principal political exponent
were in the coalition.
During its term in office, the Koivisto gov-
ernment has devoted nearly all of its energy to
transforming the economy. In the wake of the
1967 devaluation, a broad range of reforms in
fiscal, monetary, wage, price, income, and em-
ployment policy have been introduced. The
thrust of these reforms has been to contain price
inflation, promote private domestic investment,
reduce government unemployment assistance, and
promote labor mobility through retraining. The
reforms are also aimed at phasing out marginal
agricultural production and reducing surpluses,
encouraging industrial diversification and export
promotion, separating wage agreements from the
cost-of-living index, increasing housing construc-
tion in urban areas, removing barriers to trade,
and promoting closer economic relations with
Swedish Peoples Party 12(1)*
Liberal Party 8
National Coalition Party 26
Total number of seats
200
Finland's Nordic neighbors. With the assistance of
numerous bright, young Social Democratic tech-
nicians and the strong backing of President
Kekkonen, Koivisto has been able to chalk up a
remarkably successful record of accomplishment
in a relatively short period of time.
COALITION SHORTCOMINGS: PROBLEMS
FOR TILE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS
The coalition's record has been marred, how-
ever, by instances of failure. In some cases these
could not be helped, but in other cases they
stemmed from Koivisto's political inexperience.
The most nagging problem has been the unem-
ployment rate, which soared to 4.6 percent in
mid-1968, the highest figure in a decade, and
which has tapered off only gradually since then.
The Social Democrats have been attacked not
only by the opposition but also by the other
parties in the coalition as insensitive to the needs
of the people. Despite this criticism, Koivisto has
persisted in his policy of reducing government
assistance through the dole and public works,
hoping that the unemployed who are concen-
trated in the poorer agricultural and forest areas
of the north and east will decide to migrate to the
more prosperous, labor-deficient industrial areas
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of the south and southwest. Unfortunately, once
the rural poor pull up roots, they tend to keep
moving until they reach prosperous Sweden,
which now has employed nearly 100,000 Finns.
If this trend persists and the birth rate continues
to drop, Finland's total population could eventu-
ally show a net loss at a time when its economy
needs labor.
Another area of controversy has been Koivis-
to's identification with the aim of full participa-
tion by Finland in the proposed Nordic Economic
Union (NORDEC). At first the other political
parties in and outside the government were con-
tent to let Koivisto carry the ball on this proposal
in the belief that it would never get off the
ground. However, once the project began looking
feasible, the Communists, under pressure from
their conservative wing, began attacking th-. idea
as inimical to Finnish-Soviet relations. In addi-
tion, Foreign Minister Karjalainen, with the back-
ing of the Center Party, set about to torpedo the
project because he was piqued that Finland might
gain a foreign poll y success not directly attrib-
utable to his own efforts. Koivisto, enraged at
these eleventh-hour betrayals, threatened to pull
Finland out of NORDEC negotiations, resign
from office, and place the issue before the voters.
The outrage expressed both at home and in the
other Nordic countries at this indiscreet display
of political squabbling over an issue vital to the
interest of the whole Nordic area forced Koivisto
and his adversaries; to backpedal and restore grad-
ually the status quo ante. In the process Finland
and its leaders came out looking pretty foolish.
A third area of dispute has been the govern-
ment's agricultural policy. The nation is burdened
with a butter and grain glut caused by agricultural
subsidies enacted under Center Party sponsorship.
The Social Democrats have advanced nearly every
expedient to reduce these surpluses short of des-
troying them, but these proposals have been
Special Report -7
blocked by the Center Party. The agricultural
reforms agreed on-reducing land under cultiva-
tion and adjusting prices paid to farmers-are long
term in nature, and the continued growth of
agricultural surpluses meanwhile has become an
acute embarrassment. Fcr its part, the Center
Party continues its attack on Social Democratic
policy, even resorting to the argument that
studies released to the press showing that mar-
garine produce less cholesterol than butter are
part of a socialist plot against the farmers.
OTHER PARTY POSITIONS
CENTER PARTY
In addition to agriculture, the Center Party
has dusted off foreign policy, and particularly
relations with the Soviet Union, as an election
issue. Despite the protests of the other political
parties that the principles of Finland's policy as
expressed in the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line are
universally accepted. tke Center Party persists in
touting its own skit'., in advancing Finland's inter-
ests. Thus, it has pointed out that the favorable
response to the Finnish initiative on the European
security conference and the selection of Helsinki
for the opening of the strategic arms. iialitation
talks (SALT) are proof that Center Party strategy
cn b2ha;f of Finnish neutrality has received inter-
national r^zcgnition.
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A new issue has been developed for the
Center Party by Education Minister Virolainen in
the debate over reform of the Universities. In an
attempt to pander to the youth, which has be-
come bored with the Center Party, Virolainen,
with silent Communist backing, came down hard
for the principle of "one man, one vote" in ulni-
versity administration. If adopted, this would
mean that the universities would be turned over
to the students, who have an edge of ten to one
over the faculty. The Social Democrats have de-
nounced this stand as sheer opportunism, and
with the aid of the parties on the right they
would probably squelch the proposal if it were
ever to come to a vote. Still another issue, welling
up from the Center Party's grass roots, is dissatis-
faction with the broadcasting policies of the state
radio and television. In the eyes of Center Party
voters, as well as of supporters of right-wing par-
ties, the Finnish Broadcasting Company, under its
new Social Democratic director, is too left wing,
both in its presentation of news and documen-
taries, and in its willingness to satirize such
shibboleths as patriotism, motherhood, and re-
ligion, and to slip in items not suitable for
children. The Social Democrats have responded to
these attacks only by pointing to bourgeois
dominance of the press and publishing media.
The Communists have been silent in the elec-
tion campaign Until quite recently. This is not so
much a reflection of their satisfaction with the
policies of the coalitions in which they have par-
ticipated as the result of a split between the
party's liberal and conservative wings. Tension
between the two factions built up throughout the
early I 960s as the liberals gradually occupied
positions of influence in the party and modern-
ized its program. These differences were inten-
sified by the liberals' condemnation of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. The extent of the
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0. K. , let's try one more time -- for the sake of the child.
grhingi,, .5'un ,,nnl. 9 Jarruan' /971)
split was not revealed to the public, however,
until the party congress last April. At that time
the conservatives walked out in protest against
the liberal composition of the party's central
organs and thereupon began organizing pa,a!;el
party organizations of their own to lay claim to
Communist loyalties. The Soviets, alarmed at thy
possible demise of a major West European Coln-
illllllist party-the only one to sit in a govern-
ment-forced the adversaries to negotiate Until a
compromise was reached. The two sides calve to
grudging agreement in January, but neither side
has any confidence that the arrangement will last
beyond the election. Many believe that the
damage done to the party and its front, the Peo-
ples Democratic League, is already too great to be
repaired before the elections, and that a con-
siderable number of the League's supporters will
stay home in protest.
Only now are the Communists developing a
program. For the most part they are drawing on
the arsenal of charges developed by the conserva-
tives in their attack on the liberals' participation
in the center-left coalition. The essence of their
argument is that the government is spending too
much, forcing a rise in taxation, and yet is not
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spending enough to obtain increased pensions,
more housing, and greater state control over or
participation in such fields as banking, insurance,
and medicine. In addition, the Communists
charge the Social Democrats with sel'.ing out to
the bourgeoisie by their failure to tax corporate
profits more heavily, to carry out a thorough-
going tax reform that would place heavier bur-
dens on the wealthy. or to introduce industrial
democracy by giving employees a greater voice in
running their places of work.
Many of the same arguments w'e repeated,
but with different emphases, by the conservative
National Coalition Party. Thus, in their interpella-
tion of the government in Parliament last fall, the
conservatives attacked the imbalance in public
finances, the failu: ? of the government to solve
agricultural and unemployment problems, higher
taxes, and "creeping socialism." At the same time
the conservatives denounced as excessive most of
the controls imposed on the economy in the fight
against inflation and called for increased military
expenditures. Koivisto's reaction to these incon-
sistent demands has been low key; he has pointed
out that structural economic changes are costly
and long term, and that the government is trying
to minimize their harmful side effects.
"ris 1 h
"' I
National =~'
/ ~
Coalition Party
f( d Kaivisto
'
Special Report
The on.!y other party to attract national at-
tention has been the radical rightist Rural Party,
the brainchild of former Center Party member
Veikko V anamo. The Rural Party mustered only
enough votes in 1966 to get one s,,-at in Parlia-
ment, but by aiming den ngogic appeals to the
electorate in both the countryside and the cities,
its share of the vote jumped from 1 percent in
1966 to 7.3 percent in the 1968 local elections.
Vennamc also ran in the 1968 presidential elec-
tion and scored an impressive 1 1.3 percent as a
result of his no-holds-barred campaign aimed at
President Kekkonen. The Vennamo phenomenon
has refused to disappear, and as seen in two
special elections last fall as well its in political
polls, the party's strength continues to grow, to
the dismay of the other parties. The Rural Party
particularly draws support from the "backwoods"
Communists and supporters of the Center Party,
who have become alienated because they feel
party leaders based in Helsinki are willing to
desert party principles to gain ~, place in the
government. The party is irresponsible and has no
program except to attack the government con-
stantly. During the presidential campaign,
/ennamo even went so far as to call for revision
of Finland's eastern frontiers. For obvious reasons
the Rural Party has been regularly denounced by
Moscow as a "revival of fascism;" and harmful to
continued good Finnish-Soviet relations.
POLITICAL TRENDS AND POSSIBLE
OUTCOME
The attitude of the Soviet Union is decisive
to the outcome of the March election. If it were
not for Finland's geographic location, the trend
to the right noted since 1966 in such barometers
as the local elections of 1968 and numerous pub-
lic opinion polls would probably result in a bour-
geois victory and a right-center or right-socialist
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Poll
3/4.
IU/(66
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1.0
1.3
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13.11
17.0
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00
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0,0
21.7
1U.0
160
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11.0
11.5
40
too,() 100.0 100,0
coalition government. Mosco x, however, over the
years has taken upon itself the task of passing on
the acceptability oi' different Finnish political
combinations. No matter how the electorate
votes, Finnish politicians realize that the right-
center alternative, which would include Ven-
namo, would not I`: tolerated by the Soviets,
while the right-soc .,a list combination, even with-
out Vennanio, would also be repugnant. Thus, the
Finns are limited to choosing from a center-left
combination of varying breadth, an all-left gov-
ernment, an all-party coalition, a one-p=rrty
minority government, or a government of non-
party technicians. The last three options are
chosen usually in periods of national or parlia-
mentary crisis, and an all-left government would
net be possible, as it would not have a parliamen-
tary majority behind it. The most likely conibina-
tion to emerge from the 1970 election, therefore,
will be a Tenter-left combination similar to the
present one, with variations expanded slightly to
include the Liberal Party or diminished slightly to
exclude the Swedish Peoples Party.
Complicating the picture is the void sur-
rounding the post of prime minister. Some ob-
servers believe that the Center Party, as the largest
single. "bourgeois" party, would be given the man-
date for forming a goverrinicnt, despite its antici-
pated electoral losses, if the five "bourgeois" par-
ties between them managed to gain a "majority"
in Parliament. In such case, the most likely candi-
dates would be the old war horses, Virolainen and
Karjalainen.
On the other hand the Social Democrats will
probably remain as the largest party, regardless of
ideology, and the only coalition member likely to
come out of the March election with its party
base intact. Thus, they are very much in the
running for leadership of a new coalition. The
party's choice of candidates for the prime minis-
ter's post, however, is limited. The incumbent,
Koivisto, has already made it clear that he has no
stomach for the frequently ad honiinern style of
political infighting practiced in Finland, and he
has stated for the record that nothing wil! make
Will happier than to leave his post to return to the
job of Governor of the Bank of Finlaod. Koivis-
to's public statements on othor subjects have con-
sistently demonstrated that he means what he
says.
On the other hand, there are no obvious
successors to Koivisto. The ambitious minister of
ind;'stry, Vaino Leskinen, is despised within his
Social Democratic Party as well as generally for
blatantly toadying to Moscow's wishes after
having once been a leader of the party's anti-
Soviet right wing. The most popular man in the
party and the architect of its 1966 victory, Kaarlo
Pitsinki, has been unable to persuade the Soviets
that he is politically reliable; thus blocked from
political advancement, he has withdrawn from
active political life to become the nonpartisan
governor of Uusimaa Province. Socialist intel-
lectuals, such as parliamentary foreign affairs
committee chairman Pekka Kuusi and political
Special Report - 10-
SECRET
20 February 1970
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020010-9
 Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020010-9
SECRET
scientist Pentti Viitta, and bright young bureau- therefore, that the reluctant incumbent may be
crats such as national labor mediator Keijo drafted to continue as prime minister to enable
Liinamaa and state secretary Paul Paavela, have him to reap the credit when his policies bear fruit,
made no enemies, but at the same time they have thereby promoting his chances in the 1974 presi-
nu political base within the party. It is possible, dential election.
Special Report - 1 1 - 20 February 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/08/14: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500020010-9